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Foreword
Małgorzata Mazurek, Columbia University 
The pursuit of profit, accompanied by acquisitiveness and avarice, has never been 
the exclusive domain of capitalism, as Max Weber pointed out almost a century 
ago, arguing that it could be found throughout the world in any epoch, whether 
among Chinese officials or Roman aristocrats, pirates or modern peasants. Jerzy 
Kochanowski tells the story of the pursuit of profit under state socialism, some-
thing that many would see as a contradiction in terms. And yet – argues the 
author – organized, profit-oriented black markets were an organic part of the 
communist era.
In the course of World War One, and later during World War Two, much of 
what had previously been considered the legitimate pursuit of profit became clas-
sified in Poland as spekulacja, or profiteering: a morally condemned, politically 
risky and illegal mode of enrichment at the cost of others. In many post-1918 
European democracies, the specters of profiteering and hyperinflation loomed 
as large as those of radical right- and left-wing ideologies. Taking this lesson into 
account, during, and most of all, after the second world war, many European 
nation states introduced food rationing and price controls which, they hoped, 
would protect the consumer purchasing power of their citizens. In the occupied 
territories of East Central Europe, however, where the predatory extraction of 
human and material resources and the violence of war had led to mass starvation 
on a much greater scale than in the West, the black market offered salvation from 
the occupier’s state intervention. 
In the Warsaw of 1945, as in many European cities of the time, the female 
street vendor symbolized the rebirth of life amidst the ruins and rubble, where 
the “wind carried russet dust from the ruins onto bread, sausages and fruit, and 
made street vendors wipe the foodstuff with an alarmingly dirty rag.” One should 
not forget that the postwar reconstruction went hand in hand with ethnic cleans-
ing and anti-Semitism, historical themes which Jerzy Kochanowski explores 
elsewhere. In 1949, Załma Gerber, a butcher sentenced to a fine of 500 000 zloty 
– or a two-year work camp imprisonment – for overcharging, wrote in his ap-
peal to the state Special Commission for Combating Fraud and Corruption: “I 
find it unjustifiable that I have been sentenced on the basis of an accusation by 
a single client. After all, everyone knows that Jewish shops are not welcome in 
local society. […] What makes the severity of the penalty so unfair is the fact that 
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I have already lost my life’s work because of the war and the time I had spent in 
concentration camps.”
In Poland and other East Central European states, consumer self-welfare and 
the black market undermined the communist welfare state project well beyond the 
period of postwar reconstruction. As the food shortages dragged on, despite the re-
peated attempts of government to buy social peace through pro-consumer policies, 
profit-oriented activities continued to be part of daily experience. This was due not 
only to flaws in the planned economy, but also because, striving to hold onto their 
power, communist officials continually restrained and criminalized market mech-
anisms related to supply and demand as illegal profiteering. Thus, state socialism 
fought “speculation” as much as it reproduced it. 
Jerzy Kochanowski portrays these profit-oriented, illegal self-welfare activi-
ties in defiance of state-imposed social welfare as a game. These shenanigans, he 
argues, lasted half a century, resulting in a pro- and anti-profiteering “sinusoid” 
that eventually peaked in 1989, when profit-making was confirmed not only as 
a social, but also political norm. The author of Through the Back Door: The Black 
Market in Poland 1944–1989 makes it clear that the institutions designed to deal 
with black markets were in fact helpless. They did not determine reality; they 
merely reacted to it. Yet in no way was this game a matter of resistance by a heroic 
society to a villainous one-party state. Rather, the black market was the result of 
a complex interplay, in which the boundaries between the public and the private, 
the state and the individual, the legal and the criminal, were often blurred. As 
Paulina Bren and Mary Neuburger have noted, elsewhere in socialist Eastern Eu-
rope, developments in the sphere of consumption proved that the “confounding 
binaries of ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ were in many respects far more complex than 
under capitalism, and certainly more overtly political.”
 Today’s historiography on state socialism still carries imprints of the Cold 
War mindset. Many normative assumptions, idealizations and negative ste-
reotypes of communism or the free market remain unarticulated or taken for 
granted. History, especially in today’s East Central Europe, has been a hotbed of 
political claim-making. Historical narratives are created with the aim of estab-
lishing yet another edifice of the one-and-only truth, a new gateway to a right-
eous past. In this world of political passions, stories of everyday life that shed 
light on mundane details in specific contexts and which show a concern for his-
torical precision are much needed. Jerzy Kochanowski’s is a book that delivers 
just such a complex and ethnographic representation of the ordinary. Its great 
virtue is its perspective: through the eponymous “backdoor”, we zoom in on the 
countless individuals who participated in everyday profiteering, smuggling, and 
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barter. Rather than pinpointing the essence of the black market – a futile un-
dertaking if we accept the idea of history as changing reality – Through the Back 
Door describes the myriad ways in which the profit-oriented informal economy 
shaped the lives of ordinary people. 
Indeed, the historical geography of profiteering in communist Poland is as 
complex as it is fascinating. While much has been said about the social inequali-
ties created by the state socialist economy and its shadowy underbelly, the black 
market, we learn here a great deal about the regional diversity of postwar Pol-
ish society and its economy. Kochanowski’s spatial history of communist Po-
land leads us to that affluent mountain resort, Zakopane, where a dollar-based 
private tourist sector successfully challenged, if not supplanted, the official one. 
We visit port cities, those traditional hives of illegal money and commodity ex-
change. We also become acquainted with provincial socialist-era “speakeasies,” 
where illegal alcohol was produced and sold on a mass scale. Finally, we get a 
tour across East Central Europe, following cross-border trade routes including 
the “cosmetics-cum-clothing” pathway to Romania, the “crystal glass and hard 
currency” channel between Poland and Yugoslavia, and the “linen trail” to Hun-
gary. In the 1970s and 1980s, these established routes flourished and were further 
extended. Towards the end of communism, cross-border trafficking, often one 
way to cover the cost of summer vacation, became a truly global affair with its 
own complex know-how and logistics, based on shared knowledge, which was 
passed on by word of mouth. Through the Back Door we uncover this fascinating, 
arcane world, gripped as if following a detective yarn. The transnational centers 
of tourist trading – the Polenmarkt on the Mexicoplatz in Vienna or Romanian 
beaches – turned into commodity exchanges for socialist goods reveal the true 
scale and wealth of the Soviet Bloc’s black markets. 
It is always tricky to attempt a single-cause explanation of why communism 
fell, or why it lasted as long as it did. Jerzy Kochanowski chooses not to venture 
into these muddy waters, but he does leave us some clues. If we were to picture the 
East Central European counterpart of the Western “entrepreneur” (in the parlance 
of the 1980s neoliberals) – an individual both resourceful and creative, perhaps 
what would appear before our eyes might well turn out to be a woman laden with 
bags and swathed in a peasant shawl: the ubiquitous “baba with veal,” the villager 
that sold meat to urbanites. Although this familiar figure disappeared with the fall 
of communism, she remained an icon of popular and shrewd profit-making. This 
book gives the baba more than just an engaging contextualization – it gives her 




1.  Terms and Methods 
“During the war one could get anything at all”, reminisced the Polish painter 
Franciszek Starowieyski, “but once the socialist shambles began its reign, even 
trivial things became unavailable. Very quickly people realized that socialism was 
a force of “desertification.” “What will happen in the Sahara once the socialists ar-
rive? They will run out of sand,” ran a popular joke that did the rounds in 1945, 
when it became clear how quickly everything was disappearing and falling apart, 
once socialism took hold.”1 This book is dedicated to all the efforts undertaken 
by post-war Polish society to irrigate the “socialist desert” and squeeze from it as 
much as possible. Bearing in mind that most of the oases and water reserves and 
oases had been nationalized; Poles were obliged to engage in a complicated, and 
usually illegal, game playing with the state. This went on for almost half a century.
1.1  What Color was the Black Market?
This book does not aspire to be an economic, sociological or anthropological 
analysis. It aims at an interdisciplinary (albeit history-focused) reconstruction of 
various behaviors, mechanisms, phenomena, practices, processes and strategies 
united under the shared umbrella of the term “black market”. These mechanisms 
and strategies were unusually multilayered; they varied in time and geography. 
They reacted instantly to external and internal circumstances. Black market play-
ers spoke their own language and had a distinct set of values. They were involved 
in the black market sometimes purposefully and exclusively for profit, and some-
times under duress and against their will.2 As with any other mass phenomenon, 
with this one also there are controversial and debatable issues, starting with the 
terminology and the methodology; these require some clarification.
No state can completely control its citizens and their economic life. No so-
ciety consists solely of those who put the common good above the individual 
one. The economy of a state often brings to mind a river that at times dips un-
der the surface, its flow becoming subterranean. Its depth, the strength of the 
current, the type of river bed, fauna and flora of the underground flows (to stay 
with the fluvial terminology) depend on many factors and look different in every 
1 Franciszka Starowieyskiego opowieść o końcu świata czyli reforma rolna, written down 
by K. Uniechowska, Warszawa 1994, p. 132.
2 See: M. Kosewski, Ludzie w sytuacjach pokusy i upokorzenia, Warszawa 1985, pp. 12–73. 
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country; this does not make it any easier for researchers. This much is clear both 
from the variety of terms used to describe it (Poland’s black market economy has 
been variously referred to as the “gray sphere”, or shadow, black, second, parallel, 
hidden, informal, unofficial, secret, unobservable, unregistered, or unquantifiable 
economy), and also from the absence of a universally satisfying definition. While 
trying to create one, some reach for moral yardsticks and others for legal, institu-
tional, statistical (especially if they are able to register the black market activities) 
or, as a last resort, ideological criteria. Regardless of the perspective adopted, the 
term “black market” is used to refer to the production and exchange of goods or 
services conducted for profit (whether monetary or not) outside of formal insti-
tutions (also implying that it remains outside of legally binding regulations) and 
unaccounted for in the gross national product.3
Everywhere in the world the gray sphere faithfully accompanies the official 
economy. It always has its own, often endemic, characteristics dependent on the 
economic and social structure, tradition, and legal system. However, one can as-
sume that in countries where the free market system is established and devel-
oped, the gray sphere is mostly about avoiding taxes and taking advantage of 
illegal labor. Criminal activities, such as selling drug and weapons, the trade in 
fissile material, and human trafficking are a different matter. These tend to hog 
the headlines and bring enormous profits but at the same time they barely influ-
ence the everyday life of an average Frenchman, German or Finn.
The average citizen of any “people’s democracy”, whether a Pole, a Russian or 
a Romanian, did not care much about the black market in tanks or uranium, but 
wanted to know how and where they could get shoes, gas, furniture, and pots 
(and what to put in the latter), since the supply of even the most ordinary goods 
could never be taken for granted. To have money in one’s purse or wallet was 
3 The Second Economy in Marxists States, ed. M. Łoś, Houndmills–London 1990, pp. 2–4; 
E. Klinkmüller, G. Leptin, Terminologische Anmerkungen zum Begriff der Schatten-
wirtschaft, in: Beiträge zum Problem der Schattenwirtschaft, ed. G. Hedtkamp, Berlin 
1983, pp. 11–13; Gospodarka nieformalna. Uwarunkowania lokalne i systemowe, ed. K.Z. 
Sowa, Rzeszów 1990; M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy. Przesłanki, mechanizmy 
i skutki w Polsce lat osiemdziesiątych, Warszawa 1992, pp. 15, 34; F. Schneider, D.H. Enste, 
The Shadow Economy: An International Survey, Cambridge 2002, pp. 6–9. See also: The 
Unofficial Economy: Consequences and Perspectives in Different Economic Systems, ed. S. 
Alessandrini, B. Dallago, Aldershot 1987 (especially articles: E. Feige, The Anatomy of 
the Underground Economy and P. Wiles: The Second Economy: Its Definitional Problems; 
M. Göke, K.-H. Hartwig, Schwarzmärkte, in: Ökonomische Theorie der Rationierung, ed. 
M. Tietzel, München 1998, pp. 106–137.
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not enough to succeed in making a successful purchase; it was a common expe-
rience to stand in line in front of a store with no guarantee that the item of one 
dreams, or indeed anything else at all, would be there when one finally arrived 
at the front of the line hours later. Chronic shortages in the socialist economies 
are a well-known fact and much has been written about them. János Kornai’s 
work on this topic has become a classic (which, incidentally, does not mean that 
his conclusions are immune to debate).4 What matters more for our purposes is, 
rather than showing how the shortages came about, looking at how they were al-
leviated. There were two possible approaches: either the state rationed the goods 
and services, or society took over the (re)distribution. From the point of view of 
the totalitarian/authoritarian state, such an alternative was unacceptable and the 
liberal slogan “What is not forbidden is allowed” was generally substituted with 
the clear guideline: “What is not explicitly allowed is forbidden”.5
Citizens were disinclined to conform to the dictatorial economy and, espe-
cially where the shortages were particularly painful, they constantly perfected 
adjustment strategies. Through the “back door”, they would drain the state sector 
and develop social networks based on mutual but not exactly gratuitous help in 
acquiring goods and services that were absent from the market. Poles jokingly 
defined the worst possible punishment as “sentenced to two years with no cro-
nies”. Similar sentiments had their equivalents in almost all socialist countries; 
in the Soviet Union they used to say “Blat is stronger than Stalin”; the Polish 
“cronies” and Soviet “blat” both meaning “good ol’ boy networks”. The whirlpool 
of the second economy sucked out the supplies from the first one thus creating 
shortages, which increased various informal economic activities.6 In the socialist 
countries this vicious circle not only produced the second economy, but also the 
4 J. Kornai, Economics of Shortage, Amsterdam–New York 1980; J. Kornai, The Socialist 
System: The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton 1992; Models of Disequilib-
rium and Shortage in Centrally Planned Economies, ed. Ch. Davis, W. Charemza, Lon-
don 1989. See: K. Nowakowski, Niedobory w gospodarce a społeczeństwo i jednostka, 
Katowice 1993; M. Jastrząb, Puste półki. Problem zaopatrywania ludności w artykuły 
powszechnego użytku w Polsce w latach 1949–1956, Warszawa 2004, p. 130.
 2004; M. Mazurek, Społeczeństwo kolejki. O doświadczeniach niedoboru 1945 J. Kornai, 
The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism 1989, Warszawa 2010; M. 
Mazurek, Antropologia niedoboru w NRD i PRL 1971–1989, Wrocław 2010.
5 The Second Economy in Marxists States…, p. 4; A.V. Ledeneva, Russia’s economy of 
favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange, Cambridge–New York 1998, p. 87.
6 A.V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours…, p. 87.
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“second society”7 guided by its own ethical rules, goals, models, and mentality. 
Its existence was probably most in evidence when viewing society from the eco-
nomic angle. 
When the entire economy not only depends on the state but also belongs to 
it, it is hard to call the “underground” economy a parallel one. Parallel equals 
independent, and independence was certainly not a characteristic of the socialist 
second economy. In the Soviet Bloc countries, the connections between the two 
economies were very tight and usually of a parasitic kind. The official economy 
provided money, natural resources and products for private (legal and illegal) 
artisans and merchants or smugglers. Private houses were built with state-owned 
bricks and cement; cars ran on state-owned gas.8 But there was also a certain 
symbiosis. The state enterprises could not operate, nor meet their production 
goals, without using the strategies of the grey sphere both in dealings with the 
state and private co-operants. The managers of state enterprises often knowingly 
flouted the law, because they knew that without the proverbial “nuts and bolts” 
supplied by canny artisans the factory would have not been able to function. Not 
too many questions were asked, such as enquiring too closely into the source of 
steel used for the production of parts. In this context, the shades used to define 
the informal economic arrangements of the time – ranging as they do from gray 
to black – are clearly insufficient. No wonder that researchers into the socialist 
second economy were obliged to broaden the palette considerably.
Although the model described below was evolved to apply to the Soviet Un-
ion, it nevertheless applies to a great degree also to other states of the eastern bloc 
(and not just in Europe).9
7 E. Hankiss, The “Second Society”: Is There an Alternative Social Model Emerging in 
Contemporary Hungary?, in: “Social Research” p. 55, 1988/1–2 & 13–42. See: M. Marody, 
Od społeczeństwa drugiego obiegu do społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, in: “Studia Socjolog-
iczne” 1999, p. 4 (155)/35–51. See: J.R. Wedel, The Private Poland: An Anthropologist’s 
Look at Everyday Life, New York 1986; Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. 
Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR, ed. T. Lindenberger, Köln–Weimar–Wien 
1999; U. Brunnbauer, “Die sozialistische Lebensweise”. Ideologie, Gesellschaft, Familie 
und Politik in Bulgarien (1944–1989), Köln–Weimar–Wien 2007.
8 J. Brodacz, Mali ludzie – wielkie interesy. Afera skórzana w Radomiu, “Polityka”, 45/Nov 
5 1960; Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw (Archiwum Akt Nowych – 
AAN), The Office of the Council of Ministers (Urząd Rady Ministrów – URM), 32/115, 
fol. 38.
9 Based on: A. Katsenelinboigen, Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union, in: “Soviet Studies” 
29/1977/1, pp. 62–85; F. Haffner, Ist die Schattenwirtschaft ein Reformansatz? Das Ver-
hältnis der Wirtschaftsreformen in Osteuropa zur Schattenwirtschaft, “Vierteljahreshefte 
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1.1.1  Legal Markets
The market called, for more than one reason, red was in fact the inefficient 
and inflexible system of state distribution. It was aided by the pink market, in 
which privately, legally owned goods changed hands. The state created a network 
of komis (second-hand) stores (skupochnyie in Russian) where one could sell 
clothes, books, furniture and so on, for prices no higher than in regular stores. 
Komis stores were one of the few places where traces of market behavior oc-
curred – for example, the price was negotiable, and the un-cleared stock was put 
on sale. However, there were not many skupocznyie and so their influence on the 
market was negligible. 
The white markets were of greater importance. They included the town mar-
ketplaces where one could sell used goods (barakholki were often closed down 
due to their taking liberties with the interpretation of the term “second-hand 
items”), and also the kolkhoz markets which sold food. The prices in both mar-
kets were not regulated by the state (apart from times of exceptional shortage, 
when maximum prices were introduced but rarely respected).
1.1.2  Semi-legal Markets
The gray market included apartment and holiday cottage (dacha) rental services 
(and also house renovation, car repair, tailoring and shoe services) carried out 
after – or sometimes during – working hours by shabashnikovs. Income acquired 
from tutoring or medical advice was also included in that group. The illegal but 
commonly accepted barter between enterprises (without which production 
goals were often impossible to meet) was part of the grey market. The authorities 
usually turned a blind eye to the grey market, especially in the areas where the 
supply of goods and services was insufficient.
1.1.3  Illegal Markets
The brown market dealt with goods theoretically available on the red market 
but in reality subject to chronic shortages. In the case of meat, dairy products, 
clothes, refrigerators, cars, mechanised equipment, and building materials, the 
demand was vastly greater than the supply. As a result, numerous means of back 
zur Wirtschaftsforschung” 1985, pp. 177–187; L.I. Shelley, The Second Economy in the 
Soviet Union, in: The Second Economy in Marxist states…, pp. 11–26; G. Grossman, The 
Second Economy of the USSR, in: The Underground Economy in the United States and 
Abroad, ed. V. Tanzi, Lexington–Massachusetts–Toronto 1982. 
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door distribution became available. Producers, employees of trade headquarters 
and warehouses, transport drivers and salesmen, all took part in these dealings. 
People engaged in such actions in order to create social capital, hoping for a 
reciprocated “service” in other shortage areas. A separate segment of the brown 
market dealt with coveted imported items, considered as luxuries in the Soviet 
Union – mostly clothes, and in the 1980s, also video cassettes or cars, vast num-
bers of which were brought into the country, often legally, by sailors, athletes, and 
artists. Theoretically, these were to be distributed by the small network of komis 
stores but since the vendors did not want to leave a paper trail (their IDs had to 
be shown and their details recorded during each transaction), more discreet and 
less formal channels of distribution were soon created. 
Factories and enterprises also took advantage of the brown market. For ex-
ample, the management of the kolkhozes, the collective farms, were constantly 
obliged to grapple with lack of parts and being in possession of illegally acquired 
cash (lewa kasa) obtained the needed items through informal channels by buy-
ing items that had been stolen or produced as side jobs.
Although the participants in the brown market were tolerated, both the state 
and a large part of society viewed those engaged in the black market as criminals. 
Draining the red market for profit (via shoplifting, theft from warehouses and 
factories or from transport and generating a fake surplus, usually by lowering 
the quality of the product) was also considered a black market activity. Alcohol 
played an extremely important role on the black market. Its retail distribution 
was under special state control, which on the one hand led to a growth in the 
production of moonshine, and on the other to the private distribution of state 
alcohol, of course at higher prices.
Soviet luxury items (jeans, wigs, etc.) legally imported and distributed on the 
brown market were but a drop in the ocean of need. It is hard to estimate how 
many were smuggled into the Soviet Union and how many were purchased from 
tourists (this was the domain of fartsovshchiks, who also sold tourists local sou-
venirs or hard-to-get-items such as caviar). The higher caste of the black market-
ers, valutchiks (from Russian valuta – currency), monopolized the illegal trade in 
hard currency and gold, which, along with precious stones, were used as a store 
of value and were thus the main items subject to hoarding. This kind of illegal 
trading carried the most severe punishment, including the death penalty. 
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1.2  The Black Market in Communist Poland:  
Problems with Definition
We can assume that, following World War II, and in particular in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s after the communist regime had established itself, the structure 
of the internal market in Poland was not very different from that outlined above. 
At the same time, thanks to a singular coincidence of historical, political, eco-
nomic, and social factors, the Polish second economy had its own characteristics 
and indeed endemic traits, compared to other Soviet bloc countries.10
Among the historical factors, a significant role was played by the instrumen-
tal and pragmatic attitude that a large part of society had toward the state and 
its institutions, which they perceived as something external and unconnected 
to them, an attitude that was a legacy of the Second World War and, earlier, of 
the partitions of Poland. This was particularly prevalent in the part of Poland 
formerly under Russian occupation. The average Polish citizen identified first of 
all with his family and his close-knit social network, for example in a work place 
or a neighborhood, next – with the nation (in its 19th century sense), and finally 
– with the state. “This ambivalent attitude,” wrote the Polish historian Andrzej 
Friszke, “with its strong undertow of rebelliousness and contrariness weakened 
the executive abilities of the totalitarian state”.11 As a result, compared with other 
countries in the bloc, institutional control was much weaker both in the sphere 
of national symbolism and the economy. 
On the other hand, already during the interwar period, the state had exerted 
a firm grip on the economy, which caused a sizeable part of the population to 
consider it a force capable of solving economic problems; the perceived degree of 
its ability to do that colored society’s evaluation of the government and its legit-
imacy. After the war, this point of view was reinforced, especially in the context 
of fervent egalitarian propaganda, which inflated the aspirations and expecta-
tions of society in regards to consumption. However, when the economy, under-
achieving on all possible fronts, especially since the 1970s, became increasingly 
less and less capable of solving the economic problems, with increasing pain for 
10 See: A. Korbonski, “The Second Economy” in Poland, in: “Journal of International Affairs” 
35/1981/1, pp. 1–13; M. Łoś, The Dynamics of the Second Economy in Poland, in: The 
Second Economy in Marxists States…, pp. 27–49; S. Tellenbach, The Logic of Develop-
ment in Socialist Poland, “Social Forces” 57/1978/2 (special), pp. 436–456.
11 A. Friszke, Kultura polityczna w PRL 1948–1989, in: A. Friszke, Przystosowanie i opór. 
Studia z dziejów PRL, Warszawa 2007, p. 398.
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the population, citizens changed their attitude to the state and its institutions by 
taking the initiative to battle on their own against the shortages.12
Polish society was already well prepared to undertake independent, if un-
official, economic activities. It was the crisis of the 1930s that had inspired the 
multitude deprived of jobs and the means of survival to engage in trade. “High-
er categories of workers (lower rank state officials, railroad workers, employees 
of local government and social services) are being absorbed on a massive scale 
into the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie,” wrote Stanisław Rychliński, “which does 
not directly ‘enhance’ the cultural and social position of the middle class […]. 
The petty bourgeoisie has lost its static character of a middle stratum, separating 
the upper echelons of society from the underprivileged. It has become a make-
shift bridge with a dynamic undercurrent.”13 During the German occupation, the 
range of acceptable social behavior became stretched. The ability to adjust to a 
new situation and to survive became more important than social status. Trade, 
smuggling, and cottage industry made survival possible both for those from the 
social margins and the intelligentsia.14 The ghettoization of the Jews, followed by 
their annihilation, created a blank space on the economic map, which quickly 
filled with Poles. “New kinds of enterprises emerged,” wrote Jan Szczepański, “run 
by people without professional qualifications, from different social classes. It was 
a particular kind of small manufacturing functioning usually in breach of the 
then current law, all kinds of ‘shady businesses’ that disregarded the official regu-
lations, bribed the German authorities and focused on quick profit. At that time, 
new models of operating a business appeared, and remained after the war.”15 After 
returning from England, the lawyer and economist Stanisław M. Korowicz noted 
the poignant joke circulating in the late 1940s which encapsulated the new reality 
with the comment that in post-war Poland “a large number of Catholics are doing 
business and a large number of Jews wear army uniforms. It’s a crazy world!”16 We 
cannot overestimate the influence of private property in agriculture (from 1956), 
12 Ibid., 399. See: W. Narojek, Socjalistyczne “welfare state”. Studium z psychologii społecznej 
Polski Ludowej, Warszawa 1991. The shortages in Poland were worse than those in the 
GDR, Czechoslovakia or Hungary, and occasionally than those in the Soviet Union, 
Romania and Bulgaria. 
13 Drobnomieszczaństwo w strukturze i świadomości społecznej, ed. Z. Zagórski, Wrocław 
1988 (Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Prace Filozoficzne. Socjologia 2), p. 3. 
14 See: M. Walczak, Walka ekonomiczna narodu polskiego 1939–1945 Warszawa 1983, 
pp. 63–99; K. Wyka, Gospodarka wyłączona in Życie na niby, Kraków 2010, pp. 274–311.
15 Drobnomieszczaństwo…, p. 5.
16 S.M. Korowicz, W Polsce pod sowieckim jarzmem, London 1955, p. 31.
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private trade, artisanry and services on the shape and size of communist Poland’s 
second economy. In 1979, the private economy (including agriculture) employed 
23.9% of the labor force. Polish peasants, who already during the German occu-
pation had proved that they were capable of adapting to difficult circumstances, 
adapted to the new reality and actively participated in all kinds of economic ac-
tivities, usually at the shadier end of the market. On the one hand, they skillfully 
and creatively took advantage of food shortages, particularly of meat, in the cities. 
On the other, as representatives of the private – that is, the disadvantaged sector, 
they were constantly struggling with shortages in the means of production, often 
acquiring them in an unofficial way. Private trade and artisanry were strongly tied 
up with the state in a parasitic/symbiotic way. At the same time, small-time entre-
preneurs were some of the most important clients of the gold and hard currency 
black market.
As an aside, the Polish hard currency black market was sustained and stimu-
lated (an unprecedented situation in the Soviet Bloc) by the state currency poli-
cies, for instance on foreign currency bank accounts and internal export. Thus, a 
dual currency system effectively existed in Poland in the last several years before 
the fall of communism. Also, beginning with the late 1950s, Polish authorities 
presented an attitude that differed from that of the authorities of other countries 
of the Bloc towards emigration, with the exception of political emigration of 
course. The extent of permitted contacts was relatively wide, which meant a great-
er flow of hard currency, goods, and technology as well as a wider penetration 
of models of consumption. Beginning in the 1970s, Polish regulations regarding 
travel outside the Iron Curtain countries were much more liberal than those in 
the rest of the Soviet Bloc (except Yugoslavia, with its special status). All this had 
various consequences: from smuggling and the tourist trade to copycat activities 
emulated by those who keenly watched the goings-on. This mattered – since as 
in all poor countries, the ability to access goods and services offered in developed 
western countries was a synonym for wealth.17 The long-term isolation of the 
Soviet Bloc states produced in its citizens the so-called “fire-victim syndrome”, 
of those who had “lost their belongings in a fire and who were now trying to 
rebuild their life in the mode of developed societies with mass consumption. 
17 R.L. Chugh, J.S. Uppal, Black Economy in India, New Dehli 1986, p, 14 See: K. Karcz, 
Efekt naśladowania zewnętrznych wzorców konsumpcji jako czynnik utrudniający ste-
rowanie spożyciem indywidualnym, in: Narzędzia polityki gospodarczej i społecznej w 
procesie kształtowania konsumpcji. All-Poland academic and didactic conference of 
Faculties of Trade in Goods and Services of higher economic schools, September 1987, 
vol. 1, Katowice 1987, pp. 201–205.
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Those patterns reach us through films, TV, newspapers and magazines, tourism, 
family visits, etc.”18 The difference between the reality of the Soviet Bloc and the 
western ideal could to a large extent (or sometimes only) be eliminated using 
black market strategies.
It is not easy to paint a picture of the black market in communist Poland. 
Certainly, this could not be the work of a realist painter but rather a pointillist, 
with overlapping colors, and the full image only to be appreciated from a dis-
tance. Neither do traditional definitions have a perfect fit here. It makes sense to 
go along with Jerzy Tomaszewski, an acclaimed historian and economist, who 
describes the black market as a “casual term for illegal or clandestine trade tak-
ing place within controlled trade in goods […]; it emerges when the supply of 
particular items, despite being strictly regulated (official prices, provision cards, 
trade monopoly etc.) does not meet the demand.”19
Subsequent chapters will show, however, that the black market in communist 
Poland did not coincide with this definition. For example, the rationing of con-
sumer goods was only periodically in effect in Poland (from 1944 until 1953, and 
from 1976 until 1989), and then only in respect of selected items, whereas the 
black market existed during the entire post-war period.20 However, during the 
forty-five post-war years, the regulations were enforced in big enterprises, which 
had to follow the rules of distribution in respect of energy, cement, machinery, 
and money. But even the large factories had to take on board black market strate-
gies when selling such strictly regulated goods as meat, sugar, and alcohol to their 
employees or when exchanging goods with other producers. These practices 
were endemic in the 1980s. It’s important to stress that without this inter-factory 
barter, factories would often not have been able to operate at all.21 In particular, 
the monographic chapters that follow (dealing for instance with meat, alcohol or 
gas) will provide numerous examples of such practices. 
Can we include phenomena not connected with shortages and rationing un-
der the black market umbrella? The unofficial gas trade functioned in Poland, 
18 J. Szczepański, Zagadnienia konstruowania i realizacji modelu i wzorów konsumpcji soc-
jalistycznej, in: Badania nad wzorami konsumpcji, ed. J. Szczepański, Wrocław–Warsza-
wa–Kraków 1977, p. 33.
19 J. Tomaszewski, Czarny rynek, in: Encyklopedia historii gospodarczej Polski do 1945 roku, 
ed. A. Mączak, vol. 1, Warszawa 1981, p. 114.
20 During the post-war period there existed various quasi-regulatory measures such as 
coupons, branch allowances, special stores, sailors’ or miners’ ration books, etc. See: 
Ökonomische Theorie der Rationierung…
21 AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 67.
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and also in the USSR, Romania and other countries, regardless of temporary 
shortages and regulations; during such periods, it increased and specialized. 
Similarly, illicit alcohol distilling existed also in times when alcohol stores were 
well supplied. It is worth mentioning that until the crisis of the 1980s, the black 
market prices of moonshine and gas coming from state resources were low-
er than those of the official market. Should the proverbial baba – the peasant 
woman selling meat, which she brought from the countryside directly to private 
apartments in Warsaw or Krakow when meat was not being rationed – be treated 
as a black market phenomenon, or rather as a form of a traditional local distri-
bution system? How should we view the informal taking over of the function of 
inefficient stores in order to shift even goods not subject to market restrictions? 
For example, in 1984 two resourceful men got in on the act of the not-very-dy-
namic, state-owned Fish Market. They bought two tons of herring for 50zl a kilo 
in the port of Świnoujście and sold it for a much higher price in the city of Zielo-
na Góra, some 300 km away.22 Later the same year, the agent of a store on the 
Baltic coast, who had “first sunk one million zloty of his own renovating the 
space and had then later tried in vain to stock it with goods bought on the local 
market, in the end bought them in Silesia, added his costs to the price and found 
himself in prison accused of speculation.”23 A year later, newspapers covered the 
story of a saddler from Przemyśl, who supplied bread at a small surcharge to 
nearby Stubno, where there was no bakery, and as a result was hit with a fine 
and suspended sentence.”24 The concept of a “market” implies trading, albeit not 
necessarily money-based.25 This allows us to no longer consider such phenom-
ena as tax evasion, embezzlement, or corruption, leaving us at the same time 
with a question: where is the boundary between the black market (or indeed a 
market of any other hue) and economic crime? How to classify for example the 
“meat affair” in Warsaw, when a surplus of meat intentionally produced in state 
enterprises was distributed in official stores at official prices in the early 1960s? 
How can we classify artisans who produced goods using materials often illegally 
obtained from state-owned sources but who distributed their product through 
legal store networks? Such activities – although not part of the black market 
per se – yielded large, often untaxed or unreported profits, later converted into 
 
22 AAN, URM, 32/121, fol. 83.
23 S. Podemski, Niech nie lecą wióry, Polityka 18/1984.
24 Szczęście w nieszczęściu, Polityka 48/1985, Szlachetny spekulant, Polityka 8/1986.
25 D. O’Hearn, The Consumer Second Economy: Size and Effects, Soviet Studies 32/1980/2, 
p. 219.
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black-market hard currency and gold. They also encouraged the development of 
smuggling techniques, which brought in luxury and hoarding articles unavaila-
ble on the official market. 
In addition, the Polish authorities had problems with an accurate definition 
of black market phenomena. They struggled with a lack of precise legal language 
and at times, obliged to do so by the circumstances, allowed the accused the 
benefit of the doubt. More than that! In the 1980s, when the illegal trade encom-
passed practically all goods, not infrequently the sentences that the communist 
authorities meted out in cases involving the black market were strikingly lenient, 
often in direct contrast to the expectations of the public opinion that had de-
manded an intervention. When in 1984, a war veteran asked the authorities to 
curtail the speculation of goods, such as appliances and clothes, bought in official 
stores, an apparatchik from the Council of Ministers’ Committee for Obeying the 
Law, Public Order and Social Discipline ruled that the law had not been broken. 
One was allowed to resell a product at a higher price if one had bought it earlier 
solely for private use. Only deliberate re-sale, planned in advance – and this was 
hard to prove – would be prosecuted. State lawyers agreed that tightening the 
law would do little to improve the situation.26 From September 1981, anti-spec-
ulation law (see chapter 3) dealt only with “products in daily use”. A telling ex-
change of letters between the District Office of Interior Affairs in Kalisz and the 
General Prosecutor’s Office took place in 1985. “Kalisz,” wrote the deputy chief 
of the Kalisz police, “is the location of a well-known manufacturer of pianos; the 
famous Calisia is located here. When the pianos are delivered to the local music 
store, the line in front of it is just as long as the one waiting for citrus fruit in 
front of the deli next door. It means that people are eager to buy pianos. Police 
investigated the purchase of pianos outside the state-regulated system. It turned 
out that on January 17 [1985], the District Prosecutor’s Office in Kalisz took the 
position, expressed in writing, that a piano meets higher-level needs and, as such, 
is not a product of everyday use.” When the prosecution dismissed the charg-
es against the potential black marketeer, the Kalisz police, afraid that this could 
make case law (“Tomorrow, we may no longer be able to say that a fur coat is not 
an article of everyday use…!”) asked Warsaw for an opinion. Ultimately, the Gen-
eral Prosecutor upheld the decision of the Kalisz lawyers.27 The terminology used 
in post-war Poland did not help. Officially, the term “black market” did not exist. 
Initially, in the less formal official language the traditional term “profiteering” 
26 AAN, URM, 32/184, fol. 59–62.
27 AAN, URM, 32/116, K 73, p. 166.
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(paskarstwo) was used; in the more formal language – wartime, or goods, usury 
(lichwa wojenna or lichwa towarowa) was quickly substituted by the key term 
“speculation” (spekulacja),28 which defined only a part of the phenomenon we 
are talking about: “an economic crime, which consists of a person, who was not 
authorized to do so, buying goods in order to re-sell them at a profit ” or “a crime, 
which involves an illegal middleman in the process of distributing goods in or-
der to gain profit.” In post-war Poland, the term “black market” denoted rather 
the trade in hard currency and gold (the term “black-market exchange rate” was 
used also in the official correspondence). In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, 
the phrase “black market” appears more often both in the press and in the less 
official pronouncements of the authorities. The term is not clearly defined and 
generally depicts the activities of those black marketeers trading in various arti-
cles – from hard currency and gold, meat and alcohol to cars and construction 
materials. Only after 1980, when the illegal trade became a significant problem, 
was the term “black market” – often in quotation marks, often preceded by the 
adjectives food, gas, currency etc. – widely employed by journalists and MPs. The 
official term “speculation” was also used. It seems therefore that the approach of 
the Indian economists may be more useful in defining the black market in com-
munist Poland. Already at the beginning of the 1980s they had concluded that 
“in recent decades the black market has become a way of life [for the Indian peo-
ple].”29 No wonder their definition is much broader than the ones accepted in the 
West and fits the Eastern European realities much better: “When by (artificial) 
manipulation of the economic forces of demand and supply, of both currency 
and produce (or either), trade or industry (or both) create an artificial situation 
of scarcity or glut, and in the process amass huge returns on their investments 
[…], we have a black market situation.”30
28 “Goods usury” usually occurring under disrupted economic conditions (war or natural 
disaster) meant that the manufacturer or the merchant obtained extraordinary and un-
substantiated economic profits. “Speculation” implied that, additionally, a profit-taking 
middleman was involved. M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy…, p. 152.
29 S.K. Ray, Economics of the Black Market, Boulder 1981, p. 1. In the 1980s the size of the 
second economy, mostly consisting of black market practices such as gold smuggling, 
was estimated at over 50 per cent of the GNP. A. Kumar, The Black Economy in India, 
New Delhi 202, p. 55.
30 S.K. Ray, Economics…, p. 4.
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1.3  Literature, Sources, Method
Polish literature on the subject has not been very helpful in helping one get a 
grip on the topic of the Polish black market (or sorting out the definitions). It 
is economists and lawyers – and not historians or anthropologists – that have 
long dominated this area of research. In 1957, on the wave of political changes 
triggered by the momentous events of October 1956, the newly established, as 
part of the Council of Ministers, Economic Council, led by the Polish economist 
Oskar Lange (who later lived in the USA and became a professor at the Univer-
sity of Chicago), attempted to evaluate the illegal income of Poles.31 Research 
on economic crimes continued in the following years within the Supreme Audit 
Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, NIK) and the Committee for Research on So-
cial Issues of the Polish People’s Republic (Komitet Badań nad Zagadnieniami 
Społecznymi Polski Ludowej), chaired by the distinguished economist Michał 
Kalecki (who was later to serve as the deputy director of the United Nations Eco-
nomic Department). At the beginning of the 1960s, the research was cancelled 
by Władysław Gomułka’s government in an attempt to avoid the scientific confir-
mation and popularization of a well-known fact – that the involvement of Polish 
society in illegal transactions had reached a mass scale. It was more convenient 
to focus on individual economic scandals. As a result, bookstores and the librar-
ies tended to offer only legal expertise (written by Tadeusz Cyprian, Stanisław 
Galarski, Oktawia Górniok, Bronisław Koch, and others). In 1974 the Institute 
for Criminal Problems (Instytut Problematyki Przestępczości) was established at 
the Prosecutor General’s Office.32 It also dealt with economic crimes, but only a 
very small group of people had access to the often fascinating conclusions of its 
research. The uniformed services such as the Central Customs Office (Główny 
Urząd Ceł, GUC), the police (Milicja Obywatelska, MO; nota bene, in spite of 
the name “militia”, these were not community vigilantes but a fully professional 
force), and the Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa, SB) also prepared eval-
uations but only for internal distribution. 
At the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s, a Warsaw sociologist complained: “in 
Poland [black market] issues are not researched systematically, and then only 
by the media, where they are treated as marginal or pathological phenomena 
31 See: Szara strefa Października. “Notatka” o nielegalnych dochodach w Polsce 1956–1957, 
ed. J. Kochanowski, Przegląd Historyczny (PH), 95 2004/1, pp. 77–96.
32 Monitor Polski 1974/9/68.
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(economic crime, speculation).”33 Scientific dissertations written at that time by 
sociologists or economists who departed from the “pathological” perspective 
were unlikely to see the light of day in print.34 Outside of Poland very little was 
written about the Polish second economy, especially in comparison with the 
USSR, which was the center of attention. This changed in the 1980s, when the 
second economy became a subject that slowly began to find its way into Poland. 
In 1984, the first article by Marek Bednarski,35 a pioneer of black market research, 
and a brochure by Rudolf Jaworek became available.36 By the end of the year, the 
weekly Polityka had published a series of articles about the parallel economy.37 In 
the following years the black market became the subject of both presentations at 
scholarly conferences38 and of books with limited distribution.39
In spite of it being the year in which Poland’s transition from People’s Repub-
lic to democracy began, 1989 was by no means a watershed year in research on 
communist Poland’s second economy. The times of transformation brought other 
current topics to cover. In the early 1990s the only relevant book to be published 
was that of Marek Bednarski, a summary of his earlier work.40 That monograph 
with its focus on the 1980s remains to this day the most exhaustive picture of the 
economy of that period. In the middle of the 1990s, as the archives continued to 
open their doors to scholars and research on the institutions of the communist 
state moved ahead, the second economy caught the attention of Polish historians. 
One pioneer was Grzegorz Sołtysiak, who in 1991 published several sources on 
33 P. Gliński, Ekonomiczne uwarunkowania stylu życia. Rodziny miejskie w Polsce w latach 
siedemdziesiątych, 1983, PhD dissertation, IFIS PAN, p. 112.
34 The above-mentioned PhD dissertation by P. Gliński and Paweł Wyczański’s PhD dis-
sertation, the Dept. of Finance and Statistics at the SGiPS (now called the SGH) 1987, 
Czarny rynek walutowy w Polsce 1970–1984.
35 M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg, Życie Gospodarcze 1984/35 See also Gospodarka “drugiego 
obiegu” a kryzys lat osiemdziesiątych in: Rzeczywistość polska i sposoby radzenia sobie 
z nią, ed. M. Marody, A. Sułek, Warszawa 1987.
36 R. Jaworek Gospodarka nieformalna-czwarty sektor gospodarczy, Warszawa 1984.
37 J. Kleer, W cieniu, L.Będkowski, Jak sąsiad z sąsiadem, K. Krubski, Góra lodowa, M. 
Przybylik, Słonina i schab spod serca, W. Markiewicz, Poemat pedagogiczny, J. Baczyński, 
Policzyć sztuki, godziny i do kasy, Polityka 1984/49.
38 J. Rogoziński, Kryzys jako weryfikator w sferze rynku i konsumpcji, in: Narzędzia polityki 
gospodarczej i społecznej…, vol. 1, pp. 151–161. 
39 J. Misala, Nieoficjalna wymiana handlowa obywateli polskich z zagranicą, Warszawa 
1989; P. Wyczański, Dwuwalutowość w gospodarce polskiej oraz metody i możliwości jej 
ograniczenia, Warszawa 1989.
40 M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy…
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the activities of the Special Commission for Combating Fraud and Corruption 
(Komisja Specjalna do Walki z Nadużyciami i Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym) 
in the period 1945–1954.41 Another was Marcin Kula, a professor at the Uni-
versity of Warsaw and co-founder of the school of the researchers of People’s 
Poland, who encouraged his students to use the Special Commission’s materials 
while researching social history;42 other pioneers were Dariusz Jarosz and Tade-
usz Wolsza, who in 1995 published, in book format, a selection of documents 
about the Special Commission. It is undoubtedly the best researched institution 
of those dealing with the illegal economic activity of Polish society (among the 
researchers were Piotr Fiedorczyk, Roman P. Smolorz, Bogdan Sekściński, Lud-
wik S. Szuba, Ryszard Tomkiewicz, and Waldemar Tomczyk). In the late 1990s, 
information about the Polish black market began to appear in publications on a 
wider spectrum of problems – Dariusz Jarosz and Maria Pasztor wrote about the 
context of the “meat affair”, Paweł Sowiński about tourism and recreation, Dari-
usz Stola – about migration, Małgorzata Mazurek and Mariusz Jastrząb – about 
shortages, Krzysztof Kosiński – about alcoholism, Krzysztof Madej – about the 
policies of Gomułka’s regime with regard to criminal economic activities.43
The primary sources also posed significant problems for researching the Pol-
ish second economy. The black market is an illegal, informal sphere of social 
behavior, existing as it does at the margin of the law or in conflict with it. Not sur-
prisingly, black market players are never eager to document their activities. It was 
the institutions that controlled, investigated and punished those activities that 
produced the majority of sources. Such materials were mainly generated by the 
Polish Workers’ Party and the Polish United Workers’ Party, popularly, although 
incorrectly, referred to in the West as the “Communist Party” (Polska Partia Ro-
botnicza / Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PPR/PZPR), the Ministry of 
Public Security / the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa 
Publicznego/Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych , MBP/MSW), the SB and MO, 
NIK, the General Prosecutor Office, the Ministry of Justice, the GUC and the 
civic institutions engaged in the fight against speculation, such as, between 1945 
and 1954, the Special Commission or, between 1981 and 1987, the Central Com-
mission for Combating Speculation (Centralna Komisja do Walki ze Spekulacją). 
41 Komisja do walki, ed. G. Sołtysiak, Karta 1991/1, pp. 81–97.
42 T. Grosse, J. Grużewski, M. Kozak, M. Kula, M. Meller, K. Piasecki, P. Piskorski, P. Salak, 
M. Woźniak, P. Zalewski, Szarzy ludzie zaplątani w codzienności komunizmu, PH 
1993/3, pp. 335–350.
43 See the bibliography.
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Other sources included materials from central and local state archives,44 which 
at first glance had nothing to do with the black market – such as the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, MSZ) or the Central Com-
mittee of Physical Culture and Tourism (Główny Komitet Kultury Fizycznej i 
Turystyki, GKKFiT) or the Central Committee of Tourism (Główny Komitet 
Turystyki, GKT) but which were ultimately a repository of valuable information. 
Much information on the behavior of the authorities can be retrieved from of-
ficial reports but these are always written from the perspective of those author-
ities. In the absence of any sociological research into the black market45 and the 
understandable reluctance of the black market protagonists to document their 
activities, the grass-roots perspective is painfully absent. This gap is only to a 
certain degree filled by letters and complaints received by the authorities, by the 
institutions, and newspaper editors (stored in the archives of the Polish United 
Workers’ Party or Polish Television [TVP] archives) or reports gathered by the 
employees of Radio Free Europe from visitors out of Poland. The credibility of 
those sources is, however, questionable. The newspapers and magazines were no 
more credible, despite the fact that the topic of black market pathology was one 
always in demand in communist Poland. And yet, it was only the press (and then 
only for an astute reader) that constituted an invaluable source of grass-roots 
information.
During the almost decade-long process of researching and writing this book, 
I talked with close to a hundred people about the black market in communist 
Poland. I have never met anyone who lived in Poland during that time who had 
not experienced the black market phenomenon in one way or another (provided 
they were reasonably observant). There are twenty odd million similar potential 
witnesses. The sheer numbers make it difficult to use oral history testimonies in 
a representative way (not to mention other logistical challenges that this method 
would entail). Theoretically, I could have interviewed a random cross-section of 
people. The scale of such research would have exceeded, however, the resources 
of an individual scholar. I used the interview technique cautiously and only after 
exhausting other sources. The weekly Polityka and the daily Gazeta Wyborcza 
ran, on several occasions, competitions on black market memoirs; they proved 
to be useful and interesting for this author. 
44 See the bibliography – list of archives.
45 With the exception of J. Węgleński, for the research on tourist commerce from the 
beginning of 1960s, see: chapter 9.
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The type of primary sources, the great time span, and the sheer diversity of 
black market phenomena forced the author to limit radically the range of prob-
lems and focus on the most representative ones. It is important to stress that strict 
differentiation between economic crimes and black market activities turned out 
to be impossible. Often common sense and intuition remained the only valid cri-
teria and then, just in case, the label “black market” was put in quotation marks.46 
In defining any market (including the black market), the main criterion is the 
existence of an act of trading in order to gain a profit. We are also looking for 
elements of organized action, deliberateness and specialization suggesting some 
kind of professionalism. A black market strategy should include visible stages of 
planning, execution, and evaluation of profitability. Black market activities also 
involve the presence of deliberate bending or breaking of the existing law. The 
product traded on the black market has to be subject to specific restrictions, such 
as monopoly, rationing, or a ban on distribution) on the manufacturer and dis-
tributor, imposed in this case by the communist state in Poland, which leaves no 
doubt with regard to its legal status. In order to be successful, economic activity 
requires favorable conditions and sufficient time to develop and perfect appro-
priate techniques and strategies. It is best to investigate the black market mecha-
nisms that take place over a great duration with attention to possible changes and 
mutations. The interest of the authorities in a particular sector of an illegal trade 
is also one of the determining factors. A further important criterion is the mass 
scale of the phenomenon. It was certainly not possible to live during the times 
of “real socialism” without being involved in some way in black market transac-
tions. It is important to pinpoint which sector of economy was most likely to en-
gage in black market trading for the greatest time, preferably between 1944 and 
1989. Often it is not easy to pigeon-hole some of the phenomena that at first sight 
seem quintessentially black market in character. For example, the illegal tobac-
co trade, which infringed one of the main monopolies of the state, disappeared 
at the turn of the 1940s and the 1950s. Tobacco trading returned to the black 
market in the early 1980s but only briefly and accompanied by practically all 
other goods. Nor do black market sales of books fit in here since they took place 
mostly in the 1980s and were limited to the narrow circles of book aficionados. 
The same can be said of the so-called koniki, the touts selling tickets for movies 
and sports events. Although they survived throughout the entire duration of the 
 
46 in 1987, K. Rogoziński had proposed putting the word “black” in “black market” in 
quotation marks; K. Rogoziński, Kryzys jako weryfikator…, p. 161.
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Polish People’s Republic and continued throughout its collapse, their operations 
were confined to the big cities. For the same reasons I eliminate from my spec-
trum pornography and drugs.47 Geography seems to be one of the most crucial 
criteria. The phenomena that existed continuously, reached a mass scale and were 
ubiquitous in most of Poland (with allowances for regional differences) would 
be the best to observe and study. The complexity of the subject determined the 
division of the chapters into two types: general and monographic. The first gen-
eral chapter provides a short survey of the world history of the black market 
until the 1940s. It is followed by a chapter, which presents the development of the 
black market phenomenon in post-WWII Poland, with emphasis on the three 
institutions established specifically in order to combat speculation in the coun-
try. This chapter also presents the broad political, social and economic context 
of the Polish black market. The last chapter in this cluster offers an analysis and 
the correlations of the black market and its historical and geographical deter-
minants. After considering the criteria of trade, profit, specialization, mass scale, 
continuity and geography on the battlefield that was the black market, there were 
only three armies left: those that traded in meat, those that traded in alcohol, and 
those that traded in both hard currency and gold. Of course the graph of the fluc-
tuations of their black market trading was never linear. It looked more like a very 
irregular wave. We can definitely say though that in post-war Poland unofficial 
trade in those articles was an important element of the game playing between so-
ciety and the authorities. It thus made sense to dedicate a separate, monographic 
chapter to each of the above specialized branches of the black market. The in-
clusion of the automobile sector of illegal trading (including cars, gas and spare 
parts) posed more questions. On the one hand, the black market in automobiles 
came into play at the beginning of motorization at the turn of the 1950s and the 
1960s and reached a mass scale in the 1980s. On the other, most of the trans-
actions, especially those involving gas, were one-sided. The state was the sole 
distributor of gas, which could not be produced independently (unlike meat and 
alcohol) or brought from abroad (unlike currency, gold or even cars). The only 
way of introducing gas to the black market was to “repossess” it in various ways 
47 Drugs appear to be a separate issue. While other sectors of the black market enjoyed a 
certain level of social acceptance, this was not the case with drugs. Drug dealing was 
widely perceived in the rightly so, as a criminal activity. Pornography was also viewed 
negatively but not overly rigidly, although it is difficult to define it precisely and im-
possible to determine the scale of the phenomenon.
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from the state. I therefore came to the conclusion that the illegal distribution of 
gas merited a chapter of its own.48
Black market phenomena were, to some extent, homogenous: despite chang-
ing economic, political, and social circumstances, certain specific goods contin-
ued to change hands illegally. More difficult to tackle is the topic of smuggling, 
which constituted a discrete and singular black market category. On the one 
hand, smuggling broke the state monopoly in international trading,49 as well as 
tax and currency laws; on the other – it involved a very wide range of goods. 
Hard currency and gold always stayed on the smugglers’ list; other wares came 
and went depending on the economic situation, the consumption aspirations of 
society, the type of shortages etc. Despite those complexities, smuggling meets 
our criteria: it was significant throughout the post-war era, highly profitable, and 
specialized. If earlier on, smuggling was regional, took place mostly in areas close 
to the Polish borders and involved the lower classes, in communist Poland it be-
came a countrywide phenomenon. With the appearance of mass tourism in the 
late 1950s, millions of Poles began to participate in this activity. The part of the 
book dedicated to “currency values” presents highly specialized gold and curren-
cy smugglers. A separate monograph chapter is focused on “tourist commerce” 
commonly practiced within the Soviet Bloc countries. The above classification is 
proposed in the full knowledge that maintaining clear boundaries between each 
sector of the black market is extremely difficult. As always, what is not clearly 
defined and of an informal nature is usually full of empty spaces, margins and 
overlaps. As a result, some repetitions were unavoidable. It was also not possible 
to avoid highlighting some themes at the cost of others. The over-representation 
of Warsaw, evident in the book, does not mean that the role of the provinces is in-
tentionally diminished, or that it was simply the Warsaw perspective that was the 
easiest to research. This approach certainly does not reflect any bias on the part 
of the author. There is no doubt that Warsaw remained over the years the black 
48 I did not include, however, the unofficial trade in construction materials despite the 
fact it was a widespread, long-term practice prevalent throughout Poland. To analyze 
the problem would not have contributed many new details to flesh out the picture of 
the black market but it would have required a separate set of research methods and 
tools. The unofficial methods of acquiring apartments were a separate phenomenon 
that operated outside of the black market spectrum. See: D. Jarosz, Peerelowskie lamenty 
mieszkaniowe, in: Od Piłsudskiego do Wałęsy. Studia z dziejów Polski XX wieku, ed K. 
Persak, Warszawa 2008, 307–320, D. Jarosz, Mieszkanie się należy… Studium z peere-
lowskich praktyk społecznych, Warszawa 2010.
49 M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy…, p. 40.
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market capital of the country. All the source limitations forced the author to look 
at the topic through the eyes of a state official or a policeman rather than those 
of an illegal money changer (cinkciarz) or the “baba” selling veal. Thus themes 
presenting the strategies undertaken by the black market insiders, their moti-
vations, opinions, ethical considerations, and rituals are certainly debatable and 
do not exhaust the topic. The same can be said about relations between the black 
market and the official economy or about estimating the real profit from unoffi-
cial operations. Here, a more general question arises: how should we define black 
market “profit”? I am fully aware that this book can do no more than open the 
door; behind it there lie paths that can take us in many very different directions.
This book is the result of research financed by the Ministry of Science and 
Higher Education, Grant No 1 H01G074 29.
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2.  Shortage, Greed, Protest: A Short Course in 
the History of the Black Market in the First 
Half of the 20th Century
2.1  The Beginnings
As soon as man began to engage in the exchange of goods with the participation 
of money, attempts appeared to limit, ration, and control the process. These could 
be triggered by anything: a war, a natural disaster, an empty treasury, or the fear 
of rioting. The Code of Hammurabi introduced control over prices and earn-
ings. In the 11th century BC, Chinese clerks supervised the harvest and set the 
acceptable range of prices. Seven hundred years later, the Athenians were setting 
maximum prices for grain. Emperor Diocletian went much further in 301 CE by 
setting the maximum price for 900 products and a maximum wage for 160 types 
of work. Both merchants and artisans tried to by-pass the constraints, whereas 
state officials tried to find and punish the offenders.50 Interference in markets 
took place also in the Middle Ages; for instance, in 13th century England, the size 
of a loaf of bread was standardized and its price was set according to the price of 
grain. It was also in England, in 1351, that wage regulation was first introduced.51 
Attempts were made to restrict trade, for example by licensing the markets, or 
by applying the jus stapulae, the obligation on travelling salesmen passing by to 
offer their goods for sale for a period, which offered a privileged position to local 
merchants (triggering protests from others who tried to by-pass the restrictions). 
The restrictions imposed by the guilds were expected not only to impede access 
to professions but also to maintain adequate quality and price. Those contemp-
tuously called “bunglers” (partacze) manufactured outside of the guild system 
products that were usually just as good and certainly cheaper and were, in effect, 
dabbling in the black market.
 In the modern era, along with the establishment of centralized, bureaucratized 
states, which divided up the world into spheres of influence, market regulations 
began to take on a new, global shape. Colonial empires – Portugal, Spain, France 
or England – aimed at increasing the profits by introducing monopolies in trade 
with overseas territories. Pirates were black market buccaneers, undermining the 
50 R. Sèdillot, Histoire des marchés noirs, Paris 1985, pp. 13–28; J. Butterworth, The theory 
of price control and black markets, Hong Kong–Singapore–Sydney 1994, pp. 3–4.
51 J. Butterworth, The theory…, pp. 6–7.
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monopoly of the (foreign) state. In fact, it was not only foreign but also internal 
trade that was subject to monopoly. It included luxury items, grain, salt, tobacco, 
or much later, matches. Breaking the state monopoly by smuggling or producing 
wares illegally was a dangerous undertaking, but at the same time highly profita-
ble, as were most other black market activities. The smugglers, who either trans-
ported goods on their own backs or reached English or French shores in their 
boats, were the most long-standing professional players in the black market.52 
The French Revolution – with its continuous critical failures of supply, exorbi-
tant prices, and anti-speculation laws can be seen as the beginning of the “modern” 
black market. These phenomena affected all social groups, even the most privi-
leged, without exception. You could buy grain, sugar (especially after France had 
lost San Domingo), soap, and candles only by infringing the centrally imposed 
laws. The fast-growing inflation enhanced by the compulsory use of paper money 
put pressure on consumer durables and luxury items. Gold was also sought after, 
since its trade was controlled by the state. All these goods found themselves on the 
black market. The introduction of the Continental Blockade caused smuggling 
to flourish; as a result, new trade routes were developed via the ports of Portugal 
and Spain and Turkey as well as those on the Baltic.53 The American Civil War, 
dominated by a black market, was a true dress rehearsal for the arrival of the 20th 
century. The front line stretched almost across the entire continent, some 3.5 mil-
lion Americans put on military uniforms and 620 thousand lost their lives (more 
than American losses in two World Wars and the Korean War put together). For 
the first time, the railroads, the telegraph, armored ships and even a submarine 
were used on a large scale. This was the first total war in history that engaged the 
whole of society, as well as pauperizing it, and mobilized all resources, which then 
had to be rigidly controlled, including the rationing of oil.
2.2  The First World War and the Interwar Period
What the Americans had experienced in the 1860s was just a taste of European 
reality half a century later. When dispatching his troops in 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm 
promised that they would be back home “before the leaves fall from the trees”. 
Those that survived returned to their families after the leaves had fallen for the 
fifth time. The winning side had not only had the strongest army but also the 
greatest material resources. The army’s needs were a priority so they devoured 
52 R. Sédillot, Histoire…, pp. 38–52.
53 R. Sédillot, op. cit. pp. 57–79, p. 87; J. Debû-Bridel, Histoire du marché noir (1939–1947), 
Paris 1947, pp. 18–23.
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the majority of industrial and agricultural output. Civilians came second and 
received articles of lesser quality. Britain was the only country not to introduce 
rationing during WWI, considering it a violation of economic freedom. Trading, 
however, was controlled by the state, which supervised about 85% of consump-
tion. But even in Britain, as in the rest of Europe, shortages, food lines, inflation, 
and high prices were common, everyday occurrences.
Despite all that, the situation was not tragic – that is not until 1916. It was only 
the abysmal harvest of that year in Europe, Canada and the USA as well as the 
painfully felt shortage of labor in agriculture and industry that brought about the 
collapse in supplies. In 1917, in Britain women spent so much time standing in 
food lines that husbands had to take time off work from their factory jobs and 
children miss school to take their place. There was no coal. Trucks transport-
ing potatoes to towns were stopped and plundered. The authorities introduced 
maximum prices but were not able to guarantee the supply – as a result, food 
drifted on to the black market. Introducing fines for black marketeers made little 
difference; during the War no more than 290 people were fined in excess of £50, 
of whom only three had been involved in large scale black market trading. In the 
final year of the war, thirteen people were sent to prison and seven sentenced to 
pay high fines (in excess of £500).54 
France introduced food rationing in March 1917, asking its citizens to change 
their eating habits and substitute potatoes for white bread. In Germany, the War 
Food Office (Kriegsernährungsamt) set up in May 1916 did nothing to alleviate 
the provision crisis. Not for nothing was the winter of 1916/1917 called the “tur-
nip winter” – there was almost nothing else to eat.55 Food and industrial goods 
were available virtually only on the black market. In April 1918, the Reichstag 
declared it the “only effective way of distributing food”.56 To a large extent, the 
shortages contributed to the radicalization of society and accounted for the sup-
port for the revolution in 1918. In Russia, the February Revolution was triggered 
by women rebelling at standing in lines for the bakeries.57
The First World War was the black market lab where strategies were ini-
tiated and later developed not only during times of conflict. Getting round 
food rationing by making a trip directly to the countryside became common 
54 E. Smithies, The Black Economy in England since 1914, Dublin 1984, 19–21, pp. 28–30.
55 M. Wildt, Der Traum vom Sattwerden. Hunger und Protest, Schwartzmarkt und Selb-
sthilfe in Hamburg 1945–1948, Hamburg 1986, p. 12.
56 E. D. Kohler, Inflation and Black Marketeering in the Rhenish Agricultural Economy 
1919–1922, “German Studies Review” no. 8, 1985/1, p. 48.
57 See: A. Û. Davydov, Mešočniki i diktatura v Rossii: 1917–1921, St. Petersburg 2007.
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throughout Europe. In Poland (or at least in the Polish Kingdom), the terms 
“smuggling” (szmugiel) and “smuggler” (szmugler) in reference to someone 
who brought butter, meat, or potatoes to the city (often using sophisticated 
methods) were already in use in 1916 and 1917. Ration stamp fraud and gold 
and currency speculation became a common practice, gold-backed currency 
having disappeared as soon as the war broke out). The corruption allowed sup-
plies to reach the military and from there food, textiles, forage, and fuel were 
siphoned off to the civilian market.
The First World War black market (paskarstwo) quietly percolated into peace-
time, without changing its scale or range of products. The destroyed and pau-
perized Europe was unable to supply its people with enough jobs or desired 
products. Under the circumstances, the practice of ramping-up prices or break-
ing rationing (which continued in most European countries) did not disappear; 
on the contrary – the turnover of the black market increased. For example, in the 
spring of 1919 an estimated one third of food products in Germany were sold 
through black market channels.58 Inflation, and indeed hyperinflation), which 
affected some European countries, did not help to calm the mood. In Britain, the 
Ministry of Supply continued to exist until 1921 and price controls and ration-
ing of some articles carried on until 1922.59 At that time strict market regulation 
ceased in other countries. 
During the First World War there were attempts to limit the availability of 
alcohol and to introduce prohibition. Similar attempts undertaken in Russia in 
1914 were completely unsuccessful. A ban on alcohol sales, officially in force in 
Russia until 1925, was from the outset widely ignored, which helped to encour-
age unofficial production and distribution. “Officially, alcohol vending is prohib-
ited in Moscow,” a Polish officer serving in the Russian army remembered at the 
turn of 1916/1917, “but, as Russians say, ‘the law is like the shaft of a cart, it points 
the way you turn it’, so in Russia, in every decent restaurant they’ll serve in a tea-
pot enough alcohol for anyone to have their fill.”60
The Russian lesson had not been learnt in the USA, where prohibition was 
introduced in 1919. This led to the development of a huge, criminalized black 
market in alcohol, which embraced illegal production, smuggling and retailing. 
Drinking alcohol became de rigueur, partly as a protest against the state’s ef-
forts to limit personal freedom. For the first time ever, the black market began to 
58 Ibid.
59 J. Butterworth, The Theory…, 10; E. Smithies, The Black Economy…, pp. 38–40.
60 I.B. Ataman (J. Pietrucin-Pietruszewski), W wichrze rewolucji, ed. J. Kochanowski, Karta 
1991/1, p. 4.
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threaten state structures, leading to the development of organized crime, which 
penetrated the legal sphere and successfully corrupted the justice system, local 
government, the police, and the customs service. The last of these was particu-
larly significant, since smuggling became one of the chief sources of alcohol. For 
example, residents of St. Pierre and Miquelon, islands located close to US shores, 
although formally part of France (France and Canada did not recognize Ameri-
can prohibition law), abandoned fishing and instead used their boats for smug-
gling – a much more profitable pursuit. On St. Pierre, a crate of whisky went for 
$12 but could be sold for as much as $96 in New York City! No wonder that only 
in the first year of prohibition alone, the islanders shifted over 10 million (old!) 
dollars’ worth of liquor to the USA. For owners of speedboats in the Bahamas, 
Cuba and Mexico, this was also a time of prosperity.61
Prohibition also proved how dangerous state manipulation of the market and 
human needs and habits could be, and how utterly futile the efforts of the state 
against resistance by large sections of society. All that the expansion of the appa-
ratus of repression seems to achieve is an increase of evermore specialized and 
effective techniques for evading restrictions.
In independent Poland, the first decree on protection of the consumer and the 
market was issued as early as December 5, 1918. Based on the act of January 11, 
1919, the Office for Combating Usury and Speculation (Urząd do Walki z Lichwą 
i Spekulacją) was created in the Ministry of Supply. It was authorized to punish 
“acts of usury and all kinds of illegal trade in essential articles” with penalties of 
up to three months jail and fines of up to 50 thousand marks.62 Soon, the dire 
economic situation, made even worse by the war effort, forced the authorities 
to implement comprehensive measures. A bill on “combating war usury” was 
passed on July 2, 1920.63 The Office for Combating Usury and Speculation had 
wide powers, including the ability to issue warrants for searching apartments. 
Departments of State were empowered to conduct investigations and, on their 
own authority, punish minor offenders, with fines and detention of six months. 
For particularly severe crimes, the death penalty was not out of the question. 
The Office operated until the summer of 1922; subsequently, its powers were 
transferred to the voivodships. In the years that followed (1923–1924), with the 
currency stabilized, supply improved, and rationing ended – the black market 
faded away. Particular branches of it such as smuggling or distilling moonshine 
61 J. Paxton, J. Wroughton, Smuggling, Basingstoke–London, 1971, pp. 39–41. 
62 Journal of Laws, Dziennik Ustaw, Dz. U. 7/109, Jan 18, 1919; A. Mogilnicki, Lichwa, in: 
Z. Cybichowski, Encyklopedia podręczna prawa publicznego, vol 1, Warszawa, 373.
63 Dz. U. 67/449, August 4, 1920.
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would reappear as a result of the Great Depression (between 1931 and 1936, each 
year the authorities uncovered a few thousand illegal distilleries).64 The terms 
“smuggler” and “speculator” returned to the pages of Polish newspapers in the 
last weeks of peace in 1939, when fear of war caused a panic that resulted in runs 
on shops. This in turn was used by store-owners as a pretext to raise prices. The 
authorities tried to put the fear of God into ruthless traders; posters proclaimed 
that ‘speculators’ would be carted off to the Bereza Kartuska prison camp.
2.3  Second World War
Runs on stores demonstrated that society had not forgotten the dramatic shortages 
of the First World War (and its aftermath). The authorities were well aware of the 
problem, especially those in countries that conducted aggressive, conflict-oriented 
policies, reliant on food imports. Both Japan and Germany were in that group; the 
latter, despite its attempts at self-sufficiency, had to import half of its meat, fats, 
and dairy requirements. Both countries froze wages and prices. Just before the war, 
most foodstuffs and industrial goods were rigidly controlled and rationed. The au-
thorities asked citizens to cut back and use ersatz products. “Luxury is your ene-
my!” ran a propaganda campaign slogan. Regulatory bodies were established.
In Japan, as early as July 1939 a special economic police force was set up. Dur-
ing the first 15 months of its operation, it arrested more than two million people 
– 3.5% of all citizens. In spite of that, the Japanese market systematically weak-
ened and the real cost of goods exceeded the prices set by the authorities to such 
an extent that trading became simply not worthwhile. This forced both vendors 
and buyers to work towards a strategy that would preserve the appearance of 
legality and give the authorities a pretext to turn a blind eye to their activities. 
The traditional Japanese custom of bestowing gifts was revived; any discrepancy 
between the official and the market price was adjusted soon after the transac-
tion had taken place, and accounted for as its “gift” value. “The wartime strategies 
formed the basis for the post-war period, when an estimated 17 000 local black 
markets were identified. They were the basis for the development of yakuza.65 
In Germany, the National Socialists prepared for war not only the military 
but also the supply chain. Shortly before Germany attacked Poland, State Boards 
(Reichsstellen) were set up; these were responsible for different sectors of the food 
market such as grain, fat, and meat. At all administrative levels, Food Offices 
64 J. Łukasiewicz, Gorzelnictwo, in: Encyklopedia historii gospodarczej Polski do 1945 roku, 
ed. A. Mączak, vol. 1, Warszawa 1981, p. 205.
65 O. Griffith, Need, Greed and Protest…, pp. 828–830, pp. 834–835.
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(Ernährungsämter) were established – as a matter of fact this system survived the 
fall of the Third Reich.66 The German authorities were well aware of how people 
behaved in times of crisis. That is why as early as July 1939, they banned the 
hoarding of goods, and continued to expand the rationing and trade controls. As 
long as supplies were sufficient and ration stamps covered the main needs, unof-
ficial trade was limited to barter and side trade (Tauschhandel, Schleichhandel), 
mainly among friends. However, when in 1941 and 1942 it became increasingly 
difficult to buy the radically diminished rations, unofficial trade showed all char-
acteristics of a black market (Schwarzmarkt). Thanks to Germany’s brutal ex-
ploitation of the occupied countries, its rationing system functioned much more 
effectively than those of other countries.
Until the end of the Second World War, a significant number of Nazi poli-
cy-makers believed that by tightening the restrictive measures they would be 
able to harness the illegal transactions. In January 1942, Goebbels started a prop-
aganda campaign directed against the illegal trade.
 Two months later, only trading exclusively between consumers (households) 
was permitted; trading between manufacturers and consumers was prohibited. 
Despite the fact that death sentences for black market crimes continued to be 
carried out as late as April 1945, it was hard to expect that millions of people 
would accept cold and hunger without any protest. Nothing could stop the Ger-
mans from travelling to the countryside looking for food (Hamsterfahrten) or 
prevent the clandestine slaughter of animals and selling of the meat, or the distri-
bution of forged ration stamps.67 Black market activities were endemic: peasants, 
industrialists, the SS-men guarding concentration camps (where a separate black 
market existed), and soldiers (who had looted goods or bought them illegally 
in the occupied territories – a major source of contraband) all played their part 
in black market transactions on a big scale. Small fry of the black market felt 
exonerated when looking at Party elites who, even as they urged “extreme saving 
measures”, were themselves involved in consumer scandals. At the turn of 1942 
and 1943, the German public learned of an affair involving August Nöthling, the 
owner of a Berlin delicatessen who had supplied products unavailable to most 
Germans to many prominent figures (including Richard Darré, the Third Re-
ich’s Minister of Food and Agriculture. The scandal was, at Hitler’s personal wish, 
quickly hushed up (Nöthling committed suicide, probably “assisted” by the SS).68
66 M. Wildt, Der Traum…, pp. 14–15.
67 W.A. Boelcke, Der Schwarz-Markt 1945–1948. Vom Überleben nach dem Kriege, Braun-
schweig 1986, pp. 11–13.
68 Ibid., pp. 20 21, pp. 26–28.
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On the other side of the front line, the black market was a common phenomenon 
connected with never-ending problems with provisions. In 1939 Britain instituted 
a system of rationing. It was fully implemented by 1942. The British system was 
clear, egalitarian, and easy to use and control. Some products, for example ciga-
rettes or hard liquor, were not rationed but heavily taxed and supplied in small 
amounts (alcohol was mostly reserved for export). Those products immediately 
became black market items (they were stolen, smuggled, or manufactured). It was 
the same story with textiles, soap, cosmetics, and razors. Due to war priorities, 
there was a ban on production of toys, jewelry, glass, and leather goods. Naturally, 
they also appeared on the black market.69 
The black market and trade restrictions took a somewhat different form over-
seas. In particular, Canada, a member of the British Commonwealth, adopted re-
strictive measures at the very beginning of the war. The Wartime Prices and Trade 
Board (WPTB), which controlled prices, production and allocation was estab-
lished70 as early as September 3, 1939. Both in Canada and the USA, the war was 
a time of prosperity, economic growth, and pay increases. Between 1939 and 1942 
wages in Canada increased by 100%. The problem was that there was nothing to 
buy. Canada, as did Europe, radically limited production for civilian consumers. 
For example between 1940 and 1943, the production of furniture fell by half, re-
frigerators from 53 161 to 358, and washing machines – from 117 512 to 13 200 
units. The WPTB had to introduce special price lists for used articles. They were 
usually ignored and the difference was paid “under the table”. This practice applied 
especially to automobiles. The production of cars for the civilian market fell from 
102 664 in 1940 to 11 966 in 1943 (and half of these were reserved for physicians, 
policemen and firemen). Theoretically, car depreciation was expected to be 25% 
in the first year and 10% in subsequent years. In reality – as happened in the 1980s 
in Poland – used cars were sold for twice the official price. Similar practices ap-
plied to spare parts and gas (often sold by soldiers), textiles, and coal.
The list of rationed food products also gradually lengthened: in 1942 it includ-
ed coffee, tea, sugar, and alcohol, in 1943 – also beef and canned food (the rations 
were often three times as high as in Britain). In Canada, black market means 
of acquiring meat from farms, warehouses, and factories spread with lightning 
69 E. Smithies, The Black Economy…, pp. 64–67, E. Smithies, Crime in Wartime: A Social 
History of Crime in World War II, London 1982, I. Zweiniger-Bargiełowska, Austerity 
in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939–1955, Oxford-New York 2000, 
pp. 151–202, M. Roodhouse, Black Market Britain: 1939–1945, Oxford 2013.
70 See: J. Keshen, One for All or All for One: Government Controls, Black Marketing and the 
Limits of Patriotism, 1939–1947, Journal of Canadian Studies 29, 1994/4, pp. 111–143.
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speed. The alcohol shortage affected moonshine production and smuggling from 
the USA (cigarettes were also “imported” from there). In 1944 the restrictions 
were eased, in 1946 – most of them were abolished altogether.
 Rationing (and the black market) was similar in the USA. Already by1942, 
sales of tires were subject to rationing, as the supply of natural rubber had been 
cut off; next came gas rationing (beginning in May 1942 in the eastern states 
only; which were supplied mostly by sea by oil tankers; and from December, 
throughout the whole country). From November 1943, the rationing included al-
most all products that were crucial for the war effort or that were using resources 
needed for the war effort, such as cars, sugar, bicycles, shoes, coffee, cheese, butter, 
meat, canned food, dried fruit, coal etc. Gas, meat, and sugar became the main 
items sold on the back market.71
Characteristically, even in Britain, where the supply problems were much 
more severe than overseas, there was not a single case of the black market mo-
nopolizing or in any way controlling a section of the market. Organized crime 
did not develop. On the one hand, Britain was cut off from its neighbors and 
smuggling on a large scale was out of the question. On the other – most British, 
American, and Canadian citizens supported the actions of their authorities. This 
strong social control was based more on a sense of community and responsibility 
than on fear. “Supply” propaganda played on patriotism and was more effective in 
the Allied states than in Germany, Japan or Italy. The British or Americans could 
easily notice all the tangible effects of restrictive measures. The common-sense 
approach of the British and American authorities, which treated illegal trade as a 
necessary safety valve to regulate the market, cannot be underestimated. Convic-
tions in connection with black market activities were few; the majority involved 
inflating the prices of goods or breaking the rationing rules.72
Europe at war constituted a tightly woven system which included the neutral 
states. Almost all countries introduced rationing, which quickly generated black 
market phenomena. This was most noticeable in Sweden, where a large propor-
tion of food products had to be imported. There, food rationing started on March 
27, 1940, just before Germany’s attack on Denmark and Norway. Until the end 
of 1941, the rationing system in Sweden encompassed most basic products. The 
black market, at first insignificant, began to grow in 1943, and by the end of the 
war its turnover encompassed between 20 and 30% of all trade. Transactions 
71 World War II Rationing, www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1674.html (accessed: March 5, 
2014).
72 E. Smithies, The Black Economy…, pp. 68–69, J. Butterworth, The Theory…, p. 16.
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took place mostly in official stores, which commonly broke the rationing rules 
(of the 1 300 surveyed stores, 65% sold meat outside the ration coupons system). 
Between 1940 and 1952, Swedish courts sentenced 67 thousand people for taking 
part in unofficial transactions.73.
In Britain, the USA, Canada, Sweden, Germany, Japan or Italy participation in 
the black market had been prompted by need and greed; it was not an activity 
that functioned as a form of social protest. It was different in occupied countries; 
participation in black market activities was on the one hand often the only way 
of surviving on a daily basis and, on the other, a form of resistance. Kazimierz 
Wyka wrote: “In the winter of 1939/40, the population of the General Govern-
ment faced a clear dilemma: accept the size of rations and starve to death, or – 
somehow or other manage. Naturally, the first alternative was never considered 
seriously; the important thing was: how to survive without accepting the restric-
tions?”74
This was the dilemma that faced citizens of all the occupied countries. How-
ever, in each country a different percentage of the population asked themselves 
such questions. On the one hand, permanent features of the occupation land-
scape were shortages, unemployment, low wages, food lines, rationing, hunger, 
and as their consequence a black market. On the other, the occupation systems 
differed significantly from one another.75 There were different ideologies but 
also different practices. While in the economically developed Western countries 
the occupiers tried to take advantage rationally of opportunities and resources 
using the existing administrative and economic system, in the backward East 
and South they effectively adopted colonial experience, subjected the conquered 
lands to ruthless exploitation and viewed them as a source of food, cheap labor 
and resources. 
While in the west negotiations, often successful, were arranged between the 
invaders and representatives of the occupied population, in the east and south, 
coercive measures and terror were the tools of communication. The peoples 
of Denmark, Holland, and Czechoslovakia were allowed by the occupiers to 
73 J. Wijk, Svarta börsen-samhällslojalitet i kris. Livsmedelsransoneringarna och den 
illegalahandeln i Sverige 1940–1949, Stockholm 1992.
74 K. Wyka, Życie na niby, Kraków 2010, p. 276.
75 See P. Voglis, Surviving Hunger: Life in the Cities and Countryside during the Occupa-
tion, in: Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe, ed. R. Gildea, O. 
Wieviorka, A. Warring, Oxford–New York 2006, pp. 16–41. In Polish historiography: C. 
Madajczyk, Faszyzm i okupacje 1938–1945, vol 2: Mechanizmy realizowania okupacji, 
Poznań 1984.
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consume a much greater part of their industrial and agricultural output than the 
citizens of conquered Poland, Greece, Serbia or the Soviet Union. This affected 
directly the size of the ration and in consequence turned permanent shortages 
into chronic hunger. It is not surprising that in the east and south, the motivation 
to create new strategies for survival and the drive to abandon old habits was the 
strongest. Earlier black market experiences also played their part, such as those 
of Poland during World War I, as did the lower level of acceptance of authority 
compared to Western Europe. Ignoring bans and restrictions imposed by the oc-
cupier became a patriotic duty. Legal sanctions, including the death penalty, were 
unable to put a stop to this state of affairs.
Even though in different occupied countries the black market came in different 
shapes and hues;76 it usually consisted of corresponding sectors and used similar 
76 In German-occupied Poland, the black market was most developed in the territory of 
the General Government, where (especially in Warsaw) it became a specialized field 
practiced officially and professionally. See: W. Jastrzębowski, Gospodarka niemiecka w 
Polsce 1939–1944, Warszawa 1946, M. Walczak, Walka ekonomiczna narodu polskiego 
1939–1945, Warszawa 1983, T. Szarota, Okupowanej Warszawy dzień powszedni. Studi-
um historyczne, Warszawa 1988. In the territories incorporated in the Reich, where 
the center-liberal measures were much stricter and rations larger, the illegal trade was 
smaller in scope and limited to groups of trusted participants. See: T. Janicki, Czarny 
rynek w Poznaniu podczas II Wojny Światowej, Kronika Miasta Poznania, 2009–3, 
pp. 94–116. The black market in the Russian occupation zone was limited due to similar 
reasons. See: G. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie 1939–1944. Życie codzienne, Warszawa 2000, 
S. Lewandowska, Życie codzienne Wilna w latach II wojny światowej, Warszawa 1997. 
In France, by the end of the German occupation 10–30 per cent of all transactions 
were occurring on the black market. In 1942–43 in Vichy France, it is estimated that 
92 billion francs’ worth of basic food products were sold on the black market. At that 
time, the budget of the French state was 135 billion. See: R. Sédillot, Histoire, p. 143, 
L. Taylor, The Black Market in Occupied Northern France, 1940–44, Contemporary 
European History, 1997/6, pp. 158–167, P. Sanders, Histoire du marché noir 1940–46, 
Paris, 2001, D. Veillon, Vivre et survive en France 1939–1947, Paris 1995, F. Grenard, La 
France du marché noir 1940–49, Paris 2008, Y. Lecouturier, Le marché noir en Normandie 
1939–1945, Rennes 2010. On Greece, see: V. Hionidou, Black market, Hyperinflation 
and Hunger: Greece 1941–44, Food & Foodways, 2004/12, 81–106, M. Mazower, Inside 
Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation 1941–44, New Haven–London 1993, S. 
Thomadakis, Black Market, Inflation and Force in the Economy of Occupied Greece, in: 
Greece in the 1940s. A Nation of Crisis, ed. J.O. Iatrides, Hanover (USA), London 1981. 
On Holland see: H.A. van der Zee, The Hunger Winter: Occupied Holland 1944–5, 
London 1982. On Belgium see: R. Miry, Zwarte Handel in levensmiddelen, Brussels 
1946, P. Struye, G. Jacquelyns, La Belgique sous l’occupation allemande 1940–44, Brussels 
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strategies. The inhabitants of big cities, subject to the greatest pauperization, were 
always among the losers. They were the most affected by frozen wages, unem-
ployment and poverty-level food rations, which covered only a small portion of 
the human calorie requirement (no more than one third of it in the General Gov-
ernment!). They were forced to rely on the black market, where prices tended to 
be many times higher than the official ones.77 The effects of the high prices were 
often dismal: in Athens and Piraeus, some 40 thousand people died of malnu-
trition between the fall of 1941 and late 1942! For city dwellers, to participate in 
the black market, whether as customers, vendors or middlemen was a necessity, 
a basic condition of survival. The rural population, especially from areas close to 
the city, benefited from this situation. For example, small towns located in the vi-
cinity of Warsaw specialized in selling different black market products: Karczew 
supplied meat (not for nothing was it called “Prosiaków”, “prosię” meaning “a 
piglet” in Polish), Jabłonna and Legionowo – moonshine, Rembertów – tobacco, 
Piaseczno, Góra Kalwaria and Grójec – flour.78 
The countryside, increasingly exploited under strict control since 1942, was 
nevertheless still able to produce a surplus destined for the cities. Villagers in 
eastern and southern Europe were managing much better than French, Dutch 
or Danish modern farmers. Thanks to traditional methods of running farms, the 
peasants of eastern and central European were better at creating defense mecha-
nisms.79 They were better both at avoiding the distribution networks of rationed 
goods and at deliberately frustrating any surveillance. Often, thanks to corruption, 
they were able more easily to reach mutually advantageous compromises with 
lower level occupation authorities. In Europe, a grand redistribution of wealth 
was taking place: money, gold, hard currency, jewelry, furniture, carpets, clothing, 
anything and everything. All migrated from the cities to the countryside.
efterkrigstid, Copenhagen 2010. On Italy see: R. Mariano, Borsari neri in Roma citta 
aperta, Rome 1989. On Soviet Union see: V.S. Puzškarēv, “Cernyj” rynek w SSSR v 
gody velikoj otecestvennoj wojny i ego vlijanie na sostajanie vnutrennego rynka strany, 
Ekonomiceskij Žurnal, 2006/12, pp. 212–225.
77 P. Voglis, Surviving Hunger…, 2, M. Walczak, Walka ekonomiczna…, 28–29. In General 
Government, food staples prices rose on the free market 10 times for bread, p. 120 
times for pork fat, while wages were mostly frozen at pre-war levels. M. Walczak, Walka 
ekonomiczna…, pp. 23–27. 
78 M. Walczak, Walka ekonomiczna…, pp.  67–8, see also T. Szarota, Okupowanej 
Warszawy…, pp. 220–39.
79 A. Jezierski, C. Leszczyńska, Historia gospodarcza Polski, Warszawa 1999, pp. 354–5, P. 
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Trips to the countryside to get food became a commonplace occurrence. 
City inhabitants, both workers and the intelligentsia, laden with suitcases and 
bundles, were an everyday sight in Paris, Athens, Amsterdam and Warsaw. 
Out-of-town trips could supply the family and provide a bit of an income, 
which allowed the black market sharks to make enormous profits. Sometimes 
these were full-blown illegal enterprises, with their own supply and distribution 
networks, and their own transportation, as well as a good relationship with the 
occupation authorities.
Most of the food smuggled in from the countryside was sold in the cities 
in official stores or restaurants, where the owners regularly violated the ration-
ing regulations. Let us note that ration stamp trading was an important part of 
black market activity in Europe. The stamps were stolen from the occupation 
authorities, forged, and used multiple times. The emergence in Paris or Warsaw 
of illicit restaurants that served luxury dishes and drinks was a brand-new phe-
nomenon.80 The fact that you could get Russian caviar in Paris restaurants and 
smoked salmon and French cognac in those in Warsaw was made possible by the 
widespread participation in the black market of soldiers and occupation officials, 
who were often the conduits for contraband between the far-flung regions of 
occupied Europe.
Indeed, participation in the black market by the occupiers was much wider and 
multi-layered, even in the General Government where the chasm dividing the 
occupiers and the occupied was at its deepest. In all the occupied countries the 
attitude of the invaders to the black market was, on the one hand suffused with 
ideology, on the other, with pragmatism. Usually, the latter prevailed. Everywhere, 
illicit trade was fought either through dogged persistence or sporadic large-scale 
anti-black-market operations (usually followed by price hikes). These “repression 
spectaculars” were mostly for show, a cover for turning a blind eye to black market 
transactions, which to a certain extent solved local supply problems and constitut-
ed a source of additional and often sold by soldiers), textiles, and coal.
The sometimes considerable profit, both for the gendarme happy to accept a 
bribe from a street vendor and for the high official dealing in often vast quantities 
of goods – since the spiriting of goods out of military warehouses or transport 
was carried out not only by stealing but also by corrupting representatives of the 
occupying authorities. Food, fuel and textiles often entered the black market in 
this manner. There were sometimes surprises; for example, in May 1943 Warsaw 
80 J. Debû-Bridel, Histoire…, pp. 124–131, A. Strzeżek, Od konsumpcji do konspiracji czyli 
warszawskie lokale gastronomiczne 1939–1944, Warszawa 2012.
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was “inundated” with live turtles, several train cars of which had been bought 
from German convoys.81 
The General Government and especially Warsaw, situated as it was on the 
communication highway between occupied western Europe and the eastern 
front, became a destination for selling luxury items brought from France. Like-
wise, it was only thanks to the black market that German soldiers and officials 
could buy and send to their families products unavailable at home such as fats or 
alcohol. Factory owners and managers often distributed their products through 
black market channels, outside of the rationing system and for a much higher 
price. And it was also on the black market that they had to buy food and indus-
trial articles that they passed on to their workers as a form of payment in kind; 
this “oiled the wheels”, helping to keep productivity at a relatively high level. The 
occupation authorities were aware of this practice and in 1943 estimated that the 
black market covered between 30 and 50% of all demand.82 
There is no in-depth comparative analysis of the black markets in different 
European countries.83 The existing research mainly concentrates on legal trade 
and overshadows the illicit production. The territory of the General Government 
seemed to have been in the lead not only in the highly-developed clandestine 
food industry, which encompassed moonshine distilleries, mills, bakeries, meat 
and oil processing plants, but also in illegal plants manufacturing cosmetics, 
shoes, clothes and other everyday items.84 Smuggling food to the Jewish ghettos 
especially the Warsaw ghetto, was a regional specialty of the General Govern-
ment black market.85
The vast majority of the goods smuggled into the Warsaw ghetto were paid for 
with hard currency (gold, jewelry, cash) or with objects of item The art trade con-
stituted a very significant part of the black market in all the occupied countries. 
81 T. Szarota, Okupowanej Warszawy…, pp. 230–1.
82 AAN, Government Delegation for Poland, (AAN, DRnK), 202/IV-1, fol. 82, S. 
Schwaneberg, The economic policy of the German occupation authorities in the Gen-
eral Government 1939–1945, manuscript shared by the author.
83 See: T. Szarota, Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy. Szkice historyczne, kro-
nika wydarzeń, Warszawa 1995.
84 M. Walczak, Walka ekonomiczna…, pp. 73–4.
85 M. Passenstein, Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim, Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Histo-
rycznego 1958/26, C. Battrick, Smuggling as a Form of Resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto, 
“Journal of Holocaust Education” 4, 1995/2, pp. 199–224, B. Engelking, J. Leociak, Getto 
warszawskie. Przewodnik po nieistniejącym mieście, 2013, pp. 481–496, H. Grynberg, J. 
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There was also strong demand for stores of value such as hard currency and gold 
coins, which was fueled by inflation and massive profits made both by the occu-
pation apparatus and the local population, including the black market racketeers. 
Another factor in seeking a tangible form of investment was the considerable 
likelihood of suddenly losing one’s entire worldly possessions. Each of the occu-
pied countries had their favorites. While in Poland, gold dollars and roubles were 
the main objects of hoarding (see chapter 8), in France it was gold twenty-franc 
coins.86 Everybody, however – including the Germans and the Italians – placed 
great trust in the American “greenback”.
It is impossible to assess the black market during the Second World War and 
under German occupation unequivocally. Undoubtedly, the second economy 
was for many a means of survival, keeping the wolf from the door. After the 
war, it became a significant element of memory politics, construed into the most 
common form of political resistance. This was most apparent in those countries 
where armed resistance was not significant but collaboration with the occupiers 
was common. In France, for example, as soon as the war ended, research focused 
on the symbolic and heroic aspects of the black market.87 The Black Market in 
Paris, a French film released in 1956 had a similar message.
There was, however, a flipside. The black market was far from being a chari-
table activity. It punished the poor but rewarded the brave, the dynamic and the 
ruthless. Some it made rich, others it pauperized. It was kind to those who had 
no qualms in taking advantage of the situation or who chose to collaborate with 
the occupier. Prevailing public opinion on the black market was ambivalent; for 
example the Polish underground press was full of warnings about profiteering 
storeowners and their exorbitant prices. Even in France, where the black market 
eventually came to be glorified as a form of wartime resistance against the occu-
pier, after the liberation the courts were still convicting people for involvement 
in illegal trade during the occupation.88
2.4  After the War
The courts had, however, a much greater problem with post-war participants in 
the black market. The end of the war did not halt black market operations, which 
continued in peace time without a hitch. The circumstances were already favora-
ble. On the one hand, people were fed up with restrictions and did not perceive 
86 R. Sédillot, Histoire…, pp. 134–135.
87 M. David, Le marché noir, Paris 1945, J. Debû-Bridel, Histoire…
88 L. Taylor, The Black Market, p. 174.
50
them as reasonable once the war was over. Sacrifices for the sake of “our boys on 
the front line” were no longer necessary and did not prevent anyone from partic-
ipating in illegal transactions. The survivors were eager to make up the wartime 
losses. What they now wanted was to get a life in more sense than one. That is 
why for example the black market in Britain concentrated on luxury items (usu-
ally smuggled) such as the coveted nylon stockings or watches, as well as Ameri-
can cigarettes and gas, which was in such short supply that a monthly allowance 
would barely suffice for a trip from London to Brighton.89 A vast part of Europe 
was in ruins and an even larger part was impoverished. Even such a powerful 
state such as Britain was on the brink of bankruptcy. Keeping consumption at a 
low level while focusing on exports could help pay off the debts. Other countries, 
including Poland, were in a similar situation.
There were many other factors that fueled the black market mechanisms. The 
war had broken down social barriers, shaken moral standards and spread patho-
logical behavior of which the illicit trade was one of the mildest. Poverty has 
always been one of the most important engines of the black market. Alcohol and 
cigarettes were considered remedies for stress and gold and hard currencies – 
insurance against hardship. The displaced masses that spread out over the Euro-
pean continent were a natural reservoir of potential black market participants. 
Millions of people were traversing the globe, whether voluntarily or forced to do 
so by circumstances and they were widening the channels of illegal trade by can-
ny arbitrage, facilitating the flow of goods between areas of abundance and those 
of shortages. The victorious troops, the US army with the greatest resources at its 
disposal, joined in the mass transfer of goods. The long, cold and snowy winter of 
1946/47 and a catastrophic draught in the summer of 1947 posed an additional 
challenge. All European countries, from Spain to the Soviet Union, had to deal 
with supply shortages worse than those of the war; this continued to stimulate 
new black market strategies.
In post-war Britain and France, the black market complemented the official 
distribution channels. In Italy and especially in Germany, just as it had been in 
occupied Poland and Greece, making use of the black market was a prerequisite 
for survival. “If you wanted to eat, you had to trade,” a Romanian DP reminisced.90 
The black market had not only a practical but also a psychological impact. In a 
country that had been destroyed, occupied and divided, and was grappling with 
89 E. Smithies, The Black Economy, p. 91, p. 110, p. 130. Roodhouse ibid. Gas rationing 
ended in May 1950.
90 J. Sandulescu, Hunger’s Rogues: On the Black Market in Europe 1948, New York–London 
1974, p. 18. 
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enormous economic and demographic problems (with millions of displaced 
people and refugees) while coming to terms with the bitterness of defeat, the 
black market played a therapeutic role. The popular German saying “God helps 
those who help themselves”91 took on a slightly different meaning. Participation 
in the black market attested to one’s creativity and self-reliance. If in France it was 
a mythologized form of resistance, in Germany it was one of the founding myths 
of the new state. Germany was the only country where the immediate post-war 
years were commonly called, as indeed they still are now, the “Schwarzmarktzeit”, 
the time of the black market. There, the black market became a vital component 
of the collective memory, often portrayed in literature and films and the subject 
of academic research.92
It is worth dwelling on the German black market since it demonstrates per-
suasively the universal pervasiveness of black market strategies, regardless of 
place and time. If a large number of Germans, both civilians and soldiers, were 
involved in the black market transactions during the war; as soon as the war end-
ed – they all were. During the so called “no man’s time” when the old wages were 
not paid anymore and the new ones had not yet started to be paid, when the old 
food stamps had expired and the new ones were not yet available, with cash re-
serves gone and banks still closed, pantries and store shelves emptied – the black 
market was all that stood between the people and certain perdition.93
The situation was not desperate as long as the reserves remained. Soon they too 
were gone, and at the beginning of 1946, the Combined Food Board in Washington 
91 M. Wildt, Der Traum…, p. 103.
92 See: M. Wildt, Der Traum…, W.A. Boelcke, Der Schwarz-Markt…, J. Lenzner, Bren-
nende Kehle. Schwarzer Markt 1945–1948 oder: Der authentische Bericht eines Kenners 
der dunkelsten Schattenwirtschaft zwischen Stunde Null und Währungsreform von ihm 
selbst aufgezeichnet, Bremen 1988; P. Erker, Ernährungskrise und Nachkriegsgesellschaft. 
Bauern und Arbeiterschaft in Bayern 1943–1953, Stuttgart 1990; R. Gries, Die Rationeng-
esellschaft. Versorgungskampf und Vergleichsmentalität. Leipzig, München und Köln nach 
dem Kriege, Münster 1991; J. Roesler, The Black Market in Post-war Berlin and the Meth-
od Used to Counteract It; “German History: The Journal of the German History Society” 
7, 1989/1, pp. 92–107; M. Zierenberg, Stadt der Schieber. Der Berliner–Schwarzmarkt 
1939–1950, Göttingen 2008; F. Grube, G. Richter, Die Schwarzmarktzeit. Deutschland 
zwischen 1945 und 1948, Hamburg 1979; P. Steege, Black Market, Cold War. Everyday 
Life in Berlin, 1946–1949, New York 2007; S. Mörchen, Schwarzer Markt: Kriminalität, 
Ordnung und Moral in Bremen 1939–1949, Frankfurt/Main 2011. About Austria: E. 
Holzer, Schleichhändler vor Gericht. Der Schwarzmarkt in der Steiermark nach dem 2. 
Weltkrieg, Graz 2007.
93 W.A. Boelcke, Der Schwarz-Markt…, p. 76.
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drastically limited allocations for the western occupation zones, which instantly 
cut food rations down to a quarter of their previous level. In 1946 the situation 
became critical in many places. For example between April and July of 1946, 160 
out of the 700 hundred patients at the psychiatric clinic in Grafenberg near Düssel-
dorf died, and the rest were on their last legs. By June, fresh meat had disappeared 
from the market (only cans were issued).94 The situation was not much better in the 
Russian zone. When it seemed that life could not get any worse, the severe winter 
of 1946/7 arrived (which triggered a transport collapse; securing coal deliveries 
became the primary task of the police), followed by the summer drought. As a 
result, the food supply diminished further, and at the turn of 1947/48 fats became 
unavailable. All that the promise of currency reform, with its implicit devaluation, 
at first achieved was to invigorate the black market. Peasants were reluctant to get 
rid of their products, preferring to wait for the new, “good” money. When, finally, it 
did arrive in the western occupation zones, it created the basis for the free market. 
As a mass phenomenon, the black market had to leave the stage.
The German post-war black market consisted in fact of many different phe-
nomena – from the self-organised Hamsterfahrten, foraging expeditions to the 
countryside, to large-scale trade operations (often run by crime groups), theft, 
and supply ration scams. Germans had to develop the same strategies as the Poles, 
Greeks or French had earlier done. The difference was that they no longer faced 
the threat of being sent to a concentration camp if they were caught. In Germany 
and in the German speaking territories, members of all social classes, from peas-
ants to the aristocracy, were to be found using the black market.95 Because there 
was a shortage of adult men, young people and women made up the greater part 
of the black-market traders; another group consisted of Displaced Persons, the so-
called DPs. After the war, the DPs, who lived on United Nations Relief and Reha-
bilitation Administration (UNRRA) supplies, had time and opportunity on their 
hands as well as little to lose, and much to gain. Both those who were planning 
to return to their homeland and those who wanted to emigrate tried to gather 
as many resources as possible to make the beginning of a new life easier in due 
course. The black market offered a perfect opportunity.96 Trading between the city 
and the countryside constituted the foundation of the black market. Interestingly, 
94 M. Wildt, Der Traum…, p. 37, p. 43, p. 45.
95 In 1946 the Schwarzmarktring was uncovered. Agathe Prinzessin von Preußen, Elis-
abeth Prinzessin von Preußen and Luise Henriette Schmalz nee Prinzessin von Preußen 
were part of it; J. Lenzner, Brennende Kehle…, p. 13.
96 Ibid. 34–35; W.A. Boelcke, Der Schwarz-Markt…, p. 82. See: J. Sandulescu, Hunger’s 
rogues…
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peasants who to a large extent had carried on with survival strategies well-re-
hearsed during the First World War did not consider their black market activities 
as law -breaking but rather a way of combating their own poverty. Not without 
reason – from mid-1945 to mid-1948, peasants had no way of laying their hands 
legally on more than between one and two percent of the indispensable means 
of production. Out of necessity, they turned to the black market.97 They made 
no pretense of it being a charitable activity. In time, they became quite savvy in 
the realm of alternative business. As a rule, they refused to accept currency that 
was depreciating at the speed of light, but instead demanded payment from their 
trading partners in the cities in the form of clothing, bedding, carpets, jewelry and 
clocks.98 The longer the provisions crisis lasted, the more specialized became the 
actions of the peasants who waited for seasonal dips in supply and then sold food 
at a higher price. In spite of frequent controls and restrictions they always found 
a way to produce a surplus or to explain the sudden disappearance of products 
meant for central distribution. It is possible that as much as half of all production 
was distributed through unofficial channels. For example in the Russian occupa-
tion zone at the turn of 1947 and 1948, some 57% of the livestock was found to 
have ‘disappeared’.99 As a result, peasants (for example, in Bavaria)100 were the only 
group that could afford to make investments. 
In the cities, the black market, or rather the black markets were unofficially 
institutionalized, usually in streets and squares not far from the railroad stations. 
The greatest centers of unofficial trading were in Berlin (Alexanderplatz, the Tier-
garten, the ruins of the Reichstag, and in the vicinity of the Potsdamer Bahnhof) 
and also in Hamburg, Munich, Hanover, Düsseldorf, and Frankfurt-am-Main.101
Everything could be, and was, sold on the black market; however, some articles 
played a particularly important role. These were coffee, sugar, alcohol, and above 
all cigarettes. Beginning in 1943/44 when the anti-inflation measures failed and 
the German mark was depreciating rapidly, cigarettes emerged as the main sub-
stitute for money, a “measure of all things” (Erich Kästner noted in his diary in 
February 1945 that cigarettes should be counted not in numbers but in copies).102 
Cigarettes had some characteristics of good money, since they were countable and 
convenient to handle, but they were certainly not sustainable legal tender. After 
97 P. Erker, Ernährungskrise…, p. 75.
98 R. Gries, Die Rationengesellschaft…, p. 107, p. 109.
99 W.A. Boelcke, Der Schwarz-Markt…, p. 141.
100 P. Erker, Ernährungskrise…, p. 177.
101 W.A. Boelcke, Der Schwarz-Markt…, pp. 84–88.
102 P. Erker, Ernährungskrise…, p. 28.
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the war they not only maintained but also strengthened their position as a “mon-
ey substitute”. Since 60% of all adult Germans (and an unknown percentage of 
youngsters) smoked, they were all potential clients of the black market. The most 
valuable were American cigarettes, a “gold standard”, which – measured in items, 
packages, and cartons – formed the baseline for other black market prices.103
While in the spring of 1945 the price of tobacco products was a hundred times 
higher than before the war, the price of coffee and alcohol skyrocketed three hun-
dredfold.104 It was still possible to produce alcohol at home. Moonshine distill-
ing caught on like wildfire. Bootleg liquor was produced in the city and in the 
countryside, in basements, kitchens, and scientific labs (including those of the 
university in Greifswald).105 It was more difficult to acquire (whether by buying or 
stealing) coffee from the occupiers than to distil spirits at home. As for coffee, it 
was only available as contraband. Coffee was usually smuggled in, together with 
hard currency, gold or industrial products from France, Belgium and Holland – 
countries that had colonies, and thus coffee. “People transported all kinds of 
things,” Tomasz Domaniewski noted in Antwerp in the spring of 1946, “but most-
ly cars, which they filled with parts, machinery, chemicals and other items which 
in Germany they had paid a pittance for but which in Belgium or France could 
be sold for a lot of money. On the way back they brought mostly coffee, the basic 
currency of the time without which Germans could not survive and of which they 
never had enough.106 The porous border was quickly sealed, which forced smug-
glers to devise sophisticated or ruthless new methods of operation.107
Dealing on the black market was a crime and thus subject to prosecution. 
Demands to curtail it came from the occupation authorities, the unions, and po-
litical parties (on the left, especially from the KPD, the Communist Party of Ger-
many which called for the setting-up of labor camps for those involved in illegal 
trading108). And there were indeed genuine attempts to combat the underground 
trade. Special police units were created, in Munich already in 1945. In Hamburg, 
103 J. Sandulescu, Hunger’s Rouges…, p. 19, G. Schmölders, Die Zigarettenwährung, in: 
Sozial-ökonomische Verhaltenforschung. Ausgewählte Aufsätze von Günter Schmölders, 
ed. G. Brinkmann, B. Strümpel, H. Zimmermann, Berlin 1973, pp. 166–71.
104 W.A. Boelcke, Der Schwarz-Markt…, p. 109.
105 Ibid., pp. 172–173.
106 T. Domaniewski, Błogosławieni ubodzy duchem, in: Uśmiech z dalekich dróg. Opowi-
adania, Warszawa 1973, p. 9.
107 Ibid. ; J. Sandulescu, Hunger’s Rogues…, W. Trees, Schmuggler, Zöllner und die Kaf-
feepanzer. Die wilden Nachkriegsjahren an der deutschen Westgrenze, Aachen 2002.
108 M. Wildt, Der Traum…, p. 39.
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in March 1946 alone, more than 1400 checks and 150 round-ups were carried 
out. However, the best that could be done was to limit the black market and 
remove it from sight. The dealers moved the larger transactions to private apart-
ments or restaurants, and carried with them nothing more than “samples”. Offi-
cial counter measures could certainly diminish the scale of the illegal activities 
but could not get eradicate their political, economic, and social roots.109 The ille-
gal markets, in a topographical sense, revived immediately after any attempt to 
eliminate them. The authorities tried instead to fight “organized crime” groups, 
which often resembled smoothly-run businesses with access to the occupation 
authorities and German police. In 1946, US Military Police liquidated such a 
headquarters located in a bakery in Frankfurt-am-Main. It turned out that the 
bakery’s phone number had been the most frequently dialed long distance tele-
phone number in all Germany.110
War on the black market was doomed to failure; for one thing, the phenom-
enon was too widespread and, for another, illicit transactions enjoyed public 
support, since they delivered products unavailable on the legal market and also 
generated profits. People were forced to lead a double life, just as had been the case 
in the occupied countries during the war. The historian Kazimierz Wyka, who 
wrote about everyday life in occupied Poland, called it “pretend life”. The majority 
of citizens had problems telling apart things that were accepted and permitted 
from those that were prohibited, since these were all thoroughly mixed-up in 
the context of both ethics and the law. It was often a schizophrenic situation: 
a prosecutor would write down the charges against a black market dealer on a 
piece of paper bought on the black market while drinking black market coffee 
served by his wife who was wearing a dress acquired on the black market. It is 
not surprising that a poll conducted by students from Freiburg im Breisgau at 
the end of 1947 showed that the majority (76%) of respondents were convinced 
participants in the black market should be protected and only 6% believed they 
should be persecuted.111
109 R. Gries, Die Rationengesellschaft…, 220; M. Wildt, Der Traum…, p. 110.
110 W.A.Boelcke, Der Schwarz-Markt…, p. 198.
111 Ibid., 123–125. In 1947 a book was published as part of the series “Law for Every-
one” (Recht für jeden) written by a well-known lawyer Karl Kromer; Schwarzmarkt, 
Lausch- und Schleichhandel. In Frage und Antwort mit 500 praktischen Beispielen 
(Schloss Bleckende an der Elbe 1947). It was written not only for lawyers but mostly 
for black market dealers to let them know what was allowed and how they could 
defend themselves if caught. 
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The fight against the black market was even more difficult due to the widespread 
involvement of representatives of the occupation authorities, both uniformed and 
civilian, who effectively protected their German trading partners. Whereas, during 
the war, Germans had enjoyed a business bonanza in Warsaw, Amsterdam or Paris, 
after the war ended the Americans, the Russians and the British coined it hand 
over fist in Frankfurt-am-Main, Berlin and Hamburg. In July 1945, the United 
States authorities in Berlin paid their soldiers one million dollars in wages. The 
soldiers in turn sent back home goods worth three million dollars, having deft-
ly turned a handsome profit through black market operations.112 For a carton of 
cigarettes, Americans paid a dollar; they could sell it for a thousand marks. With 
such a staggeringly advantageous conversion rate, cameras, antiques, jewelry, gold 
watches, and diamonds came almost free. No wonder that the US Mail delivered 
to West Berlin and the American occupation zone three thousand cartons of cig-
arettes a day. Likewise, food, alcohol, nylons, and gas kept flooding the market. A 
sergeant in Frankfurt -am-Main specialized in bringing dentures from the USA 
and selling them to local dentists. The American authorities estimated that their 
soldiers were able to transfer goods worth $500 million in this way. What was the 
value of the items that went back home? That was impossible to determine since 
all the estimates were unreliable.113 No one has ever attempted to assess the scale 
of transactions carried out by Soviet soldiers who participated in the black market 
just as eagerly, selling their own supplies and items confiscated in Germany, in-
cluding cars. Russian strategies were somewhat different – the buyers were not so 
much interested in antiques or jewelry as in items in demand in the Soviet Union 
such as watches or sewing machines. 
And there was another difference. If, after the monetary reform, the black 
market had lost its significance in the western occupation zones, in the East it 
was only just entering a new phase. It would last for the next forty years. 
112 K.C. Ruffner, The Black Market in Post-war Berlin: Colonel Miller and an Army Scan-
dal, “Prologue Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration” 34, 
2002/3, pp. 170–183.
113 W.A. Boelcke, Der Schwarz-Markt…, 127, pp. 131–132.
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3.  The Polish (anti) Speculation Curve:  
1944–1989
Even though the shortages in post-war Poland were not always acute, there 
never existed a balanced market, crucial for the elimination of the black market. 
These shortages were curve-shaped – rising briefly in times of prosperity, then 
quickly falling again, when store shelves emptied and the lines got longer. The 
Polish authorities and the Polish people faced the necessity of having to in-
vent increasingly sophisticated strategies. The critical turning point came when 
the authorities decided it was time for an unorthodox approach, reaching new 
highs in repression. In post-war Poland there had always existed professional, 
both uniformed and civilian, institutions for dealing with economic crime. They 
could be effective but at the same time even under an authoritarian regime they 
had limitations imposed by rules. The status attached to an institution of the 
state was a stigma and they could not count on social acceptance. Additional 
institutions were therefore set up, neutrally called “commissions” or “teams” in 
order to create the illusion that the state was loosening its grip. These commis-
sions combined the structures of the state, labor unions, and social organiza-
tions and gave an impression of mass social participation or popular support 
for their activities. Until 1980, the authorities had a monopoly on information 
and propaganda, so they found it easy to manipulate public opinion, charac-
terizing certain groups as a threat and enemy of the state and fanning citizens’ 
wrath against them. This was not hard – since the more difficult everyday living 
conditions, the easier it was to drum up support, especially from low income 
citizens, to attack scapegoats.
There were three occasions in post-war Poland on which special institutions 
in charge of “extraordinary measures” for controlling and regulating the market 
were appointed: in 1945, 1957, and 1981. On each occasion they had different 
names and the political, social, and economic context was different. What they 
had in common was their target: “speculation” – this referred to any sector of the 
black market – and a shared ideological foundation. With their fighting slogans 
lifted as if straight from wartime reports, and an almost fanatical conviction of 
their own efficacy and righteousness, they were populist and egalitarian. At the 
same time, the commissions were helpless in the face of a reality that they could 
not fully control and to which they could only react. As a result, the commissions 
became an arena for a game of two players – the state and the people. The former 
had more pawns and set the rules, which they changed at will as they went along. 
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But the latter were quicker, more creative and quick to adjust. In the game of The 
State versus The People, it was The People that ultimately won.
3.1  Commission I: 1945–1950/54
The Special Commission for Combating Fraud and Economic Corruption, which 
was active between 1945 and 1954, did not progress in a linear manner. The first 
year and a half could be called a trial period and it involved looking for a formu-
la, researching the possibilities, and acting on intuition. The unleashing in 1947 
of the “battle for trade” marked the beginning of the Commission’s golden era. It 
lasted until 1950, when the Commission was deprived of most of its powers and 
left only with decision-making functions. We will focus therefore mainly on the 
first five years of its operations.
3.1.1  Trial Period: 1944–1947 
Once the euphoria of liberation had passed, Poles found themselves once again 
obliged to try and answer the ubiquitous question: “How can one make a liv-
ing?” Trading offered the simplest solution, so it is not surprising that the occu-
pation-era black market instantly adjusted to the new, post-war circumstances. 
The pauperized intelligentsia and famished workers were pushed into the black 
market by post-war circumstances. Stanisław M. Korowicz wrote, “Even the spo-
radic black-market trading proved much more advantageous financially than the 
wages of either blue, or white-collar workers.”114
The very same situation could be observed in all the war-scarred European 
countries. And everywhere, Poland included, in the muddy post-war waters there 
swam not just minnows but also sharks. The period of chaos, political desta-
bilization, and mass internal and external migrations created opportunities for 
big-time, profitable business operations. The Second World War shattered many 
social, moral, and ethical barriers. New ways of behaving, unacceptable and 
114 S.M. Korowicz, W Polsce pod sowieckim jarzmem, London 1955, p. 31. There was 
much truth in a joke that did the rounds in post-war Krakow: “Two men are chatting. 
‘What do you do for a living?’ ‘Well, I work at the post office, my wife’s a teacher, one 
daughter works for the county council, the other is a clerk at the tobacco factory, and 
my son is unemployed. But we all live quite well.’ Appalled, the first man exclaims: 
‘How come your son has no job? How can you let him remain unemployed?’ The 
father replies: ‘My friend, but he cannot afford to work – someone has to make the 
money to keep us all, or we’d all soon kick the bucket on those four miserly pay-
checks!” Ibid.
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indeed unimaginable before 1939, became commonplace. “Everywhere”, an in-
spector wrote in 1945, “in trade, industry and state or local government offices, 
fraud goes on, for the sake of making a personal profit.”115
The legal aspect of the economy also posed problems. Small-scale manufactur-
ing and commerce were rapidly coming back to life and geared up for maximum 
profit in the shortest possible time. In a country destroyed by the war and suffering 
from acute shortages, where those who had jobs earned hunger wages and many 
others such as orphans, widows, the elderly and the disabled required aid from the 
state, this caused conflicts and tension. Introducing full rationing was logistically 
impossible – it would have required the involvement of a huge apparatus, expro-
priating all production surpluses from the peasants, which would have resulted 
only in expanding the black market. In the end, a half-way system was introduced, 
with the assumption that food rationing would do no more than complement the 
free market. This partial rationing was expected to protect the weakest and also 
the “most important” citizens from the state’s point of view – big-city inhabitants, 
miners, and railroad workers.116 The latter two groups received allocations of basic 
food articles, enabling bare survival at low, fixed prices, which were expected to 
keep in check the number of those using the black market.117
The reality, as always, departed from the theory. Merchants looking for profit 
tried to avoid the regulated prices by selling (legally or not) most of their wares at 
commercial prices. They were not controlled; this led to absurd situations where 
food prices in agricultural areas (in which inspections were infrequent) were 50–
100% higher than in big cities.118 In large agglomerations such as Łódź, the price 
differential between different districts reached 100%. In the first half of 1945, ra-
tioned bread cost 0.75–1.50 zl, whereas commercial (free-market) bread between 
45 and 50 zl; similarly, pork fat respectively 2.75 – 10 zl compared to 350 – 500 
zl, meat 2.25 – 4.50 zl against 70–180 zl, and wheat flour 1.10 – 1.15 zl in shops 
and between 57.50 zl and 95.60 zl on the black market.119 As a result, there was 
not much to be bought in shops, due to the fact that the official, low prices were 
hardly an incentive to suppliers. Just as it had under the German occupation, this 
115 AAN, URM, 5/31, fol. 15. See: M. Zaremba, Wielka trwoga. Polska 1945–1947. Ludowa 
reakcja na kryzys, Kraków 2012.
116 Z. Grodek, Zaopatrzenie kartkowe w okresie Rządu Tymczasowego (31 December 
1944 – June 1945), PH, 60, 1969/4, p. 691.
117 L. Beskid, Ekonomiczne uwarunkowania rozwoju konsumpcji, in: Badania nad wzo-
rami konsumpcji, ed. J. Szczepański, Wrocław–Kraków 1977, p. 100.
118 AAN, URM, 5/31, fol. 3.
119 Z. Grodek, Zaopatrzenie…, p. 697.
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encouraged black market strategies and unsurprisingly, enhanced the yearning for 
“order”120 – since in the summer of 1945, the average wage covered no more than 
38% of the cost of living. Against the backdrop of starving workers and intelligent-
sia, those who enjoyed conspicuous consumption – thanks to hard currency and 
goods brokerage (maklerstwo towarowe i dewizowe) or wholesale looting (szaber 
hurtowy) – stuck out like a sore thumb121 and attracted public wrath.
An unbalanced market at all times encourages an egalitarian mood. This 
was especially the case in post-war Poland, where social equality was the chief 
premise of the socialist system, with official propaganda based on the slogan that 
the socialist state would provide for “each according to his need”, and emphasis 
on the equality of all citizens in terms of their biological, material, and cultural 
needs.122 Beside loudly expressed discontent, there were frequent grass-roots de-
mands for the implementation of “the appropriate provision of necessary articles 
for all working people in the spirit of democratic equality, or [for] raising wages 
to the minimum subsistence level.”123 Citizens expected the state to act decisively 
and use whatever methods were necessary.124 The authorities were themselves 
well aware that half-measures would no longer suffice, particularly as they had 
already proved ineffective.
120 See: M. Zaremba, Trzej jeźdźcy: strach przed głodem, drożyzną, chorobami zakaźnymi 
w Polsce 1944–1947, in: Gospodarka i społeczeństwo w czasach PRL-u (1944–1989), ed. 
E. Kościk, T. Głowiński, Wrocław 2007, pp. 182–206; M. Zaremba, Wielka trwoga…, 
pp. 509–552.
121 “We don’t have it as good as we should,” a woman living in Przedecz near Włocławek 
wrote on June 6 1945. “We do have a church, two priests, beautiful services and sermons 
but we don’t enjoy it because of the very high prices. We have one store here, the co-op. 
Everything is expensive there, there is one butcher but there is no meat for us there, 
they have sausage [kiełbasa], leberka [Leberwurst] but they don’t sell it to food-stamp 
holders. Well, they did, two or three times, because they sell everything under the table 
and it’s very expensive and not everybody can afford it. Those who have a lot of money 
and smuggle can pig out and booze but those who don’t have money for all that, have 
to look at it through the crack in the door, they can only complain and say it was better 
when the Germans were here because they gave equal rations to all and we could get 
everything…” AAN, Biuro Kontroli przy Prezydium KRN, 225, fol. 2.
122 J. Szczepański, Zagadnienia konstruowania i realizacji modelu i wzorów konsumpcji 
socjalistycznej, in: Badania nad wzorami konsumpcji…, p. 33; L. Beskid, Przemiany 
spożycia w gospodarstwach domowych w Polsce w latach siedemdziesiątych, in: Diag-
nozy społeczne w okresie narastającego kryzysu. Ekspertyzy Instytutu Podstawowych 
Problemów Marksizmu-Leninizmu, ed. Z. Sufin, 1981, p. 40.
123 AAN, URM, 5/640, k. 148–149.
124 AAN, URM, 5/252, k. 24.
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The period directly after the war was a golden age not only for the small fry but also for 
black market sharks: So, the Director has lost 60 bales of cotton, the President has lost 15 
wagons of coal, I have only lost two cars and Dr Szaberski won them all… [a pun based 
on ‘Szaber’ – in Polish, looting]. Karol Baraniecki, Clients of the Special Commission, 
“Szpilki”, no. 9, 26 February 1946.
.
The first decree on combating wartime usury and speculation was issued on Oc-
tober 25, 1944. In early 1945, the Central Office for Combating Wartime Usury 
and Speculation (Główny Urząd do Walki z Lichwą i Spekulacją Wojenną, GU-
WLS or GU) was established in the Office of the Council of Ministers. It dealt 
mostly with illegal trade, speculation, and the illicit production of alcohol.125 
The institution had only a few dozen employees – not many, considering its 
wide-ranging objectives. By August 1, 1945 it had been possible to establish re-
gional departments solely in the “old Poland”, that is within its pre-1939 borders – 
in the Warsaw, Lublin, Łódź, Krakow, and Katowice voivodships; the “recovered”, 
125 AAN, URM, 5/31, fol. 3.
62
post-German territories were still terra incognita. There were problems with the 
city of Białystok where it proved impossible to recruit locally, which prompted 
the idea of sending in sporadic inspection brigades a month at a time.126 Nor was 
it smooth sailing in other cities. The setting up of an anti-usury and speculation 
department in Łódź, in June 1945 caused such a stir amongst local merchants 
and black marketeers that they threatened to create a separate Department for 
the city of Łódź, staffed by their own “ol’ boy networks”.127 The results of the GU-
WLS’s activities were modest. In July 1945, in Warsaw the Office confiscated a 
mere 20 kg of tobacco, 1330 headache medications, 3.25 kg saccharine, 20 liters 
of moonshine, and in Lublin 17.5 liters of moonshine, 3.7 kg counterfeit yeast 
and 3.6 kg of tobacco.128
The first institutions set up to fight speculation functioned like those depicted in Jerzy 
Zaruba’s cartoon The Office for Fighting Speculation, “Szpilki”, no. 9, 1 May 1945.
126 AAN, URM, 5/252, fol. 21.
127 AAN, URM, 5/31, fol. 15.
128 Ibid., fol. 21–22.
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Prime Minister Edward Osóbka-Morawski’s hopes that the GUWLS would repli-
cate the Soviet cherezvychaika office, which controlled all walks of life where offi-
cial routes were being by-passed, no matter what position the fraudsters held, did 
not materialize.129 The GU was a weak and bureaucratized structure dependent on 
the coalition government (from the end of June 1945), not revolutionary enough 
and much too politicized. For conservative bureaucrats, the GU became a fifth 
wheel and on August 18, 1945 the decision was reached to incorporate the GU in 
the Ministry of Treasury. However, neither the conservatives nor the supporters 
of the GU’s independence applauded that decision.130 The latter worried that the 
GU would now be censored and supervised by the Central Inspectorate of Treas-
ury Protection (Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Skarbowej, GIOS). They postulated 
the “establishment of an Office or Inspectorate for Combating Wartime Usury and 
Speculation, parallel to the Central Inspectorate of Treasury Protection (at the 
Treasury), which would be able to introduce initiatives, and with the existing du-
plication with other Offices, would bring about reciprocal control, desirable in our 
opinion.”131 Ultimately, the Office would be included in the GIOS as a subordinate 
unit, but “with the existing powers”.132 This did not end the problems and it turned 
out that the Treasury Protection team would not be able to tackle usury and spec-
ulation, since it lacked the necessary legal authority. According to the Finance 
Minister, there were plans to amend the decree from August 25, 1944.133 There was 
no need to do this. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ 
Party (KC PPR), the real center of decision-making, was not interested in bringing 
to life another bureaucratic institution, which was difficult to control, to boot. So 
the Politburo took the initiative, while trying to keep up appearances. It is hard 
to believe that the appeal directed to the government by the Central Commission 
of the Labor Unions (Komisja Centralna Związków Zawodowych) on August 31, 
1945 urging it to create a “special commission to fight corruption, bribery, specu-
lation, and banditry” had not been inspired by the Party. Especially since ideology 
began clearly to dominate the economy: “through their propaganda and support 
for thievery, bribery and speculation as well as acts of industrial sabotage and 
disorganization of the state apparatus, reactionary groups in Poland […] want to 
exacerbate our difficulties and keep our cities starving in order to spread discon-
tent amongst the working masses so that on the wave of that discontent they, the 
129 AAN, URM, 5/252, fol. 1.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., fol. 5.
132 Ibid.
133 AAN, URM, 5/253, fol. 2.
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reactionaries, may again reach out for power and drive the working masses into 
enslavement by the capitalist and the landowner.”134 It did not take long for the 
Party authorities to react. By September 2, 1945, the Politburo of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party established a Special Commission for Combating 
Fraud (Specjalna Komisja do Walki z Nadużyciami). Administered personally by 
Władysław Gomułka, the Commission was set up at the State National Council, 
(Krajowa Rada Narodowa, KRN), headed by Bolesław Bierut, which served at that 
time as a kind of super-government.135 The Commission faced an enormous task 
and was also granted enormous powers. It was expected to combat the theft of 
state property, corruption and fraud in the “state, local government, and economic 
apparatus”, and it could avail itself of all other state structures.136 Unlike the pro-
fessional institutions, the Special Commission was to rely on the “participation of 
the social entities, and especially on supervision by municipal councils, on social 
invigilation by the labor unions, and on the activities of complaints offices estab-
lished for the purpose.”137 
Bolesław Bierut and Jakub Berman were in charge of developing the appro-
priate decrees. After more than two months of deliberations, on November 16, 
1945 the package of decrees was accepted together with the establishment of the 
Special Commission for Combating Fraud and Corruption. Published side by 
side (sections 300–302) in the Journal of Laws, Issue 53, they were an important 
step on the path to stabilizing not so much the economy but rather the power of 
the new regime.
Since there is an ample body of literature138 on the historic and legal aspects 
of the Special Commission (even though there is less coverage of its sociological 
134 Komisja Specjalna do Walki z Nadużyciami i Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym 1945–
1954, selection of documents, introduction and ed. D. Jarosz, T. Wolsza, 1995 (later: 
Jarosz, Wolsza, Komisja), p. 15.
135 About Prezydium see: Protokoły posiedzeń Prezydium Krajowej Rady Narodowej 
1944–1947, selection, introduction and ed. J. Kochanowski, Warszawa 1995.
136 P. Fiedorczyk, Komisja…, p. 36; Protokoły Posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 
1944–1945, ed. A. Kochański, Warszawa 1992, pp. 100–101.
137 A. Kochański, Polska 1944–1991. Informator historyczny, vol 1: Podział administracy-
jny, ważniejsze akty prawne, decyzje i enuncjacje państwowe (1944–1956), Warszawa 
1996, p. 100.
138 Books on the topic: Jarosz, Wolsza, Komisja; R. Tomkiewicz, Olsztyńska Delegatura 
Komisji Specjalnej do Walki z Nadużyciami i Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym 1945–
1954, Olsztyn 1995; Działalność Delegatury Komisji Specjalnej do Walki z Naduży-
ciami i Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym w Szczecinie w latach 1945–1954. Materials 
from the Scientific Conference March 20 1998, ed. Z. Chmielewski, Szczecin 1998; 
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or cultural contexts), we need only focus here on the most important issues. 
During the nine years of existence of the Commission, its chairman was Roman 
Zambrowski. It seems, however, that Bolesław Bierut and members of the Spe-
cial Commission Bureau had more sway (among others Kazimierz Jasiński – the 
director of the Executive Office, Jan Grubecki, Leon Chajn, Eugeniusz Gajewski, 
Mieczysław Mietkowski, Marek Porowski and Konrad Świetlicki). The institu-
tion that they were put in charge of had been equipped with executive means 
that were at odds with the rule of law. It had the powers to charge, prosecute, and 
pass and carry out sentences, sending convicts to labor camps that were also run 
by the same authority. The Commission’s officials – paid better than in other state 
agencies and allowed to carry weapons – were meant to be the new and trusted 
personnel of the justice system.139
The Commission’s executive authority and simultaneously its core – the War-
saw-based Executive Office – took care of the more serious cases. In 1945/46, there 
were many multi-million zloty cases, in which the perpetrators were high-rank-
ing state officials.140 The Commission was also involved with prominent cases 
such as the illegal trade in pharmaceuticals or thefts of UNRRA gifts, however 
small-scale. These mattered all the more in view of the fact that the Commission’s 
success rate in the provinces had not been that impressive.141 One does have to ac-
knowledge, however, that those in power were realists, fully aware that on the one 
P. Fiedorczyk, Komisja…; R. P. Smolorz, Verwaltung mit Rechtsbefugnissen im 
stalinistischen Polen. Die Spezialkommission zur Bekämpfung von Wirtschafts-
schädigung und Wirtschaftsmissbrauch, Regensburg 2004; L.S. Szuba, Komis-
ja Specjalna do Walki z  Nadużyciami i  Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym i  jej 
delegatura bydgoska (1945–1954), Toruń 2009; B. Sekściński, Ogniwo ter-
roru. Delegatura Komisji do Walki z Naudużyciami i Szkodnictwem Gosp-
odarczym w Lublinie, Warszawa 2012; W. Tomczyk, Delegatura Komisji Spec-
jalnej do Walki z Nadużyciami i Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym w Rzeszowie 
1946–1954, Rzeszów 2007, PhD dissertation written under the supervision of 
Prof. W. Bonusiak. http://www.pbc.rzeszow.pl/dlibra/docmetadata?id=959&from= 
publication (access: March 7 2014). In the above publications – detailed bibli-
ography (especially: W. Tomczyk, Delegatura…, pp. 3–4; L.S. Szuba, Komisja…, 
pp. 334–344. 
139 P. Fiedorczyk, Komisja…, p. 27, p. 42, 83, p. 97.
140 AAN, Krajowa Rada Narodowa (KRN), 214, fol. 180–181.
141 The work on establishing delegations ended in February, (Poznań, Szczecin, Wrocław). 
The Executive Office acted as the Warsaw delegation (delegatura warszawska). 
In 1947, there were 294, and in 1949 – 420 county inspectorates; P. Fiedorczyk, Komis-
ja…, p. 72, p. 73, p. 77.
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hand the illegal market posed a threat but on the other did rescue people in need. 
Alceo Valcini, an Italian diplomat who arrived in Warsaw in late 1945 and stayed 
for a year, was astounded to find how well supplied Warsaw was in comparison 
with starving Rome. “This abundance,” he recalled, “was eloquent testimony to the 
reign of chaos and lack of discipline that prevailed in Poland, and especially in 
Warsaw, immediately after the war. It tempted the authorities to implement dras-
tic solutions, a temptation to which they did not succumb because these would 
have been resented by a part of the population, and would have had undesirable 
political effects in view of the unstable political situation.”142 
The Commission’s first year and a half of activity was based more on pragmatism 
than ideology, all the more so as the cases brought before the Commission covered 
thirty different kinds of crimes – from hard currency and gold trading, speculation, 
and smuggling to sabotage, corruption and fraud – which turned out to be too 
much even for such a specialized and well-trained and equipped institution. The 
Commission’s focus turned then to easier cases such as illegal alcohol production, 
slaughter and tanning, and hard currency trading, which were more burdensome 
for both the state treasury and the average citizen. The particular characteristics of 
the periphery where the boundaries between the authorities and the society are al-
ways less clear (see chapter 4) and difficulties in assembling appropriate personnel 
made any more sophisticated activity difficult. Six months after the Commission 
had been established, reports from Poznań stated, “practically no member of the 
delegation has at their disposal even the most rudimentary information necessary 
to maintain adequately such an important institution as the Special Commission. 
They are individuals with no conception of law and order.”143 As a consequence, 
instead of combating fraud, the Commission often preserved the existing “ol’ boy 
networks”, thus guaranteeing their stability.
At the same time, it was not unusual for the Commission to engage in ex-
cessive repression or for its employees to settle private scores. Walenty Preiss, 
the chairman of the Szczecin delegation, who had earlier worked in the pris-
on system, treated the Commission like a form of the Bolshevik cherezvychaika: 
“During an interrogation he makes the accused stand at attention a few meters 
away, does not allow the smallest movement; there is a handgun on his desk 
with the safety catch off. The interrogation usually lasts several hours (up to 
five) and the alternating interrogators ask the accused the very same question 
a hundred times even when the accused has pleaded guilty […]. At a particular 
142 A. Valcini, Bal w hotelu “Polonia”, transl. A. Dutka, Warszawa 1983, p. 56.
143 Jarosz, Wolsza, Komisja, p. 69.
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moment, Preiss approaches the accused from behind and acts as if he is about to 
shoot him. Preiss uses the same methods even when dealing with witnesses and 
outsiders […]. Preiss’s excessive temperament has found its release in fighting 
smugglers. He has been in charge of field operations, often risking his own life. 
Blowing-off steam at the railroad station where the chairman of the delegation 
was personally catching women with small-time loot did nothing to lend dignity 
to the Commission’s image.”144
In the Łódź voivodship there was a shortage of employees authorised to 
conduct investigations and independently prepare the minutes.145 The Voivod-
ship Office of Public Security (Wojewódzki Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, 
WUBP) in Olsztyn tried to use the local Special Commission’s delegation for its 
own political ends.146 The delegation in Rzeszów was unable to cope with the 
smugglers.147 In the Warsaw voivodship, no-one took seriously the meat-free and 
cake-free (sic) days introduced by the authorities (and theoretically supervised 
by the Special Commission).148 In mid-May 1946, Wilhelm Garncarczyk the 
voivod of Warsaw complained that the war on illicit alcohol production had “so 
far really been a fiction. The bylaws are strict and they should be observed. The 
Special Commissions must join the war against moonshine and keep track of the 
police (Milicja Obywatelska, MO) to ensure that they do not take bribes.”149 Such 
actions were doomed to failure, due as much to the low level of ethics as to the 
low wages of the officials. For example in May 1946, a policeman from Warsaw 
could not present himself for duty because he had no shoes.150 Functionaries 
were therefore more likely to take bribes and engage in their own dealings than 
prosecute the black marketeers. In June 1947, the civil authorities of the Polish 
capital urged policemen who owned vending kiosks to “stop selling vodka and 
abide by the law because they are demoralizing the neighboring kiosk owners.”151 
Soon enough there was no one left to be demoralized.
144 Ibid., p. 73. See: Komisja do Walki, ed. G. Sołtysiak, Karta 1991/1, pp. 81–97.
145 AAN, URM, 5/754, fol. 26.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid., fol. 32.
148 AAN, KRN, 487, fol. 34.
149 AAN, KRN, 508, fol. 5.
150 State Archive of the City of Warsaw (Archiwum Państwowe m. st. Warszawy, APW), 
Starostwo Grodzkie Śródmiejsko-Warszawskie, 14, fol. 36.
151 Ibid., fol. 65.
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3.1.2  “We Have Won the Trade War”: 1947–1950
On July 1, 1946 the peasants were released from the compulsory submission of 
food provisions (świadczenia rzeczowe). It was a canny move from the propa-
ganda point of view, but less so as far as food supplies were concerned. Now it 
became more difficult to induce peasants to deliver food to collection stations, 
especially since the cities had nothing attractive to offer – except for a modest 
and not very appealing choice of industrial articles; former German supplies 
were exhausted and UNRRA rations limited.152 To make things worse, extreme 
weather hit most of Europe hard in 1946 and 1947 – first came a severe winter, 
followed by spring flooding and summer drought. This had serious long-term 
consequences and led to increased tension in international relations.153 But even 
before nature struck, the food supply in Poland had worsened. Peasants were 
now consuming more, thus selling less; especially since their profit margins were 
improving. Free market prices, and inflation, began to grow while purchasing 
power was sliding; all this made the already long-suffering wage earners even 
worse off. The state-imposed prices ceased to have any foundation in reality, 
since they were set much below the cost of production, and merchants tried all 
they could to avoid accepting them on a scale not seen before.154 The official mar-
ket was in disarray, due to profiteering that fed on ever more acute shortages, and 
periodical panics brought on by rumors about price hikes, a looming currency 
replacement, or the possibility of a new war. 
These circumstances allowed the authorities, which had just “won” the par-
liamentary election and eliminated the legal opposition, to start dealing with 
the small private sector, as a pretext evoking the “righteous wrath of society”. In 
April 1947, during a session of the Polish Workers’ Party Central Committee (KC 
PPR), the blame for the market situation was put down to the excessive purchas-
ing power of the cities, unwarranted enrichment of the peasants but mostly the 
“mess, disorganization, anarchy, barbarity and demoralization” of commerce.155 
152 J. Kaliński, Wpływ sytuacji rynkowej na warunki bytowe ludności. Lipiec 1946 – 
grudzień 1948 r., Kwartalnik Historyczny 76, 1969/2, pp. 319–320.
153 See: R.G. Kaiser, Cold Winter, Cold War, New York 1974; A.J. Robertson, The Bleak 
Midwinter: Britain and the Fuel Crisis 1947, Manchester 1987; A. Häusser, G. Maugg, 
Hungerwinter. Deutschlands humanitäre Katastrophe 1946/47, Berlin 2009.
154 J. Kaliński, Bitwa o handel 1947–1948, 1970, pp. 61–69; C. Bobrowski, Wspomnienia 
ze stulecia, Lublin 1985, p. 183.
155 Quote from: J. Kaliński, Wpływ sytuacji…, p. 326; AAN, The Ministry of Recovered 
Territories (Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych, MZO), 340, circular 34, 10 May 1947, 
fol. 1. 
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Unsurprisingly, it was traders who were first in the line of fire; they were often 
meted out the highest penalty available in the Special Commission’s repertoire – 
two years labor camp. At its session on May 6, 1947 the Commission announced 
that it would embark on a “path of strict coercion in order to deter specula-
tors”. The Special Commission sought permission to impose huge fines (up to 
five million zloty) and to close down the black marketeers’ stores.156 The Special 
Commission received all those powers (and more157), based on the Act of June 
2, 1947 on Combating High Prices and Excessive Profits in Trade. Together with 
other Acts passed on that day,158 it became a foundation of the “battle for trade”. 
Warsaw, 1 May 1947, propaganda banner of the Special Commission for Combating 
Economic Fraud and Corruption on the route of the parade; photo from the archives  
of the Polish Press Agency (PAP).
The Special Commission played a major role in this battle. The administrative 
authorities, which until then had been able to mete out legal penalties, were now 
expected to do no more than “cooperate in unveiling crimes liable to prosecution 
156 AAN, KS, 8, fol. 34.
157 Jarosz, Wolsza, Komisja, pp. 5–6.
158 The Act on Combating High Prices was published in the Journal of Laws/43/218. 
No. 219: Act on Citizens Tax Commissions and Public Inspectors; No. 220: Act on 
Permits for Operating Trade Enterprises and Trading in a Professional Capacity. 
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by the special commissions.”159 During the Fourth Convention of the Special 
Commission that took place on June 16, 1947 it became clear that “combating 
speculation is now the most important economic issue in the country. Following 
the war, speculation has become a mass phenomenon in Poland and it threatens 
the economic balance of the State”.160 All the members of the Commission (925 
in 1947 and 1 300 by 1949) were suddenly removed from their on-going tasks 
and without any special preparation sent out to inspect the mostly private stores, 
which at that time constituted 90% of all stores.161 By the end of the year, more 
than 70 thousand public controllers162 had inspected 213 353 retail sales prem-
ises and prepared 45 thousand penalty reports. The outcome was that almost 
22 thousand people received fines totaling more than 531 million zloty. 1 850 
people were sent to labor camps (where the conditions were made drastically 
harsher).163 The fast pace continued in the following year when 153 thousand 
people participated in more than 23 700 control actions. They inspected 455 400 
stores (some repeatedly) and wrote 77 744 criminal reports.164
The Commission was becoming an increasingly convenient and specialized 
tool, used to suit the government’s immediate needs. It was involved in all new 
areas of the battle – against wholesale and retail trade, against the agricultural 
products (mostly meat) trade, against the skilled trades, against private com-
merce (or what was left of it) and artisans, who at this point operated illegally. 
The sheer numbers of those sent to labor camps clearly showed the trend. When 
the Commission’s focus shifted to small trade, the number of people sent to the 
camps for black marketing rose from 518 in 1947 to 1 072 in 1949. First in the 
line of fire was the illegal trade in industrial articles. By the end of 1948, in a 
propaganda effort intended to demonstrate a semblance of normalization, the 
Commission proudly announced that “only a very limited range” of industrial ar-
ticles was now subject to speculation.”165 It was also for this reason that rationing 
was abolished with effect from January 1, 1949, as was the circular of December 
159 AAN, MZO, 340, no. 51, fol. 11.
160 AAN, KS, 10, fol. 92.
161 AAN, KS, 8, fol. 59.
162 The introduction of “people’s” control was a new phenomenon. According to the Act 
of June 2, 1947 public commissions for price control, citizens’ tax commissions, and 
public inspectors in treasury offices were to be created immediately; AAN, 190, fol. 28.
163 Jarosz, Wolsza, Komisja, p. 81.
164 Ibid., p. 104.
165 AAN, KS, 8, k. 103.
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29, 1948, which recommended the use of fines and advised mass arrests only in 
the “most glaring cases”.166
At the turn of 1948 and 1949, this provision applied mainly to meat supply. 
When the worst meat crisis since the war came in September 1948, the author-
ities began to tackle the meat trade, which remained mostly in private hands. 
In the fall, they unleashed a press campaign, accompanied by stringent control 
of butcher stores. The government had been clandestinely working on its “H” 
(husbandry) legislation, which it launched on January 28, 1949. Again, the Com-
mission rose to the challenge: whilst in 1947 no-one was sent to the camp for 
illegal slaughter, in 1948 there were already 314 arrests and in 1949 – the number 
soared to 2 119.167
As long as the targets of the Commission were the black market tycoons, it 
had reasonable support from the public. As soon, however, as it started to poke 
around in the pots and pockets (and lives) of ordinary people, who were simply 
trying to survive, it came to be seen as a typical state institution, an object of hate. 
The labor camps, supposedly intended to put away and re-educate the “enemies 
of the people” – black marketeers, now started to fill with ordinary folk. “In the 
camp [Mielęcin],” stated an anonymous letter sent to the Ministry of Justice in 
December 1947, “80 to 90% [of the prisoners] belong to the proletariat and land 
up in the camp because of the difficult economic situation.”168 If the number 
of anonymous letters is a measure of social trust and faith in the effectiveness 
of the state, the flurry of denunciations diminished in step with the change of 
operational mode implemented by the Special Commission: in 1946 – private 
letters constituted 28.3% of all reports, in 1947 – 8.8%, in 1948 – 6.5%, and in 
1949 – only 2.3%.169
The revolution devours its own children. Nor was the Special Commission 
spared. It had been effective at the time that the communists seizing power but, 
once the state’s structures had become entrenched, it began to interfere more 
than help. A state, and especially a totalitarian state, cannot have two prosecuting 
institutions simultaneously (in this case, the Special Commission and the State 
Prosecutor’s Office). These two Polish institutions in were in direct competition 
with each other. This led to the paradoxical situation that other organizations 
were free to pick which of the two institutions it wanted to deal with crimes com-
mitted within their own structures. The Commission was generally the preferred 
166 Jarosz, Wolsza, Komisja, p. 85.
167 Ibid, p. 105.
168 Ibid., p. 159.
169 Ibid., 98; P. Fiedorczyk, Komisja…, pp. 178–179.
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option for a good reason: the sentences that it passed were lighter than those that 
would be delivered by the courts.170 The Act of July 20, 1950 redefined the powers 
of the Polish Republic’s Prosecutor’s Office, stripping the Special Commission 
of its investigative and prosecution functions as well as of the right to accept 
reports of crimes directly from citizens. The Commission was left with dealing 
with cases that had already gone through the prosecutor’s office and with meting 
out the sentences, be they a fine, confiscation of assets, or a labor camp sentence. 
All these options were made use of, especially since – beside sentences for deal-
ing on the black market, illegal slaughter and tanning, taking benefits in kind or 
clandestine distilling – the Commission also passed judgment in political cases. 
Whereas between 1945 and 1950, the Commission sent to the camps some 25 
thousand people, between 1951 and 1954, the number more than doubled to 
59.5 thousand.171
`As late as June 1954, the General Prosecutor approvingly described the Com-
mission as a “sharp instrument of the class struggle created to implement harsh 
and quick penal repression”;172 as such, it had made a lasting impact in the deliv-
ery of the coercive state. Once the state became less repressive, however, the Com-
mission had to go. The decree disbanding the Special Commission was issued on 
December 23, 1954. What was left was the personnel (indeed, many Special Com-
mission functionaries embarked on successful careers also after 1956), the mem-
ory (both collective and institutional) and a lesson to learn that an institution like 
that is useful as long as it does not go “over the top”: it is fine to combine invigila-
tion and prosecution in one body but sentencing should be left to others.173
3.2  Intermedium I: 1950–1956 
Both the curtailing of the Commission’s powers in 1950 and the disbanding of 
it in 1954 were explained on the grounds of the supposedly stabilizing econom-
ic situation and diminishing number of prosecutions. This was no more than 
wishful thinking. The black market is like a flu virus: under favorable condi-
tions, it rapidly develops new mutations, resistant to the most sophisticated vac-
cines. Even the hard currency and gold trade, heavily persecuted and drastically 
170 P. Fiedorczyk, Komisja…, p. 50.
171 Jarosz, Wolsza, Komisja, 8. See: A. Zaćmiński, Przestępstwa polityczne w orzecznictwie 
Komisji Specjalnej do Walki z Nadużyciami i Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym 1950–
1954, “Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2008/1, pp. 321–343.
172 A. Kochański, Polska 1944–1991. Informator…, vol. 1, p. 533.
173 P. Fiedorczyk, Komisja…, pp. 325–326.
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penalized, did not disappear but rather went deeper underground, giving rise to 
new, fancier, and authority-resistant strategies. Smuggling, illegal slaughter and 
alcohol production followed suit.174
Just as had happened under the German occupation, the oppressiveness of the 
state and systemic shortages precipitated the emergence of a black market-based 
society, in which the creation of social capital and multi-branched networks of 
dependency were geared mostly towards the acquisition of goods unavailable on 
the market. Again, the market supply worsened to the point that in the middle of 
1951, food stamps for basic articles were re-introduced (and remained until the 
beginning of 1953).175 Industrial goods, coal, and construction materials were 
unofficially rationed during that time, using special coupons and allocations. The 
rapacious redenomination of the currency in October 1950, which in one fell 
swoop wiped out two thirds of Poles’ savings, completely destroyed their trust in 
the national currency and inspired spending rather than saving.176 And the con-
stant fear of a new war, prevalent in the early 1950s, coupled with periodic runs 
on shops, encouraged stockpiling. 
On the one hand, all these goings-on intensified the war on profiteering, on 
the other – they fostered the development of illegal commerce. At the same 
time, the Polish black market diversified. On the one side there were the expe-
rienced and highly specialized, wily operators, who had often undergone their 
baptism of fire during wartime; they kept a low profile and were cautiously ad-
justing themselves to the new circumstances, with networks of intermediaries 
at their disposal often outside of Poland, for example in Berlin or in port cities 
such as Szczecin or Gdynia. On the other side were the non-professionals; they 
only made occasional sallies into the black market and treated illicit trade as an 
additional source of income to eke out the hunger-level state wages.177 The na-
tionalized industries created a new re-distribution channel, readily available to a 
multitude of participants – from those employed in wholesale to transport and 
retail store workers. As a result, everyone who got a chance to do so was dealing 
on the black market, regardless of their position or income. At the beginning of 
1950, there were three phenomena involved in the “chain trade”: buying goods 
at state-owned stores, then re-selling them on the free market or to the private 
174 See the monographic chapters.
175 M. Jastrząb, Puste półki. Problem zaopatrywania ludności w artykuły powszechnego 
użytku w Polsce w latach 1949–1956, 2004, pp. 43–87.
176 J. Kochanowski, Dziesięć dni, które wstrząsnęły portfelem, Polityka, 30 Oct 2010.
177 Herder-Institut Marburg (HIM), Pressearchiv, P 6221, Item 3608/1954, The Black 
Market in Poland. 
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retail stores, and re-customizing or repackaging goods for retail trade.178 The risk 
taken was cost-effective, considering that at the beginning of the 1950s there 
was a fourfold differential in price between retail stores and local marketplaces. 
Exchanging goods for food products in rural areas and distributing them in the 
cities was also highly advantageous.179 
Taking the wind out of the black marketeers’ sails was one of the pretexts for 
the drastic price hike implemented on January 3, 1953, which almost equalized 
the retail and black market prices. The price increase, aimed at emptying citizens’ 
pockets instead of reforming the market, changed little. A mere two months later, 
the decree on the protection of the interests of buyers enhanced the impact of 
the resolutions of the Act of June 2, 1947 that had combated high prices by intro-
ducing more severe sanctions with obligatory prison sentences, which could not 
be substituted by a fine. “All acts that interfere with the trade in goods with the 
motive of profiteering” were subject to prosecution and punishment.180
The decree was tailored to purge small-time retailers. Meanwhile, talented en-
trepreneurs soon realized that the centralized and nationalized economy was a 
true Eldorado and a potential source of enormous profits. If one knew where to in-
vest and was also familiar with the law and skilled in filling the pockets of corrupt 
functionaries, one could operate successfully and safely for a long time. Between 
1954 and 1957, a Warsaw resident, one Stefania Husiatyńska, together with eleven 
partners in crime, successfully managed to run a foreign trade enterprise in War-
saw. They “received nylons from the USA and England, which they exchanged for 
cash and then gave the money to families in Poland indicated by their bosses in 
the USA”.181 The group’s turnover was estimated at 36.5 million zloty, the profit – at 
14 million zloty.182 This story was not an exception.
Husiatyńska (and those who ran similar operations) avoided as a rule any 
contacts with official structures, with the exception of the postal and custom 
services. The Stalinist state allowed its citizens quite a large margin of (economic) 
178 “Konfekcjonowanie” meant improving state-manufactured goods. For example, 
scarves and shawls were made (illegally) from linen bought in Białystok or Olsztyn 
and sold at no less than a 100% markup. AAN, KS, 10, k. 103.
179 AAN, KS, 11, fol. 265.
180 Dz.U. no. 16, item 64, Dekret o ochronie interesów nabywców w obrocie handlowym, 
4 March 1953; M. Madej, O ukrywaniu i gromadzeniu towarów jako formie spekulacji, 
“Prawo”, 1953/11, pp. 19–23.
181 APW, Warsaw Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Komitet Warszawski 
PZPR, KWar. PZPR), 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, fol. 39.
182 Trybuna Ludu, TL, no. 297 from October 27, 1957.
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latitude, whether due to omission, neglect, corruption and inability to control 
everything or deliberately as a result of its dependency on the economic activity 
of the public players. A case of a certain Mr. Kowarski is a good example here. 
Mr. Kowarski, who had acquired some capital by trading hard currency in 1953, 
“organized near Warsaw an illegal production of fruit juices necessary to man-
ufacture wine. The business was set up as a regular enterprise. Kowarski kept 
accounts and paid his workers and clerks modest wages. However, the business 
was not registered and did not pay tax.183 Kowarski’s business thrived to such an 
extent that he was soon able to buy a farm, then add or rent orchards, developing 
his own production, which practically monopolized the supply. By 1956 he had 
sold to the state products worth approximately 50 million zloty.184
Often, this “inter-sector cooperation”, which was allowed by the law, would turn 
into more or less hidden privatization of the state. Managers soon noticed that by 
using the existing legislation, which afforded considerable flexibility to all kinds of 
cooperatives (permitting for example purchases outside of the state channels), one 
could scoop up nice profits as a middleman. It is hardly surprising that such coop-
eratives “became hotbeds of a variety of private profiteers, in the process losing the 
character of nationalized enterprises.”185 This was skillful brokerage, and effectively 
drained the state’s less-than-bottomless coffers. It is worth providing a detailed il-
lustration of how the mechanism of a typical, large-scale speculation from the first 
half of the 1950s functioned, even if this necessitates quoting at length:
The profiteers, (from all over Poland, and especially from Łódź, the northern 
region of Kurpie, the mountainous southern region of Podhale, and the southern 
counties of the Lublin district) bought, on a mass scale, cottage industry prod-
ucts such as homespun cloth, wadding, and others. The basic material for the 
production of homespun cloth was wool that came from the farms of individ-
ual peasants or else had been stolen from state textile plants. The profiteers de-
livered the textiles, wadding and other materials to tailors working from home 
who made coats and other ready-to-wear clothing. The profiteers also bought 
from the state-owned retail stores haberdashery and various household items, 
to which they “added value” with the help of their cottage industry workers and 
then (often without bothering to “add” any value at all) sold for wholesale prices 
to the state-owned stores or coop stores at a huge profit.
183 J. Wołowski, Wina i kara, “Nowe Drogi” 1957/7, p. 53.
184 Ibid.
185 AAN, URM, 9/261, fol. 11.
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A certain hierarchy was born within this procedure – from small, local black 
marketeers who hoarded or purchased supply straight from the cottagers to the 
profiteers acquiring large amount of goods […]. The latter put them on the mar-
ket and were paid in cash. 
Disregarding the bans and limitations, the profiteers usually disposed of the 
goods through the stores of the Consumers’ Cooperative (Powszechna Spółdziel-
nia Spożywców, PSS), and other multi-branch coops, and also to a smaller de-
gree in the Community Cooperative (GS) stores. They could take advantage of 
the regulations, which between 1953 and 1955 allowed PSS outlets to buy goods 
from private individuals in certain circumstances (such as shortages in the 
state-owned wholesalers or in coops). The rules of the workers’ cooperatives 
(auxiliary, handicapped and others) permitted the buying of resources and “oth-
er products” necessary for their own production from decentralized sources.
Since the cooperatives had limited opportunities for using the purchased prod-
ucts or resources in production, and had difficulties disposing of them in their re-
tail stores (in the case of the GS and the PSS), they embarked on re-selling them to 
other trade enterprises. The profiteers delivered the goods – and paid the bribes – 
directly to these enterprises (usually the MHD, the CPLiA, the Centrogal, and sim-
ilar chains), received the receipts and accepted new orders for the board of the 
cooperative designated by the profiteer. After recording in the books the fictitious 
purchase and re-sale transaction, the management of the coop made payments to 
the profiteer in cash either via their own cashier or via the National Bank of Poland 
(NBP). Subsequently, the payment due was levied from the state trade enterprise by 
a bank transfer. Beside the state trade enterprises, the Polish State Railroad (PKP), 
coal mines, construction material suppliers, mills and meat processing plants were 
among the recipients of goods sold via the profiteers’ re-invoicing.”186
In a similar way, hundreds of tons of cement, steel products, and means of 
transportation were turned over. The profits from such operations, after deduct-
ing the costs (which included huge bribes), were estimated at millions of zlotys.
As ever, the only cases that we are aware of are those exposed by prosecutions. 
Between the second half of 1954 and February 1956, six hundred people were 
under investigation (no doubt, the tip of the iceberg – it is quite impossible to 
assess the size of the entire iceberg); half of them were arrested – and 40% were 
members of the Communist Party. At the beginning of 1956, Polish trade was 
corrupted to such a degree that “one could only buy the more attractive products 
from black marketeers or acquaintances that worked in state trade or by paying a 
186 Ibid., fol. 3–7.
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bribe, typically 10% of the price of the product.”187 No exception was Toruń, where 
in 1956 there was allegedly “not a single trade or service enterprise, where the 
management had not been arrested or prosecuted for profiteering.”188 According 
to cautious estimates (excluding smuggling, illegal tanning, slaughter, distilling 
etc.), in 1956, the illegal income of Poles constituted more than 8% of the national 
income (21.4 billion out of 256.7 billion zloty).189 This was only a prelude to the 
next year’s events.
3.3  Team I (and II): 1957 (and Later)
The political, economic and social problems, which crawled out of the Polish 
Pandora’s box in 1956, gave sleepless nights to those in power, especially in the 
first months of 1957. The brutally suppressed Poznań riots of June 1956 were 
what prised open this particular Pandora’s box. The weakened authorities tried 
to stifle the subsequent conflagration. They did it against the urgent pressure of 
unfolding events; their method of choice was to throw money at the emerging 
problems, which was disastrous for the unstable economy and the leaky market. 
In 1956, the purchasing power of wages began to climb (for the next such boom, 
Poles would have to wait until 1971, when it went on until 1975). In 1956 alone, 
the payroll budget rose by as much as 17.7% and peasants’ income by 20.4%.190 
And that without including illicit earnings!
Increased cash flow stimulated market demand but despite the government 
flooding the official market with goods before they were informally rationed, such 
as radio sets, motorcycles and citrus fruit, Polish wallets continued to bulge with an 
excess of “hot” money.191 The reason was that consumers had become choosier; they 
were unwilling to buy the usual shoddy goods that had littered the stores for weeks. 
By 1956, it had been noted that the needs of the Polish customer had gotten more 
sophisticated, both in respect of food products and material goods. In mid-1956 it 
was noted that the “consumer now demands prettier, more aesthetically appealing 
products of higher quality, as well as modern and fashionable, which industry does 
not deliver in satisfying quantities either because of technical difficulties or due 
187 AAN, URM, 22/210, fol. 1–16; Szara strefa Października. “Notatka” o nielegalnych 
dochodach w Polsce 1956–1957, ed. J. Kochanowski, PH, 95, 2004/1, pp. 77–96, p. 90.
188 AAN, URM, 9/261, fol. 10.
189 Szara strefa Października…; Rocznik statystyczny 1958, Warszawa 1958, p. 57.
190 M. Jastrząb, Puste półki…,117–118; C. Bobrowski, Wspomnienia…, pp. 254–255.
191 A. Jezierski, C. Leszczyńska, Historia gospodarcza Polski, Warszawa 1999, p. 538.
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to its total disregard of customer demand.”192 Not much changed in 1957; con-
sumers continued to buy some products only “out of necessity or because they 
could not afford anything better.”193 Not only were the goods available in national-
ized stores usually shoddily made but they were also very expensive. Anyone fash-
ion-conscious and anyone who gave a fig about quality and design went shopping 
in the incredibly popular “ciuchy” flea-market, or visited the network of “komis” 
sale-or-return stores (which were rapidly expanding, especially since March 1957 
when the anonymous purchasing of supplies was introduced), turning to the state 
distributors only as a last resort.194
The unfulfilled demand was only one of the factors that drove the rapid growth 
of the black market in 1956 and 1957. The decriminalization of the operations 
of private craftsmen and private trade had many different consequences. Private 
entrepreneurs needed resources, goods, semi-finished products, machinery, and 
tools. They found it difficult to acquire them legally so would turn to a gamut of 
illicit solutions.195 Sometimes the method of choice was simply theft from the state 
sector. At other times entrepreneurs had to run complex trade operations requir-
ing much capital, including hard currency, and excellent knowledge of the market, 
including the non-Polish market. For foreign products they paid with foreign cur-
rency, most often acquired on the black market. Selling the manufactured product 
was not much easier. Usually the best solution was to find a state or coop trading 
partner. It often required corrupting a state official or store manager.
 Those on both sides of the transaction rarely showed any moral qualms. No 
reader can doubt that by now that the authorities had no such considerations; 
as for the entrepreneurs, who could now operate legally, they had not rid them-
selves of the underhand ways and clandestine habits practiced in the recent 
past. In mid-1957, even the conservative Krakovians bemoaned the absence in 
the reviving private sector of honest businesses based on pre-war tradition and 
complained about the “post-war, newcomer speculators, determined to siphon 
off a significant part of the national income.”196 The press wrote: “many people 
192 AAN, URM, 27/2, fol. 8.
193 W. Szymańska, Za ile warto siedzieć, Prawo i Życie, PiŻ, 1957/11. See: Ekonomiści 
warszawscy o spekulacji, Życie Gospodarcze 1957/21.
194 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6221, Item 5276/57, Free Market and Black Market in Warsaw, 
1957.
195 Z. Broncel, Październik i dolary, “Kultura” 1957/116, 39–40; AAN, KC PZPR, 237/
XXXII–28, fol. 4.
196 State Archive in Krakow, Archiwum Państwowe w Krakowie (APKr), Komitet Wojew-
ódzki PZPR (KW PZPR), p. 229, k. 174; AAN, Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości (MS), 
558, fol. 186.
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without any serious capital, experience, or qualifications have rushed into com-
merce. They evaluated the economic situation as uncertain, new economic policy 
as short-term and counted on quick profits, not planning any long-term oper-
ations. In their favor was legislation passed by the Ministry of Interior Trade 
on the re-instatement of travelling salesmen. Such are the people who consti-
tute the core of the profiteers: discharged administration personnel and former 
door-to-door salesmen. They deal in goods purchased from nationalized stores 
or in foreign goods, the easiest to come by.”197
The private, mostly illegal, foreign trade erupted and spread like wildfire. 
Whereas previously it had been next to impossible to travel beyond the borders 
of Poland, now the gates to freedom opened a little wider and relaxed passport 
regulations encouraged Poles to travel in their masses. Emigration, mostly of 
Jews and Germans, increased as did the repatriation of Poles from the countries 
to the east of Poland; contacts with the Polish diaspora abroad (the “Polonia”) in-
tensified – this all added to the cross-border traffic. In 1957, as many as 59 thou-
sand people travelled to the West as tourists, compared with only 14 thousand a 
year earlier! Trips to the capitalist and Soviet Bloc countries were “tourist” only 
in name – usually they were connected with trade activities (see chapter 9).198 
Professional smugglers now also had better “work opportunities” and could op-
erate on a truly large scale. Hard currency, Polish currency, silver and objects of 
art were leaving Poland; the imports were gold coins, watches, nylons, and cloth-
ing. Just a single speculator, one Mieczysław Dudek, between October 1956 and 
March 1957 sent to Vienna 40 thousand dollars, 400 kg of silver, and 2 400 000 
zloty, receiving in return 11 thousand Swiss watches.199 
It was not difficult to sell even luxury goods smuggled into Poland. The de-
mand was enormous. The small but fast growing fortunes of the black marketeers 
had to be invested quickly – the memory of the savage currency redenomination 
197 E. Kaczmarczyk, Handel prywatny a zjawisko spekulacji, “Tygodnik Demokratyczny” 
1957/22.
198 P. Sowiński, Wakacje w Polsce Ludowej. Polityka władz i ruch turystyczny (1945–1989), 
2005; P. Sowiński, Merchand adventures komunizmu. Handlowe podróże Polaków na 
Zachód w latach 1956–1970, in: Od Piłsudskiego do Wałęsy. Studia z dziejów Polski 
w XX wieku, ed. K. Persak et al, Warszawa 2008, pp. 291–306; D. Stola, Kraj bez 
wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949–1989, Warszawa 2010; J. Kochanowski, “Jesteśmy za 
biedni, aby urlop spędzać w kraju”. Masowa turystyka i nielegalny handel w latach 
sześćdziesiątych XX w. Perspektywa polska, “Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gosp-
odarczych, 2008/68, pp. 125–150.
199 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, 1958, fol. 36–37. 
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in 1950 was still fresh. There was high demand for objects that were stores of val-
ue, such as jewelry, watches, and gold coins (which from 1956 could once again 
be owned legally). Construction of single-family homes was on the rise, fueling 
demand for construction materials. The sales of automobiles increased and were 
quickly followed by the illegal sale of gas (the appearance of speculation in cars 
was noted in 1957).
At first, the black market operations were relatively safe and, to a large extent, 
helped by society’s open-minded attitude. “People are used to the black market 
and it doesn’t bother them in everyday life, even if some complain,” a diarist not-
ed in 1957. “We are used to backstreet shopping. People have also got used to the 
fact that those with modest earnings lead luxurious life styles, buy cars or even 
build villas. The atmosphere of tolerance is accompanied by a sense of impunity. 
The profiteers […] feel quite safe among us. Snitching happens rarely”.200 Even 
when it did, especially after October 1956, there was a good chance that the au-
thorities would ignore incriminating information. The police, earlier accused of 
brutality or lawlessness, played it safe by restraining their more radical actions, 
often to the point of idleness. “The incorrect approach to tackling [the abuses 
of] the previous period,” the Warsaw District Committee of the Polish United 
Workers’ Party complained in 1957, “and the relatively great influx of cases in 
relation to the number of employees […] further formalized the prosecution 
proceedings.”201 The police were accused of trying not to “harm” the suspect, of 
being skeptical about the evidence and often uncritical towards the suspect and 
their defense.202 Ultimately, the “condemnation of severe sentences issued in the 
past had led in some cases to much too lenient punishments”203 and until the 
second half of 1957 “many actions considered criminal before were no longer 
prosecuted, such as […] obligatory deliveries, general profiteering, etc.”204 The 
courts and the prosecutor’s office trod lightly. Reality made it clear that the ex-
isting legislation was unable to categorize some of the black market activities as 
criminal; as a result, prosecutions were often dropped.205
Neither did the regulatory institutions have much sway. The National Trade 
Inspectorate (Państwowa Inspekcja Handlowa PIH) had no powers to inspect 
200 W. Szymańska, Za ile warto siedzieć, PiŻ, 1957/ 11.
201 APW, Warszawski Komitet Wojewódzki PZPR, 60/X–6, vol. 1, fol. 14.
202 Ibid., fol. 15.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid., fol. 1.
205 AAN, MS, 558, fol. 65–73; M. Regent, Z zagadnień spekulacji (Uwagi na tle orzecznict-
wa sądów okręgu kieleckiego), “Nowe Prawo” 1956/10, p. 118.
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production, especially that of the cooperatives and crafts. Often, it was the hostil-
ity of people openly siding with the profiteers that was more of a problem for the 
Inspectorate’s employees than the actual fraud. The Commissions for Combating 
Corruption and Fraud in Trade (Komisje do Walki ze Spekulacją i Nadużyciami 
w Handlu KWS) operating at the National Councils based their operations on 
the activists and, in the revolutionized atmosphere of late 1956 and early 1957 
stood practically no chance of functioning effectively. Paradoxical as it may seem, 
the National Trade Inspectorate (PIH) itself contributed to the demise of the said 
Commissions, even though it was its official brief to direct them. The profession-
al inspectors would no longer hide their negative attitude toward their “amateur” 
colleagues whom they considered a hindrance rather than a help.206 
It is not surprising that the black market, built up for many years, now rapidly 
provided a foundation for a solid structure. In 1957, the number of economic 
crimes detected in Warsaw rose by 26% in comparison with the previous year. 
There were numerous cases involving large amounts of capital and profit. For 
the authorities, the black market operations had both economic, especially with 
regard to the “distribution of the national product”,207 and political repercussions. 
They shook the foundations of the system and brought about an economic di-
versification of society. Krzysztof Madej noted that, in its own way, the Gomułka 
government had tried to acknowledge the rule of law.208
By early 1957, the new administration had entrenched itself sufficiently to 
begin to quench the hopes awakened during the thaw and trim the existing mar-
gins of freedom. What it needed, however, was a proxy enemy that could distract 
society. The “kulaks and reactionaries” were now bogeymen of the past but the 
profiteers fit perfectly the role of Public Enemy No. 1, particularly since cases of 
conspicuous wealth stuck out like a sore thumb against the widespread poverty 
and grayness. In the spring of 1957, the anti-black market rhetoric in the press 
and elsewhere began to resemble the “battle for trade” campaign of the past. Ja-
cekWołowski wrote in Nowe Drogi: “The battle against fraud, bribery and prof-
iteering is the battle that the government and society need to fight. Appropriate 
decrees are necessary. Public opinion demands fair sentences but we also need 
a wide and active social inspection (national councils, workers councils, and the 
unions).”209 Debates on the topic swamped the media. Some called for restraint 
206 AAN, MS, 558, fol. 37.
207 C. Bobrowski, Wspomnienia…, p. 255.
208 K. Madej, Bezradność lub represja: władze wobec przestępczości gospodarczej w PRL 
(1956–1970), Warszawa 2010. 
209 J. Wołowski, Wina i kara, “Nowe Drogi” 1957/7, p. 57.
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and argued that, with the improving economy and supply, the black market 
would disappear – but they were outnumbered by those who were in favor of 
the traditional approaches such as control, prosecution and severe punishment. 
More importantly, the authorities themselves also had faith in the saving grace of 
institutionalized repression.
In mid-March 1957, the press reported that the government was working on 
establishing a team at the Prime Minister’s office to co-ordinate a wide front (of 
professional and social institutions) for the war on the black market.210 One can 
assume that the debate conducted on May 3, 1957 by Warsaw economic activists 
was representative of the whole country. The consensus of the meeting was to 
maintain private trade (although not necessarily in city centers) but was ada-
mantly against “all attempts by speculators to conduct black market operations 
under the label of crafts (rzemiosło), and against the diversion of goods produced 
in state or coop factories in order to line the profiteers’ pockets, thereby depriv-
ing the state of part of the national income.”211 Some speakers opted for bring-
ing back the public “commissions for combating corruption and fraud in trade”, 
which were still active in some areas, albeit on their last legs, and spoke in favor 
of energizing the labor unions but most of all for obligatory participation in the 
battle by Party members, for whom fighting the profiteers should be an “impor-
tant part of the class struggle on the economic front”.212 The pragmatists were less 
than impressed; they reckoned that the public activists might be able to encour-
age housewives to get involved in inspecting markets and stores, but would be 
helpless when faced with seasoned profiteers. “Comrade Directors,” they argued, 
“keep sending out as inspectors not the best but the worst employees. Often, 
instead of carrying out the inspection, they go somewhere else. They quickly jot 
down some negative conclusions, take a stroll around the city, then come back, 
and return their report convinced that they have fulfilled their party duty.”213 The 
participants agreed that the most important issue was not ineffective inspection 
but the lack of updated legislation, which would serve both as a deterrent and a 
tool facilitating the punishment of “economic criminals”.214
This two-pronged approach was indeed implemented. In May 1957, the Polit-
buro established regional commissions to combat profiteering. On May 23, 1957, 
the Council of Ministers issued a decree to set them up in a traditional manner, 
210 Walka ze spekulacją na warsztacie Rządu, Trybuna Ludu (TL), 133, March 16, 1957.
211 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–3, vol. 8, fol. 13.
212 Ibid., fol. 15. See: APKr, KW PZPR, 229, fol. 179.
213 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–3, t. 8, fol. 72–73.
214 Ibid., fol. 71.
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attached to the county, municipal, and city district presidiums.215 Simultaneously, 
the Polish parliament (Sejm) was working on an anti-profiteering decree and 
passed it on July 13.216 Taking advantage of the relative freedom of speech still 
existed, the debate on the decree spread outside the corridors of parliament, gov-
ernment and Party offices. Not all newspapers were prepared to echo the pos-
itive tone of the Party newspapers Trybuna Ludu and Nowe Drogi. Some did 
not hide their skepticism. They criticized the decree for its lack of consistency,217 
and pointed out the senselessness of fighting the black market with punishments 
and court sentences rather than aiming for economic normality.218 The journalist 
Józef Kuśmierek went even farther by pointing out the absurdity of the “battle 
with the black market”, which “slowly saturates our whole political life and which 
has already become a new political theory, an almost conservative dogma.”219
There was no unanimity on whose job it should be to combat economic crime. 
Some, analyzing the events of the previous year, doubted if the police and the 
Prosecutor’s Office would be able to rise to the challenges of “organized crime”, 
against which, wrote Władysław Kopaliński, “one should act in an organized 
way. There should be an institution, which would systematically combine ex-
perience and facts […]. I don’t have in mind, however, those extraordinary or 
special commissions but a permanent institution, whose job it would be to sup-
ply the investigative authorities with indispensable information about the object 
of the crime.”220 There were others who were, though, of the opinion that the 
state already had at its disposal sufficient apparatus to deal with the profiteers. 
“I would like to point out quietly,” wrote Jerzy Milewski in Kierunki, “that there 
already exists in Poland an institution with a Latin-sounding name, charged with 
215 Ochotnicze komitety do walki ze spekulacją. Inicjatywa z krakowskiego, TL/224/Aug 
15, 1957.
216 Act of 13 July 1957 on combating speculation and protection of the interests of buyers 
and agricultural producers in trading, Dz.U. 1957, no 39, item 171. The most severe 
penalties (up to ten years of imprisonment and a hefty fine) were reserved for those 
employed in nationalized outlets that sold to “unauthorized persons, for commercial 
purposes, goods not designated for direct sale”. “Unauthorized buyers and those who 
distributed goods bought at the stores risked up to five years of prison. Speculation 
in goods “purchased with foreign currency paid locally and abroad” was now crimi-
nally liable. There was no mention of special institutions designated to supervise the 
execution of the law.
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prosecuting crime. It is the Prosecutor’s Office of the Polish People’s Republic. 
Auxiliary organs such as the National Trade Inspectorate and […] the Citizens’ 
Police [the state police] cooperate with the Prosecutor’s Office.”221 
A large section of society took with a large pinch of salt yet another ‘anti-fraud commission’ 
set up in 1957. In the cartoon by Zbigniew Ziomecki, The Economic Underground, an 
apparatchik from such a commission asks the workers, “If you happen upon any trace of 
the economic underground, do please let us know.” “Szpilki”, nos. 51–52 of 22–29 December 
1957 (courtesy of the author)
221 J. Milewski, Jeszcze jeden urząd?, “Kierunki” 1957/30.
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The pragmatic approach and common sense pointed to the latter solution. This 
required time, however, and the authorities were after a quick and spectacular 
success. On August 39, 1957, by an edict of Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz, 
the Teams for Combating Corruption and Economic Fraud (Zespoły do Spraw 
Zwalczania Spekulacji i Nadużyć Gospodarczych) were created. The Central 
Team was at the Prime Minister office; the chairmen of the Voivodship National 
Councils (WRN) nominally governed the regional sections. The main goal of 
the headquarters was to co-ordinate the methods and direction of the ministries 
and institutions “established to prosecute profiteering and fraud” (since October 
3, 1957, this had included all economic crimes). The headquarters mapped out 
the projects and drafted the motions requiring government decisions, and super-
vised the regional teams. Konstanty Dąbrowski, the Minister of State Inspection 
(Ministerstwo Kontroli Państwowej) and, following its dismantling, the president 
of the Supreme Audit Office NIK, became the chairman of the Prime Minister’s 
team. Its members were the deputy minister of interior trade, the Chief of the 
Police (Komendant Główny MO), representatives of the Ministry of Justice and 
Finance, the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, the Central Committee of 
the PUWP/PZRP, the Main Council of the Trade Unions (CRZZ), Społem, Farm-
ers Self-Help, Samopomoc Chłopska, the youth organizations, and the Women’s 
League.222 The structure of the regional teams reflected that of the Central Team: 
it was headed by the WRN chairman, with the president of the District Court, 
the prosecutor, the chairman of the NIK delegation and the Voivodship Chief of 
Police as team members.
The structure of the teams was expected to facilitate the execution of the basic 
tasks of the teams: the intensification of legal penalties, the strengthening of the 
enforcement apparatus (including the re-animated Commissions for Combating 
Corruption), and in the most newsworthy cases the expediting of court deci-
sions. The teams focused on the most visible and easiest to prove crimes – “goods 
profiteering”. Naturally, this focus resulted in increased scrutiny of private enter-
prise. However, the teams needed “big operations”, which would demonstrate the 
effectiveness both of the new decree and the newly established teams. On Sep-
tember 26, 1957, some 700 policemen and employees of the regulation enforce-
ment bodies participated in the roundup at the Bazar Różyckiego marketplace 
in Warsaw. On September 29 and 30, the “largest-scale enforcement operation 
since its inception” was conducted in the CDT Main Department Store in War-
saw. The sting revealed major “speculation leaks”, especially in the high-end fur 
222 AAN, MS, 558, fol. 197–198.
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department, whose target clientele were certainly not ordinary people. Despite 
press articles hailing the confiscation of hundreds of sacks of illegal goods at 
marketplaces, actual results on the ground were much more modest. And no 
amount of obfuscation could hide the fact that the first anniversary of Octo-
ber 56 followed a year that had been less than successful both economically and 
politically (bearing in mind the riots that had followed the shutting-down of Po 
Prostu magazine).223
In second-hand goods street markets, people tussled excitedly over coveted 
Western fashion items and any clothes that looked markedly “foreign” – which 
was the highest accolade for a piece of clothing, and was in fact a euphemism 
for “Western”. The inspectors’ own “clothes battles” usually ended in Pyrrhic vic-
tories, the illegal trade resuming the moment the inspectors left. Moreover, the 
dealers could easily reach a mutually beneficial consensus with the inspectors. 
“The war on profiteering and the profiteering live side happily by side”, wrote Józef 
Kuśmierek. “One can buy anything and everything on the black market, for almost 
none of the attractive goods is available legally. As for the profiteering-enforce-
ment squads, they will buy lemons for their rickety children in plain sight and 
legally on the illegal market as soon as they have finished their public inspection 
round.”224 Whilst voivodship-level achievements were easier to demonstrate – for 
instance, the questioning of light sentences passed by the county courts, checking 
the licenses of private stores and restaurants and imposing on them the appropri-
ate taxes (in Warszawa, Szczecin, Wrocław, Kielce), or combating the “marketplace 
black market”,225 attempts to activate the teams at county level were not successful. 
County teams were usually left to their own devices; not only were their employ-
ees poorly paid but at all times subject to local scrutiny, which at times resulted in 
physical assaults on the inspectors. And without any means of transport at their 
disposal, unsurprisingly, they “did not develop effective methods”.226
More and more frequently it had to be admitted that the battles coordinat-
ed by the teams were a fiction. Only small fry were arrested, whereas “most of 
the black marketeers keep selling meat on the side, deal in goods purchased 
at nationalized stores, and sell clothes door-to-door”.227 The workplaces – un-
der a formal obligation to delegate public inspectors – as a rule sent out their 
223 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6221, Item 5729/57, “Speculation” scare is smokescreen for drive 
against private enterprise.
224 J. Kuśmierek, Czego się obawiam?
225 AAN, MS, 558, fol. 226–227.
226 “Kurier Polski”, 10, January 13, 1958. 
227 Ibid.,
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“unsophisticated, lowest-qualified employees, just so that the onerous for-
malities and ‘feudal’ duties were fulfilled.”228 People were reluctant to join the 
commission, since it required time-consuming post-enforcement procedures 
involving the prosecution, court, testimonies, etc. – all the more so if the case 
was found to have merit. And, after all, refusal to participate did not entail any 
serious consequences.229 In 1959 in Praga Północ, a large, and not very safe, dis-
trict of Warsaw, from 31 plants only 148 public inspectors volunteered, despite 
interventions by Party organizations.230 Unsurprisingly, many of the cases un-
covered and documented by the inspectors were not followed up “due to irregu-
larities in the filing of charges, securing of evidence and other infringements”.231 
When the head of the team took his tasks seriously (as was the case in Wrocław), 
those interested in maintaining the status quo tried to get rid of him by accusing 
him of corruption.232 Even after his acquittal, an air of ambiguity remained, ef-
fectively pre-empting any future anti-black market initiatives on his part.
In mid-1959, exactly two years after the start of the anti-black market of-
fensive, it became clear that economic crime activities were not showing any 
downward trend. Crimes were being committed “within groups with a mutual 
understanding involving people who should have been keeping an eye on each 
other.”233 Faced with robust local social networks, both the anti-profiteering Act 
of July 1957 and the actions of various commissions and teams proved ineffectu-
al; in fact, it was the police (MO) and the apparatus of state control that detected 
the majority of offences.234 The era of professionalism had arrived. The police and 
the Trade Inspectorate (the latter often rejected any attempts to be part of the 
public control teams) as well as the highest offices of the government understood 
this very well. The resolution of the Third Congress of the Polish United Workers’ 
Party in March 1959 declared that the “protection of public property requires the 
implementation of harsher measures” and that, for the Party, a “constant battle 
228 M. Chrzanowski, Komisje do walki ze spekulacją są potrzebne, “Rada Narodowa” 
1958/42.
229 D. Pick, Fenomen “prywaciarza” w PRL. Warszawa w latach 1956–1970, Warszawa 
2003, M.A. Thesis under the supervision of prof. W. Borodziej, Historical Institute, 
University of Warsaw (copy in the author’s possession).
230 A. Bondarewski, KWS – magiczne literki, PiŻ, 1960/11.
231 AAN, MS, 558, fol. 218–220.
232 J. Krak, A. Mag, Nie strzelać! Rezerwat, PiŻ, 1959/6. 
233 AAN, MS, 5489, fol. 67. In 1957 police revealed 7384 cases of economic crimes, in 
1958–8780, in 1959 – 9287, in 1960 – 10 372; AAN, PZPR, 237/XIV–246, fol. 66.
234 AAN, MS, 5489, fol. 67.
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against the plague of fraud is of utmost importance as is instilling in the public 
a sense of the indefatigable hammering of corruption and thievery.”235 What the 
resolution did not mention, however, was that this goal should be achieved by us-
ing “social” tools, that is – community input. Even the former apologists of the an-
ti-black market legislation from 1957, two years later were much more restrained 
in their pronouncements and pointed to legal infringements, incompatibilities 
with the criminal code, ambiguities and doubts.236 They stressed that the cutting 
edge of a decree forged in haste “is quickly blunted”.237 Nevertheless, the legisla-
tion remained in use until a new criminal code was introduced in 1969 (the de-
cree was repealed in 1972).238 The teams and commissions were finally disbanded 
by the end of the 1950s.
3.3.1  Excursus: Team II
As pointed out earlier, in the investigations of economic crime conducted from 
mid-1954 until February 1956, members of the PUWP made up some 40% of 
all those arrested. These were not some rank-and-file activists from the local, 
regional committees but usually leading Party apparatchiks, who held “positions 
of power”239 – managers, directors, and chairmen. Whether in the metropolises 
or small, provincial towns, a Party membership card was a ticket to a higher 
position and provided a greater scope of action for the holder, while also pro-
viding him with a protective umbrella. While an average black marketeer was 
a small-time trader, party members were typically involved in large-scale theft, 
corruption, and embezzlement,240 activities that fall outside of the proposed field 
of research of the present work. Nevertheless, we ought to refer briefly to the 
discrete team set up between 1957 and 1958 to combat crime among Party mem-
bers. It is difficult to make a firm distinction between the different types of profi-
teering, especially since it often involved both the public and the private sector. It 
was, however, unique in the history of communist Poland that a formal body was 
set up to deal exclusively with the wrong-doings of Party members. 
235 “Nowe Drogi” 1959/ 4, p. 656.
236 K. Buchała, Ustawa o zwalczaniu spekulacji – a inne normy karne, “Palestra” 1959/5, 
pp. 39–51.
237 T. Cyprian, Spekulacja, “Palestra, 1960/ 4, pp. 13–24.
238 AAN, Institute of Crime Problems, Instytut Problematyki Przestępczości IPP, p. 107, 
Adam Krukowski, Przestępczość gospodarcza w polskim prawie karnym, fol. 86.
239 AAN, MS, 5489, fol. 67.
240 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–28, fol. 3.
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Until at least the 1960s, black-marketeers were depicted as a cross between hoodlum and 
petit-bourgeois, with workers shown fighting them. Jan Sochacki, Speculator, 1959.  
Photo: Warsaw Museum of Caricature, sign. 4302.
On October 31, 1957 the Central Committee of the PUWP appointed the Team 
for Combating Fraud and Corruption, (Zespół do Walki z Nadużyciami i Korup-
cją), with Jerzy Albrecht at the helm; the team had voivodship, municipal, county, 
and city district branches. Its goal was to “cleanse sections of state and economy 
administration of corrupted and criminal elements.”241 With no sources available 
on the actual process, we can only speculate about how the teams were set up. The 
economic context was bound to have played a part, since we know how much the 
241 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–1, fol. 1.
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economy and what he considered its pathologies mattered to Gomułka. All the 
more so, since the numbers of corruption cases, inflicting tangible, and increas-
ing, losses on the state sector systematically increased. Only radical action could 
put an end to the growing anarchy in the ranks of the PUWP, tighten discipline 
and abate the mood of “liberalism and helplessness in the executive bodies set 
up to prosecute economic crimes.”242 Their aim was two-pronged: to calm the 
mood of the lower echelons of the Party – which, emboldened by the events of 
October 56 – had ever since, more and more openly, criticized the abuses and 
irregularities. But it was also important to prove, especially now that the end of 
the “thaw” was in sight, how uncompromising the leading ideology of the state 
was capable of being, also towards its own members. Far be it from me to indulge 
in a conspiracy version of history but one cannot exclude the possibility that the 
spur to action came from the Party’s desire to get rid of its negative image by 
washing its own dirty linen, or at least selecting the items for the laundry, away 
from public scrutiny. 
The teams consisted of members of various rungs of the Party administration, 
in particular, those employed in the Prosecutor’s Office, the judiciary system, 
state security services, the Police, the Trade Inspectorate and Treasury security as 
well as Party activists from major factories, Party members within the Union of 
Socialist Youth (ZMS), the Union of Rural Youth (ZMW), and the trade unions. 
The teams were to focus on “Party organizations active in trade, restaurants and 
catering establishments, in construction, on State Agricultural Farms (PGR), and 
in institutions and enterprises in close contact with ‘private initiative’”243 – as all 
private enterprise was referred to. It was not an easy task. Even when the Party 
auditors tried to carry out their duties thoroughly, they usually hit a brick wall 
built by the local cliques. Insiders were fully aware that only through solidarity 
would they be able to wait out the actions of the Party’s cherezvychaika. For ex-
ample, members of the “economic activist group” in City Meat Trade (Miejski 
Handel Mięsem) in Chorzów “organized a clandestine meeting […] and swore 
an oath that in case of an investigation, [they would] not wreck the situation […] 
and all put up their hands to swear they would not snitch on one another.”244 The 
teams at the regional committees were so passive that by mid-1958, the Secretar-
iat of the Central Committee remarked on it in a special circular.245 This is not to 
242 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–2, fol. 1.
243 Ibid.
244 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–7, fol. 141.
245 K. Madej, Siermiężna i dolarowa – korupcja w PRL w latach 1956–1980, in: PRL – 
trwanie i zmiana, ed. D. Stola, M. Zaremba, Warszawa 2003, p. 252.
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say that there was no resistance in the big cities. For example in Warsaw, where 
“absolutely no one is in charge of the fraud-fighting team”, by the end of 1957 
only eight cases out of a hundred had been investigated. In the Old Town district 
of Warsaw and in the city center not a single case had been pursued; the situation 
was similar in Łódź.246
In spite of the lack of prosecution, by April 15, 1 958 charges had been laid 
against approximately 14 thousand party members. Of those, 9 112 were sen-
tenced, 5 809 excluded from the party and 3 280 – reprimanded. In 3 255 cas-
es, there was an attempt to remove the targeted members from their position 
(it is unknown how many were indeed removed); 4 020 cases ended up at the 
Prosecutor’s Office.247 Some were of the opinion that the teams had uncovered 
too much, while others thought it was not enough. What is certain, however, is 
that the fraud-fighting teams became dangerous – a double-edged weapon. With 
effect from the spring of 1958, the representatives of prosecuting bodies (the po-
lice, the Prosecutor’s Office) could no longer be part of the teams (and let us not 
forget that it was the police who uncovered and reported most of the cases).248 
By mid-1958, the teams had been transformed into advisory bodies operating 
within the voivodship and regional Party committees, and from that moment on 
did not have any real impact.
While much has been written on the anti-profiteering commissions from the 
1945–1954 and 1981–1987, very scant source material remains concerning the 
post-October 1956 commissions. This was not so much due to the efforts of over-
active archivists to remove the relevant files but rather the absence of documen-
tation reflected the lack of any real significance of the teams and commissions 
operating after 1957. There were several reasons. The modus operandi used during 
the times of chaos and brutal compulsory nationalization of the economy, which 
accompanied the formation of the totalitarian structures of the state, did not work 
in times heralded as a return to the rule of law. The fact that the ‘rule of law’ was no 
longer an empty phrase had given society a real chance to defend itself. 
A certain reversal of roles had taken place. After 1956, Polish society found 
itself on the revolutionary, and the authorities on the “reactionary” side of the 
barricade. As a result, the authorities could no longer use methods from the 
revolutionary repertory without appearing anachronistic. Such methods were 
246 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–7, fol. 121, 123, 126.
247 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–8, fol. 209–210. Social makeup of those prosecuted 
was more important: there were 1 756 workers, 825 peasants, 6 385 white collar/
intelligentsia (of which 4.5 thousand held positions); ibid.
248 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–28, fol. 2.
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tolerated when store shelves were empty and people desperate. The shortages 
of the late 1950s were limited to more attractive articles, which were at the time 
considered luxury items. The average citizen was now more likely to be improv-
ing his strategies for laying his hands on desirable goods rather than engaging in 
anti-profiteering activities. The prevailing perception was that, since the state was 
unable to minimize the shortages, the least it should do was to exhibit benevolent 
neutrality. 
The acclaimed poet Tadeusz Różewicz called the 1960s the times of “minor 
stabilization” but it seemed that it was Marcin Zaremba who had got it right 
when he called them the era of “minor de-stabilization”.249 There were crises, ten-
sions, and conflicts, at times solved with radical methods (such as the death pen-
alty in the notorious “meat affair”). Resisting temptation, the central authorities 
did not utilize the social mood to recreate anti-profiteering institutions. The idea, 
however, had not been forgotten. If need be, it was the trade unions that were 
given the task of implementation, then held responsible for the results. More 
than two decades were to pass before the authorities would again be involved in 
anti-black market operations.
3.4  Intermedium II: The 1960s and 1970s
This chapter does not aspire to present the economic history of the period or to 
analyze the steps taken by the authorities on the road to combating economic 
crime. The latter was researched thoroughly (especially in regards to the crucial 
period of the 1960s) by Krzysztof Madej, Maria Pasztor, and Dariusz Jarosz.250 
Instead, I would like to focus on the factors that supported and strengthened the 
black market in Poland. Some had been inherited from the earlier period and 
adapted themselves gradually to the new era. The changing political, social, and 
economic circumstances encouraged not only the assimilation of the old strat-
egies but also the creation of new ones such as the tourist trade, which became 
an element of everyday life and paved the way for the black market boom of the 
1980s. 
249 M. Zaremba, Społeczeństwo polskie lat sześćdziesiątych – między “małą stabilizacją” 
a ”małą destabilizacją”, in: Oblicza marca 1968, ed. K. Rokicki, S. Stępień, Warszawa 
2004, pp. 24–51.
250 K. Madej, Siermiężna i dolarowa…; K. Madej, Bezradność lub represja..; K. Madej, 
Milicja Obywatelska wobec przestępczości gospodarczej (1956–1970). Ewolucja struk-
tur i jej uwarunkowania, PH, 98, 2007/1, pp. 49–70; D. Jarosz, M. Pasztor, Afera mięs-
na: fakty i konteksty, Toruń 2004.
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The title of this chapter emphasizes the division into two different eras, with 
not only different first secretaries of the PUWP but also distinct economic, so-
cial, and black market landscapes. Each period had its own turning point when 
the growing economic crisis decreased the supply of goods, leading to a deteri-
oration of the general mood; on both occasions, this resulted in citizens engag-
ing more vigorously in unofficial trade strategies, and the authorities responding 
with increased vigor with counter strategies.
3.4.1  The 1960s 
The Teams for Combating Corruption and Economic Fraud were officially dis-
banded in 1961, but had already disappeared from the headlines and official 
communiqués a year earlier. Just as had been the case with the Special Com-
mission, the change was accompanied neither by economic stabilization nor by 
a slowdown in unofficial trading. On the contrary, the numbers of “speculation 
cases” prosecuted rose, especially in the meat industry. Problems with a strategic 
product such as meat, smuggling and trading of hard currency and gold quickly 
became the main characteristic of the decade.
The Polish black market was fueled both by shortages – of meat and luxu-
ry items – and panic breaking-out periodically on the market. The panics were 
triggered by internal tensions or by a growing fear of war during internation-
al crises, such as the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961,251 the Cuban crisis in 
1962, the Middle East war in 1967, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968 and skirmishes at the Soviet-Chinese border. While in the 1950s 
people had focused on buying large amounts of “crisis” goods (pasta, kasha, salt, 
canned food, candles, and soap), in the 1960s the waves of war panic increased 
the demand for store-of-value articles, that is to say gold coins and bars, and 
hard currency. Although trade in those was still prohibited, ownership was not a 
crime. Recurring rumors of an impending currency revaluation (in September 
1961, September and October 1963, January 1968, October and November 1969) 
served their purpose – not only did Poles deposit their savings in bank accounts 
but they were also buying gold and dollars hand over fist, which caused their 
price to rise rapidly, and they were storming luxury item stores, buying jewelry, 
251 In this case, the list of concerns was longer: “The buying panic is triggered by rumors 
about: war, lack of food supply in warehouses, price hikes of essentials, looming cur-
rency reform, the introduction of food coupons (which allegedly had already been 
introduced in Czechoslovakia)”; APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 20, fol. 183.
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furs, furniture and technical and mechanical appliances.252 In accordance with 
the laws of supply and demand, a large volume of such articles entered illegal 
circulation. The waves of market panic accompanied by continuous shortages 
boosted and fanned further the speculation fever and brought about a phenom-
enon that could be called “(anti)-speculation allergy”.
In the 1960s there were many additional factors that unexpectedly stimulated 
the black market. For example, advantage was taken of the rights of those return-
ing from abroad, in the 1960s – mostly from the West, to import personal effects 
without paying any customs duty. Often, literally tons of pepper, polyethylene, 
imitation leather, cosmetics, and fake furs were brought into the country under 
such a guise. Once in Poland, the goods were distributed on the black market and 
sold to state warehouses.253
The millennial festivities in 1966 were a headache for the Polish authorities, 
and not just because of their religious and political implications. The numer-
ous celebrations boosted the illegal production and distribution of devotional 
articles, toys, and probably alcohol.254 Their production often relied on resourc-
es, which had been earlier smuggled into Poland. Private craftsmen would not 
have been able to continue their production without zippers and haberdashery 
brought illegally from Czechoslovakia.255 Every time goods were confiscated at 
the border, prices in the Nowy Targ and Zakopane markets went up.256 In the 
1960s, tourism became a mass pursuit and was unapologetically used as a means 
of cross-border trade (more in chapter 9).
252 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/775, fol. 25–26.
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255 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6221, RFE-Research, Item No 2823, 3 IX 1961, “Gorale” (the 
highlanders) – the privileged class in Poland; Przemytnicy w potrzasku, TL/249 from 
September 10, 1961; J. Kochanowski, Naczynia połączone, czyli polsko-czechosłowack-
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In 1957, the private sector in Poland consisted of almost 190 thousand 
enterprises.257 With such solid foundation, it could effectively defend itself 
from the recurrent government tightening of the screw (in 1957 for the first 
time and then in 1961-1965 and 1969-1971). The registered decrease in the 
numbers of private enterprises did not reflect reality. Some artisans or mer-
chants turned to the grey zone, which was probably as wide-spread as the legal 
one.258 Or they would accept a job in the state sector during economic declines 
only to return to their illicit business when the economic environment again 
turned more permissive. The number of private operators grew significantly in 
the 1960s with the appearance of franchising (ajencja). The authorities were 
more likely to accept stores, restaurants, and service businesses run as franchis-
es than as strictly private businesses.
A large group (over a thousand in 1966) of private manufacturers took advan-
tage of the export opportunities, which emerged in 1957. What was much more 
common, however, since more profitable and demanding less effort, was cooper-
ation with the state sector, which had at its disposal unlimited resources. Despite 
the periodic hounding of private entrepreneurs, who were allegedly “draining” 
state resources, factories and offices could no longer operate without them. Not 
without significance was the fact that such cooperation was financially bene-
ficial to state officials. The inflated budgets or dubious origin of resources and 
machineries were regarded leniently. “No-one officially knows and no-one wants 
to know what the source of craftsmen’s supply is,” wrote in Życie Gospodarcze, 
in 1968, Jerzy Urban – who in the 1950s and 1960s was a journalist so unpop-
ular with the government that he was eventually banned from any journalistic 
activity, yet in the 1980s was to become a government spokesman, wildly detest-
ed by society – “because in the current atmosphere of spontaneity finding this 
out would mean closing down private artisan industry.”259 In the late 1960s the 
trend reversed – in 1965 the non-agricultural private sector employed around 
350 thousand but in 1969 the number rose to 512 thousand. That translated into 
43% growth in comparison to the 11% increase in the nationalized economy.260 
257 134 000 craft businesses, 25–27 000 sales outlets (not counting marketplaces!), some 
3 000 larger manufacturing plants, some 18 000 transportation companies, some 4.5 
thousand service outlets; D. Pick, Fenomen “prywaciarza” w PRL…, p. 30.
258 Ibid., p. 36. 
259 Ibid., p. 94.
260 AAN, KC PZPR, XII/1795, report on social and economic problems on the Gdańsk 
coast, 1971, fol. 45–46. Only in 1967 r. the number of those employed in craft business 
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Being a private operator (or employed by one) was probably more demanding 
but also more profitable. Even if the stories about the fantastically wealthy private 
artisans or merchants were not always true, their average income allowed them 
a relatively high standard of living, enabling them also to put some money in 
such stores of value as hard currency and gold, and they were also the most im-
portant clients of the hard currency and gold black markets. “We have just seized 
from ‘private initiative’,” reported the chief of the Warsaw Police Antoni Fryden, 
“62 kg of gold intended for the market and $30 000, to the total value of over 
20 million zloty.”261 In 1970, the police (MO) seized 36.5 kg in gold bars, seven 
thousand 10-rouble gold coins, and 3.5 kg gold jewelry. They were sold “mostly 
to the owners of private artisan shops, usually for hard currency.”262 The private 
entrepreneurs had competition from sailors, athletes, scientists and state officials, 
that is, groups with high if not always declared or legally obtained income, who 
invested their profits from dubious sources, embezzlement or other fraudulent 
operations in a similar way.
With the hoarding of gold and hard currency, the internal black market 
thrived; contraband operations became more efficient and professionalized. 
Since the early 1960s, the numbers of “hard currency smuggling crimes” had 
steadily risen. For example in 1963, a 47% increase was reported in comparison 
to the previous year.263 In 1962, ten big “affairs” (including three cases involving 
hard currency) were investigated, with convictions in some of the cases; a year 
later there were already 18 prosecutions (with four involving hard currency). The 
authorities attributed the growth to increased criminal activity and an “improved 
detection rate”.264
1964 was a watershed year. The “meat affair” made the authorities more 
vigilant, which resulted in an avalanche of fraud exposure, greater and lesser. 
Small-time black market dealers were again targeted en masse by the authorities, 
along with black market sharks; this was due both to the worsening provisions 
and Gomułka’s regime trying to hide the fact that it was tightening the screws. 
Diverting attention on to the traditional populist enemy – the swindler and the 
profiteer – seemed to do the trick, especially since parts of society were openly 
demanding harsher penalties for economic crimes. “There is public demand”, the 
Warsaw Committee of the PUWP reported in July 1964, “for bringing in social 
inspectors, overcoming the existing chaos, and changing the methods of fighting 
261 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, fol. 171.
262 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 49, fol. 68–69.
263 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, fol. 169.
264 Ibid., fol. 169–170. See: K. Madej, Bezradność lub represja.
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criminals. Many point to the effectiveness of the system used in Bulgaria. A 
relatively large number of people note that despite the fact that the swindlers are 
being locked up, there has been no improvement in the meat supply.”265
The idea of public anti-speculation commissions was being revisited, now, 
however, introduced by and accountable only to the trade unions. Warsaw, com-
monly perceived as the seedbed of the black market evil, was also at the fore-
front of anti-speculation activity. In January and February 1965, more than 600 
activists participated in inspections of stores and marketplaces. By mid-March, 
workplaces volunteered 1 200 “public”, that is community, inspectors.266 They 
were apparently not very competent, since the following year not only was it 
recommended that the “number of activists delegated for public controls” be 
increased but also that there be “careful selection”; nevertheless, the drive was 
towards a simplification of recruitment in order to achieve a “mass character 
of public inspection.”267 Periodically, for instance before holidays, mass-scale in-
spections were to be conducted. These operations were to be decentralized with 
the help of special city district teams. There was a call to set up community courts 
at the manager’s offices of state plants to deal with petty crime, hitherto dealt 
with by police courts (kolegia).268 Varsovians were urged to lend a hand in the 
enhancement of community invigilation by snitching on any known culprits.269
If one did no more than glance at the statistics published in official reports, the 
overall impression was of a spectacular success – while in 1965 in Warsaw, only 
220 inspections took place, by November 30,1966 the number had risen to 8 829, 
and for 1967, a staggering 20 thousand were planned! Among the participants 
were the members of the unions, police functionaries, employees of the PIH and 
the Prosecutor’s Office, and Socialist Youth Organization (ZMS) activists. How-
ever, on closer scrutiny of the comments that accompanied the figures, a less ide-
al picture emerged: attendance at the inspection raids was extremely low and the 
public courts, which had been launched with such aplomb, barely functioned.270 
All this was mostly just a lot of hot air: at the turn of 1966 and 1967 in Warsaw, 
265 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 24, fol. 269.
266 Ibid., vol. 26, fol. 180, 182.
267 Ibid., vol. 28, fol. 113.
268 The public courts law came into force on July 7, 1965 (Dz.U. no. 13, item 92). With 
amendments it was in place until 1990. A. Kochański, Polska 1944–1991. Informator 
historyczny, vol. 2: Ważniejsze akty prawne, decyzje i enuncjacje państwowe (1957–
1970), Warszawa 2000, p. 422.
269 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 28, fol. 113.
270 Ibid., vol. 30, IS 3/I/1121, fol. 19–21.
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the estimated number of all kinds of speculation cases was 1 500 annually.271 
This was not an impressive number, considering that in 1966 and 1967 Poles had 
more and more “hot” money burning their pockets, and store shelves were emp-
tying at a dramatic rate.272 The international situation (including the war in the 
Middle East) had also had an impact on internal Polish politics and had further 
complicated the situation. In early 1968, the black market exchange rate with the 
US dollar reached its highest level since 1957. The fear of war and the anxiety 
around the possibility of a currency reform not only pushed people (especially 
those who were about to emigrate) toward exchanging zloty into dollars but also 
brought about increasing bank account deposits (in April 1968, these increased 
by 23% compared with a year earlier). Stores were brimming with customers 
searching high and low for “consumer durables with investment potential such 
as refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, TV sets, furs, jewelry etc.”273
It is difficult to state unequivocally whether this was the reason for the un-
precedented emphasis on speculation in the new criminal code implemented 
in 1969. Distinctions were made between crimes linked to the nationalized and 
non-nationalized sectors and those related to manufacturing and retail trade. 
Harsher penalties were meted out to perpetrators who turned an illegal trade 
into a regular source of income. Black market operations connected with inter-
nal export were dealt with separately. The legislation retained quaint wartime 
wording, referring to penalties for “unauthorized persons” who stockpiled goods 
in “incommensurable quantities”.274 It seemed that the anti-speculation articles 
in the criminal code would be implemented swiftly. Meanwhile, throughout 
1970, the Ministry of Internal Trade was flooded with complaints about shortag-
es of: butter, margarine, cottage cheese, milk (condensed and powdered), coffee, 
chocolate, chocolate sweets, cocoa, citrus fruits, pork, cured meats, lard, pork fat, 
fish, some types of bread, and, among industrial products, textile articles, under-
wear, wool, cotton, clothing, paper and paper products, lavatory paper, crystal, 
ceramics, household glass items, coal, coke, construction materials, shoes, furni-
ture, collapsible bikes, silver-plated cutlery, some cosmetics, and spare parts.”275 
Salvation for the market was sought in a price hike. We all know how that plan 
worked out: bringing a bloody end to the decade – and to the Gomułka regime.
271 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 30, fol. 24.
272 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/773, fol. 13, 15, 44.
273 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 33, fol. 118–119.
274 Mała encyklopedia prawa, Warszawa 1980, pp. 693–694.
275 AAN, Ministry of Internal Trade and Services (Ministerstwo Handlu Wewnętrznego 
i Usług, MHWiU), 15/1, report on complaints and suggestions, 1970.
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3.4.2  The 1970s
At the beginning of the Gierek decade it looked like small-scale, traditional 
‘speculation’ was about to vanish from the everyday vocabulary. Even though 
the number of detected “speculation crimes” did not decrease,276 they disap-
peared from the front-page headlines. The prosecuting bodies were focusing 
rather on the rapidly growing problem of hard currency contraband, a more 
spectacular pursuit than chasing petty black traders. The battle against hard 
currency offences waned with the arrival of an unofficial dual currency system. 
In 1974 the government launched the chain of Pewex stores, which soon drew 
Poles like a magnet with an assortment of goods that were irresistible, whether 
because they were foreign and thus much coveted, such as electronics, Levi’s 
jeans or Western brand name spirits, or because they were simply indispensable 
– humble toilet paper, for one – and not available elsewhere much of the time. 
The name “Pewex” was short for “Przedsiębiorstwo Eksportu Wewnętrznego” – 
“Internal Export Company”, a contradiction in terms. This was, however, a eu-
phemism: in fact, what it meant was that the stores only accepted payment in 
hard currencies – not something that most citizens, with obvious exceptions 
such as seafarers, had readily available. To shop in Pewex they were obliged 
to buy German marks or most often US dollars on the black market, which 
came conveniently courtesy of the illegal currency dealer (cinkciarz), loitering 
conspicuously near the entrance. The government turned a blind eye to this 
ubiquitous illegal currency dealing, since the chain had been introduced to ease 
the country’s foreign currency deficit and the authorities were only too happy 
to harvest the dollars and other currency circulating in society, however they 
might have been come by. This meant that the illegal street money dealers, the 
chief source of hard currency for an average Pole, were now – paradoxically – 
involved in a pro-state activity. The illegal foreign trade practiced by the Poles 
now focused on obtaining hard currency. Its scope widened due to the rapidly 
growing number of participants, now in the millions, as well as the fact that it 
spanned a widening geographical area. Besides the hard-currency stores, anoth-
er policy designed to drain the private hard currency supply was the significant 
relaxation of the rules governing hard currency bank accounts (1976). 
Opening Poland to the world was one of the modernizing goals of the new 
government’s policies. In the early 1970s, the growth rates of real wages and 
276 In 1970, there were 2 921 “speculation crimes” uncovered, and 1 644 sentences passed, 
of these – 13.5% were a jail term. In 1973, there were 3 009 such crimes, with 2 161 
(13.2%) convictions; AAN, URM, 32/2, fol. 13.
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personal income household expenditure were among the highest in the world, 
and the highest among the Soviet Bloc countries (51.5% in 1971–1975).277 Be-
tween 1971 and 1975, the average wage in the nationalized economy grew 7.3% 
annually, compared to only 1.8% in the decade 1961–1970. Wages were spent 
mainly on consumption: industrial articles, services (including tourism), and 
food, including higher quality products. While between 1970 and 1975 the con-
sumption of grains decreased by 13 kg and potatoes by 20 kg per capita, the con-
sumption of butter rose by over one kilogram, sugar – more than four,and milk 
and milk products by nine liters, reflecting an improved standard of living for the 
average Pole, measured by the size of the archetypal national dish on his plate: 
the pork chop. Between 1960 and 1970, the consumption of meat per person 
grew in Poland by 10.5 kg but in the first part of 1970 alone, it soared by 17.5 kg. 
“Such an acceleration of the growth rate of meat consumption had never before 
been recorded in Poland or probably in any other country.”278 Had it occurred to 
Gierek, he could have truthfully told Poles, in the words that Harold Macmillan 
had addressed to the British in 1957, that they “have never had it so good”.
By 1971, there were fewer complaints about inadequate supplies, in particu-
lar of cars.279 People expressed cautious optimism when luxury articles such as 
TV (including color) sets, radios, and domestic appliances became commonplace 
in Polish apartments, which were now bigger and of a higher standard than the 
cramped cubicles of the Gomułka era. In 1975, Poles purchased one million TV 
sets – almost twice as many as in 1970; sales of refrigerators also doubled. The 
number of washing machines sold rose by 50%. There was great progress in the 
automobile sector. In 1970, Poles owned some 453 400 cars; this grew to 1 041 
600 by 1975, and to 2 069 4 000 by 1979. The cars were relatively cheaper now. In 
1971, one had to spend 70 monthly paychecks in order to buy a Fiat 125p; by 1974 
this had gone down to “only” 55 – still an alarming ratio by Western standards.280
Polish society was becoming accustomed to growing and more sophisticated 
consumption and to constant prices, which to a large extend ceased to mark the 
277 L. Beskid, Ewolucja konsumpcji w latach siedemdziesiątych w Polsce, in: Systemy war-
tości, p. 346. See: M. Zaremba, “Bigosowy socjalizm”. Dekada Gierka, in: Polacy wobec 
PRL. Strategie przystosowawcze, ed. G. Miernik, Kielce 2003, pp. 183–200.
278 Polityka i organizacja żywienia ludności, ed. W. Kamiński, Warszawa 1980, p. 46.
279 AAN, MHWiU, 15/1, fol. 95–97.
280 Z. Krasiński, H. Mruk, P. Rzepczyński, Handel i usługi na tle rozwoju motoryzacji 
indywidualnej, Warszawa 1977, p.11; Rynek motoryzacyjny, ed. Z. Krasiński, Warszawa 
1980, pp. 44–45.
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limits of demand.281 The good times were all too brief. The more the appetite for 
consumption grew, the more painful every successive market wobble became. 
By 1974, the writing was on the wall. The growth of individual income recorded 
in September exceeded earlier projections, a stark harbinger of growing infla-
tion. Store deliveries could not keep pace with the thicker and thicker wads of 
cash bulging in people’s wallets.282 In 1974, at the turn of August and Septem-
ber, even in usually well-stocked Warsaw there were shortages of quality cuts 
of meat, washing machines, refrigerators, furniture, radio and TV equipment. 
To be eligible to buy a sought-after consumer industrial article, you now had 
to put your name on a pre-registration list, and well in advance.283 The statistics 
still looked encouraging, especially in the five-year range. However, an average 
consumer does not think in terms of macro-economics but rather in the context 
of his kitchen table, refrigerator or garage. “The political team treated the period 
of 1971–1975 as a whole,” wrote Piotr Bożyk, Edward Gierek’s economic advisor 
between 1971 and 1975, “taking the total numbers of goods delivered to the mar-
ket as a whole, and dividing them per year and per capita. The consumer was not 
interested in such an approach. When he had the money in his wallet, he looked 
to buy a specific item – when this was not available, his disillusionment with 
politics grew. The buyers who came between 1974 and 1975 were not the same 
people who had been the lucky ones buying goods between 1971 and 1973. Thus 
the new buyers were not interested in the government’s argument that, taking 
the 5-year period as a whole, things were just fine: since the first three years had 
been very good, and the last two not so good, on average, the five-year period 
was not too bad.”284
The situation was, however, getting worse. An expert’s report (written in the 
early 1980s) on the economy of the years 1974–1977 pointed out that the “growing 
difficulties in purchasing goods and services, the diminishing variety and quality 
of supply, the rapidly growing prices, the rising black-market dollar exchange rate, 
the widening of the range of goods only available to those holding hard currency, 
the limiting of the availability of goods through the introduction of coupon and 
allocation schemes, and the pessimistic view of the future caused by the over-
all worsening market and general social and economic situation prompted in-
creased spending of current earned income on ‘jam today’ (the general perception 
281 L. Beskid, Ekonomiczne…, pp.168–169.
282 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/465, fol. 1–2.
283 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 55, fol. 61–63.
284 P. Bożyk, Marzenia i rzeczywistość czyli Anatomia polskiego kryzysu, Warszawa 1983, 
p. 89.
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was that ‘tomorrow it’s all bound to be more expensive and there will be less of 
everything’). This whittled away savings, put aside with the goal of buying a spe-
cific product, directing instead life savings accumulated to safeguard the future 
towards investing in goods, hard currency, luxury items, and gold.”285
In 1974, the rising cost of living drove many people, especially those for whom 
the raison d’être had become “to have” rather than merely “to be”, to develop var-
ious sophisticated extramural income generating operations among which black 
market strategies played an increasingly important role.286 Between 1975 and 
1980, employment in the more lucrative private sector (excluding agriculture) 
grew significantly. Between 1970 and 1975, the number of private operators rose 
from 442 300 to 469 200 and in 1980 the official number was 602 000 (the greatest 
growth was recorded among enterprise owners and co-owners). During the 1970s, 
the previously negative collective image of the private entrepreneur, derogatively 
referred to as a “prywaciarz”, changed noticeably: the “cult of successful business, 
energy, initiative was coming to the fore. The entrepreneurial spirit, the ability 
to get things done, involvement in “business” were valued by families. Children 
were raised with those values in mind and their parents contrasted them with the 
apathy and passivity in workplaces throughout the nationalized sector.”287 These 
different perceptions were, however, accompanied by a slackening of moral norms 
and increasing condoning of actions incompatible with the letter of the law.288
In the mid-1970s, terms such as the “black market” and “speculation” gradu-
ally made a re appearance; first, in Party or police confidential reports, then – in 
the press. They were in continual use from the summer of 1976 onwards when 
due to the quickly called off price hike, panic on the market, and the introduction 
of sugar rationing, unofficial distribution channels immediately sprang into life 
(based on illicit “leaking” of goods from the nationalized trade system, illegal 
produce trading etc.). The authorities reacted swiftly, setting up teams author-
ized to combat illegal food trading (mostly of meat) and to inspect trade and 
transportation.289 The teams were to be created at all levels, from the munic-
ipality to voivodship, and include representatives of the PIH, financial offices, 
and the labor unions. In June 1977, the Politburo of the Polish United Workers’ 
Party adopted a resolution to continue actions to protect “public order and social 
285 AAN, Instytut Rynku Wewnętrznego i Usług, p. 317, fol. 42–43.
286 See: P. Gliński, Ekonomiczne uwarunkowania…, op. cit.
287 Ibid., p.163.
288 See: Prywaciarze 1945–89, ed. A. Knyt, A. Wancerz-Gluza, Warszawa 2001; the au-
thor’s correspondence with R. Grzelak, September–November 2002. 
289 AAN, KC PZPR, WO, 1075, unpag.
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discipline in the country.”290 That they did so is hardly surprising – in 1977, the 
crime rate rose by 6% with economic crime up by 8%. The food sector, trade, con-
struction, transportation (the huge amount of 3.6 billion zloty worth of gas had 
been stolen!) were considered the most threatened branches of the economy.291
In the early 1977, sociologists from Poznań researched the extent of the short-
ages and found that they had been experienced by 83% of households. In the 
cities around 85% of households had searched unsuccessfully for a product, 41% 
had been looking for three products (71% and 33% respectively in rural areas).292 
In the third quarter of 1977, there were shortages of 130 products to a total val-
ue of 15.6 billion zloty, which was one third more than the “highest shortages 
recorded during the most difficult periods for the markets.”293 In the following 
quarter, the shortages rose to some 25 billion zloty! Not only were there short-
ages of meat but also of textiles, clothing, shoes, household appliances, TV and 
radio equipment, cars, furniture, coal, and even soap and toothpaste.294
In a poll conducted in 1975, five thousand people were asked to identify neg-
ative phenomena in Poland. Fifty nine percent of the respondents named alco-
holism, 51% arrogance and rudeness of bureaucrats, 48% mismanagement and 
wastefulness, 47% hooliganism, 38% nepotism and 31% bribery. At that time, 
no-one mentioned speculation.295 Two years later, alcoholism had become even 
more prominent (62.7%) but in second place came “selling under the counter” – 
as many as 59.1% of the respondents had encountered the practice very often or 
often (16.1% had encountered it rarely, 17% – never).296 As was to be expected, 
there were calls for increased vigilance. Almost 40% of respondents stressed the 
importance of public supervision. “There is a need for frequent and unexpected 
inspections, especially in stores and local community offices. People should get 
used to having their every step watched and know that they cannot get away with 
290 Ibid., 3210, unpag.
291 J. Maziarski, Przestępczość gospodarcza, “Polityka”/43, Oct 28, 1978. The report of 
July 1977 Social and economic policies after Fifth Session of CC of the PUWP stated 
blatantly that “the black market and speculation keep growing”; Raporty dla Edwarda 
Gierka, Warszawa 1988, p. 65.
292 W. Krasucka, Spekulacja (wybrane zagadnienia), “Studia Kryminologiczne, Krymi-
nalistyczne i Penitencjarne” 10/1979, pp. 152–153.
293 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/790, fol. 23.
294 Ibid., fol. 68–73.
295 Z. Sufin, Tendencje w opiniach i postawach społeczeństwa polskiego w latach 1975–
1976, in: Diagnozy społeczne w okresie narastającego kryzysu…, p. 10.
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anything.” There were also voices that “trade inspections will not help much if 
they are not accompanied by additional supplies of goods.”297
The increased trade supervision executed by professional institutions such as 
the state Police (MO), the National Trade Inspectorate (PIH), the National Price 
Commission (PKC) and the public commissions still affiliated with the Main 
Council of Labor Unions (CRZZ) was clearly noticeable (with 182 762 inspec-
tions in 1976 and 228 637 in 1977).298 The press also took up more frequently the 
issue of public involvement in inspections. “Informal, public supervision”, wrote 
Jacek Maziarski in the Polityka weekly, “has a good chance of becoming the best 
tool for combating fraud.”299 Only under certain conditions, however: “In order 
to arouse public opinion the enclaves of ambiguity need to be consistently re-
duced. Where the public interest is at stake, we must ensure decisively that there 
is no question of holy cows, taboos or shameful dissembling.”300 The journalist 
got to the root of the problem here – faced with the critical market situation, 
Poles were getting used to unorthodox methods of finding ways round problems. 
For the hundreds of thousands inspections and countrywide actions, hailed as a 
huge success (for example the operation Rynek, conducted in December 1979 by 
the police, the PIH and public inspectors301), brought meagre results, dispropor-
tionate to the effort. While in 1975, 3 140 cases of speculation had been prose-
cuted in Poland and 2 805 people had been sentenced (of which 11.2% had been 
sent to jail), in 1977 there were 4351 cases (3 090 sentences including 18.6% of 
unsuspended prison sentences). In 1979, 4 727 speculation cases had been re-
ported, in 1980 – 5 229; respectively 4 102 and 4 700 people had been put before 
a judge. A smaller percentage ended in prison (7.5% in 1979 and 5.6% in 1989).302 
Was this a sign of the weakness of the authorities – or the power of society? The 
summer of 1980 brought answers to this question.
297 Społeczeństwo polskie w drugiej połowie lat siedemdziesiątych…, pp. 193–194.
298 W. Krasucka, Spekulacja…, p. 161. See: AAN, KC PZPR, XI/790, Note on the func-
tioning of retail trade in Warsaw, October 11, 1977, fol. 96.
299 J. Maziarski, Przestępczość gospodarcza, “Polityka”, 43, October 28, 1978.
300 Ibid.
301 Milicyjna akcja “Rynek”, ŻW, no. 302 /December 24–26, 1979.
302 AAN, URM, 32/2, fol. 13.
 105
3.5  Commission II: 1981–1987
3.5.1  The Road to “Speculation Hell”
Following the fiasco of the so-called price reform of June 1976, the authorities 
tried to fight the growing crisis by limiting (not very successfully) wage increas-
es and by raising prices, often by introducing “commercial prices”, as they were 
known. Both the shortages and the methods of dealing with them aggravated the 
public mood. “There is a negative perception of commercial stores and the Pewex 
chain”, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) noted in the early August of 1978, 
which “gives rise to a well-founded suspicion that society has been divided into 
‘sectors’ or ‘castes’ of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, and that the stores service private 
entrepreneurs, thieves, and black marketeers. This situation is perceived as a con-
tradiction of socialist principles…”303 It is not surprising that the poor were the 
first to rebel. The decision of the Government Price Commission (PKC) on June 
24, 1980 to raise the prices of meat products with effect from July 1 was the last 
straw. Poles could have probably got over “commercializing”, that is to say raising, 
the prices of the already expensive, and thus out of reach, meat cuts such as beef 
tenderloin, goose, and duck. But the sudden increases in price of run-of-the-mill 
basic subsistence foods in workplace cafeterias were a different story altogether. 
The price hike was introduced in the same arrogant way as the previous one: 
abruptly, without consultation, often without informing the workplace manage-
ment or the local Party cells. For example in Wrocław, the “Party secretaries were 
generally shocked by the new prices they saw in the cafeterias and buffets. In 
most places, the managers only learnt about the new prices from their cafeteria 
workers.”304 Strikes erupted at several factories, the largest – in Lublin, in mid-Ju-
ly.305 The authorities assumed that the strikes could be extinguished with money. 
It turned out, however, that this method was only tinkering with the flames. The 
real blaze exploded on the Baltic coast on August 14, 1980.
The lists of demands put forward in August 1980 included economic items 
(often prioritized before political): wage increases, full market provision, and 
doing away with the [high] “commercial” prices, internal export, and meat 
303 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/815, fol. 11.
304 AAN, KC PZPR, WO, 3337, fol. 8.
305 See: Zapowiedź sierpniowego przełomu. Meldunki MSW o sytuacji w kraju w okresie 
1 lipca – 16 sierpnia 1980, ed. K. Dubiński, “Zeszyty Historyczne” (Paris) 2000, no. 
133, pp. 69–164.
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rationing.306 The historic 21 Demands that the Strike Committee presented to 
the government delegation at the Gdańsk Shipyard on August 17, 1980 were no 
exception. The easiest for the authorities to accept were the wage demands; as far 
as the demands concerning provisions were concerned (no. 10, no. 11, and no. 
13), all they could do was show good will and make promises. Little could the 
strikers and the authorities know that the then-existing level of market supplies, 
perceived as critically inadequate at the time, would soon – with hindsight – be 
remembered fondly. 
The rationing, already promised in the August agreements, was a lesser evil and 
had been accepted by most of the population.307 After long and stormy consulta-
tions, on April 1, 1981 the authorities introduced meat ration stamps, and in the 
following months also ration stamps for grain, rice, fats, soap, washing detergent, 
chocolate, alcohol, and cigarettes. These ration stamps are not to be confused with 
the federal aid system that has functioned in the USA as a form of food-pur-
chasing assistance for no-income and low-income people, where a stamp entitles 
the bearer to swap it for food without payment. The Polish ration stamps were 
no free-meal ticket. All that the Polish food stamps and other stamps in Poland 
entitled the bearer to – and that only after having spent many hours in the inter-
minably long lines that came to be synonymous with the era – was being eligible 
to buy the item for which the stamp had been issued. Without a ration stamp, no 
purchase was possible at all. Moreover, the allocations of food and daily utility 
items were far from quantities that we now think adequate for average needs and 
the allocation was based on the government’s assessment of an individual’s needs. 
For example, an office worker was entitled to buy 2.5 kg of meat a month, a man-
ual worker – 4.5 kg whereas a miner – a more acceptable eight kg. 
Food ration stamps further upset the market and created an even bigger mess. 
Paradoxically, what the rationing, which applied to half of the total value of food 
sales (more, if one includes alcohol) did was to limit radically buying oppor-
tunities. Poles had money (the August wage increases had provided them with 
additional cash) and they were anxious to spend it on any kind of durable. In 
mid-1981, the stampede for industrial products began – they immediately dis-
appeared from the market. In 1979, market shortages amounted to 22 billion 
zloty; in 1980 they reached 81 billion zloty. In 1981, they were estimated at 278 
306 Postulaty 1970–71 i 1980. Materiały źródłowe do dziejów wystąpień pracowniczych 
w latach 1970–1971 i 1980 (Gdańsk i Szczecin), ed. B. Chmiel, E. Kaczyńska, Warszawa 
1998.
307 See articles in: Umowa o kartki, ed. J. Kurczewski, Warszawa 2004; K. Cegieła, Kartki 
na szczęście. Reglamentacja dóbr w Polsce Ludowej, “Mówią Wieki” 2002/4, pp. 23–29. 
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billion zloty, while the disposable financial resources at the time were estimated 
(including pre-payments etc.) at 496 billion (129 billion zloty in 1979 and 173 
billion zloty in 1980).308
The huge, unquenchable demand for food, alcohol, cigarettes and industrial 
articles triggered new, unofficial ways of accessing goods and improved the ex-
isting methods. This had also happened during provision crises in the past but 
this time the huge scale of the phenomenon was in a league of its own. “Every 
shortage of output,” an official report noted in August 1981, “is immediately tak-
en advantage of by speculators, […] who intercept the goods in question and 
put them on the market using channels that enable them, whether semi-legally 
or entirely illegally, to gain high profits at the expense of consumers. As a result, 
the black marketeers hold the whole of society in a dictatorial economic grip.”309 
The economic exchange between cities and rural areas became, to a large degree, 
privatized (see chapter 5). Barter exchange developed between retail stores and 
factories. Goods travelled between producers and wholesale or retail (they were 
stolen or re-distributed through other channels at higher prices, while all that 
the retail stores received was the payment due at the official prices, and invoic-
es). Barter also took place between individuals. For example, even tee-totalers 
made sure that they had bought their allocation of vodka in the knowledge that 
it would be useful to swap for some other item in short supply. Some goods de-
livered to the stores stayed at the back of the store and were distributed through 
the back door, in more senses than one. From there they often ended up in street 
booths or marketplaces. The leaky rationing system created numerous oppor-
tunities – the coupons could be altogether ignored by the store personnel, or 
illegally obtained, which allowed those who knew the store personnel, to shop 
at state prices. Indeed, “contacts” in shops was the byword of the era. This led to 
new modes of social behavior. The shop assistant in the local butcher’s, baker’s or 
grocer’s was a person to cultivate and shower with small gifts, if one wanted to 
ensure that the family was not to run short of food. 
The strategies described above developed both on a large scale resulting in 
effective black market enterprises as well as on an individual scale, helping the 
most underprivileged groups such as pensioners, and people with disabilities to 
survive on day-to-day basis. A “professional” black marketeer complained to a 
reporter: “Thousands of riffraff are hanging around, thousands of rookies who 
308 AAN, Instytut Rynku Wewnętrznego i Usług (IRWiU), 317, Warszawa, fol. 47–48, 
52–54.
309 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 3.
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are trying to work an angle; grandmas, pensioners, salesgirls, drivers, assorted 
petty floaters and bunglers, they have all made a mess of a decent business.”310 
From the end of 1980, the terms “speculation” and “black market” (especially 
in relation to food) permanently entered both the media and colloquial Polish. 
The police (MO), and the operations of the PIH and those undertaken by the 
Teams for Market Control (Zespoły ds Kontroli Rynku) set up in September 
1980 were not very effective. A journalist commented that “fighting speculation 
is reminiscent of fighting the proverbial dragon: when you cut off the head, an-
other one immediately grows in its place.”311
Let’s not forget that it was the higher, “commercial” prices – set a year earlier 
and only on a small part of goods, at that, and which were far from stable – 
that had triggered the public protests. Now, even though the prices asked, and 
obtained, on the black market were much higher, it became an important and 
sometimes only way of filling the gaps in supply. However, only groups in eco-
nomically and politically privileged positions could satisfy their needs by taking 
advantage of the black market. The weak and the poor were left behind. The so-
cial stratification was becoming increasingly delineated by the individual’s ability 
to access goods. As had happened the year before, by mid-1981, the threat of 
social revolt became real. Only, this time, the protesters enjoyed the support of 
the 10-million strong Independent Self-governing Trade Union Solidarity. The 
authorities were forced into taking a stand. 
3.5.2  Provisorium: The Extraordinary Commission:  
August 10 – October 12, 1981
The government’s reaction was surprisingly slow in coming, considering that 
already by February 1981, Wojciech Jaruzelski had described the combating of 
speculation as “one of the main tasks for the state and economic administration 
apparatus”,312 when presenting a program for economic and social stabilization 
before the Sejm. In Częstochowa, an anti-speculation commission was set up 
in February 1981, and by mid-March – in Gdańsk. In early June, the District 
Coordination Team for Combating Fraud (Wojewódzki Zespół Koordynacyjny 
ds Zwalczania Spekulacji) was established in Łódź. It included a “rapid response 
310 S. Drozdowski, Tajne kanały czarnego rynku, “Słowo Powszechne” September 8, 1981.
311 A. Kołodziejski, Cielęcina… za dolary. Czy nie można opanować czarnego rynku ży-
wnościowego?, TL/ 298, December 15, 1980.
312 AAN, URM, 32/2, fol. 4.
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team to deal with all irregularities in trade”.313 The authorities had considered an 
anti-speculation law already in April when they introduced the rationing, how-
ever, the Rubicon was not yet being crossed. We can only assume that although 
the authorities hoped that the existing institutions and legislation314 would prove 
effective, they were also aware that society’s willingness to accept radical steps 
would increase in proportion to the length of the lines in front of the almost 
empty stores. If so, they were right. In spring 1981, a significant media campaign 
started – and not necessarily instigated by the authorities –urging them to un-
dertake an anti-speculation drive. “The newspapers,” Anna Matałowska wrote in 
Polityka, “following in the footsteps of the government, are pushing for an on-
slaught against speculation. The factory workers and other state employees are 
echoing the demands, putting the policy forward as the number one priority for 
trade in the near future.”315 At the same time, there was no shortage of others, 
who pointed out the senselessness and futility of the institutionalization of an-
ti-speculation activities.316 In front of the TV cameras on August 3 1981, Deputy 
Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski did not hide his concern. He pointed out 
the lessons of Poland under the Nazi occupation: even the prospect of death or 
the concentration camp had not held back the illegal trade. 
In the spring and summer of 1981, very few heeded such voices. Radical and 
decisive actions were gaining popular support.317 In June 1981, the market col-
lapsed. Even those who had until recently praised the introduction of rationing 
because it put had ham back on their tables, now started complaining. The ra-
tioning spread to include more and more products. People waited in long lines 
even to buy bread. It was not unusual to see on the shelves of a general grocery 
store nothing but an artful stretch of bottles of vinegar – the store manager mak-
ing a vain attempt to detract from the absence of any other products in stock. But 
finally, sometimes even the vinegar vanished from the shelves. “Generally speak-
ing, the market has collapsed,” noted Mieczysław Rakowski on July 27, 1981. 
“There are nightmarish lines, people buying out anything that shows up. Workers 
313 AAN, URM, 32/9, k. 27–28; Ibid., 21/113, fol. 57, 64–65. About Łódź, see: W. Pawłowski, 
Współczesne Janosiki, “Polityka”, no. 35, August 29, 1981. Such a commission appeared 
in the Warsaw voivodship only at the turn of July and August 1981: ŻW, no. 182, 
August 7, 1981.
314 Projekt ustawy o zwalczaniu spekulacji przekazany do Sejmu. Wypowiedź profesora 
Zygmunta Rybickiego dla PAP, ŻW, no. 188, August 14, 1981. 
315 A. Matałowska, Bazar pod obstrzałem, “Polityka”, no. 19, May 9, 1981.
316 S. Podemski, Spekulacja i prawo, “Polityka”, no. 33, August 15, 1981.
317 See: ŻW, July 30, and August 5, 1981.
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from big plants are protesting against the lower rations. The government is be-
ing accused of deliberately starving the nation, of its biological annihilation and 
similar nonsense.”318
Indeed, already in June 1981, the Independent Trade Union Solidarity began 
to blame the authorities for their helplessness in the face of the crisis and repeat-
edly organized protests against insufficient supplies.319 A serious conflict erupted 
when on July 23, the government announced it would simultaneously decrease 
meat rations and raise prices. In its meeting the following day, Solidarity’s Na-
tional Cooordinating Commission (Krajowa Komisja Porozumiewawcza) ham-
mered the economic policy of the government. “The daily life of Polish families,” 
the Commission communiqué read, “is a torment.” The union’s main goal was to 
guarantee “basic living conditions for the nation”. This time, Solidarity did more 
than merely call on the authorities to carry out reforms – it promised to take the 
initiative into its own hands. A call went out to local government and Solidarity 
branches to organize effective distribution of goods. There was a plan to organize 
commissions throughout all the regions “to control the continuing production, 
supply, and distribution of food and day-to-day industrial articles.”320 On July 30, 
“hunger marches” filled the streets of Łódź and other Polish cities. At the talks 
between the government and the Solidarity on August 3 and 6, with food sup-
plies prominent on the agenda, both sides entrenched their positions further. 
The authorities had no intention of allowing Solidarity to take the initiative. 
During the parliamentary session on July 30 and 31, due to a reshuffle of the 
government, General Jaruzelski’s confidant Czesław Kiszczak became Minister 
of Interior Affairs. From August 3 onward, 1 700 policemen were directed daily 
to fight speculation. They were reinforced by soldiers, professional inspectors, 
and community, or the so-called “public” inspectors.321 On August 10, 1981, the 
Council of Ministers passed resolution No. 156, which created, at central, voivod-
ship, and local levels, the Extraordinary Commissions for Combating Fraud (Na-
dzwyczajne Komisje do Walki ze Spekulacją). Simultaneously a legislative draft 
was submitted to parliament, proposing to “provide increased consumer pro-
tection within commercial activities concerning articles of daily necessity and 
318 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1981–1983, Warszawa 2004, p. 9.
319 See:W. Kuczyński, U progu wytrzymałości, “Tygodnik Solidarność”, no. 17, July 24, 
1981.
320 “Tygodnik Solidarność”, no. 18, July 31, 1981.
321 AAN, KC PZPR, Administration Department (Wydział Administracyjny, WA), 
LI/116, fol 64.
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the introduction of more effective means of combating the speculation.”322 Both 
decisions were justified on the grounds that lower-income citizens had been cut 
off “from basic goods outside the rationing system”, whereas “all kinds of crooks 
and embezzlers” continued to make huge profits. It was pointed out that both 
phenomena “offended the public sense of justice”.323 It is not surprising that a 
large part of the Second Session of the Party’s Central Committee (KC PZPR) on 
August 11 was dedicated to discussing ways of combating the speculation. 
The authorities had to show determination. Immediately they began to build 
the structures of the Extraordinary Commission (Nadzwyczajna Komisja): the 
headquarters (Krajowa NK with Deputy Prime Minister Stanisław Mach at the 
helm) and the voivodship commissions with Deputy Voivods at the top. The 
commissions tried to give the impression of creating a wide “anti-speculation 
front” by involving both the institutions specifically designated to deal with the 
black market and public organizations. From the very beginning the new con-
struct took on a quasi-military shape and employed, in the headquarters and 
voivodship sections, fifty four carefully selected retired police officers. The Com-
missions’ reports were to land directly on General Jaruzelski’s desk.324
Undoubtedly, many of the decision makers, including the Prime Minister, be-
lieved in the effectiveness and the validity of such undertakings. PR considera-
tions (as we would put it today) also played a role. Actions aimed at sustaining 
so-called social justice could boost confidence in the government, its populari-
ty massively undermined in favor of Solidarity, which also proclaimed concern 
about the standard of living. “Public support and acceptance for anti-speculation 
undertakings is noticeable […]” wrote Trybuna Ludu, “People clearly demand 
that the war on speculation must be won.”325 For the large groups marginalized 
by the Solidarity revolution such as members of the old unions, youth activists, 
members of ORMO (the Police Volunteer Reserve), veterans, military, police re-
tirees, and so on, the Commission provided an opportunity to return to public 
322 AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 1.
323 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 3.
324 He continued to receive them until the end of commission’s existence and it seems 
he read them carefully. On the margin of the report from July 1982, which covered 
mostly the topic of wastefulness, he wrote: “This is very interesting material. Due to its 
explosive character, it should be added to propaganda materials as soon as August”. A 
special note was addressed to the government spokesman, Jerzy Urban: “For proper 
use”; AAN, URM, 1.4 /21, fol. 80.
325 Nie ustają działania kontrolne i represyjne. Mniej spekulantów na bazarach, TL, no. 
187, August 12, 1981.
112
life. During the first all-Poland conference of the representatives of voivodship 
and local commissions on September 15, 1981, the delegates demanded not only 
more repressions against the black marketeers but also an immediate expansion 
of the public inspectorate participation. “They fondly remember,” wrote Teresa 
Kuczyńska ironically, “the era of CRZZ when we had 60 000 public inspectors. 
We need, as they put it, a whole army of people if we want to see any effects of 
the battle against speculation. It is not enough to hound the black marketeers in 
the marketplaces. There must also be more invigilation in the factories where the 
scarce goods are produced. Since all goods are today in very short supply, this 
means invigilation of all factories.”326
The delegates were in a triumphalist mood, no doubt boosted by the vigor-
ous efforts of the Extraordinary Commission which, only a few weeks into its 
existence, even before its structures had settled down, took ostentatious action 
– supervised personally by General Stanislaw Zaczkowski, the Chief of Police. 
Between August 10 and 23, almost 24 000 policemen, over 6 000 soldiers (in-
cluding some from the Internal Military Security!), nearly 5 000 professional 
inspectors, and 7 500 “public” activists conducted inspections of warehouses, 
stores, marketplaces, transportation, and purchasing stations (punkty skupu).327 
The courts were told to increase sentences and submit transcripts to headquar-
ters. The Commission planned a session – to be attended by the chairmen of the 
regional courts – on the implementation of accelerated procedures and harsher 
penalties for economic crimes.328 Over seven hundred preliminary prosecutions 
were triggered during the first two weeks of the Commission’s life. Magistrate 
courts (kolegia) received 4 030 cases. Hidden goods valued at 27.5 million zloty 
were uncovered in stores.329 Later, this level of activity diminished somewhat but 
the success rate was nevertheless high: by October, almost eight thousand case 
proceedings had been initiated in magistrates’ courts, and goods valued at 41 
million zloty had been found hidden in the stores.330
It was not by chance that state propaganda focused on the stores as the cul-
prits for shortages: was that not, after all, where the goods were hidden? Were 
the stores not the main source of supply for the black market? It was an easy 
explanation, and easily swallowed by much of society; it stood to reason – oth-
erwise, why were the shelves empty and the lines in front of the stores so long? 
326 T. Kuczyńska, Walka ze spekulacja, “Tygodnik Solidarność”, no. 27, October 2, 1981.
327 AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 2–3.
328 AAN, KC PZPR, WA, LI/116, fol. 288.
329 AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 2–3.
330 Ibid., fol. 7–9.
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The systemic problems were all blamed on this last, and most visible, link of the 
distribution chain. “The sales staff caught red-handed offer all kinds of different 
excuses: they had saved the goods for themselves, they had forgotten, it had been 
an accident. They lie through their teeth […]. Priority sales for families, friends, 
as a token of gratitude, and for many other reasons, have become common prac-
tice.”331 The goods found at the back of the store and ostentatiously put back on 
the store counter significantly improved the image of the authorities, at the time 
represented by the policeman, the PIH employee, and the “public inspector”.
It has to be said that entirely blameless store employees were far and few be-
tween but the goods found at the back of stores constituted only a small percent-
age of the whole trade. More important was the need to create a clearly defined 
enemy. The saleswoman, the store manager, the stock manager were more suit-
able for that role than an enigmatic black marketeer that citizens were unable 
to put a name or a face to. A new anti-speculation law that penalized hiding or 
“intercepting” goods pointed at potential profiteers. Store managers, until then 
not known for voicing their opinions, in the new political and economic situa-
tion loudly declared that the goal of the new law was to divide society and focus 
attention on the tail-end of the distribution process instead of finding the real 
source of the problem. The Federation of Consumers was against the new law, 
the store staff ’s unions threatened to strike. Solidarity agreed that the conceal-
ment of goods was a crime; however, it was against accelerated court proceed-
ings.332 Store employees were fighting a losing battle. Even the reassuring words 
of the Minister of Interior Trade Zygmunt Łakomiec that the “practice of goods 
concealment by sales people in the nationalized sector was a marginal phenome-
non” did not fall on sympathetic ears.333 The frustrated customers had to be right. 
But when police arrived at the scene in response to a phone call from a customer, 
the store manager was often able to convince the functionaries they had more 
urgent business elsewhere.334
There were also critical voices directed at the anti-speculation operations and 
the new law. The ostentatious pursuit of black marketeers, always presented on 
TV in the same way – functionaries meet, discussion of action plan, marching 
orders issued, trucks with police and civilian inspectors leave, followed by the 
crackdown on some marketplace and a parade of the arrested profiteers, complete 
331 S. Kopka, Uwaga – czarny rynek, “Zagadnienia Wykroczeń” 1981, no. 6, pp. 52–53.
332 M. Mazurek, Społeczeństwo kolejki. O doświadczeniach niedoboru 1945–1989, Warsza-
wa 2010, pp. 99, 100; K. Świątecka, Pozoracje, “Tygodnik Kulturalny” 1981/50.
333 W. Łuka, Nalot, PiŻ, 1981/33.
334 M. Mazurek, Społeczeństwo kolejki…, pp. 100–101.
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with a pile of the goods found beside them – was perceived as a flashy substitute 
for the nose-to-the-grindstone, effective daily toil on the part of the authorities. 
“One would have thought,” wrote Życie Literackie, “that once the authorities have 
chosen to chase those loudly and clearly labeled ‘PROFITEERS’ and Public Ene-
my Number One and decided to wipe them out at all cost, then any day now we 
should be noticing a dramatic improvement in supply, and that there would be 
no-one on the street offering a can of coffee for [the exorbitant price of] three 
hundred zloty. This is nonsense! The black marketeers will survive – because the 
repressions directed against them are carried out for their propaganda effect; 
the penalties are, so far, negligible”.335 At times, earnest pronouncements were 
also made about the positive features of the black market – such as that it was 
delivering articles at balanced prices that were not available elsewhere and, in 
doing so, was plugging the inflation gap more effectively than the state – such 
pronouncements were, however, quite sporadic. People commonly noticed that 
the anti-speculation operations led only to the development of more sophisti-
cated strategies. The black market transactions had now gone underground and 
moved to private apartments or workplaces. The once common crowds of deal-
ers disappeared from the marketplaces; instead there were individuals to be seen 
hanging around and taking orders for home deliveries (at new, higher prices!).336
The new anti-speculation law, drafted hastily by the government, proved high-
ly controversial. It had been prepared without consulting society, the unions, or 
lawyers. The law called for increasing the repressive measures; it also identified 
and penalized new kinds of crimes such as trading rationing stamps – which 
criminalized a wide range of underprivileged social groups – and delivering to 
stores money and invoices only, unaccompanied by goods. For black marketeers 
caught red-handed, the law introduced accelerated legal proceedings with im-
mediate confiscation of the object of crime and any money found on the culprit. 
Little wonder that the braver souls among the journalists specializing in legal 
issues savaged the new law. The validity of fighting the effects rather than the 
causes was questioned. There were fears that the accelerated proceedings would 
violate human rights by increasing the likelihood of legal errors. “It does not 
seem necessary,” wrote Jacek Ambroziak and Krzysztof Kauba in Tygodnik Sol-
idarność, “to create new crimes when the existing criminal code already covers 
fully all eventualities. All that is lacking is that the bodies appointed to fight the 
335 S.M. Jankowski, Wielkie polowanie?, “Życie Literackie”, no. 36 , September 6, 1981.
336 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 28.
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speculation, in particular the police and the National Trade Inspectorate PIH, act 
quick and effectively.”337
The anti-speculation endeavors of the authorities were viewed critically not 
only in the media debates but also in discussions in the Sejm. Tadeusz Skóra, the 
Deputy Minister of Justice, who was engaged in the activities of the Extraordi-
nary Commission, pointed out that even in the usually compliant parliament, 
“the law faced enormous obstacles”.338 Even if not enormous, the obstacles were 
certainly symptomatic. Not surprisingly, the MPs questioned the very name of 
the “Extraordinary Commission”, which evoked associations with Felix Dzer-
zhinsky, a Polish revolutionary, who during 1917–1926 was in charge of the 
un-coincidentally similarly named, an All-Russia Extraordinary Commission 
for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage, or the Cheka, an organization 
which became notorious for its ruthlessness and mass terror.
Ultimately, the name “Central Commission for Combating Fraud” (Centralna 
Komisja do Walki ze Spekulacja) was accepted. The Commission’s mandate was 
to organize and co-ordinate operations aimed at combating speculation in the 
country (voivodship and local commissions were responsible for specific admin-
istrative units or towns). The full-time employment offered to inspectors with 
police experience gave rise to many doubts. The government representatives re-
jected the suggestion of entrusting the inspection tasks to the PIH.339 During the 
second reading, five MPs questioned the need for new legislation, arguing that 
achieving market balance could eliminate the black market altogether. However 
the majority of the Commission members not only accepted the validity of the 
bill but also agreed to move away from mitigating the criminal code and instead 
move towards tightening sanctions for speculation crimes and introducing the 
simplified proceedings.340 Felicjanna Lesińska, a parliamentary commentator 
and MP summed it up: “We hope that anti-speculation action will make essen-
tials more easily available for every Polish family, every citizen, and also that 
people who are physically weak, the elderly and those who don’t have time to 
stand in line will be able to buy them. It is of paramount importance that Polish 
women, exhausted by everyday labor experience improvements in supply.”341
337 J. Ambroziak, K. Kauba, Ustawa o zwalczaniu spekulacji, “Tygodnik Solidarność”, no. 22, 
August 28, 1981; see: S. Podemski, Spekulacja i prawo, “Polityka”, no. 33, August 15, 1981. 
338 AAN, KC PZPR, WA, LI/116, fol. 288.
339 Prace nad projektem ustawy antyspekulacyjnej, TL, no. 207, September 4, 1981.
340 Przeciwko spekulacji – środki nadzwyczajne, TL, no. 213, September 11, 1981.
341 Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z  16 posiedzenia Sejmu PRL 8 kadencji w  dniu 16 
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On September 25, 1981, Halina Minkisiewicz-Latecka made a last-ditch stand, 
when the bill was already before the Sejm, to stop the implementation of acceler-
ated proceedings. “As a lawyer,” she declared, “I cannot agree with the expediency 
of introducing the anti-speculation law or with many of its provisions. Specu-
lation is an evil and stifles the feeble organism of our economic and social life. 
However, repressive measures should be last on the list of means to diminish this 
damaging phenomenon. Only deep economic reform, with due regard for the 
laws of supply and demand, correctly set prices and improved supply can elim-
inate or marginalize the phenomenon of speculation […]. The bill as presented 
[…] proposes increased repression, the abolition of supervision of prosecution, 
limited defense rights, and, most importantly, it proposes the country-wide in-
troduction of accelerated proceedings. There is to be no inquiry, and no investi-
gation. During the proceedings, the accused would not be officially charged and 
the immediate hearing of the case would deprive the accused of the possibility of 
preparing a defense and choosing defense counsel.
The accelerated procedure is not conducive to uncovering the truth and un-
dermines the constitutional right to a defense. It also contravenes the interna-
tional human rights convention ratified by Poland in 1977.”342
The motion to abandon the provisions for an accelerated procedure was de-
feated. Moments later, voting took place on the whole bill and it was of course 
passed, although, it must be noted, with a significant number of votes against 
(11) and abstentions (12). Even in the revolutionary conditions of 1981, the fact 
that there were not only any votes against the motion, but indeed as many as 
eleven, was unprecedented.343
The law on combating speculation344 was expected to remain in force until 
the end of 1982. It detailed and penalized all manifestations of the black market. 
New crimes such as selling rationed articles, ration-coupon fraud, the hiding or 
interception of goods in transit between a manufacturer or warehouse and a re-
tail outlet joined the existing list of specific, punishable offences (Items 221–225 
of the criminal code and items 132, 133, 135 of the code of misdemeanors). Fel-
onies were punishable with up to five-year imprisonment and/or a fine (even 
in excess of 100 thousand zloty). The black marketeer could expect confisca-
tion of the object of the crime and of money (if the authorities had a reasonable 
basis for linking it with black market operations). The police and the National 
342 Ibid., col. 134–135.
343 Ibid., col.137–138.
344 Dz. U. 1981, no. 24, item 124.
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Trade Inspectorate (PIH) conducted most investigations and were authorized 
to “support the charges” before the Court of the First Instance. The accelerated 
procedure could be applied to both felonies and misdemeanors. 
In comparison to the previous anti-speculation legislation, the creation of an 
institution that was to deal with speculation in an integrated way was a novelty. 
Although the new law was quite general, it was fleshed out by the decree of the 
Council of Ministers of October 12, 1981 “concerning particular tasks, the com-
position, and mode of operation of the commission for combating fraud” (Dz. U. 
1981, No. 25, Item 133), which was much more detailed. There was now a chance 
that the war on speculation would enter a new phase. 
3.5.3  The Front Line of the War on Speculation:  
The Central Commission
At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, the Central Commission had enormous pow-
ers; it could prosecute, pass judgments and administer sentences. Its 1980s suc-
cessor had similar powers but adopted more of a softly-softly approach. Although 
its main statutory tasks included the combating of speculation and prevention of 
its growth, identification of the black marketeers’ modus operandi, and the initi-
ation and improvement of methods of control, in practice, the powers of the new 
governing bodies, especially those the Central Commission, were much wider. 
The Commission did not have labour camps at its disposal; nevertheless, due to 
its special position in the state structure, it could exert considerable influence on 
both the executive organs (ministries, regional administration, etc.) and legisla-
tion or modify the scale of the repressive measures taken. 
Unlike its predecessors, the Central Commission for Combating Fraud (Cen-
tralna Komisja do Walki ze Spekulacją, CKWS), was not subordinate to the na-
tional councils or the State Council but answered directly to the government, its 
headquarters located conveniently in the building of the Office of the Council of 
Ministers (URM). It was the Prime Minister who nominated the Central Com-
mission’s members. From February 1981 to November 1985, the Polish Prime 
Minister was General Wojciech Jaruzelski, and the fact that he was a military 
man had implications for the composition of the Commission, its way of func-
tioning and even the terms used in the official correspondence. Statutorily, one 
of the deputy Prime Ministers was at the helm of the Commission345 but the real 
power throughout its existence was in the hands of its deputy chairman, Colonel 
345 Stanisław Mach, Jerzy Ozdowski, Zenon Komender (the longest term, from August 
1982 to November 1985), and Józef Kozioł. The greatest personnel changes in CKWS 
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Władysław Trzaska. As a deputy director of the Office for Combating Economic 
Crimes at Militia Headquarters (Biuro do Walki z Przestępstwami Gospodarczy-
mi KG MO), he knew this business well. Other deputy chairmen: General Józef 
Beim (Chief of the State Police, Komendant Główny MO), General Marian Ryba 
(Main Inspector of Control at URM), and, from November 1985, Tadeusz Skóra, 
first deputy minister of justice contributed significantly to the Commission’s 
work. According to the ordinance of October 12, 1981 the deputy secretaries of 
state in the Ministry of Administration, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Internal Trade and Services, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Chief Inspector 
of the PIH, all became members of the CKWS. The chairman could also invite 
representatives of other bodies to participate in the Commission’s work (espe-
cially in its meetings) – these included the Supreme Audit Office (NIK), the State 
Council Chancellery (Kancelaria Rady Państwa), the Office of the Prosecutor 
General, national economic associations (Samopomoc Chłopska and Społem), 
trade unions (since 1982, the only one remaining was the All-Poland Alliance 
of Trade Unions, Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ) 
and social organizations.346 With the changing political reality, the invitation to 
participate in the Commission’s work was gradually extended to representatives 
of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival (Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia 
Narodowego, PRON), the Executive Board of the League of Polish Women, and 
the Consumers’ Federation. 
The representatives of these organizations gained de facto status as CKWS 
permanent members and participated regularly in the meetings organized at 
the Office of Council of Ministers. Beside an annual “national anti-speculation 
conference”, with the participation of all voivodship and regional commissions, 
smaller meetings were often organized (five in 1981, 25 in 1982, 23 in 1983, and 
16 in 1984). The meetings were a platform not only for fiery discussions and 
took place after Zbigniew Messner’s government was constituted in the fall of 1985; 
AAN, URM, 32/85, fol. 2–3.
346 Forty-nine voivodship commissions had a similar structure: a deputy voivod as chair-
man, and two deputy chairmen (one continuously in office). Representatives of the 
Voivodship Police Command Center, (KW MO), the National Trade Inspectorate 
(PIH), the National Price Commission (PKC) and “employees of relevant depart-
ments in the voivod’s office” were also members of the Commission. Voivodship 
Commissions employed 730 officials and activists while 1 715 local commissions (at 
the lowest level of state administration) employed 1 773 persons. (October 1985); 
AAN, URM, 1.5/43, fol. 289.
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the swapping of experiences but also for gathering information and issuing 
instructions to the individual ministries and institutions and for exercising 
control over their execution. During every meeting the Commission officially 
accepted the reports from a number of voivodships. The headquarters often 
voiced legitimate objections about the effectiveness of their local counterparts. 
Following the protests in August and September 1981, the first months of the 
Commission’s activity were a period of building structures and perfecting rules. 
The scrutiny of the media and the presence of Solidarity members at regional 
meetings prevented the Commission from spreading its wings. Headquarters 
urged the executive organs to concentrate on “organized speculation” with a spe-
cial focus on particular articles (cigarettes, alcohol, coffee, sweets) by following 
their route from manufacturer and warehouse to consumer. Social, youth, and 
coop organizations were encouraged to participate actively in the operations.347
Martial Law invigorated the commissions. The Solidarity Trade Union ceased 
to be a threat. The rigorous legal measures implemented on December 13, 1981 
(such as the introduction of summary legal proceedings) simplified all proce-
dures and the “social activists”, marginalized earlier, could again exercise their 
strong influence. The anti-speculation operations fit perfectly with propaganda 
slogans promising “stabilization” and emphasizing the need to “bring back or-
der”. The deputy ministers who were also members of the Central Commission 
(CKWS) now had a brief to organize active anti-speculation teams throughout 
their departments and to raise the topic of combating speculation in all their 
dealings with the “region”. The emphasis was on invigorating departmental in-
spections, which had hitherto been ineffective. The goal was to alleviate the 
burden on the police, who “during the days and weeks busied themselves with 
activities connected with the implementation of Martial Law.”348
It soon became clear that neither the summary procedures nor the curfew, the 
limiting of freedom of movement, road blocks, suspended phone communica-
tion or the “militarization of supply”349 were able to curb the black market. After 
several turbulent days, the second economy players resumed their previous ways 
of operating in often new, clandestine ways. The black marketeers continued 
347 Ibid.
348 AAN, URM, 32/6, fol. 3.
349 The initial suspension of sales included articles officially designated as “strategic”, 
such as blankets, sleeping bags, mattresses, bedding, batteries, precious metals and 
articles made thereof, paper and luxury articles (furs, leather, clothes, rugs). The 
supply of clothes was under rigorous supervision. Sales of gold, furs, high end rugs 
and printing paper were suspended for the longest period. 
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to hone their strategies. The vicious circle began to turn even faster. The ever 
more sophisticated black market strategies forced the authorities to engage ever 
greater forces “on the frontline of the war on speculation” and to prosecute and 
punish ostentatiously people who had “made millions on speculation”.350 A steep 
price hike in February 1982 weakened the demand for goods only for a short 
time, particularly as halfway through the year, individual income rose signifi-
cantly. Higher prices did not automatically translate into well-supplied stores. 
The incidence of shortages began to grow rapidly, reaching a level of 739 billion 
zloty. In the previous year, 278 billion zloty had seemed an inconceivably large 
amount, but the drastic price hike of February 1982 changed radically the price 
relations.351
The authorities soon realized how misguided the intention to continue the ap-
plication of the anti-speculation law (and the activities of the Commission) only 
until the end of 1982. They instantly set about mending the error of their ways. 
On April 20, 1982, the topic of extending the period of application of the law was 
on the agenda of the Second National Anti-Speculation Conference (II Krajowa 
Narada Antyspekulacyjna). Tadeusz Skóra, the Deputy Minister of Justice (and 
at the same time a member of the CKWS) instructed his legal department in 
his sector to initiate the appropriate steps.352 The voivodship commissions were 
required to send in comments and proposals. 
In line with the zeitgeist, most of the resolutions presented by the voivodship 
commissions proposed the implementation of increased repressive measures 
and fines, and the introduction of a lower threshold for “qualifying speculation”, 
and opted for an unlimited period for the application of the law. Selling meat 
from private slaughter (ubój gospodarczy) and exchanging goods between na-
tionalized enterprises were also subject to provisions of the anti-speculation law. 
It also became clear that the demands of headquarters surpassed the capabilities 
of the regional commissions, which were often lost in the jungle of regulations 
(Katowice suggested compiling a glossary of the phrases used in the decree).353 
We cannot be certain whether the radical proposals coming from regional Po-
land genuinely reflected the prevalent point of view or were merely paying lip 
service in order to satisfy officials in Warsaw, whereas actions on the ground 
in the provinces suggested the existence of a more liberal approach (see next 
chapter). Only Białystok – a peripheral, rural region, with a high percentage of 
350 AAN, URM, 32/113, fol. 24.
351 AAN, IRWiU, 317, fol. 54, pp. 56–57.
352 AAN, URM, 32/23, fol. 18.
353 Ibid., fol. 54.
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Russian Orthodox population – was courageous enough to express any doubts. 
“We must consider the question of whether the voivodship and regional com-
missions for combating speculation created by this decree should continue with 
their operations. In the current setup, there are too many public inspection or-
gans operating at the regional level and their activities overlap (commissions of 
public inspection, Federation of Consumers, housing development committees, 
anti-speculation commissions in workplaces). This extensive system of public 
inspection makes the voivodship and regional commissions redundant. We pro-
pose that the tasks of the voivodship commissions be handed over to the police 
and the National Trade Inspectorate (PIH), which both have the greatest respon-
sibility for the war on speculation. Only specialized organs with wide legal pow-
ers should be focusing on this matter.’354
Very few members of the official media had the courage to express similar 
opinions (one that did was Stanisław Podemski in Polityka).355 Most of the na-
tional and regional newspapers published triumphalist stories about winning the 
war on speculation. The evaluation and assessment of the work of the commis-
sions was based, among others, on the number of references to their activities in 
the press (there was even a separate section on press coverage in the commis-
sion reports). This was only one of the elements of the propaganda campaign 
aimed at highlighting public support for the anti-speculation activities of the 
authorities. Another was the meetings with “representatives of teams of workers”, 
during which the “workers demanded harsher penalties for black marketeers, 
parasites, and people guilty of wasting public property. According to the workers, 
the courts treated the accused too leniently and the mass media did not reveal 
their full names. Workers who had participated directly in the militia raids on 
marketplaces expressed similar opinions.”356
The law on combating speculation was amended on October 9, 1982.357 
The amendment took care of minor defects in the 1981 law. It took account of 
the changes in the rationing system implemented in 1982, and set the level of 
“qualifying speculation” at 200 thousand zloty, as well as defined in more de-
tail what constituted the “interception” of goods on their way to retail stores, 
which was the most damaging offence of all. But the most important was item 10 
354 AAN, URM, 32/23, fol. 25–26.
355 S. Podemski, Spekulacje wokół spekulacji, “Polityka”, no. 38/August 28, 1982.
356 AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 156. 
357 Act of 9 October 1982 amending the combating of speculation, Dz.U. 1982, no. 33, 
item 218; Z. Niewola, Z aktualnej problematyki walki ze spekulacją, “Ideologia i Pol-
ityka” 1982, no. 11.
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of the amendment. It effectively removed the proviso that the law would apply 
“until December 31, 1982”. The Party commentator remarked that the amend-
ment made “this legal act into an instrument that now permitted an effective, 
long-term fight against speculation abuses.”358 Indeed, the decree was ultimately 
not repealed until July 5, 1990.
No piece of legislation, and especially one that aims to increase repression, 
can bring back a balanced market. Although store shelves slowly filled with kasha 
and sugar throughout the 1980s, meat, chocolate, and gas continued nevertheless 
to be rationed. The 1982 decree on sobriety education made it significantly more 
difficult to buy alcohol. Income growth outpacing growth in supply during most 
of the 1980s overheated the market with “hot” money, especially where consumer 
durables were concerned. As a result finding a refrigerator or TV set to buy bor-
dered on the miraculous. Contrary to the declarations of the official propaganda, 
which applauded the normalized political and economic situation, the number 
of “speculation crimes” grew consistently. There were 14 934 such crimes (17.4% 
of all economic crimes) in 1982, and 24 171 (18.5%) in 1985.359 The differences 
were not only quantitative but also qualitative. At the start of their existence, 
the anti-speculation commissions dealt mostly with the retail trading of meat, 
vodka, jam, or socks but soon it became clear that anything could be the object 
of black market trade – cars, gas, refrigerators, books, pianos, and even cred-
it facilities for the newly married and special store coupons for veterans.360 By 
the end of its term, the Commission had to face truly advanced technology – 
unofficial importers mostly from the Far East flooded the Polish market with 
electronic equipment, including computers.The most important objects of the 
black market trade are presented in the monograph chapters; here we would like 
to focus on the bureaucratic aspect of the black market operations. The primary 
strategy continued to be the diversion of goods from the official distribution 
channels. Traditionally, the most common was “speculation of goods bought in 
nationalized trade outlets” (Item 221 of the Criminal Code; in 1981 – 56.9% of 
all black market cases, in 1985 – 47.2%). During most of the 1980s, alcohol sales 
constituted some 60% of all black market cases under prosecution. Most of the 
offenders were small-scale dealers who could not count on big returns and who 
treated black market transactions as a way of supplementing their hunger wages 
358 AAN, URM, 32/2, fol. 5.
359 Ibid.
360 AAN, URM, 32/117, fol. 80.
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or pensions. This began to change in the middle of the decade when industrial 
articles started to play a more important role in the black market.361
The analysis of the rationing system conducted at the beginning of 1983 pre-
dicted that coupons, or stamps, for some products (meat, chocolate) would be 
abolished by 1985.362 Reality did not meet expectation, however: coupons for 
sugar were abolished on November 1, 1985, but for chocolate – only in March 
1988, for gas – not until January 1989, and for meat – only on August 1, 1989. 
This delay left enough time for often sophisticated techniques for breaking and 
bypassing the rules of the rationing system to be developed. The availability of 
the product and its price, usually much lower within the rationing system than 
on the free market, played a very important role. The number of detected ration-
ing system violations (punishable according to the decree of September 25, 1981) 
grew continuously. In 1981, they constituted 1.3% of all speculation crimes, and 
in 1985 – 29.1%; the number kept growing. In 1986, when the experiment with 
free market sales of meat from private slaughter began, the majority of scams 
applied to gas rationing. At the same time, the improved supply of basic food 
products resulted in smaller numbers of cases that involved concealing goods 
from buyers in stores (from 24.8% in 1982 down to 6.9% in 1985). 
The percentage of crimes involving the interception of goods on their way 
from manufacturer or warehouse to retail store (the store would receive only 
the invoice and the money) stayed at a similar level (6.7% in 1981 and 11.3% in 
1985). Such undertakings were the most risky and usually required cooperation 
between the employees of manufacturers, warehouses, transportation compa-
nies, and retail outlets. They were risky but brought in big profits; for example, 
the value of the intercepted goods (furniture, rugs, and household items) in half 
of the cases detected in 1984 exceeded 200 thousand zloty.363
Since 1986 this section of the black market had also been in downturn mode, 
which probably was related not only to the increased repression but also to the 
growing hard currency sales of consumer durables in the system of internal ex-
port and the growing trade of articles brought privately (legally or not) from 
abroad. The wider opening of the border was also responsible for the increase, 
from the middle of the decade, in “speculative accumulation of goods” – by 15% 
 
361 Ibid., fol. 121.
362 AAN, IRWiU, 318, fol. 34.
363 AAN, URM, 32/116, fol. 29. In 1984 the average wage in industry (in tangible out-
put) was 18 300 zloty, in 1985 – 20 000 zloty, in 1986 – around 24 000, and in 1987 
– around 29 000 zloty; Rocznik statystyczny 1988, Warszawa 1988, p. 157.
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in 1986 alone. People stored not only food products but also industrial articles 
destined for unofficial export, such as silver, tools, sporting equipment, etc., or 
those coming from abroad: clothing and electronics.364
If anti-speculation operations were to meet the expectations raised by gov-
ernment propaganda, they had to have an audience. Big, spectacular operations 
involving thousands of people provided just that. Even if in individual places the 
results were paltry, when added together on a national scale they looked quite 
impressive. In 1984 alone, in addition to local actions there took place a number 
of nationwide operations – twelve code-named Rynek(Market), seven Benzyna 
(Gas) and one operation against book dealers (as well as Operation Sector, di-
rected against private enterprise) took place nationwide. Special attention was 
paid to acknowledging the participation of social forces, for example in 1984; 29 
thousand civilian activists and over 24 thousand members of the Police Volun-
teer Reserve (ORMO) took part in anti-speculation operations.365
In the end, the community teams had little impact, even less than the often 
criticized internal inspections within particular trade branches,366 but they (es-
pecially the workers’ brigades) were always the government’s pets. On the one 
hand, from the ideological and class-oriented point of view, the workers were 
recognized as the healthy core of the nation. On the other, for decades the au-
thorities had been paying special attention to supplying workers adequately with 
necessary goods and now considered them especially vulnerable to the oper-
ations of the black market. Already in the fall of 1981, the commissions were 
ordered to “identify (based on the existing situation) sites in the voivodship with 
the largest concentration of workers and low income population where the black 
market is especially strong. […] In those places, extensive controls with the use 
of necessary auxiliary means have to be planned. The concentration of such 
364 AAN, URM, 32/117, fol. 5.
365 AAN, URM, 32/116, fol. 27.
366 The results in May 1986 are typical. In that year, the professional inspection insti-
tutions (PIH, PKC, and the State Inspectorate for Purchase and Processing of Agri-
cultural Articles [Państwowa Inspekcja Skupu i Przetwórstwa Artykułów Rolnych, 
PISiPAR]) detected almost 38% of all speculation cases, their branch sections detect-
ed 18% and “mixed teams with the participation of public activists” – 13.6%; AAN, 
URM, 32/180, fol. 263. Branch inspections, especially in trade, were criticized for 
their seeming inability to detect shortcomings identified immediately by an external 
inspection. AAN, the Central Custom Office, Główny Urząd Ceł (GUC), 16/153, fol. 
5. This was not an isolated opinion.
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operations will allow the streamlining of the existing resources, which are now at 
the disposal of various institutions.”367 
A militia inspection at the Różycki Bazaar in Warsaw, a traditional haunt on the  
black-market map of Warsaw, 28 January 1982; photo from the archives of the  
Polish Press Agency (PAP).
367 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 8–10.
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The true “concentration of operations” started after the imposition of Martial 
Law when Solidarity members no longer posed a threat to the decisions of the 
commissions. “The program for stabilizing social discipline and public safety 
in 1982”, approved by Wojciech Jaruzelski on February 21, 1982, envisaged the 
further development of wide social control.368 “It is not enough to create an in-
stitution,” Jerzy Ozdowski, deputy prime minister argued during the Anti-Specu-
lation Meeting in April 1982, “no matter how effective an official or how efficient 
an inspector, they are not enough. We need to create a social atmosphere hostile 
towards black market and able to eradicate all symptoms of this social mala-
dy.”369 Characteristically, the politicians were the ones who wanted to include the 
activists in control operations while the representatives of social organizations 
held a more pragmatic view. At the same meeting Andrzej Nałęcz-Jawecki (later 
editor-in-chief of the consumers’ weekly Veto) proposed setting up “tiger bri-
gades” (after a popular French TV series), efficient and mobile units consisting of 
professionals (police and National Trade Inspectorate). “But maybe let’s call them 
‘lynx’ or something.” he reflected, “since there are no tigers in Poland.” Catching 
the perpetrator red-handed was the most important because it allowed the appli-
cation of summary measures.370
The views of the Military Council on National Salvation (Wojskowa Rada 
Ocalenia Narodowego, WRON) prevailed. Its members argued that the fight 
against social pathologies, including the black market, had “to be conducted in a 
consistent and coordinated way and should involve the social element [ordinary 
citizens], particularly the working class”.371 On September 11, 1982, the WRON 
approved the document “On the broad inclusion of the working class in the direct 
fight against speculation.” The following day, the document landed on the desks 
of the directors of voivodship commissions with the order to mobilize “workers’ 
brigades”. Since the procedures were left unspecified, the simplest solutions were 
embraced. For example in Piotrków Trybunalski, the voivod set up brigades con-
sisting of men that he selected personally, mainly the tried and tested activists of 
the former Main Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ). In Poznań and Wałbrzych, 
specific factories were singled out to provide recruits.372 The decisions of the 
factory management tended to be guided by the consideration of maintaining 
368 Ibid., fol. 26.
369 AAN, URM, 32/113, fol. 20.
370 Ibid., fol. 37–38.
371 AAN, URM, 32/178, fol. 1.
372 Ibid., fol. 12, 32; A. Gawlik, Robotnicy w brygadach tygrysa, “Sprawy i Ludzie” 1982, 
no. 30.
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efficient production; thus, contrary to the guidelines, the selected recruits were 
often white-collar rather than the ideologically correct working class. 
By the end of 1982, more than 16 thousands workers had joined 1 750 bri-
gades. It is not possible to assess how many of them thought of this job as mean-
ingful. It seems that, as often happens in volunteer-based actions, the enthusiasm 
was short-lived and was quickly followed by weariness and mere going through 
the motions and by various forms of evasion. Moreover, even the most dedicated 
activists were not immune to feeling the pinch. Inspections, followed by having 
to appear in court as witnesses were time-consuming and hardly lucrative, 
especially as the activists were employed on a piecework basis.373 Additionally, 
the specifics of a given location made all the difference. In small towns there were 
“various informal connections, within social groups and families” that limited, 
or even made it entirely impossible to carry out “appropriate inspections and 
suppression operations.”374 The geography of activist involvement in anti-specu-
lation operations depended on the degree of urbanization and industrialization. 
By the end of 1982, almost seven thousand people had participated in inspections 
in the Gdańsk voivodship, and some three thousand each in the Katowice and 
Warsaw voivodships. No wonder that, in the predominantly rural Biała Podlas-
ka and Lublin voivodships, with their closely-knit communities, there had been 
but 35 and 75 participants respectively. A voice from the conservative Bydgoszcz 
voivodship (with 175 activists fielded) expressed the general sentiment plainly: 
“Let workers stick to producing consumer goods and let the organizations set up 
to fight the black marketeers do their job.”375
Organs of inspection tend to be susceptible to corruption; the workers’ bri-
gades were no exception. Frequently, the “workers’ inspection” turned out to be 
a sham or cases of bribery would come to light.376 Halfway through the dec-
ade, such problems were significant enough to force the commission to conduct 
large-scale operations (for example Operation Rynek) without involving social 
forces but rely instead only on the professionals and the police (MO).377
It is difficult to assess the degree of antipathy of members of workers bri-
gades and other community inspection units towards private enterprise and 
the intelligentsia. The bias against the latter was clearly visible during bookstore 
checks when the booksellers had to face the same accusations as salespersons 
373 AAN, URM, 32/178, fol. 18.
374 AAN, URM, 32/150, fol. 70.
375 Ibid., fol. 32–34.
376 Ibid., fol. 66, 69–70, 82–83, 95, 98–99. Ibid.,1.4/60, fol. 7.
377 AAN, URM, 32/118, fol. 118.
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at butcher’s stores. An example from the Silesian town of Ozimek followed a 
familiar pattern: “an inspection by two workers and a policeman found that in 
the warehouse at the back of the store there were dictionaries and multi-volume 
works set aside for schools and subscribers. The manager was sent home and a 
search conducted; several books by Tolstoy were seized (a multi-volume set). In 
the evening, the manager was arrested. The following day she was in court facing 
a fast-track trial. The judge decided that the case should be dismissed and sent it 
back to be investigated under the normal procedure.”378
The above quote shows some of the characteristics of the justice system in the 
1980s in general and in particular in the context of speculation cases. The judges 
found themselves between Scylla and Charybdis: orders from above demanding 
increased repression, and the common sense of everyday practice, which demon-
strated plainly that many of the accused had broken the law not because they 
wanted to get rich but because they were under economic duress. The reality was 
more complicated than the rules and laws provided for. “A judge often comes 
across,” Ryszard Bolecki, a Supreme Court judge, said in April 1985, “instances 
of petty offences, coming face to face with poverty. Because in the times that we 
live in, we don’t hide that we have poor people in this country. There is the law, 
which must be adhered to […] but the truth of the matter is that judges do have 
some conscience too.”379 Only rarely, however, were they able to take advantage 
of the (theoretical) independence of their judicial power and dismiss smaller 
cases without further ado, for example by finding a compromise or settling for a 
lesser evil. But there were also those judges who were only too happy to follow 
religiously the orders from above.
Speculation, which the authorities considered one of the greatest threats to 
the existence of the state, had to be dealt with severely. By December 1980, the 
Prosecutor General had ordered that all speculation proceedings be concluded 
within one month and not three, as had previously been the case. However, until 
the fall of 1981, the penal emphasis was on economic repression. In comparison 
with the years 1978 to 1980, the immediate custodial sentences were softened 
(93.2% of cases were conditionally suspended). By the fall of 1981, the era of 
liberalization had slowly come to an end. In September, the Ministry of Justice 
appealed to judges asking for “more consistency”, reminding them of Article 426 
of the criminal code, which allowed confiscation of property and also Article 
378 AAN, URM, 32/36, fol. 11, 20.
379 AAN, URM, 32/74, fol. 27.
 129
412, which allowed confiscation of the proceeds of crime.380 The fines were now 
increased or combined with prison sentences. The real change, however, came 
with Martial Law.381
After December 13, 1981, law enforcement naturally focused on cases of “break-
ing the social order in a manner leading to anarchy”. Next in line was speculation. 
The authorities declared: “Today, the situation requires tough penalties for crimes 
of speculation and the frequent imposition of immediate custodial sentences”.382 
In January 1982 alone, 830 people were convicted under articles 221– 225 of 
the criminal code and the anti-speculation law (in 1981, on average 389 people 
had been convicted monthly! – 622 of them under the accelerated procedures.383 
Magistrates’ courts, which until then had treated the black marketeers leniently, 
were now put under the microscope. At the end of February 1982, the magistrates’ 
courts received instructions to give priority to cases of speculation (second only to 
misconduct under the Martial Law decree), to pass tougher sentences and to main-
tain “full readiness to examine cases under the accelerated procedures, as well as 
to conduct effective investigations under the normal procedures.”384 The problem 
of the magistrates’ courts remained unsolved; in 1983 they were still persisting in 
their reluctance to pass custodial sentences. In the first half of the year there were 
106 arrests, of which 80 took place in Warsaw!385 
All these efforts were only partially effective, particularly in smaller towns, 
where “society failed to condemn unequivocally the perpetrators”.386 Although 
in 1982 and 1983, the number of people accused of speculation and the number 
of convictions were higher than in 1981, the percentage of immediate custodial 
sentences, which were supposed to demonstrate the authorities’ determination 
and consistence, remained at a similar level (table 1). According to the Prosecu-
tor General’s Office, in 1982 the “repressions used by the courts often do not meet 
social expectations. This applies to custodial sentences, the majority of which 
have been suspended and to the fines which are being set at a level dispropor-
tionate to the wealth and profits of the accused.”387
380 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 67, 70.
381 AAN, URM, 32/14, fol. 20, 22.
382 AAN, URM, 32/113.
383 AAN, URM, 32/14, fol. 23.
384 AAN, URM, 32/113, fol. 6, 23.
385 AAN, URM, 32/47, fol. 11.
386 AAN, URM, 32/47, fol. 11.
387 AAN, KC PZPR, WA, LI/118, fol. 156. 
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1981 5 729 102 4 655 4.2%
1982 14 934 391 9 983 4.1%
1983 14 723 337 7 076 4.9%
1984 20 829 628 11 619 5.7%
1985 24 171 998 12 594 9.8%
1986 17 683 549 8 167 14.1%
Source:  AAN, URM, 32/2, fol. 13
The war on speculation offered a practical proof of the Stalinist theory that class 
war intensifies in step with the progress of the building of socialism. Martial Law 
was abolished in July 1983, restrictive measures loosened, and border controls 
relaxed but penalties for crimes of speculation remained strict. Tightening the 
repressive measures and perfecting the tools for their implementation became 
for the Ministry of Justice its main concern in 1983 and 1984.388 In mid-1983, 
the Ministry embarked on briefing the judges of all the voivodship courts – in 
individual and group meetings – on the importance of arriving at “appropriate 
findings”.389 The Ministry seemed to have much faith in the effectiveness of this 
approach – soon it began to insist that the chief voivodship judges submit de-
tailed monthly reports on the number of convictions, type of proceedings and 
details of charges and sentencing.390
In the following year, the Ministry of Justice and the Central Commission con-
tinued to criticize the leniency of the courts, complaining about the low number 
of immediate custodial sentences, and the excessive number, over 60 percent, of 
suspended sentences. Both institutions were dissatisfied with the liberal treatment 
of qualifying speculation. Of the 270 cases processed in the first half of 1984, no 
more than every fifth black marketeer was sentenced without suspension. The 
Ministry also took a dim view of the judicial reluctance to confiscate property – in 
388 AAN, URM, 32/74, fol. 12.
389 AAN, URM, 32/47, fol. 74–75.
390 AAN, URM, 32/186, fol. 15–17.
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279 cases, confiscation was ordered in only two cases. In 1984 there were fifteen 
confiscation orders, half of them passed by the court in Konin.391 
The regional differences in the approach to crimes of speculation crimes were 
another tender spot for the justice system and a quick remedy was nowhere to 
be found. The highest percentage of immediate custodial sentences was noted 
in 1984 (up to September) in the Legnica (13%), Zamość (10.2%), and Kraków 
(10.1%) voivodships. In the Opole voivodship it was only 1.2%, in the Siedlce 
voivodship – 1.3%, in the Sieradz voivodship – 1.4%, and in Konin, Łomża and 
Rzeszów voivodships, immediate custodial sentences were not used at all. In Ka-
towice, Leszno, Olsztyn or Opole not a single “qualifying black marketeer” had 
been identified.392 Fines in excess of 50 000 zloty were imposed only in 21 (out 
of 49) voivodships, most of them in Koszalin voivodship (26.3% of all fines), 
Wałbrzych (20%) and Suwałki (18.2%), and were applied the least in the voivod-
ships of Lublin (2.4%), Bielsko-Biała (3.4%), and Szczecin (3.8%). “In the Warsaw 
district where there is the greatest threat of black market crimes occurring, no 
fine in the aforementioned range was imposed.”393
In these circumstances, the Ministry of Justice came to view the homogenous 
distribution of penalties as its main task for 1985,394 naturally, by achieving equi-
librium at the level of uniformly higher rather than lower sentences. It began 
by reviewing the more lenient sentences. In the first quarter of 1985 alone, the 
Ministry conducted 86 extraordinary reviews of black market cases – half the 
number of annual reviews in previous years – increasing the penalties imposed 
in almost all of them.395 The decree of May 10, 1985 on special criminal liabili-
ty396 further narrowed the judges’ room for maneuver in speculation cases. The 
new law significantly limited the option of suspended imprisonment, removing 
it completely in cases of qualifying speculation. The fine could not now be less 
than twice the value of the object of speculation; the application of the acceler-
ated procedures was widened, and an administrative summary procedure was 
391 AAN, URM, 32/63, fol. 12, 15, 93.
392 Ibid., fol. 64.
393 Ibid., k. 64–65. The authorities were happy to see the effects of implementing the 
accelerated procedures. In 1984, 852 sentences were passed under these procedures, 
64.2% more than in 1983; AAN, URM, 32/116, fol. 24.
394 AAN, URM, 32/74, fol. 12.
395 Ibid., fol. 13.
396 Dz.U. 1985, no. 23, item 101. The decree was in force between July 1, 1985 and April 
30, 1988.
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introduced – without any trial at all. Additional sanctions became obligatory 
such as advertising the sentence in the press.
The new blueprint changed the game. While in the first half of 1985, there had 
been 442 accelerated sentences, in the third quarter of 1985 the number went up 
to 663 (and with another 710 implemented by means of the administrative sum-
mary procedure).397 In mid-November 1985, Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner 
received reports that since the implementation of the decree of May 10 “almost 
26.0% of the profiteers are tried under the accelerated procedures and almost 
30.0% under the summary administrative procedure, that is, without a trial”.398 
This reflected the authorities’ point of view on the “necessity for tough sentences 
for the most dangerous perpetrators of speculation crimes, including immediate 
custodial sentences and fines as well as wide range of additional penalties to help 
profiteers realize that the crimes were not worthwhile.”399 This trend continued 
in 1986. Almost 60% of all cases were tried in under either the accelerated or 
summary administrative procedures.400
While repression escalated, the social structure of the black market remained 
unchanged, with the majority of participants driven to involvement by poverty. 
Although in September 1981 Stanisław Zaczkowski, the Chief of Police, had re-
ferred to the black marketeers as the “margin of society” and “the unemployed”,401 
a review of three hundred cases from the first half of 1981 showed a different pic-
ture. 61% of all those convicted for speculation were women, and 46% – people 
older than 50. In 59% of cases the scene of the crime – particularly where sales of 
alcohol were concerned – was a private apartment.402 In September 1984, Deputy 
Minister of Justice Tadeusz Skóra admitted that while half of convicted black 
marketeers were involved in trading, the other half included “small fry, pension-
ers, elder women caught at the market places”.403 In 1986, this breakdown stayed 
the same – 40% of the people convicted on speculation charges were employed in 
nationalized workplaces, with 15% of them in management. At 30%, pensioners 
constituted the second largest group, and the unemployed – 18.5%, the majority 
dependent on their spouses. Women constituted 39% of all convicted, and the 
397 AAN, URM, 32/122, fol. 233.
398 Ibid., fol. 260.
399 AAN, URM, 32/117, fol. 33.
400 AAN, URM, 32/118, fol. 7.
401 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 91. 
402 AAN, URM, 32/186, fol. 1.
403 AAN, URM, 32/63, fol. 20. See: J. Klimek, Spekulant na etacie, “Gazeta Prawnicza” 
1983, no. 10.
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over-40s – 64%. What made this group of criminals exceptional was the fact that 
87% had no prior convictions.404
Even if not blind, Justice was certainly ruthless; this proved to be the last 
straw for those opposed to the repressive policies and the war on speculation 
and brought forth a barrage of criticism. The futility of the anti-speculation op-
erations was frequently pointed out. “It is easy to see,” Józef Popkiewicz wrote 
in Polityka in the spring of 1984, “that it is the unbalanced market that breeds 
speculation and not the other way around […]. Is it then possible to defeat or 
at least diminish the size of the black market without obliterating its perma-
nent source? The answer is a resounding ‘No!’”405 The message between the lines 
was that the government should focus on balancing the market rather than on 
hounding small traders.
 A strong reaction first to the passing and then implementation of the law of 
May 10, 1985 marked the beginning of the process of the gradual reclaiming 
of pluralistic public space. “They say,” wrote Stanisław Podemski, “that you can’t 
make an omelet without breaking eggs and that the war on speculation comes at 
high cost. This is not acceptable. Human beings are not to be broken like eggs.”406 
The last straw was the aforementioned case, in June 1985, of a saddler from Prze-
myśl who for a small mark-up organized deliveries of bread to the nearby Stubno 
where there was no bakery. Despite the fact that the man had a written permission 
from the authorities and enjoyed the enthusiastic approval of Stubno’s residents, 
he was arrested, charged with speculation, and in October 1985, sentenced to 
two years in jail, albeit suspended. His punishment also included confiscation of 
all his savings and a huge fine: 250 thousand zloty. What particularly incited re-
sponse from the media was the comment that, had he been caught after May 10 – 
when the new law was passed – he would have had to serve his prison term and 
pay a much higher fine (double the value of the object of his crime).407 This re-
alization triggered a stormy discussion in the media. “University professors and 
cleaning ladies, farmers and workers […] wrote letters to the editors defending 
404 AAN, URM, 32/105, fol. 70.
405 J. Popkiewicz, Nierównowaga i spekulacja, “Polityka” no. 21, May 24, 1984.
406 S. Podemski, Niech nie lecą wióry, “Polityka” no. 18, May 4, 1985. See also: W. Mark-
iewicz, Sklep nieczynny z powodu aresztowania personelu, “Polityka” no. 26, June 29, 
1985.
407 Szczęście w nieszczęściu, “Polityka”nr 48 z 30 XI 1985; Szlachetny spekulant, “Polityka” 
no. 8, February 22, 1986. 
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the saddler. In the end the Minister of Justice reluctantly allowed an extraordi-
nary appeal in favor of the accused.”408
Mandatory press announcements of the sentences passed – intended as an 
additional punishment and a deterrent to others – backfired, bringing ridicule 
to the anti-speculation campaign: announcements about convictions for selling 
toys or herring made them appear absurd and futile. “Speculation is the lowest 
form of entrepreneurship, which has been known for thousands of years,” wrote 
Daniel Passent in early 1986. “No-one has ever been able to eradicate it if the 
circumstances for it were favorable.” The authorities should be happy that “despite 
educating people for two generations that hard work is the only source of wealth, 
the idea of buying cheap and selling high has not been completely eradicated. The 
obnoxious appetite for profit and for growing rich continues to lift its head despite 
years of scrubbing our morals with a tough brush, sometimes a prison one.”409
Something also began to stir on the other side of the barricade. “One can 
observe a certain fatigue, weariness or demobilization in the area of fighting 
speculation,” commented Deputy Chief of Lublin Police (MO), Colonel Andrzej 
Koczwarski, in early 1986. “There are some people, including police officers, who 
would like to take a back seat and get some rest.”410 A year later, even representa-
tives of the Prosecutor General called for prudence in cases such as food ration 
coupon fraud committed by “farmers employed outside agriculture (chłoporo-
botnicy)”.411
The discrepancy between theory and practice in the “war on speculation” and 
the economic, political, and social realities in Poland became increasingly clear 
in the second half of the 1980s. On the one hand state propaganda kept talking 
about economic reform, the US dollar was becoming the de facto main currency, 
and state travel agencies were organizing trips that were “tourist” in name only 
but in reality had a purely business character. On the other hand, the repressive 
measures employed against the black marketeers were quasi-Stalinist. Thanks 
to the amnesty bill of July 17, 1986, most political prisoners were let out of jail 
but the prison doors remained shut for even the most insignificant, small-scale 
profiteers – the amnesty did not cover economic crimes.
408 S. Podemski, Sędziowie i kary, “Polityka” no. 7, February 14, 1987. In early 1987, the 
Supreme Court discontinued the proceedings against the saddler and reminded the 
public that the criminal code had precedence over the decree of May 10, 1985.
409 D. Passent, Karp z gwizdkiem, “Polityka” no 6, February 8, 1986.
410 AAN, URM, 32/117, 179.
411 AAN, URM, 32/105, fol. 25.
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It is difficult to say if the anti-speculations legacy troubled the new admin-
istration. It certainly did nothing to enhance the image of the government. 
The situation of 1954, when the Special Commission had been simultaneously 
praised and pushed out of the game now repeated itself. Now, on the one hand, 
the CKWS received high accolades (for example during the cabinet meeting on 
May 12, 1986 or on many occasions in parliament in May and June of 1986); but 
on the other hand, beginning in 1987, its activity visibly slowed down and the 
frequency of the meetings of the Central Commission and the regional branches 
decreased.412
On October 23, 1987, the Polish parliament passed a bill on the scope of the 
activities of chief and central administrative bodies and the CKWS was no longer 
among them. Since the anti-speculation decree was still in force, there was a need 
to create a substitute organization. The tasks of the CKWS were allocated to the 
Committee of the Council of Ministers for Compliance with the Law, Public 
Order and Discipline (Komitet RM ds Przestrzegania Prawa, Porządku Publicz-
nego i Dyscypliny Społecznej). On the basis of the CKWS and the “Sektor” Cen-
tral Coordinating Team (Centralny Zespół Koordynacyjny), the Central Team 
Coordinating the Internal Market Protection (Centralny Zespół Koordynujący 
Ochronę Rynku Wewnętrznego) was created. The plan was to set up Voivodship 
Teams Coordinating Internal Market Protection (with 29 positions for secretar-
ies of the voivodship commissions). The Central Team, just as the CKWS had, 
was to synchronize anti-speculation operations, as well as analyze and evaluate 
the phenomenon of the black market. Colonel Zbigniew Nowicki (Deputy Chief 
of Police) was designated as its new chairman; his deputies were Piotr Ostasze-
wski, director of the PIH and Colonel Wacław Skoczylas, Director of the Of-
fice for Combating Economic Crime at Police Headquarters (Biuro do Walki z 
Przestępstwami Gospodarczymi KG MO).413
The dismantling of the CKWS proceeded much more smoothly than its op-
erations ever had. On October 27, the voivods and mayors of Warsaw, Kraków 
and Łódź received a telex informing them of the liquidation of the voivodship 
and local commissions. A thank-you note on behalf of the Prime Minister to the 
activists participating in anti-speculation operations rounded off the message. 
Any authorization issued in the past to inspectors by the commissions was to 
be withdrawn “in a controlled manner”.414 The solemn farewell Party organized 
412 AAN, URM, 32/2, fol. 10–12.
413 AAN, URM, 1.5/43, fol. 325–327.
414 AAN, URM, 32/2, fol. 50–51.
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on November 4, 1987 at the Office of the Council of Ministers was brief. After 
the handing out of the medals, the reading of the laudatory letters and the final 
speech delivered by Józef Kozioł, the ex-chairman of CKWS, guests – a fact duly 
recorded!415 – were offered fruit juice. 
This was a symbolic end of an era. The pace of the Central Coordinating Team 
(Centralny Zepół Koordynujący) slowed down significantly. We can only wonder 
whether the authorities came to deliberately allow a certain leeway for unofficial 
dealings, which inevitably accompanied market shortages, or whether, perhaps, 
the weakening government ran out of strength or will to act. While in 1987 as 
many as 5 607 people had been sentenced for speculation crimes (including 1 
801 under the accelerated procedure and 1 565 under the administrative sum-
mary procedure), convictions slowed down to 3 682 in 1988 and even lower, to 2 
120, in 1989 – fewer than at the end of the 1970s!416
The disappearance of black market issues from the headlines marked the true 
end of the war on speculation. Even Trybuna Ludu, the official daily newspaper 
of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) and one of its main propaganda out-
lets, hitherto passionately committed to the anti-speculation battle, had breathed 
its last in this war. On December 1, 1988 the newspaper published what sounded 
like a symbolic farewell: “We should have no illusions that repression is capable 
of eradicating speculation. The black market thrives on an unbalanced market. It 
can be destroyed only by increasing supply to equal demand.”417 A month later, 
with the new economic laws passed in December 1988, a new era began – also 
for the black market.
415 Ibid., fol. 68–71.
416 Rocznik statystyczny 1988, Warszawa 1988, pp. 504–505; Rocznik statystyczny 1991, 
Warszawa 1991, p. 80. 
417 Z. Krzyżanowska, Między “pierwszym” a ”drugim obiegiem”, TL, no. 279,  December 
1, 1988.
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4.  The (Historical) Geography of the Black 
Market in the Polish People’s Republic
4.1  General Remarks
This chapter does not aspire to present detailed characteristics of the centers of 
illicit distilling, illegal slaughter, smuggling, or of the hard currency trade. It aims 
rather to demonstrate correlations between black market phenomena and the 
geographical and historical context. There is no doubt, for example, that the par-
titions of Poland or the border changes and mass migrations after Second World 
War to this day continue to influence the political, social, economic and cultural 
situation in Poland.418 
The geographical and historical determinants of the second economy were al-
ready in evidence immediately after the war. It was already clear in January 1948 
that the local representative powers of the Special Commission for Combating 
Fraud and Corruption had to stand up against specific, at times endemic, phe-
nomena. The Kraków and Bielsko sections of the Commission had to deal with 
smuggling, Kielce – with illegal leather tanning, Szczecin – also with contraband 
but mostly with looting.419 The capital of Poland, Warsaw, was traditionally con-
sidered the center and the seedbed of all “speculation operations”.
The post-partition legacy was also apparent. For example in 1957 when op-
erations began against “economic criminals” who were also Party members, the 
greatest challenges arose in the regions where different historical traditions met. 
While in the Upper Silesia part of the Katowice voivodship, there were few, if 
any, problems in the former Polish Kingdom – created in 1815 by the Congress 
of Vienna and informally known as Congress Poland – the task was much more 
onerous. “In Częstochowa,” it was reported in 1957, “where the economic under-
ground is particularly extensive, the comrades are dealing with the largest num-
ber of cases. Especially when it comes to trade, there are several instances that 
are serious and difficult to tackle because of the connections between the people 
418 See: M. Janicki, W. Władyka, Dwie Polski, “Polityka”no. 44/November 3, 2007; J. Raci-
borski, Zachowania wyborcze Polaków 1989–2006, in: Wymiary życia społecznego. 
Polska na przełomie XX i XXI wieku, ed. M. Marody, Warszawa 2007, pp. 344–372.
419 AAN, KS, 82, fol. 4.
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involved, such as family ties. This is one reason why nobody was expelled from 
the Party in Częstochowa this year.”420
There was also a reason why (until the 1980s) illegal alcohol production 
thrived in the lands formerly under Russian and Austrian partition and in the 
territories where a high percentage of population had originated from those ar-
eas. And, at least during the first decade after the war, regional differences were 
also reflected in different approaches to what was considered the store of value of 
choice, especially in conservative, rural areas. Peasants in the former Polish King-
dom preferred gold tsarist roubles, whereas in the former Galicia, they favored 
Austrian ducats and gold dollars.
The deliberate and autonomous actions of the voivods and the PUWP’s local 
secretaries had a significant influence on the historic regional differences and 
divisions, especially during the initial phase of the rationing system in 1981.421 
Individual administrative units conducted their own rationing policy “under 
the pressure of trade unions and voivodship committees, or following the initi-
atives of voivods, or generally under some kind of pressure.”422 Even in neigh-
boring voivodships the same goods (coffee, cigarettes, alcohol, clothing, or fats) 
could be available on the market or under strict rationing. In accordance with the 
law of communicating vessels, goods trickled from the regions where they were 
available to the regions where their sale was limited.423
The national system of rationing included, even in its most restrictive phase at 
the turn of 1981 and 1982, only a portion of market goods, which left the region-
al decision makers with substantial room for maneuver. Already in April 1982, it 
had become clear that the “country is a mosaic of rationing and trade particular-
isms.”424 Inspections of the efficiency in implementing the rationing rules con-
ducted in 48 voivodships found some irregularities in half of them. In parallel 
420 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–7, fol. 131.
421 Sometimes it led to creating coalitions, which Mieczysław F. Rakowski called “local 
deals”. These were confederacies of several voivodships, with the strongest one as a 
leader. The first secretaries and voivods formed a “Public Safety Committee”. “They 
help each other, they advise each other on how to by-pass the regulation coming from 
Warsaw, they foster surplus exchange between the voivodships, they help each outer 
out with the resources, etc. […]. Preventing the economic crash is their most impor-
tant goal”; M.F. Rakowski, Rzeczpospolita na progu lat osiemdziesiątych, Warszawa 
1981, p. 82.
422 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 60, 114.
423 Ibid.
424 AAN, URM, 32/113, fol. 48.
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with sales based on centrally issued ration coupons, there developed autonomous 
regional distribution of goods in exchange for vouchers, ID documents, and tax 
receipts. The heads of town and community councils often chose to grant “special 
allocations”. The latter usually involved additional (frequently quite substantial) 
amounts of alcohol awarded “not only for weddings and baptism celebrations 
but also nameday parties, anniversaries and other undocumented occasions.” 
Until the end of the 1980s, knowledge of the complicated rationing geography 
was an important part of black market strategies.425
4.2  Center – Periphery
The main dividing line on the black market map did not run along the old or 
current administrative borders but rather along the boundaries separating the 
big cities – the “centers” – from the “periphery”, small towns and rural areas. The 
opposition between center and periphery is usually explored in cultural dis-
course but it is also of significance in economic discourse. In post-war Poland, 
the center and periphery represented two quite different worlds.
4.2.1  Center – Big Cities
A big city provided a wonderful backdrop for devising black market strategies. 
Industry and other state institutions were like bottomless coffers from which both 
the private sector and the “state” swindlers helped themselves by the handful. The 
following excerpt refers to Warsaw but it is also representative of Kraków, Katow-
ice, Łódź or Gdańsk: “Warsaw industry produces many attractive articles, provid-
ing opportunities for theft. Various manufactories operating under the disguise 
of craft have their headquarters in Warsaw. Most of the time, they are doomed to 
rely on stolen materials for supplies. Various enterprises, for example publishing 
houses, in many instances ignore strict rules of financial discipline. If one adds to 
this a widespread practice of contract projects and an abundance of private sub-
contractors, it all creates even more opportunities for fraud and misuse.”426
In 1957 in Szpilki magazine no. 35, the well-known cartoonist Karol Ferst-
er published a telling caricature: a petty-bourgeois couple apply for a permit to 
open a store; handing their application to the clerk, they remark, “We are about 
to open a store in an area where there are no nationalized outlets. Where are 
we supposed to get our supplies from?” For contemporaries, the context was 
425 Ibid., fol. 20–23, 80; AAN, URM, 32/117, fol. 79–80.
426 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/VII–245, fol. 108–109. 
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immediately understandable. In 1957, the network of private traders comprised 
26 thousand stores, twice as many as in the previous year; however, stores kept 
opening not in the outskirts and small towns where demand was great but most-
ly in downtown areas of big cities. In the free market system, merchants find the 
centers attractive, because this is where the wealthy clientele lives. In communist 
Poland, it was the concentration of nationalized trade in the big cities that drew 
the private merchants there. “Some private stores engage in the illegal practice 
of buying from nationalized stores large quantities of goods in short supply on 
the official market in order to sell them on the black market. With the increased 
speculation in private trade, the prices of goods from small private manufactur-
ers are rising.”427 Year 1957 brought a veritable revolution: the number of private 
eateries grew fivefold. It was easier for the authorities to influence their loca-
tion by granting (or withholding) liquor license but still the majority of the new 
restaurants opened in the central districts of the biggest cities.428 State or coop 
trade constituted one of the most crucial sources of supply for private merchants 
(official and unofficial) until the late 1980s.
The big cities offered not only more business opportunities, but also a clien-
tele more wised-up to the then current trends. These arrived first in Warsaw, the 
Tri-City (Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Sopot), Wrocław and Kraków. For this reason, 
demand in the big cities was the most sophisticated and developed, and their 
residents had the money to buy goods. Trade in the big cities, including the black 
market, differed from the traditional, often pre-industrial ways of conducting 
transactions in rural areas. It was not limited to group of acquaintances and often 
used modern methods of marketing such as press advertisements. 
Big city public space facilitated the “modernization” of the second economy 
by delineating permanent, easily recognizable areas of black market activity. Tra-
ditionally these were located in large market places or long established market 
halls.429 This was the case in Łódź, Kraków, and Wrocław430 but especially in War-
saw, where the Różycki Bazaar, the Rembertów Marketplace or (in the 1980s) 
427 AAN, URM, 22/115, fol. 2. 
428 Ibid.
429 In November 1981, the chief of the Central Commission for Combating Fraud stated: 
“Speculation concentrates in big cities especially in large bazaars and market halls”; 
AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 26.
430 Wrocław’s most famous marketplace was at Nankier Square. See: HIM, Pressearchiv, P 
6221, Item 6856/54, The Free Market and the Black Market in Wrocław, August 10, 1954; 
Z. Antosiewicz, Prosperity placu Nankiera, “Tygodnik Demokratyczny” 1956, no. 20.
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and the Skra marketplace on the fields of an athletic club had cross-regional or 
national significance.431
Transport centers such as railroad stations were also black market hubs. One 
such, from the 1960s to the 1980s, was Katowice. “The crowd swirled right in 
front of my eyes,” Romuald Teyszerski described the Katowice railroad station 
in 1968. “The foreign traders sat impassively against the walls, while Poles were 
excitedly rummaging in the piles of polo shirts, sweaters and non-iron shirts. 
The vendors – Hungarians, Czechs, citizens of Yugoslavia, and Austrians – were 
experts on the topic of current prices […]. My friends later told me this was a 
normal sight. Katowice is a central hub for incoming traffic ‘from the West’ (this 
is where foreign tourists often start their visit to Poland) and with the arrival of 
each train, the trading begins. It’s important to sell quickly, to get rid of the goods, 
to make money quickly and venture into Poland. The travelers come here having 
been told by their friends that this is the place for trading. And to do that, they 
don’t even have to leave the station building.”432
Every big city also had a well-known site where the illegal hard currency trad-
ing took place. In Warsaw, this was initially the area around the Hotel Polonia, 
near the corner of Marszałkowska Street and Aleje Jerozolimskie. Later, the area 
near Jasna, Traugutta, and Kredytowa Streets, where the banks were located, be-
came known for hard currency black market deals.433 In Kraków, Rynek Główny 
(the Main Market) and adjacent streets became the location of choice for the 
moneychangers’ (known as cinkciarze434). In Gdynia it was Świętojańska Street 
(and to a lesser extent, all the other streets leading to the port), in Szczecin – the 
Piast Café and Kaskada restaurant,435 in Wrocław – the restaurant in the Ho-
tel Metropol, among other places.436 The hard currency black market in Lub-
lin was located between the PKO bank on Tysiąclecie Avenue and the market 
place across the street (on Ruska Street). “A dream location for the money deal-
ers;” a journalist commented in 1988, “there, they had everything in one place – 
an official bank, underground passage, black marketeers, and a real market.”437 
431 See: J. Kurczewski, M. Cichowski, K. Wiliński, Wielkie bazary warszawskie. Środowisko 
społeczne, kultura i problem społeczny, Warszawa 2010.
432 R. Teyszerski, Złote jajo po polsku, “Kierunki”, no. 36/September 8, 1968.
433 About Warsaw: J. Kochanowski, “Niepewne czasy, pewny dolar”. Szkic do obrazu 
warszawskiego czarnego rynku walutowego, PH, 100, 2009/1, pp. 29–46.
434 APKr, KW PZPR, 293, fol. 214, 223.
435 J. Wołoszańska, Nie tylko przez pryzmat prawa, ŻW, April 22, 1971.
436 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6221, Item 4942/58, Black market in Poland.
437 J. Nieporowski, Raj dla cinkciarzy, “Tygodnik Kulturalny”, no. 14/October 3, 1988.
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The money dealing spots moved around, depending on the meandering of the 
official hard currency policies. In early 1970s, Pewex stores became the location 
of choice for the money dealers. The immediately recognizable moneychangers 
were a permanent fixture of the big city landscape in communist Poland.
Warsaw was undoubtedly the most important black market center in the Pol-
ish People’s Republic. The Warsaw dealers who sold gold, US dollars, alcohol and 
other products in short supply on the official market, effectively took advantage 
of their experience gained during the Second World War. They were indeed ef-
ficient, as one can conclude from the fact that 11.4% of all black market crimes 
investigated by the Special Commission in 1946 and 22.7% in 1947 were com-
mitted in Warsaw.438 The Polish capital became a city with a high exposure to 
crime. In the early 1960s, the national crime rate in Poland was 130 incidents per 
10 000 people. In Warsaw it was 211 (only Szczecin voivodship beat the record). 
It was also in Warsaw that the highest rate of crime against public property and 
black market offenses were reported. While the national average rate in crimes 
involving public property was 30 per 10 000 people, in Warsaw it was 50. For 
black market offenses, the national average was 2.2 cases per 10 000 people; in 
Warsaw – it was 7.3.439 Warsaw was a big city and it was easy to engage in illegal 
trade there “without attracting any unwanted attention”, even when this required 
international contacts. “In Warsaw,” it was reported in 1964, “there are groups of 
active hard currency dealers (waluciarze) who have extensive connections with 
various international groups and maintain trade relations with economic swin-
dlers, who buy from them foreign hard currency and gold using stolen money.”440 
In 1976, seventy five percent of the 220 cases of “professional speculation” (Item 
221, Clause 4 of the Criminal Code) were committed in the Warsaw voivodship, 
as was the highest number, that is – 820 of all speculation crimes (Items 221–225 
of the Criminal Code); Katowice voivodship was in second place with 379 inci-
dents, and Łódź voivodship was third with 274.441
Warsaw had the greatest number of private stores: in the early 1960s – there 
were 621 stores per 1.2 million city residents and 915 stores per 2.4 million War-
saw voivodship residents. In comparison, in the Katowice voivodship with a pop-
ulation of 3.4 million, there were 726 private stores. At the same time in Warsaw 
438 AAN, KS, 10, fol. 175.
439 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, fol. 163–164.
440 Ibid., fol. 164.
441 W. Krasucka, Spekulacja (wybrane zagadnienia), “Studia Kryminologiczne, Krymi-
nalistyczne i Penitencjarne” 10, 1979, p. 157.
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and vicinity, there were to be found 30% of all artisan shops in Poland.442 In 1969, 
in Warsaw and vicinity, there were some 40 thousand artisan shops, industrial 
plants, trade and service outlets – a similar number as those of Łódź, Kraków, 
and Wrocław put together. Almost half of the private export production came 
from Warsaw. One third of Polish “private millionaire businesses” (some 700) 
was located here.443
The private sector was an important but not the only factor influencing the 
shape and size of the Warsaw black market. Warsaw was the center of the cultur-
al, scientific, economic, and political life of the country. Many Warsaw residents 
had at their disposal a substantial amount of illegally acquired cash. They needed 
to invest it discreetly. At the same time international diplomatic and trade rep-
resentatives stationed in Warsaw and most of the foreign media correspondents 
also resided there. Already in the 1940s, foreign embassies had partially covered 
their operational costs with Polish money purchased on the black market. Their 
staff, including the diplomats, undertook their own illegal trading and smuggling 
operations (more in chapter 8). At that time, the only Polish international airport 
hosting intercontinental flights was located in Warsaw. As a result, not only did 
western patterns of consumption spread faster in the Polish capital city, but also 
western currencies flooded the local market.
As the capital of Poland, Warsaw was a “hotbed of all kinds of speculation.”444 
In other Polish cities it was their history, geography, and economy that deter-
mined the characteristics of the black market. Port cities will be discussed in the 
next sub-chapter. Kraków based its black market on tourist traffic, Poznań on 
International Fair visitors.445 Particular circumstances, especially historical ones, 
could strongly influence local black market prosperity. For example, Radom be-
came in the 1950s one of the richest cities in Poland, although this was not offi-
cially acknowledged. 
Radom owed its fame to its tradition of leatherworking going back to the Mid-
dle Ages. In the mid-1950s, the output of Radom tanneries was half of what they 
had been producing before the Second World War, and it barely covered the needs 
of the state-owned shoe factories. At the same time, 120 private shoemaker’s shops 
were registered in Radom and vicinity. In 1957, they manufactured 56 thousand 
pairs of shoes, using 15 thousand square meters of soft leather and about 20 tons 
of hard leather. The official allowance covered one third of the needs (six thousand 
442 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, fol. 163–164.
443 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/XVIII–3, vol. 3, fol. 58.
444 AAN, URM, 32/74, fol. 19.
445 Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu, 1071, Prezydium WRN, 7122/X/79, fol. 114, 146.
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square meters of soft leather and six tons of hard leather). The remaining leather 
came from three thousand illegal tanneries located in various places in the city 
and its vicinity. The unofficial tanning shops based their production also on that 
of state-owned factories, which were the source of otherwise unavailable tannins 
and strictly rationed raw leather. Substantial profits446 both from stealing and 
production were invested primarily on the black market. Unofficial businesses 
requiring a special supply base influenced the development of illegal alcohol pro-
duction and trade.447 As a result of show trials in 1960 and 1961, which ended 
with some leather swindlers being sentenced to death448 (albeit the sentences were 
not carried out), the black market in Radom gradually grew poorer and lost its 
luster.449 Even in the 1970s, when the city became the voivodship capital, Radom’s 
second economy had nothing special to offer. 
It can be said that Radom belonged somewhere in between the center and the 
periphery. In the early 1960s, a Polityka journalist wrote: “A city that is big, grey, 
and ugly. The streets are crowded but the crowds are sluggish, spiritless, gray. It 
is a cross between a big industrial center and a small county town”.450 A “big city” 
characteristic was the fact that the more significant cases of illegal trading did 
end up in court. But Radom’s “small town” ambiance was apparent from the fact 
that its second economy sailed under the radar for such a long time in theory 
only; in fact, the authorities kept their eyes more or less shut to its existence quite 
deliberately and not entirely disinterestedly. 
4.2.2  Periphery: Municipal and District Poland
Writing about the Soviet Union in the 1940s, the American historian Julie Hessler 
noted: “At the local level, the repression of the unofficial economy was combined 
446 According to the report of the PUWP commission from 1958, Radom residents’ 
income in 1957 was 1 294 million zl and expenditure – 1633 million zl. Only local 
expenditure and savings in local banks were included in the report!; AAN, KC PZPR, 
XI/281, fol. 25–26. 
447 Ibid.
448 J. Brodacz, Mali ludzie – wielkie interesy. Afera skórzana w Radomiu, “Polityka”no. 45/
November 5, 1960; S. Kozicki, Radom czy Dedowo, “Polityka” no. 1/January 5, 1963; 
C.T. Zwolski, Historia miasta Radomia. Kronika, Radom 2005; P. Chojnacki, K. Madej, 
Przypadki prokuratora, “Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej” 2005, no. 1–2, p. 116.
449 When in late January 1965, the authorities in the Kielce voivodship liquidated groups 
of “hard currency criminals”, the largest number of arrests were in Radom; AIPN, 
MSW II, 4370, 34.
450 S. Kozicki, Radom czy Dedowo, “Polityka” no. 1/January 5, 1963.
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with grudging toleration; police, prosecutors, market administrators, and finan-
cial agencies treated private exchange at the bazaar as an inevitable, though in 
many cases illegal, part of economic life.”451 There is no doubt that the further 
away the regions were from the decision-making political center, the more its 
population reliant on agriculture for their income, the lower the number of in-
habitants per square kilometer, and the more conservative its social structures, 
the more liberal its authorities tended to be towards spontaneous economic ac-
tivities of citizens. Often the official liberalism was associated with corruption, 
or informal, sometimes family-based, obligations and relations. Not infrequently, 
some altogether pragmatic reasons were behind official support for black mar-
ket “tycoons”.452 The periphery (referred to as “greenfield” in the Polish People’s 
Republic) was usually underprivileged in comparison with the big cities, and 
with smaller but industrialized cities,453 as far as supplies were concerned. Local 
decision makers accepted a wider margin of economic freedom as a way of fill-
ing in the gaps in supply. The official trade coordinator in the Siedlce voivodship 
was characteristically sympathetic, when in 1981 he commented on the arrest of 
a black marketeer in the small town Żelechów: the “speculator was selling meat 
and meat products to the population. The police and my employer intervened. 
However, I must say that the reaction of the community, the buyers, was the 
very opposite. They did not want him punished severely, they did not want him 
destroyed – because he [was] the only meat supplier in the town and communi-
ty.”454 In the years that followed, such reports became commonplace.455
451 J. Hessler, A postwar Perestroika? Toward a history of private enterprise in the USSR, 
“Slavic Review” no. 57, 1998, no. 3, p. 522.
452 Ibid., p. 540.
453 For example, in 1970, the average deliveries in Kielce voivodship were 19.3 kg, but in 
the industrialized city of Starachowice – 38.5 kg; in the Rzeszów voivodship – 20.2 
kg but in the city of Mielec where airplane factories were located – 56.6 kg. In the 
Warsaw voivodship deliveries reached on average 41.4 kg but in the city of Warsaw 
– 81 kg of meat and deli products. In subsequent years, the proportion did not vary 
greatly. In mid-1976, the average deliveries in the Warsaw voivodship came to 96 kg 
per person annually; in Łódź voivodship to 85.3 kg and in the Katowice voivodship 
to 75.5 kg (the three voivodships received two thirds of the deliveries of all best 
quality meat). At the same time, the deliveries for the less industralized Łomża and 
Zamość voivodships amounted to some 19.5 kg each. J. Kochanowski, “…jesteśmy 
już przyzwyczajeni”. Prolegomena do społeczno-modernizacyjnych kulis “problemu 
mięsnego” w PRL, PH, 96, 2005/4, p. 603. 
454 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 76.
455 AAN, URM, 32/64, fol. 34. 
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In small, closed communities, where people were interdependent and bound 
to deal with one another on a regular basis, the “patron-client” relationship was 
paramount. This situation led to the development of efficient social networks 
with a tight-knit structure, which successfully buffered any intervention from 
outside, with the help of the relationships that local entrepreneurs, state and pri-
vate, legal and illegal, had with the local power elite. It was a tall order to infiltrate 
and fight such local arrangements, as can be illustrated by the efforts undertaken 
by the Central Team for Combating Fraud and Corruption (Zespół Centralny 
do Walki z Nadużyciami i Korupcją), created in 1957 (introduced in the previous 
chapter). In the big cities, sections of the unofficial economy were connected 
mostly by business links and they were easy to identify and expunge. In local 
communities, the family connections and client links were much less clear but 
more durable and, resistant to external influence. The local cliques were tightly 
knit, loyal and included lower level Party activists, salespeople and inspectors 
but also Party functionaries, policemen or prosecutors who, if need be, could 
hide incriminating documents in the deepest drawers. For example in the Upper 
Silesia town of Mysłowice in 1957, a local Team for Combating Fraud “excluded 
the chief prosecutor and his deputy from the Party for drunkenness and links 
with private enterprise. After they had been kicked out, it came to light that this 
chief prosecutor was having a villa built for him in Dąbrówka, and prisoners 
were building it for him. One has to wonder how he could have ever been able to 
prosecute crimes and abuses…”456
One can reasonably conclude that, as social trust in the economic capabilities 
of the state diminished in the late 1970s, the informal – and most certainly un-
lawful – economic activity that was of benefit to the local community gained the 
tacit acceptance of local authorities. This was clear from the way that they tended 
to adapt orders from the headquarters to local circumstances, and carry them 
out only when big city functionaries were really paying attention. But even then, 
the actions were often feigned. A report from September 1981 noted: “In villages 
and subdivisions the battle against speculation is so far highly unsatisfactory. We 
may say there are blind spots on the map of our fight against speculation. The 
specific relations among people in the rural areas, the nepotism in distributing 
the goods, the warning systems in place and the low frequency of inspections all 
allow the local black marketeers to get away with their operations.”457
456 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–7, fol. 12.
457 AAN, URM, 32/112, 31. The Solidarity revolution of 1980 and 1981 exposed social 
networks in provincial Poland. The most typical were informal ties existing at com-
munity level between different branches of local government and economic agencies. 
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In the following years, the blind spots were only superficially identified and 
certainly not removed. Of course, anti-speculation commissions were also set up 
in the peripheral areas, with meetings taking place and official reports submitted, 
but the results were usually modest. The regional-level, internal inspections of 
individual institutions such as the Peasants’ Self-Help Cooperative (Samopomoc 
Chłopska) were often a pro forma, ritualized activity. Even if the inspections ac-
tually took place, they usually included local functionaries who were prone to 
not notice the shortcomings – which an external commission would uncover 
immediately on arrival.458
As a consequence, the number of speculation cases brought before the pro-
vincial courts was small. According to the police and judicial data, 90% (in 1982), 
and 76.5% (in 1983) of all speculation crimes occurred in the cities. Warsaw 
reacted with irritation to the regional prosecution statistics. For example in 
September 1983, in the Suwałki voivodship the courts did not hear a single spec-
ulation case, and in Białystok – only one. During the same period, Warsaw courts 
delivered 105 verdicts. Six months later, in March 1984, Polish courts sentenced 
618 citizens for speculation crimes. In the Suwałki voivodship, as usual, no one 
was sentenced for speculation at all; in the Legnica, Zielona Góra, Tarnobrzeg, 
Łomża, Sieradz, Skierniewice, Opole, Kielce, Bielsko-Biała, Elbląg, Konin, Kosza-
lin, Krosno, Piotrków, Płock, Tarnobrzeg, Nowy Sącz, and Olsztyn voivodships – 
between 2 and 10 people were sentenced. In the Katowice voivodship there were 
69 sentences, and in Warsaw voivodship – 123.459
The head of the local authority (naczelnik gminy) was always blamed for tolerating 
the existence of such ties. Thanks to the networks, “tried and trusted” interest groups 
appeared in the community and informal structures are born. “They are like private 
entities within institutions or workplaces. In extreme cases, if aided by the commu-
nity leader, they turn into family clans. Family clans usually operate rural trade.” Ibid. 
458 AAN, URM, 32/171, fol. 116.
459 AAN, URM, 32/186, fol. 15–17; ibid, 32/121, fol. 60. An anecdote told by Col. Wacław 
Skoczylas, the Director of the Office for Combating Economic Fraud at Police Head-
quarters (KG MO) in November 1986, shed some light on these results: “Two or three 
years ago, I had a conversation with one of the First Secretaries of the Voivoidship 
Committees. […] I discussed with him the issue of arresting 60 drivers from a trans-
portation enterprise. Why did I talk to the First Secretary? Because this was about 
making a political decision – about arresting 60 drivers in a company employing 70 
drivers in total putting the transport system in the whole voivodship into chaos. This 
wise First Secretary – and very wise indeed he was, and he taught me a lot! – said 
to me: “To arrest 60 drivers means 60 temporary widows, at least 60 or maybe even 
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It was clear to many that the reality of the black market outside the big cities 
did not look rosy. By the second part of 1981, it was already apparent that the 
black marketeers were intercepting almost all means of productions in rural ar-
eas – tractors, farming equipment, building materials, coal, insecticides, “even 
pitchforks and rubber boots”.460 To a significant extent, it was the residents of the 
big cities who subsidized the black market prices of those items by purchasing 
food products in short supply, mostly meat, which flowed to the cities via inde-
pendent channels.
4.3  The North versus the South
In the mid-1980s, as part of the step-up of the battle against the hard currency 
black market, the chief of the Police Headquarters department in charge of eco-
nomic crime conducted “disciplinary talks regarding the unsatisfactory results 
of combating this type of crime with the chief of departments for combating 
economic crime in the following voivodship headquarters: Białystok, Biała Pod-
laska, Konin, Bydgoszcz, Ciechanów, Chełm, Częstochowa, Gorzów Wielkopol-
ski, Kalisz, Koszalin, Krosno, Piła, Sieradz, Skierniewice, and Zamość.”461 All the 
conversations were conducted over the phone but in two cases, in Kraków and 
Gdańsk, at the opposite ends of the country, he showed up personally. This was 
not surprising – it was the mountainous region in the South and the coast in the 
North that were the black market hubs of socialist Poland. This was a result of the 
geographical and historical factors that influenced social behavior (economical, 
political, etc.), and could be best observed in Zakopane and on the coast, and 
especially in the Tri-city.462
120 orphans. No chance, comrade Skoczylas! You go and arrest the Director!” Ibid., 
32/99, fol. 39–40. 
460 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 31. In the subsequent years (and probably until the end of 
the Polish People’s Republic) not much changed. Ibid., 32/114, fol. 50; ibid., 32/115, 
fol. 39.
461 AIPN, KG MO, 35/554, fol. 49.
462 I will focus here on the well-researched 1960s and 1970s. I wrote about the sec-
ond economy in Podhale in the following articles: Zakopiański kapitalizm, “Gazeta 
Wyborcza”, December 18–19, 2004, Socjalizm na halach, czyli “Patologia stosunków 
społeczno-ekonomicznych i politycznych w Zakopanem” (1972), PH, 98, 2007/1, 
pp. 71–96.
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4.3.1  The South: It Is Impossible to Bring Socialism to the  
Polish Highlands!
Of all the Polish post-war land borders, only the section of the southern border 
running east from, Racibórz could pride itself on going back to the Middle Ages. 
The residents of this mountain borderland identified themselves not in terms of 
politics but rather of geography and culture and “more important than borders 
was kinship, in pursuit of which all the residents of the Carpathian region visit-
ed each other regardless of the obstructions posed by territorial administration. 
Being a góral, a highlander, mattered more than being a Pole or a Romanian. 
This tradition was so engrained that border patrols were quite unable to keep 
their compatriots under control.”463 Mountain societies all over the world (and 
the Polish highlanders are no exception) live in conservative social structures 
where the dominant role is held by the “big family” and the authorities and their 
law enforcement are approached in a utilitarian manner. Well aware of their in-
ability to control the highlanders, the authorities tended to allow them quite a 
bit of leeway. A Radio Free Europe report from 1961 got it right when observing 
that the “highlanders’ prosperity is usually derived from overt violations of legal 
regulations”.464
Difficult geographical and climate conditions that hindered any possibilities 
for productive agriculture or industry forced the górals to develop specific sur-
vival strategies. One such was social mobility, manifested in emigration and sea-
sonal work migrations. Emigration from the Podhale region to North America 
(between 1870 and 1930 approximately 42 thousand people left this region) had 
a significant impact on local strategies. From the US or Canada, the emigrants 
sent money and parcels with western products, which made post-war Podhale a 
center for trading fashionable western clothing.465 The emigrants already settled 
 
463 M. Prandota, Koński interes, “Tygodnik Kulturalny”, no. 22/1983.
464 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6221, RFE-Research, Item No 2823, September 3, 1961, “Gorale” 
(the highlanders) – the privileged class in Poland.
465 In the spring of 1958 a refugee from Poland confessed to a Radio Free Europe repre-
sentative: “For those who sell clothes, Podhale, and the vicinities of Nowy Targ and 
Nowy Sącz are still the best sources of supply. The cheapest second-hand items are in 
Nowy Targ and even professional traders go there to buy a bargain second-hand coat 
or other clothes. Fashionable Warsaw families who wear foreign outfits or who plan 
their budgets well, buy their clothes once or twice a year in Nowy Sącz or Zakopane 
when they go there for vacation”; HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6211, RFE-Research, Item 
1660/58, Warsaw flea market does booming business.
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in the West provided support for their compatriots from the region who were 
also looking for opportunities to earn money overseas (especially after 1956, 
when it became easier to leave Poland). Only 223 people left Zakopane for the US 
and Canada; in 1967 and in 1971, the number rose sixfold. After working over-
seas for one year, a Podhale woman brought home on average $3.5 000, a man – 
between 5 and 7 000. We can safely assume that the returning seasonal workers 
pumped annually into Zakopane and Podhale economy several million dollars.
Tradition going back a long time and easily available raw materials made 
Nowy Targ the center of a (mostly illegal) fur industry. According to Radio Free 
Europe: the “financial elite of the highlanders […] is created by furriers […]. 
There are many furrier workshops in Podhale and apart from an official work-
shop, every furrier has several other concealed in different shacks.”466 When in 
the 1960s, demand for the products of Podhale furriers increased significant-
ly, thanks also to the winter Olympics in Grenoble, where the stylish sheepskin 
coats from Zakopane were a big hit, the highlanders started to bring in sheep 
even from faraway regions of Poland. In the past, a similar long-distance trade 
had existed in horses, which the highlanders bought in the Suwałki voivodship in 
the North, among others, in order to smuggle them into Czechoslovakia. 
Already in the 19th century, the highlanders had recognized smuggling as an 
effective survival strategy, which they often considered a profession. Smuggling 
maintained its position as a significant source of income during most of the 20th 
century, adapting with ease to outside circumstances such as fluctuating demand 
and a rise in tourism. In its1959 report on economic crime, the Supreme Audit 
Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) paid special attention to the “smuggling on the 
southern border, in which the highlander population engages on a professional 
level.”467 In the first post-war decade, smuggling routes traditionally led to Slo-
vakia, with Slovakian zippers brought in covering the entire Polish nationwide 
466 Ibid., Item No 2823, September 3, 1961. Until the 1980s, the Podhale “furrier industry” 
was a favorite topic of “anti-speculation” journalism; see: G. Wall, Kwiatki do kożucha, 
“Walka Młodych” August , 1971; A. Kulicka, Rekiny w baranicach, “Polityka” no. 44/
November 4, 1978; A.R. Szymański, Kożuch z meliny, “Fakty” December 1, 1984. 
467 Informacja o przestępczości gospodarczej w 1959 r., Warszawa 1960 (NIK, Wydział 
ds. Nadużyć Gospodarczych, copy in author’s possession), p. 19. See: A. Buńda, Po-
granicze mniej formalne czyli nielegalne przekraczanie granic na Podhalu, in: Góry 
i góralszczyzna w dziejach i kulturze pogranicza polsko-słowackiego (Podhale, Spisz, 
Orawa, Gorce, Pieniny). Historia, ed. J.M. Roszkowski, R. Kowalski, Nowy Targ 2005, 
pp. 127–134.
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demand for this product. In the next decade, the routes extended to reach Italy 
and Yugoslavia.468
Tourism discovered Zakopane and the Podhale region in the 1870s, becom-
ing an important engine of change. In a few decades, Zakopane was turned into 
the best  known resort in Poland, a center of high culture, and a magnet for the 
intellectual elite. After the Second World War, Zakopane was able to maintain 
its position and consolidate it, especially after the events of 1956, when acceler-
ated modernization boosted demand for recreational activities. When the state 
was unable to meet this demand, the private sector seized the opportunity and 
quickly outdid, usually in an unofficial manner, the sluggish state infrastructure, 
overloaded with regulations. In Zakopane, private money reserves were put to 
good use and invested in the development of a tourist empire, practically inde-
pendent from the state and extremely profitable. The privatization of the state in 
the winter capital of Poland went so far that, in the words of a statement of the 
Party commission dispatched to Zakopane in 1972, “the state in Zakopane was 
put in a position much worse than it would have been in capitalism; it was side-
lined to the position of not even janitor but to that of an unpaid crossing guard 
or street sweeper.”469
 From the 1960s onward, each year some 2.5 million tourists visited Zakopane 
and nearby villages; they all required food, shelter, transportation, and entertain-
ment and successfully supported if not forced the development of local black 
market strategies. Investment in tourist infrastructure yielded between 20% and 
35% profit on accommodation and 50% on catering. Under favorable conditions, 
the capital invested could be recovered within two to five years. In the 1960s, 
organized groups of private builders had already descended on Zakopane. They 
pressurized the highlanders, often aided and abetted by city officials, to sell their 
land, which the entrepreneurs later re-sold at much higher prices. The same 
groups tried to control the market for construction services. The building boom 
entailed a thriving development of the black market for building materials. They 
were often imported from distant regions of the country or even smuggled from 
abroad, from Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Yugoslavia.
In the early 1970s, illegal craft studios that manufactured souvenirs (local 
members of the intelligentsia commonly did some outwork to supplement their 
income) had a revenue perhaps as much as ten times higher than the profits 
468 See chapter 9.
469 Large fragments of the report were published in: Socjalizm na halach…, pp. 80–96, 
p. 89; original: AAN, KC PZPR, XI/564, fol. 212–279. 
152
(some 37 million zloty) of the 700 registered private enterprises. The necessity 
to provide food for the tourists led to the development of usually illegal strate-
gies of acquiring products that were hard to get (such as meat) and boosted the 
illegal distilling and sale of alcohol. “There are streets in Zakopane,” the 1972 
Party report continued, “where in every second house, there is an illegal joint 
selling alcohol (it seems Zakopane has the highest alcohol consumption rate in 
the country, because, as the locals put it, ‘It’s an exceptionally good place to have 
a drink’.”470
The real gold mine, however, was the hard currency trade. According to esti-
mates, Zakopane residents and its 180 local “professional” hard currency dealers, 
as well as some 250 dealers visiting from different parts of Poland and another 
450 dealers from abroad were jointly able to turn over 16 million dollars in total 
annually. In a year, foreign tourists left between two and three million dollars in 
the town. Of some 400 000 foreigners annually, only 10% (including the 40 000 
from the capitalist states) availed themselves of the accommodation provided by 
the state; the overwhelming majority opted for private rooms or houses where 
they paid the rent in hard currency (or goods) at an exchange rate favorable for 
both parties. In the late 1950s, when the borders regulations between the mem-
ber countries of the Soviet Bloc countries were relaxed to a certain extent, Zako-
pane became a vacation favorite for tourists from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
the GDR. There, they could find vacation options different from those offered by 
standard holiday resorts and free from state control.471 In the summer of 1970, 
the acclaimed opposition writer and journalist Stefan Kisielewski commented 
on the tourist situation in Zakopane: “there is a lot of Germans from the GDR, 
Czechs, Hungarians, even Russians. I don’t know how they can afford it here […], 
they must have their own calculations, if they come here in such numbers.”472
Podhale took advantage of the heavy traffic at the main southern border 
crossing. In 1968, for example, some 900 000 people crossed the border at Łysa 
Polana.473 High demand in Poland for Soviet Bloc currencies,474 favorable ex-
change rates, and easy access made this region an attractive destination for Soviet 
Bloc citizens. In the 1970s, the Thursday market in Nowy Targ turned into a 
470 Socjalizm na halach…, p. 81.
471 For example in 1971, the Hungarians opened a winter bus route between Budapest 
and Zakopane, in the summer extended to Kraków (via Zakopane); AAN, Główny 
Komitet Kultury Fizycznej I Turystyki (GKKFiT), 16/93, fol. 6.
472 S. Kisielewski, Dzienniki, Warszawa 1998, p. 427.
473 APKr, KW PZPR, 293, fol. 244, 257. 
474 See chapter dedicated to hard currencies and gold.
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currency exchange hub thanks to some 30 000 Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Bul-
garians, Yugoslavia citizens, and GDR Germans who visited in high season. The 
visitors brought money, exchanged it at the black market rate and went shopping 
(for food, textiles, auto parts, sport equipment, and radio and TV sets) at very 
attractive prices.475
The Party commission report from 1972 offered a relatively reliable estimate of 
the profits of the Zakopane second economy. The annual revenue that flowed to 
Zakopane from vacation rentals, food industry, transportation, trade (including 
hard currency), and prostitution reached the dizzy heights of over one billion 
zloty – the equivalent of state investment in the infrastructure of Zakopane in the 
entire decade of the 1960s! The magnitude of this income stream certainly had 
an impact on local government structures – an important part of this quasi-cap-
italist machine. The informal groups that had formed around particular interests 
and were actively involved in their implementation had a key role in Podhale. 
The financial means at their disposal were such that the problem tended to be 
not “how can we afford to bribe him?” but rather “why won’t he take the bribe?” 
These groups effectively corrupted members of the Party apparatus, city clerks, 
tax collectors, and police and prosecution officials. As a result, the Party and state 
authority was “delivered through direct contacts between the first secretary of the 
PUWP Municipal Committee and the directors of the enterprises and managers 
of various institutions and agencies.” This “directorial group” was the proper, or 
indeed the ultimate authority. Having spent several years in the Party apparatus, 
lower-level administration employees would move on to lucrative posts such as 
resort managers. The distinction between the state and private ownership as well 
as between legal and illegal operations became even more blurred.
Unfortunately, no academic analysis of the “underground” Zakopane of the 
1970s and 1980s exists. We can safely assume that the attempts of the authorities, 
mostly in the 1970s, to force the owners of private rentals to use the state agencies 
and to obey the building by-laws altered only minimally the existing structure of 
power. What they certainly did achieve was to trigger new accommodative strat-
egies. In December 1975, a report on implementing the government’s resolution 
suggested that the “dynamic increase in tourist numbers […] calls for a program 
that would reign in this phenomenon and foster conditions to control it fully.”476 
There is also a paucity of primary sources recording “the war on speculation” 
475 W. Markiewicz, Przyjedź pan w lipcu…, ŻW, no. 101/ April 20, 1976; see: T. Robak, 
Miasto przy przystanku, “Polityka” no. 62 / October 14, 1972.
476 AAN, GKKFiT, 11/45, fol. 66.
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waged in the Nowy Sącz voivodship in the 1980s.477 However, careful scrutiny of 
the contemporary Podhale and Zakopane can teach us a thing or two about how 
old practices can be adapted to new circumstances.478
4.3.2  The North: “The Land Fills Your Belly, the Sea Fills  
Your Pockets”479 
In socialist Poland, this aphorism was true also in the context of the black mar-
ket. The size of the second economy on the Baltic coast was comparable with the 
Podhale region’s black market, even though the objects of trade and the local 
environment were different. Port cities tend to evolve characteristic econom-
ic, cultural, and social structures. In comparison with traditional, conservative, 
highland communities – culturally homogenous and static, the populations of 
port cities are usually dynamic, open to the outside world, and creative, as well 
as multicultural and multi-ethnic.480 They are more open to modernization. New 
models of behavior that come in from the outside thick and fast are absorbed 
with ease. While emigration is often a part of highlanders’ experience, coastal 
communities are open to the reverse phenomenon – immigration. The charac-
teristics of port cities influence their social structure and the behavior of their 
residents. Pre-modern bonds (such as in the extended families of the highland-
ers) are less important than the modern factors that exist outside a family, work 
or place of residence.
477 AAN, URM, 32/22.
478 For New Year’s Eve 2007/2008, Zakopane had the capacity to host 50–100 000 visitors, 
of which, however, only 22 000 beds were available as legal tourist accommodation. 
The others slept in beds that belonged to the gray market; http://www.turinfo.
pl/p/ak_id,22478,,zakopane,w_zakopanem,tatry,sylwester,noclegi,miejsca_nocleg 
owe,dziennik_polski.html (March 8, 2014). Supply follows demand often in the shape 
of building without permits. A regional weekly wrote about the illegal construction 
of a 62-room hotel. Official decisions ordering demolition were rarely respected; 
“Tygodnik Podhalański” April 9, 2005; February 3, 2007. 
479 On this topic I wrote also in: “Ziemia żywi, morze bogaci”. Strategie czarnorynkowe 
w polskich miastach portowych 1945–1989, in: Morze nasze i nie nasze. Zbiór studiów, 
ed. P. Kurpiewski, T. Stegner, Gdańsk 2011, pp. 229–240.
480 See: I. Jakimowicz-Ostrowska, Mniejszości narodowe w Gdyni w latach 1944–2005, 
Gdynia 2008; Tożsamość kulturowa. Szkice o mniejszościach narodowych na Pomorzu 
Gdańskim. Series 2, ed. A. Chodubski, A.K. Waśkiewicz, Gdańsk 2002; W starej i nowej 
ojczyźnie. Mniejszości narodowe w Gdańsku po II wojnie światowej, ed. I. Hałagida, 
Gdańsk 1997.
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Initially, Gdynia stood out among the port cities of post-war Poland. Less 
destroyed than Gdańsk, subject to fewer restrictions than Szczecin, which for 
many years after the war was more of a Soviet than a Polish port, Gdynia was 
able to retain some of its pre-war residents, including the entrepreneurs. Soon, it 
became a Polish window to the world. This happened thanks to the private and 
coop owned businesses, whose participation in total trade was initially greater 
than that of the state owned enterprises. Already in the 1940s, trade in Gdynia 
had re-attained its pre-war level. Because of the importance of foreign trade to 
the Polish economy, the authorities looked favorably on the operations of Gdy-
nia’s private sector. In Gdynia, it had existed longer than anywhere else in Po-
land. There is no doubt, even if it is difficult to find conclusive source evidence, 
that the uninterrupted long-term settlement and ability to maintain the pre-war 
tradition of creativity and entrepreneurship had an impact on the behavior of 
Gdynia’s inhabitants, and their willingness to engage in black market activities.
Newcomers searching for work in Gdynia during the interwar period, even 
those unfamiliar with port cities, instantly adapted to what the city had to offer; 
by the end of the 1930s, a high proportion of them identified with Gdynia.481 A 
similar phenomenon was apparent in Szczecin, Świnoujście and Gdańsk, where 
after 1945, the population was almost entirely displaced by new settlers, attract-
ed by the proximity of the sea, with the opportunities and advantages that it 
provided. According to estimates from early 1984, “during the interwar period 
and especially after the war, large population cohorts arrived in the Gdańsk 
voivodship from various regions of Poland […].The newcomers usually settled 
in greater Gdańsk. They were often young, dynamic, and looking for a new and 
easier way of life as well as demanding rapid social and professional advance-
ment. These large migrations fundamentally changed the population structure 
in the voivodship. People between the ages of 15 to 25 constitute more than 30% 
of people of working age, and 50% of all employed have post-primary education 
[…]. The numerous residents employed in international transportation, fishing, 
and foreign trade enjoy the additional lucrative proceeds of price differentials 
and currency parity. These people have substantial financial reserves and accept 
the petty bourgeois system of values, treating money as a fetish, and are under 
the influence of social-democratic and clerical ideology.”482
481 In 1936, there were 31% of Gdynia residents under the age of thirty, 17% owned a 
business, and 33% were employed in industry and crafts. 
482 AAN, KC PZPR, WA, LI/3, fol. 4. See: M. Gulda, Struktura i ruchliwość społeczna 
Trójmiasta w świadomości jego mieszkańców. Studium socjologiczne, Gdańsk 1980; I. 
Sobczak, Obraz demograficzny województw nadmorskich Polski w latach 1946–1990. 
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The factor that spurred on the black market in Polish port cities was not so 
much tourism, as was the case with Zakopane, but a multi-layered “seafaring” 
factor. The opening of the ports in Gdynia and Gdańsk in mid-July 1945, and 
later also in Szczecin, set in motion an unofficial flow of goods and money that 
even Stalinism could not stop. The port cities opened up a crack in the Iron Cur-
tain wider than usually appreciated (and certainly wider than anywhere else in 
Poland). Regardless of the international situation, Polish ships sailed west and 
Western ships entered Polish ports. Until 1952, Western seamen, often from the 
Netherlands, worked on Polish fishing vessels. During Stalinism, the Polish fish-
ing fleet had at its disposal permanent bases in the ports of Western Europe, for 
example in Ostend and Cuxhaven. Ship operators from Gdynia or Szczecin tried 
at all costs to maintain permanent trade connections with capitalist countries 
and create new ones (for example in 1953, between Szczecin and the Finnish 
ports). The first Polish Baltic ferry, Gdynia–Trelleborg, began to operate in April 
1946. A real boom in passenger and freight traffic began at the turn of the 1960s 
and the 1970s. The new ferry connections with the Scandinavian countries were 
crucial in the development of black market phenomena, in which not only Poles 
but also Germans, Danes, Swedes or Finns were involved.483 The Polish marine 
navy was often ironically referred to as “merchandise” rather than “merchant”, 
but crews from other countries did not refrain from smuggling, either.484 
Ships were capacious enough to conceal even a very large amount of contra-
band and the perspicacity of the custom officers often could not keep up with the 
ingenuity of the crew members. To start with, there were not enough customs 
officers, and at first, their equipment was modest, or non-existent. For example in 
late 1946, the Polish customs on the Baltic coast did not have a single motor boat485 
or enough time to inspect each ship thoroughly. Sometimes the contraband was 
picked up outside of a port, in the open sea with the help of fishing or leisure 
Wybrane liczby i tendencje rozwoju, Gdańsk 1992; I. Sobczak, Procesy demograficzne 
w województwie gdańskim w latach 1945–1965, Gdańsk 1970.
483 On the development of sea transport and communication, see: W.G. Strąk, Kronika 
Polski na morzu 1918–1989, Warszawa–Olsztyn 1996; see also: R. Górniak, Most 
promowy między Polską i Szwecją, Wiadomości Celne (WC), 1973, no. 8, pp. 19–21. 
484 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6211, Item 3691/58, Soviet goods smuggled into Poland. In the 
late 1950s, there were cases of entire ship crews, complete with the captain, conduct-
ing smuggling operations. For instance, the entire crew of the Curie Skłodowska “was 
discharged […] for smuggling pepper and selling it in Rotterdam port.” AAN, KC 
PZPR, 327/XXXII–8, fol. 47. 
485 AAN, URM, 5/639, fol. 2–4, 7.
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boats.486 The smuggling network comprised seafarers, fishermen, longshoremen 
and – surprisingly frequently – also custom officers, whose official wages were 
never very high, which gave them an incentive to augment them by extramural 
activities. 
Port warehouses were vulnerable to theft. All attractive items such as textiles, 
wool, plastics, alcohol, cigarettes, citrus fruits, canned food, leather, non-ferrous 
metals, and auto parts went missing on a daily basis. In the late 1950s, in Gdynia 
alone, ten thousand cases of theft were recorded annually.487 Local port author-
ities and local police were not keen to intervene and tended to turn a blind eye. 
On the one hand, longshoremen all over the world considered theft a part of 
their rightfully earned wages,488 on the other – “brazen accumulation of wealth 
by seamen in a relatively short time creates a glaring disparity in the material 
circumstances of different strata of the working class”. For the authorities to give 
the longshoremen a chance to make extra money constituted a peculiar form of 
bonus, and contributed to maintaining social peace.489 The introduction of con-
tainers limited the opportunities for theft but did not eliminate them. 
While theft was by nature a crime of opportunity, trading by seafarers was 
a goal-oriented activity geared towards achieving the highest gains possible. It 
required flexibility and a good knowledge of the market, as well as efficient co-
operation of the crew.490 Good reconnaissance and preparation could yield truly 
enormous profits. The crew of the cargo ship Kopalnia Wirek proved this when 
they brought a ton of garlic from Spain. On selling it, for an outlay of one dollar 
– at that time worth 100 zloty on the black market – they gained 3 100 zloty.491 
Gold smuggling was also lucrative during the post-war period. However, the pre-
cious-metals branch of the second economy required not only large-scale capital 
investment but also entailed high risk, so the majority of seamen and fisher-
men limited their operations to smuggling goods, focusing on what sold well at 
any particular time. In the 1950 s and 1960s, artificial jewelry was the bestseller; 
486 AIPN, 01521/784, Stanisław Banaszek, Marian Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze 
i zasady ich zwalczania, Warszawa 1969, Wydawnictwo WOP, pp. 95–96.
487 AAN, MS, 558, fol. 169.
488 E. Smithies, The Black Economy in England since 1914, Dublin 1984, pp. 78, 132.
489 AAN, MS, 558, fol. 173.
490 “In legal importation by seafarers, collective forms such as shared money or shared 
profits, often take precedence. The myth of Polish individualism has been shaken”. 
J. Koźliński, K.W. Olszewski, Dwie stopy na złotym wybrzeżu, “Kierunki”, no. 36/
September 8, 1957.
491 AAN, KC PZPR, XII/1795, fol. 56. 
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between 1956 and 1960 – beauty products, especially lipstick, were popular. 
Between 1955 and 1966, watches were in high demand and between 1960 and 
1965 – clothing (for example nylon raincoats).492 Smuggling on a mass scale of 
electronic watches and mini calculators came into vogue in the early 1970s. The 
goods – from gold and watches to wigs and chewing gum – were supplied by 
specialized firms usually managed by Polish emigrants and located in ports of 
Western Europe such as Hamburg, Kiel or Rotterdam.493
Although customs duties on private imports diminished their profitability, 
some of the time the seafarers declared part of the incoming cargo to the cus-
toms; this usually occurred when they expected the duties to be not too high and 
the profits to be worthwhile, or when the size of the cargo made a clandestine 
transfer ashore unviable. However, most of the goods were probably undeclared 
to the customs and remained concealed. We do not have reliable tools to gauge 
the proportion of goods that remained undeclared, but a comparison of Central 
Customs Office (GUC) data with the volume of wholesale purchases of foreign 
articles by the state institutions provides an insight (see Table 2).
The regulations, from the late 1950s onward increasingly liberal, made oper-
ations easier. “A special instruction says,” a journalist from Trybuna Ludu com-
mented in 1960, “that it is only forbidden to purchase goods from people who are 
intoxicated or show visible signs of mental illness, and the third clause says the 
delivered goods must not bear any indication of having been stolen.”494 Transac-
tions of up to six thousand zloty in value could be carried out anonymously. For 
higher amounts, the wholesalers had to show their ID, but this was not a problem, 
because “in port cities there was an army of touts and patsies willing – for a fee – 
to ‘lend’ their ID to help close a transaction. Wholesale depot managers are fully 
aware of this practice but they ignore it because they get paid and receive bonus-
es only if the official targets have been met.”495 It is important to emphasize that 
492 Uwagi dotyczące rozmiarów i metod przemytu w ruchu morskim, WC, 1970, no. 1, 
pp. 14–15. Brokerage between foreign ports increased profits. For example in 1967, 
the crew of the Boruta bought nylon raincoats on the Kiel Canal and sold them in 
Klaipeda, with the hard currency proceeds buying goods in high demand in Poland, 
such as gold; “Biuletyn Szkoleniowy” GUC, no. 37, July 1967, pp. 43–44.
493 B. Piastowicz, Marynarz wciąż się bawi, “Biuletyn Szkoleniowy” GUC, no. 41, April 
1969, pp. 1–6. Seafarers often delivered hard currency to middlemen and addresses 
where the goods were to be sent; J. Olszewski, Waluciarze i przemytnicy, TL, no. 129/ 
May 9, 1971.
494 O przemycie portowym bez osłonek, TL, no. 250/September 8, 1960.
495 Ibid.
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we are only able to consider articles that had gone through the commercial and 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state. It is difficult to estimate the volume sold via 
private channels outside of any control apparatus, both in Poland496 and abroad. 
We can assume that the crews of Polish ships met a large part of the demand for 
chewing gum in Czechoslovakia (in the late 1950s) and for wigs and jeans in the 
Soviet Union (a decade later).
Table 2. Foreign goods from private imports 1959–1961
Year Article
Purchased by komis stores Duty paid
Number Value in zloty Number Value in zloty
1959 Fountain pens 13 347 1 775 910 70 9 800
1960 Fountain pens 5 999 479 920 138 11 040
1959 Watches 6 735 11 448 100 1 1 700
1960 Watches 12 158 15 825 250 5 7 500
1959 Nylons 9 291 1 319 460 373 52 966
1960 Nylons 19 430 1 578 307 1 089 108 900
Source:  AAN, NIK II, 19/46, fol. 36.
Before the crisis of 1981 emptied all the shelves in Polish stores, private import 
arriving through Baltic ports had played a supplementary role on the Polish mar-
ket, delivering articles commonly considered as luxury goods. However, after the 
state channels of distribution had failed completely, it became one of the most 
important sources of supply (for example of cosmetics). In mid-1981,  the sit-
uation was so catastrophic that on July 15, the customs import duties on the 
majority of goods were abolished. The decision of the Gdańsk and Szczecin 
voivods to relieve state-owned warehouses of the obligation to prove the identity 
of suppliers of foreign articles gave a new impetus to private importers. Before 
the tax authorities realized that as a result of the new regulations the state treas-
ury was suffering great losses, the private importers managed to make fortunes 
in Szczecin and the Tri-City. Just in the period August 1 to November 20, 1981, 
496 A copious supply of foreign articles on the Baltic coast lowered their prices in 
comparison to the rest of Poland. “A shop owner from the coast who does not 
have his own car (and there are not many of them) takes a taxi, if he wants to go 
to Lublin, Rzeszów or Zamość. There, he can sell to a state-owned store for 24 zloty 
the Kiwi shoe polish, which is in abundance on the coast, where it can be bought 
for 16 zloty a box.” J. Koźliński, K.W. Olszewski, Dwie stopy na złotym wybrzeżu, 
“Kierunki”, no. 36/September 8, 1957.
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state institutions in Szczecin bought cosmetics worth 300 million zloty and in 
the Tri-City – over 180 million zloty. A later investigation showed that private 
merchants had imported a staggering volume of goods. For example an “unem-
ployed” man from Rumia near the port of Gdynia imported from Sweden 9 600 
kg of washing machine detergent and 2 300 kg of soap; a bartender on a Polish 
ferry bought, also in Sweden and in October 1981 alone, 2 750 liters of shampoo. 
The calculation showed that at least 200 thousand dollars must have left Szczecin 
in order to buy cosmetics alone.497
Naturally, the goods arriving in Polish ports through private channels had 
been purchased for hard currency, whether illegal or not. Since the government 
recognized the fact that a Polish wage would not go far even in the humblest 
canteens of exotic ports all over the world, Polish merchant seafarers received a 
hard currency allowance on top of their wages. These allowances were, however, 
only a drop in the ocean of need. For example in 1964, seafarers were paid a 
“hard currency supplement” of 1 369 000 dollars. Some of this they could, and 
did, spend in state-run dollar stores, such as the Baltona chain; after this “official” 
shopping, a healthy surplus of 1 080 000 dollars still remained in the pockets of 
merchant seafarers and fishermen. In the same year, various warehouses – offi-
cially! – bought from seafarers goods worth 465 million zloty (285 million in 
Szczecin, and the rest in the Tri-City). This was four times as much as seafarers’ 
dollar earnings even if calculated at the black market exchange rate – much high-
er than the official one.498 What accounted for the difference was the smuggling 
out of goods or – even more frequently, since it was easier to accomplish – of 
hard currency.499 Strategies to acquire hard currency had been developing on the 
Baltic coast since 1945. They were driven by the huge differential between the 
497 AAN, URM, 32/113, fol. 249; ibid., 21/185, fol. 1–2.
498 S. Sumiga, Szkodzą dobremu imieniu ogółu, “Tygodnik Morski” 1965, no. 7. In Szczecin 
in 1962, the value of total purchases of foreign goods amounted to 140 million. At 
the same time, foreign currency earnings of seafarers and fishermen in Szczecin were 
only 11 million “foreign exchange zloty” (the so-called złoty dewizowy, a unit used as 
an artificial currency for calculation purposes only); B. Karski, Przemyt w majestacie 
prawa, PiŻ, 1963, no. 14.
499 In 1950, the Customs Office in Gdynia initiated 29 proceedings in hard currency 
smuggling cases, in 1965 – 195, in 1970 – 217, and in 1975 – 405. E. Graban, Niektóre 
aspekty powstania i funkcjonowania Urzędu Celnego w Gdyni, in: Korzenie Gdyni, part 
4: Mała stabilizacja. Materiały z konferencji historycznej 22 września 2004 r., Gdynia 
2004, p. 29. 
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official and black market exchange rates500 that persisted in post-war Poland and 
deterred visitors and seafarers from using banks and official hard currency agen-
cies, where the rates offered were quite unattractive. In September 1945 (accord-
ing to the data from November 1946) of the twenty institutions operating from 
Szczecin to Gdańsk and authorized to buy hard currency, twelve did not record 
any transaction due to a “lack of any offers”. Similarly, the majority of the hard 
currency recovered for the state by the Treasury Protection Brigades (Brygady 
Ochrony Skarbowej) came from confiscations from currency dealers rather than 
purchases.501 Prostitution, which targeted foreign visitors, also brought in large 
quantities of foreign money. According to police records, in the early 1970s more 
than 1 220 prostitutes were registered in the Tri-City, of which 700 in Gdańsk 
alone.502 It is difficult to estimate the number of currency traders (the previously 
mentioned cinkciarze) that operated in restaurants and hotels in the Tri-City, 
Szczecin and Świnoujście.503 One thing is certain: the demand for hard currency 
on the Baltic coast vastly exceeded the quantities of dollars, marks or crowns that 
the dealers and the prostitutes could supply. The goods taken to Lublin or Prze-
myśl were sold there for hard currency, the currency obtained then “imported” 
back to the coast. According to police records, the hard currency gangs of the 
coast had “their agents everywhere in Poland – in Warsaw, Kraków, Wrocław, in 
Silesia, and in the Sub-Carpathian region. They [bought] dollars there and [took] 
them back to the Baltic coast.”504
The infamous “December 1970” brought protests, sparked mainly on the coast 
in Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin by a sudden increase in the price of food and 
other everyday items. The riots were extinguished by the Polish People’s Army 
and the police (MO), with at least 42 people killed and more than 1 000 wounded. 
In the wake of the riots, the authorities examined thoroughly all aspects of polit-
ical and social life in the Gdańsk voivodship.505 The analysis showed the mech-
anism by which black market phenomena influenced the behavior of the local 
500 For example, in the fall of 1946, the US dollar officially cost 100 zl while on the black 
market its price was between 900 and 1 000. The British pound cost, respectively, 397 
and approx.1 500, the Swedish crown – 25 and 150 zloty.
501 AAN, URM, 5/639, fol. 2–4.
502 J. Oleksiewicz, “Miłość” w portowym mieście, “Express Poznański”, 1973, no. 217; AAN, 
KC PZPR, XII/1795, fol. 57.
503 According to police sources, in 1971, approx. 500 currency traders operated in the 
Tri-City J. Olszewski, Waluciarze i przemytnicy, TL, no. 129/May 9, 1971.
504 Ibid.
505 AAN, KC PZPR, XII/1795, fol. 1–59.
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population. In Zakopane the profits were usually invested in tourist infrastruc-
ture, on the Baltic coast in private (legal or otherwise) production and trade. As a 
result, in the 1960s, the private sector on the Baltic coast was much more dynamic 
than the state sector, for obvious reasons: wages paid by private manufacturers, 
artisans and merchants were much higher.506 Most of the artisan workshops in 
Poland were in private ownership. In the Gdańsk voivodship, especially in the 
Tri-City, the private sector was dominant in trade (50% of all outlets) and catering 
(60% of outlets). In private manufacturing, the fastest growing branches of indus-
try were those based on new technologies, such as the chemical sector.507 This can 
be attributed to the regional connections with the West, closer than elsewhere in 
Poland, and to the importation of raw materials and equipment by seamen.508 Al-
ready in the late 1960s, almost a quarter of private industrial and artisan produc-
tion was exported, mostly to the capitalist countries, which shows how innovative 
Gdańsk businessmen were. In 1970 alone, private exports grew by 240%.509
While residents of the Podhale region, afraid of entrusting their money to the 
state, had for a long time preferred to put their money under the proverbial mat-
tress, the financial elite in the Tri-City commonly used modern savings instru-
ments. High-rate term accounts and “automobile saving accounts” constituted 
only 10% of all bank accounts but accumulated half of all deposits in the Gdańsk 
voivodship (over three billion zloty). The fastest growing accounts (threefold 
growth between 1965 and 1970) were the anonymous saving accounts, used as 
safe currency in large-scale transactions. “It seems that many deposits on those 
accounts come from hidden, untaxed income from private enterprise and illegal 
machinations. Such accounts make black market trading much easier.”510
A large proportion of the profits acquired from illegal hard currency smuggling 
as well as legal private enterprise operations (all, as the tax authorities claimed, 
506 Ibid., fol. 46.
507 Ibid., fol. 53.
508 Between July 1 and December 31, 197, the Customs Office in Gdynia examined du-
ty-paid goods brought in by seafarers on 13 ships. Customs officers paid particular 
attention to articles destined for the private services and production markets: 387 
sets of false eyelashes, 3.2 kg fake nails, 253.4 kg artificial leather, 62.4 kg plastic foil, 
2567.12 kg artificial fur, 4 935.23 kg Crimplene, 705.97 kg of laminate, and 391.2 kg of 
jersey fabric. The 1 418.3 kg of wigs found were probably destined for “re-export” to 
the Soviet Union; AAN, GUC, 30/78, k. 1–14. Cf. Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku, 
Oddział w Gdyni, Komitet Miejski PZPR w Gdyni, 325/307, fol. 55–68.
509 AAN, KC PZPR, XII/1795, k. 54.
510 Ibid., fol. 50.
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deeply rooted in the grey market) was invested in residential construction for own 
need, as in the Podhale region. Private investors financed 26% of all residential 
dwellings built between 1956 and 1969; these “utilized, probably not always legally, 
a quarter of building materials and potential.”511 In 1969, the usable floor area of an 
average apartment built by the state was 42.6m2 and of those built privately – 93m2. 
In the same year, 30% of private single-family houses and 70% of private apart-
ments were constructed in large cities; this was “in blatant contrast to the ‘dwelling 
hunger’ among employees of the nationalized economy, especially the workers.”512
The authors of the analysis were probably right in saying that “there exists 
a close link and interdependency […] of criminal phenomena involving hard 
currency. Seafarers are exposed to regular contacts with the ‘western way of liv-
ing’, the existence of substantial private wealth on the Baltic coast, and the de-
moralizing influence that this way of life has […] on certain groups of young 
people, especially workers on the lowest wages. This influence manifests itself by 
involving some of them in this kind of life for example as currency traders, which 
elicits among some workers strong feelings of hatred towards the world of wealth 
and resentment towards the authorities who tolerate such a state of affairs. These 
factors all played some role in the December events [of 1970].”513
4.4  East–West 
The 1980s were the twilight of the golden era of trading by seafarers. The econom-
ic crisis and Martial Law diminished both sea traffic and the volume of foreign 
trade. More seamen than ever before were waiting to be signed up, and once they 
got the job, were anxious to keep it. Mariners lost their privileged position as mo-
nopolists. Large volumes of goods now arrived in Poland directly from Turkey, 
India and the Far East, brought in by private tourist importers, usually by air. Sea-
farers now focused on the, often arcane, trading operations between foreign ports, 
and continued to be a conduit of bringing hard currency to Poland.514 Amateur 
outsiders filled in the gap in the market vacated by the seafarers, and smuggled 
goods including alcohol, bed linen, and food as well as various knick-knacks on 
511 Ibid., fol. 55.
512 Ibid.
513 Ibid., fol. 57.
514 M. Olszewski, Przestępczość celna i graniczna dewizowa w 1987 r., WC, 1988, no. 41, 
p. 23. Seafarers continued to engage in smuggling. On May 26, 1986, for example, 
900 linear meters of Madeira cotton were found (in the captain’s cabin!) aboard the 
Gorce, arriving from Holland; AAN, KC PZPR, WA, 541, 1985, fol. 3v.
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ferries arriving from Sweden, Denmark and Finland. In the mid-1980s, travel 
agencies began to organize short ferry trips to Scandinavian countries, without 
even bothering to conceal their commercial goal.515 A similar process of “domes-
ticating” the cross-border black market took place on the western and eastern 
borders of the country, along, respectively, the Oder and the Bug rivers.
While the southern and northern borders of Poland largely retained their pre-
war shape, the eastern and western borders had been completely re-drawn after 
the war; this had political, social, and economic consequences. The rivers Oder, 
Lusatian Neisse and Bug now flowed through, and divided, previously cohesive 
territories. After the end of the war, the more complicated the everyday rela-
tions between communities on either side of the rivers (as in the divided cities 
on the Oder and the Neisse516) became, the more the practical aspects of life 
dominated the political imponderables. Despite being in different countries, the 
riverside communities (more so in the west than in the east) remained parts of a 
self-regulating system for some time after the war.517 This phenomenon was re-
inforced by the presence of the remaining original local population unwilling to 
accept the political and geographical changes. Forced and voluntary mass-scale 
migrations effectively prolonged the chaos (which facilitated black market oper-
ations) and made impossible any efforts to control effectively the new borders. 
Corruption thrived along the Oder and the Bug rivers. While in the east it was 
often triggered simply by the will to survive – and to bribe guards or ticket col-
lectors could shorten a lengthy journey or improve its conditions – in the west, 
the usual incentive was an opportunity to make big money. Industrial products, 
515 AAN, KC PZPR, LII/127, fol. 29.
516 For example in Zgorzelec/Görlitz, the gasworks remained on the Polish side and 
the power and water plants – on the German side. Słubice (the former Frank-
furt-an-der-Oder suburb of Dammvorstadt), where the first bank opened as ear-
ly as 1945 but the pharmacy not until 1952,was a town completely dependent on 
Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, today known as Frankfurt (Oder). In Gubin, the gasworks, 
slaughterhouse, and railroad station were on the German side, Guben. The water 
supply of Świnoujście (formerly Swinemünde) came from the German side. See: D. 
Jajeśniak-Quast, K. Stokłosa, Geteilte Städte an Oder und Neiße. Frankfurt (Oder) – 
Słubice, Guben–Gubin und Görlitz–Zgorzelec 1945–1995, Berlin 2000; K. Stokłosa, 
Grenzstädte in Ostmitteleuropa. Guben und Gubin 1945 bis 1995, Berlin 2003; J. Ko-
chanowski, Zanim powstała NRD. Polska wobec radzieckiej strefy okupacyjnej Niemiec 
1945–1949, Wrocław 2008. 
517 J. Kochanowski, “Naczynia połączone“. Nieoficjalne kontakty ekonomiczne pomiędzy 
obywatelami radzieckiej strefy okupacyjnej/NRD i Polski w latach 1945–1989, in: RFN-
NRD-PRL. Zbliżenia, ed. K. Ruchniewicz, D. Wojtaszyn, Wrocław 2014, pp. 107–117.
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cars, currencies, and gold were smuggled out of Germany; large amounts of food, 
especially fats, not to mention people, were smuggled from Poland. 
During the chaotic post-war years, even state institutions, including the Min-
istry of Public Security, participated in black market operations.518 The Chief 
of the Polish Military Mission in Berlin, Jakub Prawin, reported in late Janu-
ary 1946: “In Berlin there are numerous Poles, who are involved in loitering and 
speculation on black markets; there are even incidents of robbery. A certain Ger-
man black marketeer came to me complaining that he had been robbed by a Pole, 
who was wearing the uniform of a captain. People arrive, even for business trips, 
without visas, sometimes without passports.”519
The stiffening of the passport regulations in 1946 limited illegal travel from the 
interior of the country but did not mean much for the borderland residents who 
could always find a weak spot even along the best-guarded border. Geographical 
conditions facilitated illegal border crossing; low morale and modest wages made 
the guards more open to accepting bribes.520 Polish and German railroad workers 
successfully smuggled goods (and people).521 They also took business advantage 
of the transports of displaced Germans, where supervision was haphazard.522 
As long as the divided border cities were dependent on each other and German 
workers worked in Polish factories and mines, the smuggling thrived.523
518 J. Kochanowski, W polskiej niewoli. Niemieccy jeńcy wojenni w Polsce 1945–1950, 
Warszawa 2001, p. 53.
519 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive (Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, 
AMSZ), z. 6, w. 42, vol. 671, PMW, Report no. 2, January 27, 1946, fol. 17. See: Polska 
– Niemcy Wschodnie 1945–1990. Wybór dokumentów, ed. J. Kochanowski, K. Ziemer, 
vol. 1: Polska wobec radzieckiej strefy okupacyjnej Niemiec: maj 1945 – paździer-
nik 1949, ed. J. Kochanowski, doc. ed. A. Krajewski, M. Mazurek, Warszawa 2006, 
pp. 90–91. At least up until the end of 1945, despite the robust passport regulations 
in force at the time, corrupt border guards allowed to cross the border anyone, who 
had any kind of permit or authorization issued by any number of, not always official, 
institutions (such as for example the “Warsaw Cafe” in Wałbrzych, the Polish Western 
Union in Toruń or the Polish Red Cross in Chełmno); K. Stokłosa, Grenzstädte […], 
p. 51; AAN, MZO, 132, Polska Misja Repatriacyjna w Berlinie do MAP, 13 XII 1945 
(see: Polska – Niemcy Wschodnie […], vol. 1, pp. 78–81).
520 AMSZ, z. 6, w. 42, vol. 668, fol. 6 (see: Polska – Niemcy Wschodnie […], vol. 1, pp. 115–
116).
521 Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, Oddział w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim, Urząd 
Celny Kostrzyn, 6.
522 AMSZ, z. 6, w. 42, vol. 671, PMW, fol. 64.
523 Wrocław State Archive (Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, APWr),Voivod-
ship Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party ( Komitet Wojewódzki Polskiej Partii 
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The high demand for animal fat in Germany, which local production could 
not meet, forced the Polish “exporters” to bring them even from remote places in 
Poland. For example, in mid-1947, in Zgorzelec and other border towns, pack-
ages with pork fat began to arrive, sent by mail from the Lublin region, and were 
later smuggled across the border. It was a profitable business: “In exchange for 
two kg of fat, the smugglers could buy a decent radio.”524 This practice reached 
such proportions that on June 30, 1948, the Polish Workers Party (PPR) commit-
tee issued a special circular: “The smuggler is the enemy of our heroic Nation! A 
smuggler is a spy! […] The well-being of our Democratic State and the security 
of our borders demand that we decry and destroy all smugglers and their helpers. 
Not one gram of fat will be allowed to leave our People’s State.”525 Central author-
ities used the exhortation to fight the smuggling as one of the pretexts to close 
the border even for the petty border traffic. Although in the 1960s, the border 
on the Oder-Neisse was not entirely devoid of activity, and tourism (especially 
from the GDR to Poland) was growing slowly but steadily, it was only in January 
1972 that the real turning point came.526
Traffic on the new eastern border came to a standstill even earlier than on 
the western border. From 1944 to 1946, there were still wide gaps in that bor-
der, which allowed into Poland, beside those coming as part of the official re-
settlement program, approximately 200 thousand additional people. These were 
Home Army soldiers who wanted to keep a low profile or peasants from Eastern 
Galicia and Volhynia running away from Ukrainian terror, as well as those from 
the Vilnius Region that did not want to wait any longer for official repatriation. 
It was much more difficult to cross this border in subsequent years, whether law-
fully or otherwise. Black market phenomena similar to those at the Oder-Neisse 
border could not develop along the Bug, because on neither sides of the border 
with the Soviet Union did people have much to offer in the way of goods to be 
traded. The migrant population on both sides of the river focused their efforts 
rather on survival than on illegal, profitable transactions. They either wanted to 
sell personal belongings that they could not take to Poland, stock up on their 
food supply, and hide from border guards and robbers items not allowed across 
Robotniczej, KW PPR), 196, Sprawozdanie Komitetu Powiatowego PPR Zgorzelec 
na miesiąc luty 1948 (see: Polska – Niemcy Wschodnie […], vol. 1, pp. 339–340).
524 AAN, Central Inspectorate of Treasury Protection (Główny Inspektorat Ochrony 
Skarbowej, GIOS), 117, unpag.
525 APWr, KW PPR, 162, fol. 95 (see: Polska – Niemcy Wschodnie […], vol. 1, pp. 339–340.
526 L. Koćwin, Polityczne determinanty polsko-wschodnioniemieckich stosunków przy-
granicznych 1949–1990, Wrocław 1993, pp. 20–29.
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the border, or make sure that at least they took their religious objects with them 
when they set off to leave home.527 Those who were returning from the interior 
of the Soviet Union did not usually have any personal possessions and required 
immediate assistance. The main phase of resettlement from the Soviet Union to 
Poland, as well as in the reverse direction, ended in late 1946 and thereafter “the 
friendship border” was friendly only in name. For the average citizen it was as 
difficult to get across as the Iron Curtain.528
Certainly, the eastern border of Poland was sealed better than the border on 
the Oder-Neisse. Even in the early 1950s, reports of successful smuggling oper-
ations and numerous clandestine escapes across the western border were quite 
frequent.529 The Polish, German and Soviet boat crews sailing along the Oder 
largely eliminated the imbalance of supply to the two banks of the river. For 
example in the fall of 1951, “the citizen Maria Cyprys from Golszewice, in the 
county of Niemodlin, killed a hog weighing approximately 100 kg, handed the 
meat to the crew of a river boat run by German citizens on the Oder and in 
return received four tons of coal and a substantial supply of clothing fabric.”530
Facing hunger brought on by the natural disasters of 1946 and 1947 – a severe 
winter and spring flooding, residents on both sides of the Bug realized there 
were hidden gateways also on the eastern border. In the spring of 1947, reports 
started circulating about “Soviet citizens [buying out grain], particularly in the 
Lublin, Kielce, and Łódź voivodships. For example, in the Lublin voivodship in 
Lubartów, Biała Podlaska, Kraśnik, Łęczna, and Włodawa, unknown Russian 
527 Numerous examples in: Przesiedlenie ludności polskiej z Kresów Wschodnich do Pol-
ski 1944–1947, ed. S. Ciesielski, introd. W. Borodziej, S. Ciesielski, J. Kochanowski, 
Warszawa 1999. On the, often very dramatic, instances of transporting religious 
objects see: T. Kukiz, Madonny Kresowe i inne obrazy sakralne z Kresów w diecezjach 
Polski, Warszawa 2002 (and other works by this author). 
528 On border closing, see: D. Stola, Zamknięcie Polski. Zniesienie swobody wyjazdu 
i uszczelnienie granic w latach 40. i 50, in: PRL – trwanie i zmiana, ed. D. Stola, M. 
Zaremba, Warszawa 2003, pp. 159–186.
529 Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, Oddział we Wrocławiu, Komenda Wojew-
ódzka MO we Wrocławiu, 053/312, Sprawozdanie PUBP w Zgorzelcu za grudzień 
1950 r.; ibid., 053/216. Conducted in mid-1957, the “Counter-intelligence exami-
nation of the state border between Poland and the GDR” showed it could be easily 
“broken along its whole length”; Polska – Niemcy Wschodnie 1945–1990. Wybór do-
kumentów, ed. J. Kochanowski, K. Ziemer, vol. 3: Lata 1956–1957, ed. M. Górny, M.J. 
Hartwich, Warszawa 2008, pp. 369–384.
530 Trade Unions Archive (Archiwum Związków Zawodowych, AZZ), Wydział Ekonom-
iczny, 5/8.
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speaking individuals arrived at the market place and bought all the grain – 
outbidding everybody else. On May 13, similar individuals purchased grain in 
Chełm Lubelski, paying 15 thousand zloty for 100 kg of rye and 20 thousand 
zloty for [100 kg] of wheat.”531
The railroad, especially the transit connection between Germany and the So-
viet Union, allowed for significant improvements in black market operations on 
the eastern and western borders. While Soviet ships entering Gdynia or Szczecin 
played an important role in maritime contraband traffic, it was railroad trans-
port, mainly military, that had the same function on land. At the turn of the 1940s 
and 1950s, Soviet citizens, usually in uniform, constituted the majority of people 
crossing both the border on the Oder and that on the Bug. Convoys of supplies 
travelled both ways. They contained installations disassembled in Germany, war 
loot, war reparations, and demobilized as well as freshly conscripted soldiers.532 
Every time that the train stopped, its crew wasted no time in bonding with the 
locals. Kutno was an important east–west junction. “After the lecture […], some 
of Kutno’s residents came over to tell me about their town,” Maria Dąbrowska 
noted in her diary on February 10, 1948. “Kutno is a center for trading German 
loot brought by Soviet military personnel. For pork fat, vodka, and spirits one can 
get radios, bicycles, silk, etc. They told me that they have a saying: ‘Who knows 
not Kutno, knows not life’.”533 As far as the experience of life based on illegal trade 
went, other towns on this route, including Warsaw, were not far behind Kutno.
Soviet convoys were always more difficult to inspect than all others, and, from 
1947, arrest of their personnel became forbidden even if it had been established 
that smuggling had taken place. There is little wonder that there was always a place 
for contraband in a Soviet train’s storage area.534 Despite an agreement signed in 
the late 1950, which gave the Polish authorities more opportunities for inspection, 
the results were meager. A customs official from Rzepin remembered how “transit 
passenger and freight trains from the GDR to the Soviet Union and in the reverse 
direction were manned on the Frankfurt (Oder) – Brest (Brześć) route by GDR 
531 AAN, GIOS, vol. 117.
532 In October and November 1952, eighty-two thousand entries and hundred and six 
thousand exits of Soviet citizens were noted in passport-free traffic. The mobility of 
Polish citizens was several dozen times less; D. Stola, Zamknięcie […], p. 168.
533 M. Dąbrowska, Dzienniki powojenne, vol. 1: 1945–1949, ed. T. Drewnowski, Warszawa 
1997, p. 190.
534 “Smugglers,” it was reported in 1950, “make hiding places in service cars, in steam 
engines and cargo cars. They bring from the city tens of kilos of goods set aside for 
smuggling and place them in the familiar hiding spots.” AAN, GIOS, 123, fol. 223.
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railroad employees. The crews engaged in large-scale smuggling on trains in both 
directions.”535 It is difficult to trust claims that smuggling operations decreased af-
ter Polish crews had replaced the German ones on transit trains. Such operations 
became rather more professional while cross-border private traffic, increasing af-
ter 1956, deprived the railroad workers of their monopoly position. There is no 
doubt that trains from the West continued for a long time to play a pivotal role 
in transporting “high value” contraband such as gold, watches, and currency. In 
the instructions for custom officials issued in 1958, the examples of hiding places 
for contraband to look out for were based on French or German rolling stock.536 
Some of the hiding places, especially those containing gold ruble coins, a favorite 
store of value for Soviet savers, were probably only searched once the train had 
reached the Soviet side of the border, and not any sooner.
The turning point came in 1956 when, thanks to the political thaw, former 
Polish citizens living in the Soviet Union could be resettled back home; by 1959, 
almost 250 000 people had returned to Poland. The Poles going home were aware 
they would have to rebuild their life from scratch and so tried to bring along 
any goods that would easily sell in Poland. In the Soviet Union, they bought 
radios, motorcycles, or even cars.537 For the people released from labor camps 
and for the exiles, often not short of money but lacking lacking opportunities 
to invest it, the authorities arranged ad-hoc solutions. “Everywhere in railroad 
stations,” Barbara Skarga remembered from her journey across the Soviet Union 
on a train full of former deportees, “we encounter hastily set up jewelry kiosks. 
We are allowed to take everything to Poland with us without paying any customs 
duty but we are not allowed to take rubles out. Any rubles that we have on us, we 
have to spend on something. Those who had cashed in a substantial number of 
bonds buy silver: rings, powder boxes, or cigarette cases. They are often in bad 
taste but the metal is of high quality.”538 Customs exemptions for personal effects 
facilitated the use of the repatriation process as a way of bringing in substantial 
535 Ibid.; J. Kubzdyl, Walczyłem z przemytem kolejowym, WC, 1985, no. 37, p. 24.
536 Album skrytek przemytniczych, Warszawa 1958. For example, at the turn of 1964 and 
1965, a group approximately 30-strong hid gold on a train and smuggled it between 
Paris and Moscow (they smuggled to West Germany 16 000 dollars, which they used 
to buy 457 twenty-dollar coins); AIPN, MSW II, 4370, fol. 26–27. See: J. Kubzdyl, 
Walczyłem z przemytem…; Przemyt w ruchu osobowym, WC, 1970, no. 1, pp. 23–24.
537 M. Ruchniewicz, Repatriacja ludności polskiej z ZSRR w latach 1955–59, Warsza-
wa 2000, p. 265. For literary rendition see: M. Ławrynowicz, Diabeł na dzwonnicy, 
Warszawa 1998.
538 B. Skarga, Po wyzwoleniu… (1944–1956), Kraków 2008, p. 294.
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amounts of contraband, which often belonged to a different “investor” and not 
the actual re-settler. Those returning from the West used a similar strategy.539 
After 1956, tourists and visitors could cross the eastern border more easily and 
successful black market dealing was part-and-parcel of their trips. A real break-
through came two decades later.
When, in the late 1940s, the borders were sealed, the volume of the small-scale 
black market operations conducted by railroad workers across the borders on the 
Oder and the Bug was not significant for the second economy of the borderlands. 
The image of the black market both in the South and that in the North began to 
change radically soon after 1956; the former – thanks to the local tourism and 
stable settlements on both sides of the border, whereas the latter benefited from 
the sea factor. However, the eastern and the western border areas required time 
and an external impulse to change. In the case of the western border, this hap-
pened quite abruptly on January 1, 1972 when the passage between Poland and 
the GDR opened for passport-free and visa-free traffic. Much has been written 
about this decision and its political consequences on both sides of the Oder–
Neisse.540 It allows us to focus here on the transformation of the borderland black 
market image. Naturally, residents living close to the bridges on the Oder and the 
Neisse rivers became the beneficiaries of the new situation. Until October 1980, 
when the border was closed again, they made up between a third to a half of all 
those visiting the neighboring country.
The sleepy towns on the Polish side of the border such as Zgorzelec, Słubice, 
Gubin, and Kostrzyn, all of a sudden found themselves much closer to Berlin or 
Dresden than to Warsaw or Poznań. In 1972, Hanna Krall wrote, “Słubice and Gu-
bin became part of Europe literally overnight.”541 And overnight, Poles discovered 
the contents of the stores in the GDR. Mass buying alerted the government in East 
Berlin and forced it to introduce stricter customs inspections. In response to pres-
sure from the GDR authorities, the Polish authorities limited the mark exchange 
allowance to 200 per month (by the regulation issued by the Governor of the Polish 
539 HIM, Pressearchiv P 0141, RFE-Research, Item 914/57, Discontented Polish repatriates 
from France and USSR.
540 L. Koćwin, Polityczne determinanty […]; D. Jajeśniak-Quast, K. Stokłosa, Geteilte 
Städte […]; C. Osękowski, Otwarta granica między NRD a Polską w latach siedem-
dziesiątych. Wymiar polityczny, gospodarczy i społeczny, in: Przyjaźń nakazana? Sto-
sunki między NRD i Polską w latach 1949–1990, ed. B. Kerski, A. Kotula, K. Wóycicki, 
Szczecin 2003.
541 H. Krall, My patrzymy na Europę, “Polityka”, no. 38/September16, 1972.
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National Bank on December 21, 1972).542 Of course, this decision influenced the 
local black market situation. Border officials tended to treat more favorably the 
residents of border towns who frequently crossed the Oder–Neisse line. “Cottage 
manufacturers” from even remote regions of the country immediately took ad-
vantage of such leniency and began to hire Zgorzelec or Słubice residents, many 
of whom worked in the GDR, to carry small amounts of goods across the border. 
In the mid-1970s, “smuggling communities” developed in the border towns.543
Limiting the mark allowance for the Poles (from April 1974, to only 100 marks 
per three months) increased trafficking to the GDR of Polish goods in high de-
mand on the other side of the border and made illegal money exchange flourish. 
GDR nationals were selling their currency because the unofficial transactions of-
fered better rates but also because incompetent bureaucrats on both sides of the 
border made official exchange difficult. “In Słubice,”a Polityka journalist wrote in 
1977, “we observed how a mark exchange kiosk functions. A pleasant girl would 
mostly shake her head when asked by Germans whether they could exchange 
marks for zloty. This was not possible without official paperwork from their bank 
but very few people in the GDR were aware of this. Later, we saw the very same 
people offering their marks to exchange for zloty in various other places.”544
There is no doubt that a significant number of the unofficial currency transac-
tions were not spontaneous but planned well in advance, and expertly organized 
and executed,545 since it was the currency trade rather than, say, shoe smuggling 
that yielded the real profit. People quickly realized that there was a healthy mar-
gin in buying GDR marks for western marks at locations close to West Berlin.546 
542 See: M. Mazurek, Antropologia niedoboru w NRD i PRL 1971–1989, Wrocław 2010, 
pp. 30–60; J. Kochanowski, Groźba nad NRD, “Karta” 1999, no. 28, pp. 132–135; Polskie 
dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1972, ed. W. Borodziej and P. Długołęcki, Warszawa 2005, 
pp. 609–610, 634–635. See: K. Lenk, Von Salamiwürsten und Salamanderschuhen. 
Schmuggel zwischen der DDR und der Volksrepublik Polen in den 1970er und 1980er 
Jahren, Diplomarbeit an der Fakultät für Kulturwissenschaften, Europa-Universität 
Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder 2006 (with thanks to Prof. Philipp Ther for allowing me 
to use the manuscript).
543 Łańcuszek, WC, 1975, no. 17, p. 20.
544 A. Paszyński, M. Turski, Granica bez kompleksów, “Polityka”, no. 22/May28, 1977.
545 Polityka i dyplomacja polska wobec Niemiec, vol 2: 1971–1990, ed. M. Tomala, Warsza-
wa 2006, pp. 105–108; H. Kożuchowski, Wymiana przygraniczna, in: Rozwój społec-
zno-ekonomiczny obszarów przygranicznych, ed. B. Winiarski, M. Musiał, M. Klamut, 
Wrocław 1979, p. 239.
546 AIPN, 01521/2035, Jacek Oleś, Przemyt wartości dewizowych, Akademia Spraw 
Wewnętrznych, Instytut Kryminalistyki i Kryminologii, Warszawa 1978, pp. 65–70.
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With East German marks, those that knew the right people could also buy gold, 
which in Poland gave the best return on the initial investment. At first, it was the 
Polish Roma living along the western border who specialized in such transac-
tions, since many of them had relatives either in the GDR or in West Germany. 
In May 1972, an entire Roma family was arrested for involvement in large-scale 
gold smuggling.547 Six months later, another Roma family attracted the attention 
of the authorities by selling gold coins in Jubiler stores. The investigation proved 
how easy the business was: over the course of a few months, seven million zloty 
had been officially exchanged for eastern marks. Later, in the GDR, 1 233 South 
African Krugerrands – 42.1 kg of gold! – had been purchased from people ar-
riving from West Germany or West Berlin.548 Soon, there mushroomed special-
ized “enterprises” that were illegally purchasing GDR marks, and to lesser degree 
other Soviet Bloc currencies, with which they bought hard currencies and gold 
in the GDR. One consignment of currency alone, which arrived in Poland from 
Berlin in the summer of 1975, included 593 580 000 GDR marks.549
Smaller or larger smuggling operations were only part, not even the most im-
portant, of the borderland landscape. The banks of the border rivers comple-
mented each other in a much more prosaic way: guests from Poland enthused 
about East German products while visitors from the GDR were impressed with 
what Polish artisans had to offer. These craftsmen, who operated both legally and 
illegally, flocked every week to the border towns and sold to those arriving from 
across the Oder–Neisse border all kinds of bric-à-brac such as plastic toys, fash-
ionable clothing and underwear and such sought-after symbols of Western pop 
culture as toys and various gadgets with logos of popular bands or singers.550 The 
suspension by the GDR authorities (from October 30, 1980) of the agreement 
allowing passport-free and visa-free cross border traffic seriously disrupted the 
grey economy status quo that had developed for the past decade between the 
two societies. Martial Law, declared in Poland on December 13, 1981, put up 
another very effective obstacle to the cross-border trade. From then on, Polish 
contract workers employed in the GDR were the primary unofficial traders. For 
many, a job in a German factory or on a construction site was merely a source of 
capital used for trading; and it was this trading that constituted their main source 
547 S. Kot, Samochód pełen złota, PiŻ, 1974, no. 42.
548 J. Arturowicz, “Złoty” gang, “Express Poznański”, no. 294/December 15–16, 1973.
549 M. Buchowski, Wielki pieniądz, “Trybuna Odrzańska”, no 274/1, 1976.
550 A. Mozołowski, Skoczyć na małe piwko, “Polityka”, no. 21/May 22, 1976. In 1974, Polish 
artisans and merchants supplied the residents of the GRD borderlands with soccer 
trinkets popular during the World Cup in West Germany; ibid.
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of income. While in 1983, the official GDR mark’s exchange rate was 17 zloty 
and the black market rate was the very attractive 60–80 zloty, it was overshad-
owed by the rates achieved through trading specific goods: the “chocolate” rate 
was 200, the “shoe” rate – 250, the “pepper” rate – 250, and the “baking powder” 
rate – over 300 zloty to the mark. The further away from the border, the higher 
the return was. Merchants from far and wide already positioned at the border 
swarmed onto trains, trying to buy the smuggled goods for as little as possible. 
And the closer to the border, the more liberal in their approach were the local 
authorities. According to a high-ranking police official from Gorzów Wielkopol-
ski, a town close to the border, in mid-1983, trading operations conducted by 
Poles employed in the GDR had “stirred up controversy” but they were also ad-
vantageous for the state by “enriching the market with goods and replenishing 
the state treasury with hard currency.” He proposed to regularize the practice by 
introducing regulated prices or giving the state purchasing rights.551
 The privileged position of Polish workers in the GDR gradually weakened 
during the 1980s, along with the liberalization of passport regulations. The ul-
timate blow came with new rules that allowed Poles to retain their passports 
between trips (from early 1989). From that moment on, instead of being the des-
tination of trading trips, the GDR became merely a transit route to West Berlin – 
now the source of real profit. “The departures take place,” it was reported in 
mid-March 1989, “usually at weekends. On those days, dozens of buses of tour-
ist groups organized by Orbis, Gromada, Turysta or other foreign travel agen-
cies, as well as hundreds of private cars, pass through the border crossings at 
Świecko and Kołbaskowo.”552 The first official hard-currency exchange kiosk at 
the Świecko crossing opened on March 16, 1989, followed soon by others open-
ing along the western border. 
Transit traffic also revived the black market on the eastern border. Unofficial 
trade with the Soviet Union (more in chapter 9) had always been very profitable. 
 
551 W. Przybyłowicz, Kontrabanda, “Polityka”, no. 26/June 25, 1983. “Every Friday at 2:10 
am an express train from Leipzig enters the railway station in Wrocław. One can buy 
everything on this train: coffee, chocolate, a moped, a washing machine, kitchen 
mixers, vacuum cleaners, tights, spices and many other articles unavailable on our 
market.” W. Faściszewski, Przemytnik, “Sprawy i Ludzie” 1984, no. 4. 
552 AAN, KC PZPR, 95/12B, GUC, fol. 30–32. Se: U. Weber, Der Polenmarkt in Berlin. Zur 
Rekonstruktion eines kulturellen Kontakts im Prozess der politischen Transformation 
Mittel- und Osteuropas, Neuried 2002; M. Irek, Der Schmugglerzug Warschau–Ber-
lin–Warschau. Materialien einer Feldforschung, Berlin 1998.
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It did not require sophisticated strategies. In the Soviet Union, public demand 
for anything with a passing resemblance to a Western product was even greater 
than in Poland but the supply was much lower. Many Poles became the middle-
men who transferred to the East not only technologies but also consumer trends. 
The majority of those crossing the eastern border – relatives visiting their fam-
ilies, participants in organized trips, including the so-called “friendship trains”, 
functionaries protected by passports issued for the purposes of conducting their 
duties, contract workers employed on construction sites, students and scholars – 
took advantage of the situation. They all carried with them wigs, blouses, un-
derwear, coats, jeans, and plastic bags with the mandatory English logo. Coming 
back, they brought gold, currency (cheaper in the Soviet Union than in Poland), 
household items, furs, and coffee. Choosing the right goods was not difficult. 
Figuring out how to enter the Soviet Union was, however, a challenge. Individual 
trips, such as those to the GDR, were not possible. One could only visit the USSR 
on a business trip, with a private invitation or as part of an organized trip. Other 
than those, there was only one trouble-free way of entering the country: on a 
transit journey to somewhere else.
In the latter part of the 1970s, trips to other Soviet Bloc countries reached a 
mass scale. From 1977, nothing more than the appropriate stamp in one’s ID doc-
ument was required for such journeys but this lenient approach did not apply to 
the Soviet Union. Trips to Turkey, Greece or the Middle East also became easier 
than before. Soon, travelers enthusiastically tested the thousand-year old principle 
that profits increase in proportion to the number of countries visited. Even those 
with less time or money to invest in such business ventures, or those who were 
simply less entrepreneurial, could still carry on a lucrative trade by simply getting 
on the train to Lvov. They could take advantage of the brief change-over of electric 
locomotives just before the train got to the city (some even went as far as to use 
the emergency brake or bribe the railroad workers to stop for longer) to sell the 
goods quickly and return to Poland without ever reaching the supposed “country 
of destination”. Some would make a quick stop in Lvov to sell goods in demand 
in the Soviet Union and buy articles that could be later easily sold on in Hungary, 
Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey or the Middle Eastern states. Lvov, thanks to 
its advantageous geographical location since the Middle Ages famous as a thriving 
business hub, quickly became an important center of illegal trade; soon, the term 
“Lvov transit” entered the smuggling, and diplomatic, lexicon. On the other side of 
the border, the city of Przemyśl also gained a new significance. In the 1970s and 
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1980s, it featured prominently in the reports on trafficking on the eastern border 
delivered to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.553
Martial Law did not interrupt these extremely profitable operations for long. 
Unlike Czechs, Slovaks and East Germans who usually shared their authorities’ 
adverse opinion of Polish traders, not only did the social players east of Poland 
accept such operations but were keen to cooperate. It is not surprising that by 
mid-1983, Lvov had regained its position as a center of “concentrated smuggling 
of goods and trading of hard currencies.”554 The “Lvov transit”, which had played 
an important role until the late 1980s, now gradually began to lose its significance 
in favor of the traditional trading exchange; all the more so, since with the begin-
ning of perestroika, the borders opened wider for travelers, both those arriving and 
departing. The growing demand for outwardly visible social status symbols such 
as clothing was as difficult to meet as before. After the introduction of new regula-
tions at the turn of 1986 and 1987, cross-border traffic quickly began to grow. For 
example in Belarus the number of visitors from Poland increased sixfold in 1988 
in comparison to the previous year. In 1989, the number of “destination” arrivals 
in the USSR grew by 100%, and of transit arrivals – by 200%. Poland consolidated 
its position as the nation whose citizens visited the USSR most frequently. And 
vice-versa: Poland became a primary destination for Soviet citizens.555
This affected the black market landscape mostly on the eastern side of the bor-
der. Naturally, travelers from Belarus and Ukraine were in evidence in the market 
places in Przemyśl, Siedlce and Białystok but were not as numerous as the Poles 
frequenting the Ukrainian or Belorussian baracholkas. During 1987–1988, Polish 
trading developed sufficiently556 to force the authorities of the border Soviet re-
publics to set up bazaars to accommodate it, for example in Vilnius, Zasław near 
Minsk, Brześć/Brest and Grodno. The last of these was renowned “in all of the 
Soviet Union. Soviet citizens traveled to this market from as far away as Siberia 
and the Asian republics to shop and sell their own goods there.”557 The bazaars 
did not last long and soon closed down. The authorities justified the decision on 
553 AIPN, Biuro Paszportów MSW, 21052; AIPN, KG MO, 35/185, fol. 20–21, 170. K. 
Stipsicy, Schmuggeln nach Plan, “Die Zeit”, no. 37/September 9, 1983; R. Geremek, 
Pokój, przyjaźń, dieńgi, “Życie”, June 3–4, 2000.
554 AMSZ, Consular Department (Departament Konsularny, DK), 22/87, w. 10. 
555 AMSZ, DK, 29/97, w. 20.
556 In the late 1980s, the profitability of trading operations in the East equaled trans-
actions conducted in the West; M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy. Przesłanki, 
mechanizmy i skutki w Polsce lat osiemdziesiątych, Warszawa 1992, pp. 138–139.
557 AMSZ, DK, 29/97, w. 20.
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the basis that criminal “elements” had been gathering around the market where 
the illegal goods sold and the local police had not been able to control them. 
Official komis stores, which bought goods from Polish tourists, replaced the 
bazaars.558 The restrictions deterred neither the Poles nor the inhabitants of Lvov, 
Vilnius, and Grodno who soon privatized the commerce with visitors from the 
West and established private, unofficial komis stores.559
The year 1989 was a turning point for black market geography including the 
East–West axis, where the changes seemed to be the most profound. The trans-
formation triggered by the “autumn of the peoples” removed some of the old 
political barriers, and widened the range of needs and aspirations without blur-
ring the differences in the standards of living. In 1990, with the unification and 
currency union of the two German states, the West reached the Oder–Neisse. In 
the same year, for the USSR (and its successor states), it was Poland that now be-
came the “West”. The Russian market place in Warsaw replaced the Polish market 
place in Berlin. On the one hand, smuggling (traditionally most important on 
the East–West route) became professionalized and criminalized, on the other – 
to a large extent, it reverted to its old function as the medium of unofficial ex-
change between border communities that played a very important role in the 
Polish-German, Polish-Ukrainian, Belorussian and Russian borderlands. This, 
however, belongs to a different era.
558 AMSZ, DK, 21/93, w. 5.




“What did you have for dinner tonight”?
“Meat!” X or Y answers, beaming delightedly. “There was no meat today…” 
– the tone is plaintive, pessimistic, reproachful. “I am off to get some meat!” is 
uttered in tones of excitement and anticipation; “I have got some meat!” is pro-
nounced with a triumphant grin. “They had no meat in the store…” is full of bit-
ter disappointment. Human thoughts and words revolve around meat, as do the 
people themselves almost literally so. Meat is the subject of group psychosis; it is 
the trigger for violent swings from cheerful expectation to morose resignation. 
Omnipotent meat, the realm of fantasy and gossip […].”560
The above excerpt from October 1948 could have been equally well written in 
1951, or any of the years 1959, 1963, 1970, 1976, 1980, or 1989. There is no doubt 
that meat – or rather the enduring shortage thereof – was the most common top-
ic of conversation both in private homes and in government offices throughout 
the entire era of the Polish People’s Republic. Since individual, private farmers 
were the main producers of meat in Poland and the state wanted to play the role 
of the monopoly distributor of this Polish staple food, meat became the most 
common object of illegal trade and created thereby an important link between 
the periphery and the center, the city and the countryside, the state and the pri-
vate domain. That is why we shall look not only at unofficial meat trade strategies 
but also their social, economic and political context.
5.1  “Meat Is Problem Number One”:561 But Why?
It would be a simplification to say that all the post-war political upheavals were 
triggered by meat shortages but public opinion certainly perceived it that way. 
Meat was the prism through which society viewed the authorities. If we accept 
political jokes as the most common expression of public opinion, the fact that 
meat was the most popular topic of jokes between late 1940s and late 1980s is 
quite revealing.562 By the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, meat supply had reached 
560 J. Kawalec, “Spadochronowe” zakupy, “Echo Dnia”, no. 298/October 30, 1948.
561 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXI–243, fol. 223. PH, 96, 2005, z. 4, pp. 587–605. 
562 See: Ł. Kamiński, A. Małkiewicz, K. Ruchniewicz, Opór społeczny w Europie Środkowej 
w latach 1948–1953 na przykładzie Polski, NRD i Czechosłowacji. Wstępny raport 
z badań, Wrocław 2004, pp. 285–290; T. Szarota, Śmiech zakazany – kawał (dow-
cip) polityczny jako informacja o postrzeganiu peerelowskiej rzeczywistości, “Polska 
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a high position on the list of unsolved problems both at central and regional 
government level. One of the indicators was the frequency with which the topic 
of meat turned up in the documents of the Politburo, where it started to feature 
in the late 1940s, gained a permanent place during the catastrophic collapse of 
the market in the summer and fall of 1951 and kept that position until 1989.563
While society considered the incompetence and misguided economic poli-
cies of the authorities the main reason for the chronic meat shortages, the ac-
tual causes were more complex. We need to look at meat as one of the crucial 
indicators of social prestige and financial status. The correlation has been well 
established564 between industrialization-cum-urbanization and changes in con-
sumption patterns, accompanied by increased consumption of high-protein, 
high-quality food products. In The Making of the English Working Class, E. P. 
Thompson pointed out that meat could certainly serve as a sensitive measure of 
the material standard of living, since it was one of the first products purchased 
with real income growth.565
Meat consumption patterns depended on historical, economic, and social fac-
tors but we can safely assume that in Europe of the time, the further east and 
south you went, the more meatless the average diet was. While in the 1930s in 
Great Britain and Switzerland people consumed on average 66 kg of meat per 
year, and in Germany 48–52 kg, in Poland (shortly before the Second World War) 
the annual average was just 21.6 kg. In pre-war Poland, 45% of the population 
did not reach this average (the lowest consumption was some two kg per year), 
roughly 25% exceeded it (for example in Poznań, the average consumption was 
61 kg, and in Krakow – 53 kg) and one percent of Poles consumed as much as 100 
kg of meat per year.566 The differences were significant in the post-war period, a 
1944/45–1989. Studia i Materiały” 5, 2001, pp. 209–236; about “meat jokes” see: D. 
Jarosz i M. Pasztor, Afera mięsna: fakty i konteksty, Toruń 2004, pp. 196–200.
563 The “meat problem” was discussed at the session of KC PZPR Politburo for the last 
time on November 7, 1989; AAN, KC PZPR, 2162, fol. 67.
564 M. Pohorille, Preferencje konsumentów a postulowany wzorzec spożycia, Warszawa 
1978, pp. 178–179; H.-J. Teuteberg, The general relationship between diet and indus-
trialization, in: European diet from pre-industrial to modern times, ed. E. and R. 
Forster, New York 1975, pp. 61–109.
565 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, New York 1964, quoted 
from H.P. Müller, Die “feinen Unterschiede”, wo es keine geben sollte. Anmerkungen 
zum Verhältnis von Arbeiteraristokratie und Luxus, in: “Luxus und Konsum” – eine 
historische Annäherung, Münster–New York–München 2003, p. 209.
566 Mały rocznik statystyczny 1938, Warszawa 1938, pp. 147, 149–151; W. Szewczyk, 
Spożycie żywności w Polsce w okresie międzywojennym (na tle dochodów i wydatków 
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time when the former lower classes now enjoying new political, economic, and 
social circumstances, wanted at all costs to reach the pre-war consumption mod-
el of the middle class.567
After the Second World War, Polish society had to re-establish consumption 
patterns from the ground up. The war not only starved everyone equally but it 
also equalized the chances of all social groups. Pauperization affected all, but the 
situation of the ruling classes soon began to improve, and polices of full employ-
ment and wage increases quickly eliminated the income differentials between 
white- and blue-collar employees.568 Although, for the next few years, real income 
was lower than it had been before 1939, it was sufficient to subsist on relatively 
cheap, subsidized food. Low food prices were expected to ease the harshness of 
post-war living, endear the poorer part of the population to the new authorities, 
provide conditions for a high birth rate, and facilitate industrialization.569
During the era of reconstruction of the state between 1946 and 1950, meat 
consumption in Poland grew on average by 5.2 kg annually, between 1950 and 
1970 – by 0.8 kg, and in the first part of Gierek’s decade, at the time considered 
abundant and prosperous – by 3.5 kg.570 Propaganda provided a boost for con-
sumption, with its exhortations to give to every citizen “according to his needs” 
– the prerequisite stipulation for a socialist state, and repeatedly stressing the bi-
ological, material, and cultural equality of all citizens. Society accepted the egal-
itarian approach but the attempts of the authorities to instill a vague definition 
of a “socialist model of consumption” were destined to end in failure. Models of 
consumption, social needs and aspirations are never the sum of the perceptions 
of the authorities, but tend to rely on, often long-engrained, social customs and 
na konsumpcję), Warszawa 1991, pp. 144, 150; J. Żarnowski, Polska 1918–1939. Praca 
– technika – społeczeństwo, Warszawa 1999, pp. 150, 252.
567 W. Szymański, Ceny a konsumpcja i produkcja żywności, Warszawa 1979, p. 177.
568 L. Beskid, Ekonomiczne uwarunkowania rozwoju konsumpcji, in: Badania nad wzo-
rami konsumpcji, ed. J. Szczepański, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1977, pp. 99–100; 
S. Jankowski, Warunki bytu ludności, in: Gospodarka Polski Ludowej 1944–1955, ed. 
J. Kaliński, Z. Landau, vol. 2, Warszawa 1976, p. 66.
569 W. Michna, W. Sztarbałło, K. Prędecka, A. Dyka, Modele spożycia żywności (w aspekcie 
polityki wyżywienia na lata 1986–1990), Warszawa 1986, p. 5.
570 Z. Lewandowska, Model konsumpcji w Polsce w okresie industrializacji socjalistycznej, 
Warszawa 1979, pp. 75–76. In 1950, meat consumption in Czechoslovakia represent-
ed 90%, in Hungary 71%, and in the GDR 60% of meat consumption in Poland. In 
the next twenty years, the proportions reversed; ibid., p. 79.
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habits, shaped by living conditions, cultural tradition, copy-cat behavior and oth-
er factors.571
Contrary to the popular perception that the peasant model of consumption 
was a feature of the ruralization of post-war Polish cities, it was not the case 
that peasants who migrated to the cities imposed their village diet on the city 
dwellers. In fact, the opposite was true. It was the rural migrants who adopted the 
petty bourgeois model of consumption, with its higher proportion of meat. The 
lower middle class became the standard-setting group for the workers and peas-
ants – first for those who moved to the cities, then for those living on farms but 
employed outside agriculture, and finally for rural residents living solely from 
farming.572
With robust consumption, social tensions rose quickly every time that state 
production faltered. From the late 1950s, people began to pay attention to the 
quality of food; aspirations of a growing section of society moved beyond a plate-
ful of potatoes or cabbage accompanied by pork scratchings. As mentioned ear-
lier, increased demand for meat is an integral part of modernization. Indeed, the 
generation born during the post-war demographic boom was growing up – and 
this entailed an increased requirement for high-calorie foods – at a time when 
the modernization process was accelerating rapidly. The number of city dwellers 
employed in industry and services rose; the general level of education increased. 
Women were now more active professionally which meant they spent less time 
on household chores. As it did in the West, expenditure on grain products, pota-
toes, eggs, sugar, and animal fat decreased but there was an increased demand for 
meat products, especially those of high quality. The appetite however remained 
unsatisfied.573 The growth in production, especially of meat, lagged behind the 
growth in population. Since the population in the cities was increasing the fast-
est, the amount of meat per capita for city inhabitants systematically decreased. 
For example in comparison with 1958, in the years 1960, 1963, and 1964 meat 
supply decreased by more than 8 kg.574 Increased demand for high quality meat 
571 M. Pohorille, Konsumpcja, in: Systemy wartości a wzory konsumpcji społeczeństwa 
polskiego, Warszawa 1980, p. 111.
572 J. Szczepański, Zagadnienia konstruowania i realizacji modelu i wzorów konsumpcji 
socjalistycznej, in: Badania nad wzorami konsumpcji […], pp. 61–62.
573 L. Beskid, Ekonomiczne …, pp. 187, 195; E. Kieżel, Podstawy programowania spożycia 
żywności, Katowice 1985, pp. 51, 122–123; Z. Żekoński, Wstępne informacje o struk-
turze żywienia ludności miast, OBOP, Warszawa 1960 (I used a copy stored in ODZP 
TVP, 1847/7). See: D. Jarosz, M. Pasztor, Afera mięsna […], pp. 158–162. 
574 AZZ, Wydział Ekonomiczny, 204/43, October 1, 1965.
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coincided with a significant increase in the export of such products. It never rose 
to the excessive levels claimed by urban myth (in fact, it never exceeded 12% of 
national consumption); it was, however, not the quantity but the quality of the 
exported meat that mattered. Poland exported the highest quality meat, which 
was also the most sought-after, and often unavailable on the local market. In 
1955, 99% of the national production of canned ham was sold abroad; twenty 
years later, this had risen to 74.3%. This was one of the reasons for the singular 
supply conundrum: in 1965, ham, which on average constituted 23% of carcass 
meat, made up only 1.1% of the official market in meat.575
Furthermore, the standards of labor-saving services such as restaurants and 
of products such as processed fast foods were not keeping up with social change, 
which allowed more women – since it was women who were in charge of the 
logistics of putting food on the plate in the-then Poland – to work or study than 
had been the case before the war. Moreover, the quality of food on offer in the 
Polish catering system that consisted of workplace cafeterias and a few restau-
rants was not very enticing. Thus, most Poles took their meals at home and the 
Polish woman remained in the kitchen – with the stereotype of a good wife that 
serves a two-course cooked lunch every day alive and well. In only 1.5% of urban 
households and 0.2% of rural households were home meals not on offer. Dinner 
was served at home each day in 88% of city households and in 93% of homes 
in rural areas.576 As refrigerators were in short supply, this meant bulk grocery 
shopping daily, which in turn put much pressure on the market places.577
Attempts undertaken in the early 1960s to ease the housewife’s burden with 
such brand-new, labor-saving measures as frozen foods and the sale of meat in 
pre-packaged portions as well as canned foods and deli products were not suc-
cessful. Poland did not have the appropriate technology for the mass production 
575 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/V/598, fol. 33; W. Szymański, Ceny a konsumpcja […], p. 257.
576 E. Kieżel, Podstawy programowania spożycia […], p.  61; A. Wiśniewski, Czaso-
chłonność żywienia w gospodarstwach domowych, in: Diagnoza zmian w strukturze 
konsumpcji (na przykładzie gospodarstw domowych), Katowice 1990, p.  117; A. 
Wiśniewski, Warunki i sposoby realizacji funkcji żywieniowej gospodarstw domowych 
w Polsce w końcu lat osiemdziesiątych, in: Konsumpcja w gospodarstwach domowych 
lat osiemdziesiątych, ed. T. Pałaszewska-Reindl, Katowice 1992, p. 34. 
577 Before long, refrigerators became more popular, making it possible to store food for 
longer periods. For example in 1975, a reporter on Polityka observed: “after standing 
in line for a long time you usually buy more. There is a reason why refrigerators with 
big freezers are now disappearing from the stores whereas before they were not so 
popular””; Z. Szeliga, Mięso – kłopoty i perspektywy, “Polityka”, no. 11/March 15, 1975.
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of packaging and there were problems with distribution. Moreover, society 
resisted such novelties and chose to rely on traditional catering preferences. De-
spite the adverse opinion of dieticians, pork remained the most popular meat: in 
1960–1961, it constituted 69% of meat consumption; during 1974–1975, it nev-
er fell below 66.2%. However, between 1950 and 1976 poultry production grew 
sevenfold and beef production increased four times but the old favorite, pork, 
only by two thirds.578 The reason was that the natural environment in Polish ru-
ral areas and the type of fodder available were more conducive to cattle rearing 
than pig farming and thus the consumption of beef and dairy products prevailed, 
regardless of the fact that given a choice, Poles would have preferred pork chops 
and ham on the plate. Meat was much less labor-intensive than other foodstuffs, 
which were not any easier to buy. Not only that: its price remained competitive.579
Society perceived the efficient supply of affordable meat as a basic public 
good, part of the status quo, based on a consensus with the authorities. The latter 
were ready to maintain stable food prices even at the expense of massive and ev-
er-growing subsidies. In 1975, government subsidies of food in Poland amount-
ed to 168 billion zloty, and by 1978, they were up to 270 billion. In 1977, a farmer 
was paid 41 zloty for one kilogram of livestock while a kilogram of pork shoulder 
cost 42 zloty!580 In the late 1980s, subsidies absorbed almost 30% of the budget. 
This social policy led to a paradoxical situation: in 1988, the value of retail sales 
in the meat industry was 618.2 billion zloty, whereas the value of livestock in 
state purchase prices was 1 298.7 billion zloty. In the middle of 1989, in order to 
maintain the price of cured and deli meat, the government had to subsidize it by 
211.4%, pork – by 220.7%, and beef – by 276.8%.581
As a result, meat consumption rose faster than people’s income. What was 
even worse, both indicators grew more quickly than production. For example 
between 1970 and 1974, meat supply increased by 78.5% and the payroll budget 
by 114%, which rapidly increased demand (the prices stayed the same!).582 It 
was not possible to turn people’s attention to highly processed food products, 
because their quality was poor and their quantities insufficient. Gomułka’s and 
578 Polityka i organizacja żywienia ludności, ed. W. Kamiński, Warszawa 1980, p. 70.
579 K. Hofman, Konsumpcja żywności w Polsce. Aspekty ekonomiczne, społeczne i żywie-
niowe, Warszawa 1989, pp. 103, 139; B. Kowrygo, E. Rosiak, Spożycie żywności przez 
ludność rolniczą w świetle danych Instytutu Ekonomiki Rolnej, in : Model konsumpcji 
żywności w Polsce w środowisku wiejskim, Warszawa 1981, p. 99.
580 W. Szymański, Ceny a konsumpcja […], p. 304.
581 AAN, KC PZPR, 2149, fol. 161.
582 W. Szymański, Ceny a konsumpcja […], pp. 251, 256.
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Gierek’s administrations undertook such attempts without much success. Finally, 
the emphasis on food consumption in general and meat in particular became so 
pronounced that it began to re-direct government policy. The authorities were 
making desperate decisions such as, in the 1970s, incurring massive debt for the 
importation of animal feed, introducing “commercial stores” in 1976 or forcing 
workplaces to run animal husbandry on the side. 
Ultimately, the government resorted to drastic measures such as sudden 
price hikes (in 1953, 1959, 1967, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1982). They usually had 
in common two characteristics: they sparked social protests (in two of these 
instances, in 1970 and in 1976, as result of protests, the hikes were reversed), 
and they had no permanent economic effects. Even the price increase of early 
1982, the most radical in the history of the directed Polish post-war econo-
my, had only limited results. On the one hand, the authorities did not dare to 
raise prices to the level of profitability; on the other, meat was such an attractive 
product that people continued to buy it even at the higher prices and at the 
expense of reducing demand for other products. Consumers opted to use their 
savings if it allowed them to maintain their level of consumption (known as 
the “bolt effect”). This mechanism of the minimal effectiveness of increasing 
meat prices was usually explained in terms of “minimal meat price elasticity of 
demand”. One could say that in the case of meat, the reverse was also true: the 
“income elasticity” was high: the higher real income, the greater was expendi-
ture on food, especially on meat. When in the early 1970s, the incomes in the 
lowest bracket began to grow significantly, Poles started to spend a larger por-
tion of their money on meat. This was a vicious circle, which only the reforms of 
1989–1990 would be able to break.583
Polish agriculture, subject to continuous economic experiments, was not able 
to rise to the challenge of the growing demand for food. Agricultural policy in 
the times of the Polish People’s Republic was an area of “constant clashes between 
political and social goals on the one side and the effectiveness of production 
goals on the other.”584 While the authorities had to acknowledge the social de-
mand for ever-larger pieces of meat on the plate, private agriculture (the largest 
supplier of meat) continued to constitute an ideological and economic burden 
that was difficult to bear. Comments by the-then agriculture minister Kazimierz 
583 Mechanizmy ekonomiczne kształtowania spożycia. Kryzys, próba reform, kierunki 
zmian, ed. L. Żabiński, Katowice 1991, p. 44; E. Kieżel, Podstawy programowania 
spożycia […], p. 55.
584 S. Golinowska, Decyzje centrum o kształtowaniu rzeczowej struktury spożycia, Warsza-
wa 1989, p. 105.
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Barcikowski, noted down by Mieczysław Rakowski (on January 12, 1973), illustrate 
very well the see-saw fluctuations in agricultural policy: “Agriculture always de-
velops very well in our country when the Party feels weak. This was the case in 
1948. The moment we begin to “believe in our strength” – as we did in 1949 – we 
immediately go after the peasant’s money, and as a result, production decreases. 
Later, when we are again weak, as in 1956, agriculture begins to thrive again. And 
so forth. Right now the comrades from the Finance Ministry again propose to 
invade the peasant’s pocket.”585
In the year 1958 alone, private agriculture received approximately the same 
funding as the state and coop sectors put together. It is not surprising that 1958 
was one of the very few years when the demand for meat was met.586 The equi-
librium did not endure; expenditure on private agriculture fell to 30% (in the 
late 1960s), while the financial burden rose; this effectively held the peasants 
back from long-term investment in their farms.587 The story repeated itself in the 
1970s, when, after several fat years (including increasing state purchase prices 
and the abolition of compulsory deliveries), agricultural funding was cut again 
and more money was allocated to industry.588 As a result, Polish farms were so 
underfunded that in the early1980s, their resources were estimated to be no more 
than half of their actual requirements for fertilizer, insecticide, land ameliora-
tion etc.589 This affected the volume of production and increased vulnerability to 
weather fluctuations. Poor potato harvests caused by drought or excessive rain 
resulted in a collapse of animal husbandry from which it took years to recov-
er. The correlation between bad weather (in 1947, 1951, 1959, 1962, 1964, 1969, 
1974–1975, and 1979–1980) and the collapse of the meat market and political 
upheavals is evident.590
When dealing with individual farmers, the authorities had to be careful not 
to upset the delicate balance. Polish peasants remained capitalists at heart and 
followed the laws of the market. If they did perceive what the state had to offer – 
for example, the official state purchase price, credits offered, or supply – as being 
sufficiently to their advantage, farmers would try to increase production and sell 
585 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1972–1975, Warszawa 2002, p. 89.
586 S. Golinowska, Decyzje centrum […], pp. 84, 116.
587 B. Gulbicka, Dochody, spożycie i akumulacja w indywidualnych gospodarstwach chłop-
skich w Polsce Ludowej, Warszawa 1986, pp. 83, 92. 
588 W. Michna, W. Sztarbałło, K. Prędecka, A. Dyka, Modele spożycia żywności […], 
pp. 6–8.
589 B. Gulbicka, Dochody, spożycie i akumulacja […], pp. 10, 13.
590 S. Golinowska, Decyzje centrum […], p. 117.
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more to the state. In a process of denaturation of consumption, they would do so 
even at the expense of their self-sufficiency. In the topsy-turvy Polish economy, 
they knew very well that at neighborhood stores they could buy cheese, bread 
or sausage at prices lower than their own production cost! However, when state 
purchase prices remained stable and the cost of the means of production was 
going up (or the means of production were in short supply), nothing could force 
the peasant to continue or increase production and sell the products to the state, 
especially when the unofficial market guaranteed much better prices. 
In the 1970s, shortages of animal feed crushed animal husbandry in Poland 
and, by the same token, the daily diet. In 1976, a journalist on the weekly Polityka 
hit the nail on the head when he noted that the “battle for animal feed in the 
countryside is fiercer than the battle for meat in the cities.”591 In the end, special-
ized farms dependent on feed supply and geared towards mass production gave 
up on animal husbandry. Small farmers, who grew a little bit of this and a little bit 
of that, were in a better situation. The problem was that their limited production 
could not ensure a balanced market. 
State meat supply did not meet consumer demand. The authorities prioritized 
meat deliveries to large agglomerations and large working-class centers, leaving 
the so-called green areas to their own devices; this entailed the de facto legali-
zation of the black market. Rationing had a similar effect. It stopped the process 
of the denaturation of farms and reduced radically the opportunities for buying 
meat for sections of society used to higher consumption and able to pay for it. 
Until rationing was abolished, and the free market introduced, the only solution 
that remained was to use the services of the ubiquitous “veal woman” or intensify 
efforts to acquire more ration coupons.592
5.2  Meat on the Black Market: Between  
Repression and Consent
In its Report on Economic Crime in 1959, the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) wrote, 
without beating about the bush, that shortages on the meat market translated 
591 A.K. Wróblewski, Świni banknotami nie nakarmi. Sztufada zamiast schabowego, in: 
Czarna księga cenzury PRL, part 2, Londyn 1978, p. 460.
592 R. Milic-Czerniak, Adaptacja konsumentów do warunków kryzysu ekonom-
iczno-społecznego w pierwszej połowie lat osiemdziesiątych, in: Warunki i sposób życia 
– zachowania przystosowawcze w kryzysie, ed. L. Beskid, Warszawa 1989, pp. 115–116; 
Umowa o kartki, ed. J. Kurczewski, Warszawa 2004.
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immediately into increased activity of the “criminal elements”593 in society. Those 
activities were wide-ranging – from illegal slaughter, meat speculation, and un-
der-the-counter sales to theft and the often large-scale fraud in state-owned 
processing plants. These strategies were a response to state policies and, in turn, 
immediately elicited further reaction from the state. The next chapter presents 
the mechanisms of this mutual interaction.
5.2.1  “The Great Battle for Meat”: 1944–1950
The beginning of the illegal meat trade goes back to the interwar period. During 
the economic crisis in the early 1930s, the average consumer, and thus the small 
butcher, began to look for cheaper sources of meat. Since meat delivered to the 
cities had to be inspected – naturally, for a fee, as a way of bypassing this onerous 
obligation, large-scale smuggling developed. Meat could, for example, be deliv-
ered without inspection in cheap food mail packages or by “railroad workers for 
their own needs and for other railroad workers and for trading also by railroad 
pensioners and widows, by persons who did not sell meat but brought it for their 
own families, for school children, as gifts for friends or business partners. Meat 
and cold cuts were smuggled through city tollgates in buses and trucks, which 
city authorities had no authority to stop, and traveled to Krakow in horse drawn 
wagons. Pedestrians also transported meat; for instance, women who sold milk 
concealed meat in milk cans.”594 This description of the smuggling of meat into 
Krakow applied equally well to other cities.
During the German occupation, the illegal meat trade was an activity with 
mass participation of professional players. After the war, these did not give up 
their profitable pursuit but now found themselves having to negotiate the obsta-
cles put before them by the new authorities, who did not want to lose control 
over this strategic product. The Polish authorities, keen to maintain low prices and 
keep the system of the ration coupons afloat, embarked on regulation of animal 
husbandry and imposed compulsory meat deliveries to state outlets (on August 
22, 1944 and February 9, 1945). The new system allowed for a relatively wide mar-
gin of free market operations, although merchants and artisans had to buy farm 
animals through official channels. Initially, state supervision was limited to coun-
teracting the raising of prices above the official level, to enforcing public health 
593 Informacja o przestępczości gospodarczej w 1959 r., Warszawa 1960 (NIK, Wydział ds. 
Nadużyć Gospodarczych, copy in the author’s possession), p. 40.
594 R. Radzyński, Produkcja, handel i spożycie mięsa w Krakowie, Kraków 1934, pp. 33–34, 
45. 
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standards and the introduction in February 1946 of meat-free days in restaurants 
and canteens. Penalties for violating the regulations were not, however, severe.
There were also other reasons why the authorities did not want to push too 
hard. Excessively repressive measures could have encouraged further profession-
alized black market strategies and, after the abolition in July 1946 (for propagan-
da purposes) of benefits in kind, there was a danger that they might spark off 
deep social dissatisfaction. And, perhaps, the authorities had misgivings about 
tangling with the meat industry, since – as reported in mid-1946 – it was the 
domain of the “most brutal human elements, of low ethical standard” which pro-
moted the “most negative and dishonest trading practices and methods of com-
petition.”595 Moreover, small merchants, wholesalers, and other traders often had 
connections with local power elites.596
For quite prosaic reasons, it was not possible to eliminate quickly and effec-
tively the private middlemen, without whom meat shortages would have been 
much greater. As a result, the “battle for meat” was one of the last stages of the 
“war on trade”. It began with the authorities dealing with the last link of the dis-
tribution chain by imposing, from mid-1948, restrictive inspections on butchers. 
The retail prices imposed were the same as or barely higher than the cost of the 
carcasses. No businessman in his right mind will sell without making a profit 
or, worse still, at a loss. Inevitably, the butchers resorted to illegal slaughter and 
under-the-counter sales, where they could get a higher price at all times. This 
in turn gave the authorities, usually represented by the Special Commission, an 
efficient propaganda weapon.597
In July 1948, the announcement heralding a change of agricultural policy 
triggered the eruption of “kolkhoz” panic. Drunkenness and religious fervor in-
tensified; there were rumors about impending war or even the end of the world, 
which was supposed to arrive on August 15 of that year. “Just in case”, people 
started hoarding pork fat and sugar.598 The proceedings of the August session of 
the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party (which lasted from August 
31 to September 3, 1948) was a telling preview of the methods which the Party 
would soon use to deal with both the “right-wing nationalist deviation” and such 
freedoms as remained, including economic freedom. In early September 1948, 
595 AAN, Akta Józefa Wojtyny, 18, fol. 6–7.
596 AAN, Komisarz Rządowy do Spraw Organizacji Gospodarki Mięsnej, fol. 3–4, 6–7.
597 AAN, KS, 5, fol. 122.
598 D. Jarosz, M. Pasztor, W  krzywym zwierciadle. Polityka władz komunistycznych 
w Polsce w świetle plotek i pogłosek z lat 1949–1956, Warszawa 1995, pp. 29–30; “Głos 
Ludu”, no. 256/September 15, 1948.
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“meat fever” erupted. Citizens waited in long lines in front of the still-private 
butcher shops. Housewives had no qualms about paying over the odds for a piece 
of fatty bacon, an indispensable ingredient of a Polish meal at the time, even 
though it was considerably more expensive than leaner meat. Private restaurants 
also stocked meat regardless of the price, so that on “days when meat sale is pro-
hibited they were able to offer their favored clients a pork chop of impressive 
size.”599 The authorities reacted immediately and lists of corrupt butchers and 
restaurant owners punished by the Special Commission started to appear in the 
press.600 Let’s Slap Down the Wreckers! exhorted the daily Express Ilustrowany in 
Łódź on September 17, a day after a large anti-speculation operation had been 
conducted nationwide in Poland by the Special Commission, the police, and 
“worker activists”.601 For the targeted culprits, this was a painful blow. In Poznań, 
“Agapit Czyżak, the owner of a restaurant on Mylna Street, paid a 30 thousand 
zloty fine for serving two pork chops on a meat-free day.”602
At the same time, the authorities zeroed in on the market places, where there 
were allegedly two buyers competing for every animal brought by peasants, 
which drove the price to absurd heights.603 This enabled the authorities to wid-
en the battlefront and strike at the private middlemen, who were much more 
effective than the state and coop purchasing agencies. The advantage that these 
private operators had is easy to explain. They had broad experience, often from 
599 “Polska Zbrojna”, no. 254, September 15, 1948. “On meatless days poultry and game 
are allowed,” Aleksander Janta-Połczyński remembered from his visit to Poland in 
1948. “On such days one can find on a restaurant menu, for example, a roast boar, 
pork or chicken schnitzel. I asked: what is this schnitzel made from? It’s all made 
with veal, of course, they answered.” A. Janta-Połczyński, Wracam z Polski 1948, Paryż 
1949, p. 20.
600 “Gazeta Robotnicza”, no. 253/September 13, 1948; “Dziennik Zachodni”, no. 256/
September 14, 948; “Gazeta Zachodnia” (Poznań), no. 314/September 16, 1948.
601 “Express Ilustrowany”, no. 257/September 17, 1948; see: “Kurier Codzienny”, no. 257/
September 18, 1948.
602 Kontrakcja Rządu i klasy robotniczej łamie dywersję spekulantów na rynku żywnościo-
wym, “Trybuna Robotnicza” (Katowice), no. 244/September 20, 1948.
603 “Kurier Codzienny”, no. 254/September 15, 1948; “Rzeczpospolita”, no. 268/September 
28, 1948; see: Kupcy podbijają ceny. Na targu bydlęcym w Rawie Mazowieckiej, ŻW, 
no. 258/September 18, 1948; Reorganizacja rynku mięsnego warunkiem skutecznego 
zwalczania spekulacji, ibid., no. 259/September 19, 1948; W Siemiatyczach […],“Wiec-
zór”, no. 260/September 20, 1948; Nadszedł czas walki, “Słowo Polskie” (Wrocław), no. 
258/September 18, 1948; Walka z paskarzami rozpoczęta, “Głos Pomorza” (Toruń), 
no. 260/September 2, 1948.
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before the War; they were familiar with the local area and enjoyed the trust of 
the peasants. They also knew how to avoid inspections and had at their disposal 
the, usually illegal, distribution channels in the cities.604 While the authorities 
advised leniency towards the farmers, because harsh repression was considered a 
“political error”, merchants or restaurant owners could be punished mercilessly: 
not just fined but sent to labor camps. While in mid-1948, the average prison 
sentence amounted to no more than a few months, by the fall of that year, black 
marketeers were being sent to camps in Mielęcin or Chrusty with a sentence 
that was increasingly often as much as two years. The newspapers meticulously 
reported the harsh punishments, as a deterrent to others.605
The official propaganda was skewed to imply that it was the black marketeers 
who were the perpetrators, whereas the government was doing no more than 
fighting back. There was to be left no doubt who the winners were, with headlines 
such as: After Deflecting the Attack (Trybuna Robotnicza, September 23, 1948) 
or Broken Offensive (Wrocławski Kurier Ilustrowany, September 26, 1948). The 
goal of the propaganda was to demonstrate the caring nature of the government, 
portrayed as being concerned with the contents of the average citizen’s cooking 
pot, and to imply a causative link between the new “meat stabilization” with the 
new political developments. In December 1948, the amalgamation of the Polish 
Workers Party (PPR) and Polish Socialist Party (PPS) took place. The two com-
bined to form the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), which would remain in 
power until 1989. The “return to normalcy” promised during the Party Congress 
materialized on December 20, when the momentous decision to abolish ration-
ing (from January 1, 1949) was made.606
The authorities achieved their first propaganda goal: proving that there was a 
link between pacifying the black marketeers and achieving market equilibrium. 
Now, the time came to comprehensively eliminate the enemy and substitute coop 
stores for the private stores.607 In early 1949, the authorities were not denying 
they would be on the offensive this time around. For the time being, harassment 
continued, as the newspapers published ever-longer lists of those punished for il-
legal slaughter and trade. There was a new emphasis on denouncing black market 
sales of meat coming from sick or dead animals and much coverage space was 
604 “Głos Ludu”, no. 258/September 18, 1948.
605 AAN, KS, 11, fol. 84; “Gazeta Zachodnia”, no. 258/September 20, 1948; “Głos Ludu”, 
no. 268/September 28, 1948.
606 M. Jastrząb, Puste półki. Problem zaopatrywania ludności w artykuły powszechnego 
użytku w Polsce w latach 1949–1956, Warszawa 2004, p. 130.
607 “Robotnik”, no. 319/November 19, 1948.
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given to “butchers’ scheming to prove that meat sales ought to be concentrated to 
a greater extent in the hands of the nationalized sector. Only then, when this had 
become a reality, would buyers be able to purchase meat easily and it would cease 
to be an object of speculation.”608
These actions prepared the ground for the government’s ultimate offensive. 
By December 7, 1948, the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers 
(KERM) had decided on a new animal husbandry policy. “Operation H” was to 
stimulate animal production on small private farms and on large state and coop 
enterprises. Large funds, in excess of 6.2 billion (old) zloty, were allocated for the 
purpose.609 On January 28, 1949, the Council of Ministers passed the motion and 
launched Operation H in public. The Council, according to Kurier Polski, “an-
nounced a new and great economic battle which we have to win just as we had 
won other battles: on bread, on trade, on surpassing production plan targets. On 
February 1, the great battle for meat begins!”610
Operation H began in an ominous way: on February 1, in an outside session in 
Żyrardów, the Warsaw District Court summarily sentenced the butcher Tadeusz 
Syrociński, accused of hiding 84 kg of pork fat, not only to confiscation of his 
store and deli meat shop as well as revocation of his professional license but also 
to the draconian –and unprecedented – seven years in prison.611 From then on, 
the media coverage of “meat news” fell into two categories: either it focused on 
the successful government operations that, it was hoped, would be welcomed by 
peasants (such as governmental aid to newly opened state purchasing stations), 
or else it highlighted details of the battle with the nefarious black marketeers. 
Their operations, the public was told, “weigh heavily on the meat trade and im-
pede supplying inhabitants of cities in accordance with the plan and which harm 
meat production. In order to win the battle for animal husbandry, we need to 
implement repressive measures against the speculator elements who engage in 
illegal slaughter and carcass trade. The inspections should be stepped up and the 
swindlers severely punished.”612
608 “Express Ilustrowany”, no. 15/January 16, 1949; “Kurier Codzienny” (Warszawa), no. 
4/January 5, 1949.
609 “Kurier Polski”, no. 29/January 30, 1949.
610 Ibid.
611 “Rzeczpospolita”, no. 32/February 2, 1949.
612 “Słowo Polskie” (Wrocław), no. 46/February 16, 1949; see: “Dziennik Zachodni”, no. 
46/February16, 1949; “Express Poznański”, no. 47/February 18, 1949. 
 191
In the countryside, the authorities carried out surveillance of travelers and 
market places as well as other sites where animals were traditionally sold.613 Fre-
quent inspections of butcher’s stores and restaurants took place in cities and they 
usually resulted in the closing down of the raided establishments. For example 
in Kutno, store inspections lasted for three days (from February 10 to 12). The 
lists of butchers found guilty got longer again and, in line with the (in Polish, 
rhyming) saying that “hiding veal gets you straight to Mielęcin” (labor camp), 
sentences to labor-camp terms prevailed.614 The authorities wanted to kill two 
birds with one stone: eliminating private buyers could force the peasants to “sell 
legally and locally, and by doing that contribute to fulfilling obligations in ac-
cordance with the plan.”615
This was not easy. Private merchants immediately responded by developing 
further effective strategies.616 Peasants were generally reluctant to establish any 
contact with the authorities, since they knew that even to register the sale of a pig 
or a calf would rebound on them with a tax, collected directly at the purchasing 
station. Ever since 1949, the authorities feared the consequences of tampering 
with meat production and tended to treat leniently peasants,617 who were well 
aware of this. This is clear from the fact that there were cases of a farmer taking 
the blame for a butcher or other merchant, who would in fact pay the fine.618 The 
anonymous letters arriving at the police (MO) and the Security Office (UB) or 
Special Commission (KS) offices, which were probably the trigger for most of the 
“slaughter” cases, reveal the intricate, interconnected network that hindered the 
punishment of violators. The following unsigned missive, from 1954, is equally 
613 During a big inspection conducted before Easter 1949 (April 8 to 12) it turned out 
that on the first day alone and only in Gdańsk DOKP, 926 kg of meat was confiscated 
and approximately 50 people were arrested. The result was that smugglers developed 
new, shrewder strategies. For example, meat was mailed in packages (before Easter 
the number of such packages in Łódź alone rose from one to eight thousand daily) 
or transported via remote routes. “Głos Wybrzeża”, no. 105/April 16–18, 1949; AAN, 
KS, 11, fol. 110.
614 “Express Ilustrowany”, no. 43/February13, 1949; ibid., no. 64/March 6, 1949; “Głos 
Kutnowski”, no. 44/February15, 1949; “Życie Częstochowy”, no. 45/February15, 1949.
615 AAN, KS, 11, fol. 98.
616 The Warsaw Delegation of the Special Commission reported in September 1949: 
“What mostly happens during inspections is that meat is confiscated; the dealers are 
much harder to catch”. Ibid., Odprawa przewodniczących Delegatur KS, September 
29, 1949, fol. 127.
617 Ibid., fol 118.
618 Ibid., fol. 127.
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representative of periods earlier and later than the time it was penned: “in the 
village of Gulczewo, [citizen X] is engaged in selling meat and kielbasa. He kills 
cows and pigs, sells a lot, kills two animals every week and has been selling for 
over seven years. He got rich from selling meat, re-built his house and he gives 
nothing to the State. Yesterday in Kręgi Stare he bought a hog weighing 160 kg 
from this cobbler Skoczeń. He has no fear trading because he gets along well 
with the sołtys [head of the village], he invites him over and gives him scraps of 
meat so the sołtys doesn’t make a fuss. When the police from Somianki arrive 
in the village, they don’t even stop at Skoczeń’s house, and why is that? So I am 
turning to the security authorities, please start the investigation because [citizen 
X] is a wrecker of the State.” (NB, the Polish original was ungrammatical and 
misspelt.)619
In December 1949, the battle against illegal slaughter and meat sales entered a 
new phase, with “Operation U” [in Polish: ubój – slaughter], whereas “Operation 
Z” [in Polish: zboże – grain] was set up to tackle illegal milling. The recommend-
ed penalty for illegal slaughter and meat trading was a minimum of 18 months 
of labor camp.620 Whereas, preceding the Operations, in 1946 and 1947, no-one 
had been sentenced to labor camp for illegal slaughter, and in 1948 – the measure 
had represented just over six percent of sentences, with 314 people punished in 
that way, in 1949 labor camp sentences jumped to 23.2% of sentences, with 2 119 
issued.621 In early 1950, Operation U intensified. After analyzing the defensive 
strategies of butchers, peasants and merchants (for example the right to slaugh-
ter for their own consumption), in late February 1950 the authorities issued a 
special circular which set out explicitly the circumstances in which slaughter 
could take place and meat be distributed and sold. It was now easier to catch 
peasants involved in criminal activity and send them to labor camp. However, by 
the spring, the authorities were already recommending that the repression ease 
and proceedings discontinue.622 By 1950, the government felt sufficiently strong 
in the driving seat that, on July 24, Operation H ended. 
619 AAN, KS, 1503, fol. 46.
620 AAN, KS, 11, fol. 166.
621 Komisja Specjalna do Walki z Nadużyciami i Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym 1945–
1954, ed. D. Jarosz, T. Wolsza, Warszawa 1995, p. 104.
622 AAN, KS, 4, fol. 2–4, 6.
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5.2.2  “State Ribs Will Taste Better…” 1950–1956
The authorities declared victory too early. The meat supply had not improved 
and the meat black marketeers continued their operations. Contrary to expec-
tations, the government’s actions prompted the appearance of new illegal mer-
chants: butchers who, having been ousted from their shops, traveled from village 
to village, offering their services. The scale of illegal slaughter can be estimated 
by noting the discrepancy between the official numbers of purchases of cattle by 
head and the purchase of rawhides. According to the State Commission for Eco-
nomic Planning, between January and July 1951, the state bought 404 857 cows 
and 559 799 cow rawhides, as well as 1 250 247 calves and 1 993 086 calfskins.623 
Clearly, a proportion of the carcasses must have been spirited away. 
During the 1950s, an entire network of middlemen was involved in the illegal meat  
trade. Zbigniew Kiulin, Illnesses caused by meat: TAPEWORM, “Szpilki”, no. 35,  
2 September 1951.
623 M. Jastrząb, Puste półki…, pp. 82–83.
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By 1950, there were recurrent waves of hunger panic. In the following year, 
largely due to post-war burdens, the state supply system collapsed; this much 
was most painfully evident within the sensitive meat industry sector. State pur-
chases kept decreasing; in August 1951, the amount of meat the state bought 
from the farmers did not reach even half of the level achieved in the previous 
year. People openly voiced their dissatisfaction. A strike broke out in Żyrardów. 
The lines in front of the, mostly state-owned, butcher stores would begin to form 
in the evening for the next morning’s opening. In a butcher’s on Puławska Street 
in Warsaw (on August 23), the crowd was heard chanting: “Stalin! Bierut! Meat!” 
– a daring juxtaposition for the era.624 The authorities had no option other than 
to reinstate the ration coupons, now euphemistically called “meat-and-fat vouch-
ers”.625 A street poet expressed his feeling about how effective they were:
What’s there to say,
Why bother to yell. 
They won’t let us die,
So we gotta stay alive.
It’d be all simple and plain –
The Grim Reaper would win the day… 
But the meat stamp gets in the way,
Won’t let Death take you away.
And just when you’re almost done,
It fights Death with some spam.
For the meat stamp
Does little to nourish,
But it just won’t let you perish.626
Naturally, it followed that both the illegal trade and the ostentatious fight against 
it intensified.627 In stores, railway stations and at market places inspections 
624 APW, KWar. PZPR, July 3–43, vol. 1, fol. 187.
625 Centrum władzy. Protokoły posiedzeń kierownictwa PZPR. Wybór z lat 1949–1970, 
ed. A. Dudek, A. Kochański, K. Persak, Warszawa 2000, pp. 96–98; M. Jastrząb, Puste 
półki…, pp. 161–207.
626 ODZP TVP, 1050/1, letter from October 18, 1951.
627 The anonymous letter sent by a farmer from Biłgoraj to a Fala 49 radio program on 
August 31, 1951 shows what the authorities were up against: “Dear Fala 49, how can 
we catch these profiteers? If a worker doesn’t buy under the counter even as little as 
10g of meat or fat, then he won’t get to eat meat or fat at all since it’s unavailable in 
the coop stores. If I could buy at the coop at least one kg of some fat once a week for 
a family of five […], I myself would denounce at least three profiteers. But if I did 
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became more frequent, and women smuggling meat in milk cans were arrested, 
just as they used to be during the German occupation. Once again, merchants 
arrested and punished by the Special Commission became the news of the day.628 
The war on the meat front continued. In a circular distributed in early December 
1951, the Ministry of Public Security (MBP) announced: “The fight against illegal 
slaughter, speculative trading of meat and cattle and all other forms of hostile 
activities is one of the main conditions of successful contracts, crucial for meat 
supply […] The County Office of Public Security (PUBP), the County Police 
Headquarters (PKMO) and in particular the community divisions of the police 
must engage in the fight against the enemy in this field.”629
The main goal of the operation was to secure the implementation of obligato-
ry deliveries of livestock for slaughter, which were re-instated by the Act of Feb-
ruary 15, 1952. President Bolesław Bierut personally censored a flyer prepared 
for that occasion by the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party 
(KC PZPR) and the General Committee of the United People’s Party (ZSL).630 He 
was the author of the invocation “Citizen peasants!” and added several anti-spec-
ulation phrases to the body of the text (such as the need to “subdue the profiteers 
getting fat at the expense of the working people” on account of “speculation”).631 
Introducing the obligatory deliveries was one of the preparatory stages for Op-
eration R, with the “R” standing for the (simultaneous) “regulation of prices and 
wages” – euphemism for steep price hikes – and abolition of food coupons, as 
well as legalizing private, albeit regulated, trade in farm product surpluses that 
was meant to provide competition for the black market. The changes were to 
be implemented on January 3, 1953. The authorities assumed that even though 
the official prices would be higher than those on the black market, the superior 
quality of the product would compensate for the difference. They expected “state 
ribs” to taste better since the peasants who sold meat illegally, usually kept behind 
a portion of pork fat for their own use, whereas the authorities calculated the 
“price of meat with fat included”. The “legal” meat would be available in smaller 
quantities, whereas the farmers sold meat in volume.632 
turn in a profiteer, then all that I and my family would have to eat would be potatoes 
without even any butter….”; ibid., Biuletyn 29, September 6, 1951.
628 APW, KWar. PZPR, July 30; 43, vol. 1, fol. 199, 240. 
629 AIPN, Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego,) 699, 
fol. 165.
630 “Polish United Workers Party and United People’s Party to all peasants, small and 
medium landholders”.
631 AAN, Bolesław Bierut Archive, 254/IV–16.
632 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/V/151, fol. 6.
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Individual peasants could seek a permit for legal commercial slaughter. It was common 
practice to make repeated use of a single issued permit, and the meat found its way  
to the black market, as the cartoon by Jerzy Srokowski illustrates; “Szpilki”, no. 35,  
2 September 1951.
“The process of creating free a market,” the authorities predicted, “should reveal 
the following trends: on the one hand, the disappearance of speculation risk 
should result in decreased demand for meat. On the other – additional demand 
for meat should arise among the categories of population that today do not have 
access to the black market and do not have time to stand in lines.”633 Such a 
mechanism might have worked with a larger margin of political freedom. How-
ever, in 1953 it was not feasible: the budding free market blueprint was marred 
633 Ibid., fol. 3.
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by the numerous restrictions on the peasants, which made it unacceptable. In 
order to sell meat officially, farmers were expected to first provide all their ob-
ligatory deliveries and slaughter the animals in state-owned or coop slaughter-
houses. They could then sell meat in designated places only, exclusively in “retail 
portions” of up to five kilos each. Transporting larger amounts of meat without 
an appropriate certificate was forbidden.634
The poor harvests of 1952 and 1953 aggravated the already difficult situa-
tion, while official policies did nothing to inspire experimental ingenuity among 
peasants. The money paid for compulsory deliveries often covered only half of 
the cost of production (which in 1953 alone caused the farmers a massive loss of 
between three and five billion zloty) and, together with high land tax, effectively 
eroded the farmers’ economy. Peasants did nothing to up production even when 
they were able to, because they worried about the rising costs of services and 
other financial burdens.635 Unsurprisingly, they distributed legally only a portion 
of the surplus, while the remaining part they tried to sell, even if not at higher 
prices, certainly outside of the state-regulated market. It is difficult to estimate 
the size of the unofficial deals between the cities and the rural areas; however, its 
sheer existence had to be painful for the authorities, which is why, on November 
29, 1954, the government issued a circular urging citizens to intensify the fight 
against the illegal trade in animals for slaughter with a view to profiteering and 
to tighten the discipline of compulsory deliveries.636
The circular failed to have the expected effect. By the second half of 1955, the 
first signs of a political thaw encouraged the peasants to sabotage the compul-
sory deliveries. In August 1955, they delivered to state outlets only 63% of the 
stipulated quantities of meat and milk, and in Lublin, Kielce, Białystok, and Ko-
szalin voivodships – no more than 40%. In spite of the official supervision of the 
meat trade implemented as a countermeasure, in September 1955, compulsory 
deliveries fell to 48.4% of the required amount.637 Criminal sanctions also proved 
fairly ineffective in the face of that great enemy of communism – the weather: 
a severe winter impeded deliveries; soon after, the spring flooding had the same 
effect.638 Reports arriving in Warsaw from all over the country were similar to the 
634 Ibid., fol. 16.
635 L. Próchniak, Kolektywizacja rolnictwa w regionie łódzkim, Łódź 2003, p. 141.
636 A. Kochański, Polska 1944–1991. Informator historyczny, vol. 1: Podział administracy-
jny, ważniejsze akty prawne, decyzje i enuncjacje państwowe (1944–1956), Warszawa 
1996, p. 550.
637 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XII–240, fol. 27, 41.
638 AAN, MHW, 78, fol. 38.
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one sent from Łódź in mid-March 1956: “The butcher and dairy stores are un-
der great pressure. Meat, cured meats and fats all sell out in an hour or two, and 
the lines are interminable. There is a mood of dissatisfaction and anxiety among 
the customers. The workers express their discontent during official meetings, in 
letters sent to various institutions, and so on.”639 Soon, the workers’ discontent 
would spill out onto the streets. 
5.2.3  “In Gomułka’s Times, There Are Only Crumbs…”: 1956–1970
Immediately following Polish Thaw in October 1956 butchers, who after 1948 
had been forced to close their stores and shops, took advantage of the new green 
light for the private sector. The number of butcher stores grew again from 479 
in 1955 to 863 in 1956, and 2 525 in 1957.640 This partially relieved the pressure 
on the authorities, especially those at the provincial level, of supply problems 
and this in turn improved somewhat the public mood. Indeed, the improvement 
merited bending the law a little. By early 1957, the Minister of Justice informed 
Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz that in regional Poland, official consent for 
the further development of crafts had been misunderstood – “in the sense that 
the leading role of the State is unnecessary, including in the meat trade, and that 
the monopoly of state institutions in this sector of the economy should be lim-
ited in favor of private butcher shops.”641 The National Council presidia widely 
authorized private butchers to purchase meat and livestock directly from farm-
ers. As for the farmers, they compared the profit from state deliveries and private 
sales with that to be derived from selling meat to the group of illegal middlemen 
that had quickly re-emerged – and increasingly chose the latter option, especially 
since the risk was minimal. By the turn of 1956 and 1957, the situation on the 
market resembled that of the fall of 1948. There were instances when the law 
enforcement agencies sided with meat profiteers; for example in Limanów, at the 
instigation of black marketeers, the county police assaulted the official purchase 
agents.642 In the Kraków voivodship in early January 1957, “according to esti-
mates, black marketeers bought amounts of livestock that would be enough for a 
week’s provisions for all of Kraków and Nowa Huta.”643 The situation was similar 
everywhere in Poland. 
639 Ibid., fol. 45.
640 AAN, MS, 3084, fol. 26.
641 AAN, MS, 3091, fol. 6.
642 Ibid., fol. 7.
643 Ibid.
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The regulations issued in early 1957 that limited the economic freedom of 
private butchers were not effective, nor were attempts to bring their operations 
to the attention of the police (MO) and National Trade Inspectorate (PIH). The 
old distribution networks were quick to re-emerge, and new ones would soon 
appear, and adapt themselves to the new circumstances. The authorities were not 
eager to impose drastic measures, as they were fully aware that in times of chaos, 
a full plate food is a good guarantee of peace. Some of the regional decisions have 
been mentioned earlier. The central government conducted a policy of appeas-
ing the citizens by raising wages and maintaining lower prices, including those 
of meat. Economists, Czesław Bobrowski to name one, fully aware of the dire 
economic consequences of such a policy, tried to convince the decision makers 
that it was imperative to raise prices. To no avail. “The longer the lines for meat,” 
argued Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz, “the easier it will be for citizens to 
accept new prices.”644 The authorities were hoist by their own petard: society got 
used to low prices, and to increased consumption. In 1955, the annual average 
public-sector wages could buy 41 kg of beef, 32 kg of pork, 41 kg of plain sausage, 
19 kg of ham, and 31 kg of pork fat. Three years later the figures were, respective-
ly, 56, 44, 56, 26, and 54 kg.645
In 1958, probably for the first time since the Second World War, a supply of 
meat sufficient to meet demand was recorded. It was also the last time. In 1958, 
the authorities changed their economic policy and initiated the next phase of 
intensive industrialization – at the expense of agriculture. Rumors – not entirely 
baseless – of collectivization, returned and immediately put a stop to farmers’ in-
vestment in production. It did not help that coincidentally in 1958, a poor potato 
harvest had an adverse effect on cattle and pig farming. The awakened appetites 
were not satisfied in 1959: the deepening problems with meat brought a wave of 
discontent in the summer of that year. Elements of nostalgia for what, with the 
hindsight, now seemed like the “good ol’ times” under Bierut and the “right and 
just” rationing system began to appear in the letters arriving at Polish Radio. The 
title of this subsection comes from that correspondence.646
On October 20, 1959, Mieczysław Rakowski noted in his diary: “The Party 
has been gripped by meat fever. The shortage of meat has revealed all the oth-
er weaknesses in the system. Let’s put it in plain words: we have an economic 
crisis.”647 At this troubled time, the government reverted to the tried and tested 
644 C. Bobrowski, Wspomnienia ze stulecia, Lublin 1985, p. 256.
645 AAN, KC PZPR, 1692, fol. 11.
646 ODZP TVP, 1050/29, Biuletyn listów no. 47/September 12, 1959.
647 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1958–1962, Warszawa 1998, p. 145.
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remedies of the past: hikes in the price of meat (on average by some 20%; yet for 
the cheapest kinds of cured meat purchased mostly by workers, the rise was in 
excess of 35%)648 and renewed, intense onslaught on the black marketeers, again 
blamed as partially responsible for the higher prices. Just as a decade earlier, this 
strategy was supposed to convince farmers to sell the livestock to the state just as 
it had been – and with no better results.
The first item on the agenda of the Politburo session on October 3, 1959 was 
the meat price hikes, the second – the fight against meat speculation. The Po-
litburo accepted the Prime Minister’s ordinance of October 1, 1959, which es-
tablished special Inspectorates for Fighting the Abuses in the Meat Economy at 
Police Headquarters (KG MO) and Voivodship Police Headquarters (KW MO), 
not only in Warsaw and Łódź but also down to county level. The new institution 
destined to deal with crime in all sectors of meat industry (state purchase, pro-
cessing, and trade) was to be under the special care of Voivodship Committees of 
the Polish United Workers’ Party, which were also responsible for hiring appro-
priate civil personnel (National Trade Inspectorate, PIH, Supreme Audit Office, 
and NIK).649 A hastily organized press campaign resembled that from the turn of 
1948 and 1949, and was aimed at convincing society that it was the peasants and 
black marketeers who were to blame for the shortages.650
The propaganda campaign created the backdrop for the Third Session of the 
Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, dedicated mostly to 
meat problems. Party First Secretary Władysław Gomułka, who chaired the ses-
sion, came up with a blindingly obvious assessment of the situation: “The crux 
of the problem is that the demand for meat is greater than the supply.”651 More 
importantly, these were the causes of the shortages that he listed: increased pur-
chasing power, population growth, an incorrect relationship between the price of 
meat and that of other products, declining animal husbandry, and the increased 
648 AAN, KC PZPR, 1693, Politburo session, September 15, 1959, fol. 504.
649 AAN, KC PZPR, V/63, Poliburo session, October 3, 1959, fol. 102. The ordinance of 
the Minister of Internal Affairs from October 8, 1959 established the mandate of the 
inspectorates in Police and Voivod Police Headquarters. On December 5, 1959 the 
Prime Minister appointed inspectors in city and county police headquarters; A. Ko-
chański, Polska 1944–1991. Informator historyczny, vol. 2: Ważniejsze akty prawne, 
decyzje i enuncjacje państwowe (1957–1970), Warszawa 2000, pp. 180, 188.
650 For example: “Kurier Polski”, no. 241/October 12, 1959.
651 W. Gomułka, Aktualne trudności na rynku mięsnym i środki niezbędne dla ich prze-
zwyciężenia. Presentation at the Third Session of the PUWP CC on October 17, 1959, 
Warszawa 1959, p. 10.
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number of animals slaughtered by farmers. The Session called for the raising of 
meat prices and an increase in the production of meat substitutes, the introduc-
tion of a more restrictive policy towards farmers and, finally, for the waging of a 
“decisive war against economic crimes”.652
The police had their work cut out for the next few months. In October 1959, 
Police Headquarters (KG MO) specified what should be on its radar: purchases 
of livestock for reasons other than farming by people who did not own farms, 
slaughter or sales of livestock sooner than three months from the date of pur-
chase (undue haste taken to be indicative of speculation), meat deliveries to 
the market by farmers not complying with their delivery obligation, sales of 
“home-made” cured meats and meat from slaughter without official permission, 
meat inspections in places other than designated and in pieces weighing more 
than five kilograms.653 The police were expected to show interest in market plac-
es, flea markets and crowd gatherings, and instructed to inspect access roads, 
main roads, and bus and railroad stations. Both uniformed and undercover 
agents were required to identify individuals involved in illegal trade, conduct 
conversations with well-known black marketeers and organize around them a 
network of secret “informers in order to provide a constant flow of information 
on the illegal meat trade.”654 In the cities, the police were instructed to keep an 
eye on those who bought meat in stores with the intention of re-selling it, and 
on those who offered for sale meat brought from the countryside. In order to 
identify the latter, local police had to watch anyone who regularly delivered “milk 
and dairy products each morning in order to establish if they were at the same 
time distributing meat from illegal slaughter.”655 Police had also to check wheth-
er illegal “booze dives” – known as melinas – were engaged in meat trade as a 
side line. Special attention had to be paid to slaughterhouse and meat processing 
plants employees who stole meat from their place of work; such cases were to be 
handled by specialist investigative police units.
In late November 1959, the Ministry of Internal Trade joined the crackdown 
against the black marketeers by confirming an absolute ban on selling meat and 
cured meats from private slaughter and by hindering strategies used by farmers 
such as repeated use of permits for individual slaughter and sale. The local coun-
cils, responsible for granting and issuing permits, could now reject the application 
652 Ibid., pp. 69–83.




if the permit seeker had been previously convicted for meat speculation.656 There 
were many such applicants – by the end of February 1960, the police (MO) had 
embarked on 13 153 meat-related investigations, most of them in the Bydgoszcz, 
Katowice, Kielce, Kraków, Poznań, and Warsaw Voivodships.
By late 1960, the inspectorates had launched 24 705 investigations and pressed 
charges in 21 052 cases. The pace slowed down significantly in the following 
year. The inspectorates engaged National Trade Inspectorate (PIH) and Supreme 
Audit Office (NIK) employees only temporarily, and they soon had to return 
to their previous duties. In 1961, the inspectorates at county and city level were 
dissolved and in police headquarters, including the voivodship level, a mere 202 
functionaries were allocated to these specific tasks. Most of them perceived this 
as a professional degradation and used any pretext to switch jobs. Those who 
remained tended to be less skilled and many became corrupt in the course of 
their duty. In 1961, the number of investigations fell to 7 113 (down by 71.2%) 
and only in 2 829 cases (down by 86.6%) were charges pressed.657
Table 3.  Fraud in the meat economy: September 1959 – February 1960 
Perpetrator Category Total Arrests
Meat traders 4 694 626
Animal traders 3 202 595
Meat plant employees 2 553 524
State purchase station 
employees
1 233 341
Retail store employees 1 063 131
Other 2 571 207
Source:  Information on economic crime in 1959, Warszawa 1960 (Supreme Audit Office, 
NIK, Economic Fraud Department (Wydział ds. Nadużyć Gospodarczych); copy in 
the author’s possession). 
Subsequently, the numbers probably decreased further; it is not possible to find 
any trace of the inspectorates’ activity in the following years, even though they 
existed on paper until 1970.
None of this meant that the market was stable. On the contrary – 1962 brought 
another deep slump in meat supply and a wave of new ideas about limiting its 
 
656 Ibid.
657 AZZ, CRZZ Wydział Socjalny, 204/29, 204/36, unpag.
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consumption, including restricting the number of meat dishes in restaurants 
and increasing the number serving only vegetarian fare.658 The severe winter of 
1962/1963, followed by a summer drought, exacerbated the problems and led 
the authorities to implement radical saving programs.659 “Standing in line is a 
part of everyday life,” Mieczysław Rakowski noted in his diary on December 2, 
1963. “Hundreds and millions of people chase after meat and deli cuts. We have 
not had such difficulties in a long time.”660 The authorities were taking note of 
meat issues and becoming more sensitive about the topic. There had already been 
plans in 1961 and 1962 to create a National Inspectorate for the Meat Economy 
(Państwowa Inspekcja Gospodarki Mięsnej) with a brief to supervise all aspects 
of the meat trade, from state purchase to retail, thus complementing the police 
inspectorates.661 A Meat Inspectorate was finally created in August 1964, without 
doubt as a side effect of the “meat affair”, a scandal which – in a different econom-
ic and political environment – would have not ended as it did: with the death 
penalty for Stanisław Wawrzecki.662
An analysis of acts of fraud committed in the meat industry and presenta-
tion of methods used to combat them is not one of my main goals. However, 
scams in the industry significantly influenced how the authorities viewed the 
meat problem, part of which was the traditional meat black market. The grand 
operation against the profiteers did nothing to fill the butcher stores with stock. 
“Many people conclude,” the authorities reported from Warsaw in July 1964, “that 
even though the swindlers have been arrested, there is no improvement in the 
658 AZZ, CRZZ Social Department (Wydział Socjalny), 204/30, Conclusions concerning 
limiting meat consumption in public catering, October 2, 1962.
659 AZZ, CRZZ Social Department, 204/33, Market evaluation 1962–1963, June 25, 1963. 
The resolution of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers (KERM) 
from August 10, 1963 restricted the deliveries of bulk meat fat for voivodships. Con-
sequently, the Ministry of Internal Trade (MHW) asked the chairmen of the presid-
iums of the Voivodship National Councils (WRN) to save the maximum amount of 
meat at the expense of cured and processed meat and make restaurants and other 
public catering outlets “serve fish, herring and vegetarian dishes”. Meat-free Mondays 
should be observed unconditionally; ibid., MHW to the chairmen of WRN presidi-
ums, August 20, 1963. The authorities considered replacing meat with soya in cured 
meats. AAN, KC PZPR, 1730, Note on changes in meat and meat products supply, 
December 16, 1963, fol. 96.
660 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1963–1966, Warszawa 1999, p. 97.
661 AZZ, CRZZ Wydział Socjalny, 204/29.
662 See: D. Jarosz, M. Pasztor, Afera mięsna…
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provision of meat.”663 As a result, the authorities sought unconventional admin-
istrative and technological solutions,664 while at the same time increasing repres-
sive measures, especially against farmers. In the Central Archives of Modern 
Records in Warsaw there can be found Władysław Gomułka’s notes from 1964, 
among them, his “Note on banning the slaughter of calves and on increasing 
the number of cattle in individual farms” that Gomułka wrote after reading a, 
less than uplifting, report on “Production reserves of medium and large peasant 
farms.”665 His emphasis was not so much on the development of animal farming 
but rather on the prosecution of illegal slaughter. Gomułka advocated steep fines 
(of between one and two thousand zloty) and suggested that “to be more effec-
tive, we can reward those who report illegal slaughter with 100 zloty per calf, with 
the reward payable once the fine had been levied. Transferring the fines wholly 
or in part to the Community National Council (GRN) should be considered in 
order to encourage the combat of the illegal slaughter of calves.”666 Gomułka rec-
ommended the introduction of a national ban on private trading in veal in order 
to limit the slaughter of calves, thereby providing a boost to livestock husbandry. 
Each case of illegal slaughter would be punished with steep fines and confisca-
tion of meat. “In order to encourage the prosecution of illegal veal trading, the 
police should receive a reward each time that they confiscate veal.”667 Let us bear 
in mind that these words were not written by a local party apparatchik but by the 
First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party!
But even the most innovative ideas could not repair the market. Random in-
spections of stores conducted on the orders of Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiew-
icz in the cities and towns of the Warsaw, Łódź, Kielce, and Poznań voivodships 
in September 1965 yielded depressing results. The stores had insufficient stock; 
meat and processed-food shortages were chronic.668 Withdrawing some meat 
663 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, t. 24, Special Information, July 10, 1964.
664 See: D. Jarosz, M. Pasztor, Z badań nad stosunkiem władz Polski Ludowej do niedob-
orów mięsa, “Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych” 65, 2005, pp. 229–266.
665 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/V/917, fol. 43–47.
666 Ibid., fol. 46.
667 Ibid., fol. 47. Indeed, in 1964 the slaughter of calves was banned, which led to bi-
zarre situations: “Agricultural services, ORMO patrols, the police, and Party activists 
blocked the roads on market days trying to prevent veal ‘leaks’. Often disturbanc-
es would occur, with the protesters using pitch forks and stakes. More cases were 
brought before the courts against those who had assaulted the functionaries than 
those slaughtering calves illegally.” The ban was abolished in 1971; M. Mońko, Zedrzeć 
skórkę incognito, “Polityka”, No. 8/February 22, 1986.
668 AZZ, CRZZ Wydział Ekonomiczny, 204/43.
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from supplies earmarked for export did not radically change the situation. The 
year 1966 was a little better but the next big slump was just around the corner. On 
September 6, 1967, the Minister of Agriculture Mieczysław Jagielski “emphasized 
that, in comparison with the actual capacity, plans concerning the internal needs 
and the export of agricultural produce are pure fiction.” This naturally had im-
pact on the growth of illegal trade, particularly in smaller cities, where the official 
distribution of meat practically ceased to function.669
Rumors resurfaced of the government plans to increase prices. In fact the au-
thorities had been considering this option for some time, as a way of temporarily 
limiting demand for meat but kept postponing the unpopular decision. They de-
cided to try and implement it at the worst possible moment, in the fall of 1967, 
when due to the shortages, the public mood was on the verge of explosion.670 On 
October 24, 1967, the Politburo supported a 16% price hike.671 It came into force 
in late November and caused a wave of discontent and protest, even short-lived 
strikes. In the end, the authorities managed to pacify the public; it is possible that 
the anti-Semitic campaign, unleashed at the turn of 1967 and 1968, was partly in-
tended to divert public reaction to the price rises. There was however, another effect 
of raising prices, which the Party strategists had in fact been aware of. They raised 
retail prices but not the state purchase prices. Once again, the peasants turned out 
to be capitalists: instead of selling to the state, they opted for the black market.672
State purchase prices went up only on January 1, 1970. The peasants respond-
ed with mass deliveries, which in several voivodships closed down the delivery 
stations for several days.673 The price increase could not eliminate the abysmally 
inadequate supply of animal feed, coal and fertilizer, nor counter the effects of the 
long and severe winter of 1969/1970. By April 1970, the Ministry of Agriculture 
began to spin a dark forecast for the second half of the year.674 The predictions 
included problems with provisions, an increase of illegal slaughter and general 
fraud in the meat sector. The grim outlook probably prompted the accelerated 
setting up of the National Inspectorate of Purchasing and Processing Agricul-
tural Products (Państwowa Inspekcja Skupu i Przetwórstwa Artykułów Rolnych, 
PISiPAR) that was to replace two existing Inspectorates, which dealt specifically 
669 AIPN, 0296/66, vol. 2, fol. 1–2.
670 M. Zaremba, Gdzie jest mięso. Donosy o nastrojach Polaków z przełomu 1967 i 1968 
r., “Polityka”, No. 8/February 21, 1998.
671 AAN, KC PZPR, 1738, fol. 190.
672 J. Krok-Paszkowski, Podatek od mięsa, “Kultura”, Paris 1968, No. 1/243–2/224, p. 128.
673 AAN, URM, 5.3/11, fol. 38.
674 AAN, URM, 5.3/12, fol. 5, 12–13.
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with grain and meat. The authorities did not hide their desire to strengthen the 
“meat division”, until then only loosely connected with the prosecuting authori-
ties and city councils, which operated only in seven voivodships. The Inspector-
ate (PISiPAR) was finally created by the Act of June 30, 1970 (Journal of Laws, 
no. 16, Art. 137), its authority enhanced at national level with increased powers 
and appropriate tools.675
The bleak forecast turned out to be correct. In late 1970, store shelves emptied, 
free-market prices went up again,676 and the authorities got ready to impose a 
new price hike. It had not been long since the last one, and the public mood 
was so fragile that even members of the Party establishment worried about the 
fallout. By late November 1970, Artur Starewicz predicted that a price rise would 
“start a deep and fast-spread political crisis”677 – little could he know how fast. In 
no more than a month, a new team came to power.
5.2.4  “When There Are Pigs, There Will Be Smart Ideas…”:678  
1971–1980
A day after the December price rise had been announced, one Krystyna Dębińs-
ka from Żory wrote to a radio station: “The price hike has hit us like a bolt out of 
the blue. We’ve been plunged into a horrible predicament. We used to have meat 
and choice cuts on Sundays and on special occasions. From now on, we will be 
having meat at best three times a year: for Christmas, Easter and maybe on May 
the First [the International Workers’ Day].”679 A year later, she would have been 
able to feel much more optimistic. As mentioned earlier, consumption, including 
meat, rose rapidly in the early years of the decade. Higher state purchasing prices 
altered patterns of consumption: the peasants now slaughtered their animals less 
often for their own consumption, preferring instead to buy meat at the butcher’s 
store. Rudimentary market laws proved to be working and helped arrive at an 
outcome that Gomułka had tried to achieve by repression: in 1971, the number 
675 AAN, URM, 5.3/13, fol. 27; ibid., 5.3/14, fol. 523––525, 528. It turned out that the secu-
rity measures in the meat industry had been tightened only on paper. Between 1965 
and 1968 alone, twelve major affairs were exposed. Meat plants managers-in-chief of 
were involved in nine of these, and their deputies – in all of them. Major frauds were 
also uncovered in plants where criminal gangs had previously been liquidated.”AAN, 
KC PZPR, 237/XII–448, fol. 7.
676 APW, Warsaw Voivodship Committee of PUWP, 60/VIII–31, vol. 1, fol. 48–51.
677 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1969–1971, Warszawa 2001, pp. 263–264.
678 AAN, URM, 5.3/86, fol. 96.
679 ODZP TVP, 1231/2, Biuletyn 1971, 1(560), Commentary on recent events.
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of animal hides purchased by the state – a clear indicator of private slaughter – 
began to decrease. Comrade Wiesław’s dreams were finally materializing – farm-
ers’ main objective was now livestock husbandry.680
However, consumption kept growing quickly – too quickly! – and often on 
credit, to boot. An economic collapse became a matter of time. A supply crisis 
was first experienced in the middle of 1973 and led immediately to a renewed 
proliferation of illegal strategies. “In the cities, door-to-door illegal sales of meat 
and ‘neighborly’ deliveries to work places are commonplace. In the first six 
months of this year, state purchases of cowhide grew by 33%, and pigskin by 
21% while sales of calfskin are still going strong – all this points to the growing 
presence of illegal operations.”681
 A temporary improvement in supply fooled the decision makers. “When I 
was recently talking with Jaroszewicz,” Mieczysław Rakowski noted on June 18, 
1974, “and told him that people were grumbling about meat shortages, I heard 
from him there would be no more meat. He said that people would complain at 
first but then calm down.”682 The supplies kept getting worse yet Poles showed no 
signs of calming down. The first meltdown came in February 1975, when stores 
began to resemble those of the final, ravenous years of the previous decade.683 
It certainly influenced the public mood. According to polls conducted by the 
Center of Public Opinion Research (OBOP) in 1974, 34% of the population rated 
the level of provision in grocery stores as good. A year later, less than half could 
find any poultry, fish or liverwurst to buy in the neighborhood store, and only 4% 
of the respondents were able to buy boneless beef or ham.684 Despite the prevail-
ing “propaganda of success” (according to the plan accepted in October 1974 at 
the 15th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ 
Party, annual meat consumption was expected to grow to 90 kg per capita by 
1990), it was becoming increasingly clear that the demand would not be met, es-
pecially if prices remained as they were. A re-run of the hard-to-forget 1960s was 
just around the corner. The less chance there was to buy meat in official stores, 
the more often people turned to illegal sources.685
680 AAN, URM, 5.3/30, fol. 258–259; Rynek mięsny, “Polityka”, No. 37/ September 9, 1972. 
681 APKr, KW PZPR, 319, fol. 174.
682 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1972–1975…, pp. 258–259.
683 Z. Szeliga, Mięso – kłopoty i perspektywy, “Polityka”, No. 11/March 15, 1975.
684 M. Zaremba, “Bigosowy socjalizm”. Dekada Gierka, in: Polacy wobec PRL. Strategie 
przystosowawcze, ed. G. Miernik, Kielce 2003, p. 198.
685 AAN, KC PZPR, WO, 3067, vol. 56, fol. 44.
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The black market distribution assumed such proportions that on October 8, 
1975 the government embarked on a battle against the unofficial trade in agricul-
tural produce. Meat was the only item specifically identified in the document.686 As 
in the fall of 1959, the state was guaranteed a pre-emptive right to buy livestock. 
The authorities were to identify individuals selling theirs – legally or otherwise 
– on the free market as well as all those who did not fulfill their contract agree-
ments or sabotaged their state deliveries (although deliveries to state outlets had 
not been compulsory since 1972). City and county officials were expected to talk 
to such people “explaining the economic and social damage caused by this kind of 
action, urging them to fulfill their duties to the state, and forbidding further illegal 
activities.” If this approach did not work, the officials could refer the case to the 
“appropriate agencies”, which included PISiPAR, police, and the prosecutor’s office.
The onus was now on the Minister of the Interior Affairs to urge the police to 
put some vigor into the fight against illegal trade and make use of existing legis-
lation (such as the Public Health Regulations, already in force since the 1940s); 
however, no discrete institution was set up for the purpose, as had been the case 
in 1959. The operation did not bring spectacular results, accompanied as it was 
by significant public (and one can guess also institutional) resistance. In any 
event, a mere year later, after the price hikes announced in 1976 were abandoned, 
the local officials at gmina (lowest administrative) level were again required to 
give verbal warnings to farmers who were not fulfilling their contracts with the 
state. Permits for private slaughter were to be refused. This time, however, the 
officials were expected to create special teams that would combat illegal trading 
and control distribution and transportation.687 
By all accounts, the relevant authorities were just as reluctant to implement 
these recommendations as they were to force through the Politburo’s orders 
to limit the amount of meat in the catering industry, with an emphasis on “low 
meat-content dishes” (and preferably no meat content at all), to introduce a second 
meat-free day a week,688 and to make it compulsory for industrial enterprises to set 
up their own livestock fattening houses.689 Neither any of these initiatives nor the 
fast-track research on krill-processing and adaptation of “other sea organisms”690 
for human consumption did anything to improve the outlook for meat stores; on 
686 AAN, KC PZPR, 1786, fol. 576–587.
687 AAN, KC PZPR, 1792, The Minister of Internal Trade and Services to voivods and 
city mayors, July 1976, fol. 446.
688 Ibid. 
689 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/834, k. 162–165.
690 AAN, KC PZPR, 1794, k. 4.
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the contrary, they contributed directly to further expansion of the black market, 
further upping the illegal prices. In July 1977, in the Nowy Sącz voivodship there 
were complaints that free-market prices had gone up by almost a third in compar-
ison with the previous year.691 A year later, a Nowy Targ resident sent a missive to 
the Politburo: “There are illegal dives in our city where you can buy choice cuts of 
meat for 120–140 zł (sausage) and ham at 300 zl per kilogram, but I ask you, who 
can afford that? Only furriers and doctors, and nobody else”.692 All sectors of illegal 
meat production showed signs of recovery. In 1977, the Department of Profession-
al Development at the Ministry of Internal Affairs published (for internal purposes 
only) reference materials on “meat”693 crimes, and the Institute of Crime Problems 
in Warsaw conducted research on fraud in the meat industry.
In the “commercial stores”, which opened in 1976, choice cuts of meat were of-
fered at much higher prices. The stores were intended to facilitate the process of 
realigning market prices. The authorities were also seriously considering allow-
ing farmers to set independent prices of the meat distributed legally (until then, 
they had been able to raise prices by no more than 40%). This move was aimed 
at reducing the profitability of black market transactions, usually conducted in 
poor hygienic conditions but, above all, it was expected “to educate buyers about 
the actual costs of meat production”.694 It took a decade to achieve this goal. In 
the years that followed, the meat market changed in ways that the planners of the 
Gierek era could not have imagined. 
5.2.5  “They Slaughter a Pig, Because They Have to Eat …”:  
1980–1989 
The year 1979 was not good for Polish agriculture but the following year proved 
to be catastrophic, the worst since the Second World War. Agricultural produc-
tion fell by 10.7%. The grain harvest stayed at the same level as in the previous, 
weak year but the sugar beet harvest was smaller by a third and that of potatoes 
shrank to half its former size; this had an immediate impact on animal husband-
ry. In the second half of 1980, the authorities imported a significant amount of 
animal feed but this move was not enough to prevent the catastrophe. Shortage 
of animal feed had a short-lived, positive impact on butcher stores meat supplies 
691 AAN, KC PZPR, WO, 3202.
692 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/1064, k. 156.
693 W. Dąbrowski, T. Jakubczyk, Nielegalny obrót zwierzętami rzeźnymi i artykułami rol-
no-spożywczymi. Wybrane zagadnienia, Warszawa 1977.
694 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/476, fol. 21–22.
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when, in the fall of 1980, peasants started selling off their livestock. State pur-
chasing stations and cold storage groaned with meat and the processing plants 
could not keep up.695 It was a harbinger of problems in the very near future.
The crash came in the first months of 1981. In that year, the state bought 
42.6% fewer pigs, 42.4% less cattle, and 27.1% less grain than in the previous 
year.696 “I only want to say this,” Radom deputy voivode, Wawrzyniec Pietruszka, 
announced during the First National Anti-Speculation Meeting on September 
15, 1981, “the state purchase of meat in Radom voivodship has fallen to a level 
unprecedented in the history of the voivodship. We are now buying twenty or 
forty pieces daily whereas we used to buy 2 000 or 2 500; on average, 1 500 items a 
day.”697 The crash was felt acutely in the eastern part of Poland, where most indi-
vidual farms were small. Their owners significantly limited animal farming and, 
on account of the shortages, put aside for their own use a larger part of their pro-
duction than before. Another factor was that in eastern Poland, the black market 
tradition of illegal meat trade was the strongest.698
In the summer of 1981, the situation became even more disastrous. On August 
13, General Wojciech Jaruzelski asked the Prime Minister of the Soviet government, 
Nikolai Tichonov, for 30 000 tons of meat in exchange for potatoes; the Minister 
of Internal Trade withdrew the regulations introduced much earlier by President 
Bierut, which allowed legal trade in meat from private slaughter.699 The authorities 
were fully aware of their utter inability to control the market in the situation when 
to even be able to buy food on ration coupons bordered on the miraculous and 
the countryside had been denied the coupons altogether. “We can do nothing to 
eliminate the unofficial meat trade,” the Deputy Prime Minister, Stanisław Mach, 
admitted in September 1981. “When a nephew visits his uncle, they kill a pig and 
he takes it to town. I don’t see any sense in taking action against such situations. 
We are not able to do this and such cases are not worth prosecuting, we won’t get 
anywhere. It’s just not worth it. If he brings the meat to the city, than at least he 
won’t be buying it there. It works out the same. We should approach the issue in a 
695 AAN, KC PZPR, WO, 3448, fol. 4 (Legnica), 16 (Radom), 23 (Bielsko-Biała), 27 (Ko-
szalin), 34 (Częstochowa).
696 B. Gulbicka, Dochody, spożycie i akumulacja…, p. 208.
697 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 47.
698 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/756, fol. 23; see: E. Fiala, Gdzie jest mięso?, TL, No. 223/September 
23, 1981.
699 A. Kochański, Polska 1944–1991. Informator historyczny, vol. 3: Ważniejsze akty 
prawne, decyzje i enuncjacje państwowe (1971–1991), part 1: 1971–1982, Warszawa 
2005, p. 506.
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flexible way. The same way we approach the question of slaughter of livestock by 
neighboring farmers. Two neighbors share a slaughtered pig. They slaughter a pig 
because they have to eat.”700
Soon, however, the official voices ceased to be as liberal as that. It became 
clear that the officially acknowledged “breaking of the economic bond between 
the city and the countryside” applied primarily to state channels. The farmers 
effectively took advantage of the situation and were selling their products illegal-
ly. The opening of the price scissors benefited the countryside (in 1981, average 
earnings from selling agricultural products rose by 67%, while prices of industri-
al articles only by 27%). It was advantageous for farmers to sell meat and potatoes 
outside of the official channels and to purchase farming equipment in the same 
way.701 Selling was easy – city residents were coming directly to the farms, as had 
happened during the German occupation, and paid the inflated price without 
batting an eyelid. 
Illegal mobile meat shop. Warsaw, 2 September 1981. Photo: Polish Press Agency (PAP).
700 AAN, URM, 32/112, fol. 118–119.
701 D.T. Grala, Reformy gospodarcze w PRL (1982–1989). Próba uratowania socjalizmu, 
Warszawa 2005, p. 76. See: AAN, The Institute of Internal Market and Services, 317, 
Market Development under Insufficient Supply and Rationing 1980–1984, Warszawa, 
December 1983, fol. 34. 
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For the city and the countryside, direct mutual cooperation was vital, bypassing 
state institutions. City dwellers did not feel like decreasing their consumption as 
radically as the imposed rations implied,702 preferring to dip into their savings 
instead, if need be. As a result, between 1980 and 1981, the standard of living 
did not decline in line with the whole economy. While in 1980 the national in-
come fell by 6%, consumption actually rose by 1%, and in 1981, with a fall in the 
national income in excess of 10%, consumption declined only by 5%.703 For the 
increasingly demanding peasants, the offer put on the table by the state was less 
than satisfactory. For example in 1982, although the prices that the state paid 
farmers for agricultural products did rise, the increase was only half that of the 
rise in the prices of consumer goods and farming equipment (56.9% and 112.4% 
respectively) that the peasants were obliged to keep buying. In the following 
years, the ratio worsened further.704 Participation in black market operations be-
came all the more profitable.
In 1981, the meat black market entered its golden era. Never before had it 
boasted such mass participation, using such an abundance of strategies, with 
such a universal acquiescence in its complex modus operandi, applied both by 
individuals and by institutional players (and the latter did not always side with 
the authorities). The government was unable even to estimate the size of the un-
official meat trade and admitted helplessly: “It is not possible to establish the 
actual amount of meat […] brought to the market from illegal slaughter or as 
a result of various economic schemes outside of the rationing and distribution 
system.”705 It was estimated that between 30 and 70% of all bulk meat was sold 
in ways that were more or less illegal. Even when an animal was delivered to a 
state purchasing station, this was no guarantee that all the meat would end up 
in a butcher’s store. “Complicated economic operations in the meat industry,” 
according to the Meat Industry Center (Centrala Przemysłu Mięsnego), “begin 
with state contracts and purchase, through meat processing and up to the final 
sale of a ready product, and at each stage, there are opportunities for abuse.”706
702 In urban agglomerations, rationing drastically decreased the size of annual deliveries 
per person: in Warsaw from 109.9 kg (1980) to 54.5 kg (1986), in Katowice from 98.9 
to 55.5, in Łódź from 88.7 to 54.1, and in Gdańsk from 65.6 to 49 kg.
703 L. Beskid, Ekonomiczny i społeczny wymiar przemian warunków życia w latach 1980–
1985, in: Warunki i sposób życia…, p. 20.
704 B. Gulbicka, Konsumpcja w  indywidualnych gospodarstwach chłopskich w  latach 
1980–1984: report, Warszawa 1986, p. 3.
705 AAN, URM, 32/64, fol. 11–12, 17; ibid., 32/75, fol. 24. 
706 See: A. Wolin, Nie tylko pięć miliardów, “Rzeczpospolita” January 29, 1982.
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5.2.5.1  Meat Industry or (Creative) Relapse into Crime
Once in a state purchasing station, pigs and cows often mysteriously vanished, in 
reality immediately bought “under the table” by unofficial agents, owners of pri-
vate butcher’s shops or franchised restaurants and guesthouses.707 Traditionally, 
the meat industry remained the source of supply for the unofficial market. The 
meat industry continued to be an arena of repeat crime – “often before one inves-
tigation ends, the next one has to be opened in the same plant.”708 The panoply of 
old illegal strategies ranging from sophisticated scams generating surplus to pet-
ty thefts was now extended by some new strategies, often based on the “creative” 
interpretation of existing regulations.
Meat and meat products “leaked” from all kinds of plants, big processing plants 
operating under the Meat Industry Center (Centrala Przemyslu Mięsnego) and 
small enterprises, which belonged to the Warsaw Consumer Cooperative (WSS 
Społem), Farmers Self-Help Cooperative (Samopomoc Chłopska), Communi-
ty Cooperatives (Gminna Spółdzielnia), State Agriculture Farms (PGR) and the 
Agricultural Cooperative (RSP). It was an open secret that the scale of the abuses 
was greater in the peripheries than in central Poland, where it had the backup 
of community networks and the very setting of the plants – these were usually 
located in former craft shops in residential areas, often adjacent to apartment 
houses – shielded the local meat industry from official intervention.709
In early 1982, according to the Meat Industry Center there were two kinds of 
“meat” crimes: “group crime operations involving employees of various depart-
ments (purchase, production, distribution, and security) in a meat plant work-
ing together with the goal of creating unrecorded surplus to sell with the help 
of people operating outside of the industry,” and individual theft committed 
by meat plant employees who helped themselves to “various amounts of meat 
and meat products.”710 The first method was wholesale – it supplied the black 
market with often industrial quantities of fresh and cured meat. For example, 
in late 1981 and early 1982, meat plant workers in Szczecin in cooperation with 
707 AAN, URM, 32/23, fol. 70; Przestępstwo zaczyna się w punkcie skupu. Z kapitanem 
mgr. inż. Krystynem Pochlidem z Biura do Walki z Przestępstwami Gospodarczymi 
Komendy Głównej MO rozmawia Sławomir Orłowski, “Express Wieczorny” Septem-
ber 21–23, 1984.
708 Zamknięte koło malwersacji mięsnych, TL, November 14, 1980.
709 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1459, fol. 328; W masarniach… chudną, TL, August 5, 1982.
710 AAN, URM, 32/10, fol. 4.
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PKS bus drivers carted away 3.5 tons of meat and 6.4 tons of offal.711 In 1986, in 
processing plants in Chrzanów and Bytom, 1.6 tons of meat and meat products 
was discovered ready to be “disappeared”.712 There were also “targeted” thefts 
usually of “de-completed half-carcasses” which involved trimming off the most 
valuable cuts of meat. One such scam was uncovered in the Katowice Meat 
Plant, where the inspectors reported that “in the post-slaughter warehouse a 
notebook was found, in which warehouse employees entered an accurate re-
cord of the number and category of cuts diverted for their own purposes. It 
transpired from the notes that between April and June 1981, they had cut 12 
360 carcasses, which constituted approximately 11.9% of the total number of 
half-carcasses acquired from slaughter. The daily number of cuts varied be-
tween 17 and 242, while daily slaughter varied between 500 and 550 animals.”713
The employees of meat plants could easily treat meat obtained in this manner 
as “added value” that could be sold through unofficial channels or exchanged for 
other goods or services. They did not have to worry about their own everyday 
supply; they received special allowances, which had increased since 1981 thanks 
to the recent collective agreements. According to the agreements, all meat indus-
try employees, from couriers to directors, were entitled to receive or buy approx-
imately 15 kg of meat per month each. However, the inspection conducted at 
the turn of 1981 and 1982 by the Ministry of Finance, the Central Commission 
for Combating Fraud (CKWS) and the National Inspectorate of Purchasing and 
Processing of Agricultural Products (PISiPAR) revealed that only one (in the 
Poznań voivodship) in twenty six plants complied with the regulations. In all the 
others, the employees received as much as up to 42 kg of meat and meat products, 
usually the best cuts, monthly. This was quite legal and based on management de-
cisions, taken under pressure from the unions, including Solidarity. There were 
146 000 authorized employees and retirees in the meat industry but numerous 
outsiders took advantage of buying meat in factory stores, among them employ-
ees of institutions working closely with the meat industry or persons of “vague 
status, who bought meat following a verbal or written recommendation of the 
director”.714 For example, in the Żerań factory there were at least 250 such people, 
and in Wrocław the PISiPAR employees also had similar privileges.
711 Mięso w nielegalnym obrocie, TL, April 17–18, 1982.
712 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1459, fol. 328.
713 AAN, URM, 32/6, PISiPAR, fol. 40.
714 Hojne deputaty w zakładach mięsnych, ŻW, 12 III 1982; Nadużycia w przemyśle mięs-
nym, “Rzeczpospolita” March 12, 1982; AAN, URM, 32/113, fol. 76.
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According to the Prosecutor General’s Office, in 1981, in factory stores in 
Kalisz, Poznań, Płock, Tarnobrzeg, Wrocław, Jelenia Góra and Warsaw voivod-
ships alone at least 330 tons of meat and its products and over 20 tons of fats 
had been sold in quantities above the guaranteed allowance. It is difficult to say 
how widespread this phenomenon was and what the decision process was for 
granting special allowances for weddings, baptisms, and other family celebra-
tions. Often, the allowance was just a pretext for a legal meat transfer out of the 
factory.715 Attempts undertaken in mid-1982 to decrease the meat allowances of 
the industry’s employees’ met with understandable and effective resistance.
By virtue of dealing with scarce and valuable goods, meat plants found them-
selves in a highly privileged position in comparison with other branches of indus-
try and services. Their management teams often took advantage of the situation 
and, contrary to the law and with workers’ approval, engaged in barter transac-
tions with other enterprises.716 This was possible as part of good relationships 
with other industrial entities, and with the help of an imaginative interpretation 
of the State Enterprise Act of September 25, 1981 as well as of the government 
decision to allow enterprises to purchase and sell market goods “on the basis of 
freely arranged sales agreements.” The fact that the Act did not include the ra-
tioned articles in the transactions was rarely acknowledged and prosecutors gen-
erally did not support police intervention in such cases.717 The prosecutors were 
also usually indulgent in instances where the law had self-evidently been broken, 
such as in the case of the Powiśle Social Services Agricultural Conglomerate in 
Czernin, where between January 1 and March 31, 1984 the management bought 
and slaughtered 3 138 animals weighing 322 488 kg and sold the meat outside the 
rationing system to its own employees (83 tons) but also to the Gdańsk Shipyard, 
the Malinowo Gardening Company near Tczew or the Żywiec Brewery.718
 State and cooperative agriculture producers were often more concerned 
with satisfying the needs of employees and local residents than complying with 
the demands of the government. To achieve this goal, they took advantage of 
the regulations that referred, on public health grounds, to selective slaughter of 
weak or injured animals. Meat obtained in this way did not have to be deliv-
ered to state purchasing stations. Sometimes, however, it was healthy animals 
715 AAN, URM, 32/17, fol. 80.
716 For example, in late 1981 Meat Plants in the Służewiec district of Warsaw exchanged 
768 kg of kielbasa for alcohol with the Warsaw Spirits Plant; AAN, URM, 32/17, 
fol. 141.
717 AAN, URM, 32/182, fol. 66.
718 AAN, URM, 32/191, fol. 104–105.
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that were earmarked for employees’ own consumption, and the ones selected on 
health grounds were sold to the state. The case of the Agricultural Cooperative 
in Borowiec in Wielkopolska was fairly typical. In 1981, the Coop “directed to 
the slaughterhouse 1 412 pigs weighing 151.5 tons and 198 cattle weighing 50.7 
tons for its own needs. Healthy animals were selected for slaughter to meet em-
ployees’ own needs and the animals to be slaughtered compulsorily were sent 
to the Meat Plant in Ostrów Wielkopolski. Aside from that, while the rationing 
rules were in effect, 74 pigs and two cows were sold to the Orbis Travel Agency 
in Warsaw, LOT Airlines in Warsaw, the Furniture Factory in Wrocław, the Forest 
Service in Taczanów, and to others. With such a large volume of slaughter for 
its own consumption and sales to other agencies, the Agricultural Cooperative 
Conglomerate (RKS) under inspection fulfilled only 87.8% of the quota under its 
livestock delivery agreement with the Meat Plant in Krotoszyn and only 28% of 
its hog quota.”719 In 1981 alone, the cooperatives sold 1 440 cows and 8 504 pigs 
to various state businesses and institutions, among them the National Bank of 
Poland. Its Central Hard Currency Department in Warsaw purchased four “cows 
with a cumulative live weight of 1 732 kg for 56 zloty per kilo. After slaughtering 
the cows in the Nowy Dwór slaughterhouse, on October 19, 1981 the meat was 
delivered to Warsaw by the coop’s transportation and sold to NPB employees, five 
kilograms per person at 130 zloty per kilo.”720
After the introduction of Martial Law, the scheme was practiced perhaps less 
ostentatiously but probably on a similar scale. In August 1984 it was estimated 
that the State Agriculture Farms (PGR) and Agricultural Cooperative (RSP) re-
served for their own needs between 30 and 40% of all livestock.721 Between 1983 
and 1984 alone, in “nationalized agriculture units” at least 22 679 animals (3 993 
cows and 18 686 pigs, in total 2 730 tons in weight) were slaughtered and “meat 
and its products were sold in significant amounts outside the rationing system to 
state farm employees, local residents, restaurants and resort managers.”722
This widespread privatization of the state took place with the tacit consent 
not only of plant management teams but also of local political elites, for whom it 
was a way of preventing social tensions and reinforcing client networks.723 This 
situation created two categories of people – those with access to this kind of dis-
tribution channels and those without. The first tried to entrench themselves in 
719 AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 79.
720 AAN, URM, 32/113, fol. 58.
721 AAN, URM, 32/62, fol. 8.
722 AAN, URM, 32/75, fol. 108.
723 Ibid.
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their comfortable positions and defended them ferociously. The second engaged 
in futile protests and tried to develop individual strategies for looking for direct 
access to meat in the countryside. As a fallback position, they could also rely on 
the “veal woman”…
5.2.5.2  “The Veal Woman”: A Retrospective Portrait
“They treated me like I was some kind of minister,” the peasant woman from a 
village near Radzymin, who used to deliver meat to Professor Władysław Bar-
toszewski and other members of the Warsaw elite, reminisced fondly in con-
versation with this author in 2004.724 Today, it is the ubiquitous “veal woman” 
– with her characteristic headscarf, and laden with big baskets and bundles – that 
springs to mind as a symbolic image of the days, now happily in the past, when 
Poland experienced food shortages that were alleviated only through a symbiosis 
of the country and the city. The veal woman paid regular, often prescheduled 
visits to city apartments and offices and sold veal, unavailable elsewhere. The 
complexity of the situation deserves a closer look, also from a historical per-
spective. Direct vending as a solution to the meat supply problem was based 
on practices of transfer and distribution going back not only to the times of the 
German occupation but even to the First World War. Additionally, the mass mi-
gration from rural areas to the cities, which began in the late 1940s, resulted in 
a whole network of private dependencies and new distribution channels, quite 
informal and extremely difficult to examine. All big cities in Poland had their 
own “meat and dairy supply hinterland”. Near Warsaw, the most absorbent mar-
ket in the country, initially the most important were Karczew (during the War 
already known as “Prosiakowo”, Piglet Town725), Nowa Iwiczna (aka the “capital 
of illegal slaughter” in the late 1940s),726 and the neighborhoods of Radzymin, 
Wołomin and Wyszków. In early 1949, every second adult resident of Rybienko 
and Jadów and every fourth of the Radzymin county was said to be engaged 
in illegal slaughter.727 The production capacity of local barns and pigsties soon 
became insufficient to satisfy the growing demand but people were constantly 
724 Wacława Grzelak’s testimony, Stary Kraszew, February 22, 2004, in the author’s 
possession.
725 In the fall of 1948 there were still 34 butcher stores, approximately 170 livestock 
merchants and 11 legal enterprises rendering slaughter waste into industrial fat in 
this village with the population of 5 000; “Głos Ludu”, No. 276/October 6, 1948.
726 ŻW, No. 307/November 7, 1948.
727 TL, No. 50/February 20, 1949.
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expanding the supply networks. For example in the early 1950s, illegal butch-
ers from Karczew were bringing pigs from Mińsk, Łuków, and even Kozienice 
counties from where they were shipped down the Vistula.728 In the 1980s, thanks 
to the developing transportation system, everyday provisions for Warsaw came 
from as far away as Siedlce, Ostrołęka and Radom.729 The Warsaw market had 
a great absorptive capacity, as is clear from the fact that in 1985, in the Warsaw 
voivodship 120 times more calf hides were bought by the state than live animals 
(the actual numbers were 36 775 and 300 respectively). Incidentally, the number 
of hides was four times higher than the calf head-count in the voivodship.730
In the big cities, the transfer of meat from rural areas was of great signifi-
cance.731 During the first post-war decade, the narrow-gauge commuter railway 
was used more often than the regular trains. Since the turn of the 19th and the 
20th centuries, the narrow gauge railroad had helped to supply the cities with 
food and, to large extent, determined the type of agriculture along its route. The 
passengers of commuter trains were not chance travelers but often a tightly-knit 
group. Frequent train stops, the slow pace and the mostly cooperative, locally 
based crew provided relative security for the illegal traders. 
The atmosphere in regular trains, where inspections were easier to carry, was 
less trade-friendly. To avoid transporting meat on trains, traders instead posted 
it by mail or enlisted the help of railroad workers, who knew how to avoid the 
inspectors, or of the military who did not allow them to touch their luggage.732 
Often dealers reached for proven methods of hiding contraband, tested during 
the First World War, such as putting it in milk cans or faking pregnancy – using 
the latter method, women from Wyszków carried several kilos of veal at a time.733
The more experienced meat dealers tried to use the bus service (PKS), which 
replaced the narrow-gauge railroad, gradually withdrawn from service from the 
728 AAN, KS, 1500.
729 Zwoleń, Białobrzegi, Skaryszew, Przytyk, and Jedlińsk (among others) constituted a 
meat hinterland for Radom; “Życie Radomskie”, No. 75/March 17, 1949.
730 M. Mońko, Zedrzeć skórkę incognito, “Polityka”, No. 8/February 22, 1986.
731 The examples apply mostly to Warsaw. The strategies used in other big cities did not 
differ significantly. On Poznań see: M. Czech, Przedwojenny smak, in: Prywaciarze 
1945–89, ed. A. Knyt, A. Wancerz-Gluza, Warszawa 2001, pp. 97–98.
732 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VIII–12, vol 1, fol. 14; Szlakiem handlu pokątnego. “Małkinia” 
– 20.50, ŻW, No. 265/September 26, 1948.
733 Dziś rozmawiamy z kpt. A. Skomskim z Komendy Wojewódzkiej MO w Warszawie 
o mięsie w bańkach i sztuczkach z klasą, “Sztandar Młodych”, No. 252/October 22, 
1959; “Dziennik Polski” London, No. 157/July 23, 1960.
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beginning of the 1950s, or random private cars, especially company cars, which 
were rarely inspected by police. The buses were a convenient option, because the 
traders had the opportunity of getting off before the stop where the inspection 
was expected. “The so-called blockades we use in our operations,” the authorities 
reported in September 1984, “prompt the dealers to get off the bus at an earlier 
stop or at a request stop, in order to avoid searches.”734
Public transportation did not guarantee safety but it was cheap. One could 
almost say that the state subsidized the black market by providing cheap trans-
portation. However, only small dealers used public transport; those who dealt in 
quantity had to rely on cars.735 Several dozen kilograms of goods could be taken 
by train or by bus, but by car you could transport several hundred. For example in 
March 1984, police from Wyszków found 217 kg of pork in a Fiat arriving from 
Warsaw. In June, they discovered 179 kg of veal.736 The “motorized” trade allowed 
shorter transit times and improved sanitary conditions. “There are those,” wrote 
Marek Przybylik in 1984, “who come in cars equipped with refrigerators where 
meat is neatly packaged according to the wishes of the clients, exactly to order.”737
Although many urban families retain vivid, and now entertaining, memories 
of the complex and ingenious operations of the 1980 meat smuggling from the 
countryside to their doorstep,738 these operations were in reality quite amateur-
ish and did no more than meet the immediate needs of family members and 
a few friends. Usually, attempts to make serious money from the trade prob-
ably ended in a way similar to the experiences of a Warsaw taxi driver in the 
mid-980s, who in the village Kosów Lacki in Podlasie bought some 150 kg of 
meat products to sell for profit. “I paid 125 500 zloty from my own pocket for 
these fresh, mouth-watering tidbits. Later that evening, we went on our way back 
to Warsaw. We felt apprehensive, since at that time the police were quite aggres-
sive in dealing with such activities and often stopped cars for inspection. We got 
home without any trouble. The goods stayed at my place. Next morning, I went to 
Filona Street to Staszek’s workplace. There I sold some of the cold cuts for about 
30 000 zloty. For another 20 000, I sold meat among my friends but I still had 
over 60 kg left. And it was Sunday. What was I supposed to do?! I visited a few 
734 AAN, URM, 32/64, fol. 46.
735 Wacława Grzelak’s testimony, Stary Kraszew, February 22, 2004, in the author’s pos-
session.
736 AAN, URM, 32/64, fol. 190.
737 M. Przybylik, Słonina i schab spod serca…, “Polityka”, No. 49/December 6, 1984.
738 See: J. Wachowicz-Makowska, Panienka z PRL-u, Warszawa 2007, pp. 197–198. Lit-
erary rendition in: J. Niemczuk, Plaga, Warszawa 1990.
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restaurants. No luck… We stopped at the auto market in Bemowo and chatted 
with some grill owners, then visited the flea market on Księcia Janusza Street. All 
to no avail. They either had enough of their own stuff or they wanted invoices. 
All fired up (me especially), we set off to the village of Marki. The owner of a 
roadside pub, Under the Roses, bought 12 kg of kielbasa from us at 800 zloty per 
kilo; he then called a motel. They wanted 20 kg. When we turned up with 46 kg, 
they were a bit surprised but in the end took it all. I was so relieved. We barely 
broke even. And what a hassle! I decided to stay away from the meat business in 
the future, unless as a middleman or a driver.”739
Bearing in mind the perishable nature of the product in question, the reliability 
of the supplier was of utmost importance in the meat trade. Both state propaganda 
and urban myths referred darkly to cases of selling dog meat as veal; these were not 
always far-fetched. This alone was one good reason why tried and tested distribu-
tion networks were long-lived and the contact details of a reliable and honest “veal 
woman” – valuable information, carefully protected and passed on only to a chosen 
few. The reverse was also true: the supplier wanted a stable network of solvent cus-
tomers to whom they could deliver repeat orders on a fixed day and at fixed place. 
“Special orders” were possible but their price was usually higher. Out of necessity, 
the women traders set out on weekdays,740 when most of their, usually also female, 
customers were at work. Thus the image that lives on in the collective memory is of 
a “veal woman”, who would visit an office, an institute or a hospital, surreptitiously 
weighing out the portions of veal or pork in some den at the back. “I was taking 
meat to the hospital in Spartańska Street [in Warsaw]. Doctors and nurses ran to 
get meat as soon as they saw me. When the director saw that I had veal, he chased 
me away and threatened to call the police if he saw me there again. He threw me 
out but did me no harm. I did not go there regularly but there were other people 
who had a place in a basement where they portioned the veal.”741
739 L. Wand, Z własnego życia, “Gazeta Wyborcza” Supplement October 10, 1997.
740 Most travel dates had to be correlated with the days of farmers’ markets, where the 
animals were usually bought. Convoys from Dobre near Mińsk Mazowiecki took off 
on Tuesdays (after the Monday market) and from Radzymin on Thursdays (after the 
Wednesday market); testimonies in the author’s possession. 
741 Wacława Grzelak’s testimony, Stary Kraszew, February 22, 2004, in the author’s pos-
session. The “veal woman’s” visit to the State Medical Publishing House (PZWL) is 
worth mentioning: “At PZWL a “veal woman” used to show up on specific days. She 
had her own spot: a wide windowsill right next to the main entrance, slightly shield-
ed by a wall, and when she busied herself there, she also put up a curtain. Everyone 
took equal advantage of the services of the “veal woman”– from cleaning ladies and 
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In the mid-1980s, in a Warsaw downtown area, Świętokrzyska Street, where 
private stores and numerous state institutions were located, the police identi-
fied approximately fifty regular traders but were well aware that the real number 
was at least double that.742 These tended to be “retailers”; the wholesalers would 
hang around market places, particularly the one at Polna Street, which “mostly 
served select customers from the embassies and the cultural elite.”743 “We know 
from our investigation”, a policeman reported to the Central Commission for 
Combating Fraud (CKWS), “that, near Polna marketplace, a profiteer sells illegal 
meat from two calves three times a week. We can assume that with good organ-
ization, he can turn over 200 calves a year. The profit from selling the meat of a 
single calf is 6–9 000 zloty, depending on the season. After taking into consid-
eration the additional profit from the anonymous sale of the offal and calfskins 
in the GS-Farmers Self-Help at between 600 and 700 zloty per item, the trader’s 
profit can exceed one million zloty a year. Trading for hard currency has been 
recorded.”744 Undoubtedly, the state stores were also an important distribution 
place for meat brought from the countryside.745
cloakroom attendants to the directors and Party functionaries. I often met our Party 
executive secretary and we exchanged comments about the current delivery (“a won-
derful veal shoulder”, “beautiful bacon”). During the Solidarity period, our PZWL 
“veal woman” wore two buttons pinned to her dress or coat – one with the face of 
Pope John Paul II, the other with the Solidarity logo. After the imposition of Martial 
Law, she took them off but she gladly accepted underground leaflets to emphasize 
that, ideologically, she was one of us”; J. Wachowicz-Makowska, Panienka…, p. 197.
742 AAN, URM, 32/64, fol. 43–44.
743 Ibid., fol. 43.
744 Ibid., fol. 46. By late 1980, at the Polna marketplace there was no shortage of cli-
ents willing to pay between two dollars fifty and three dollars for a kilo of veal; A. 
Kołodziejski, Cielęcina… za dolary. Czy nie można opanować czarnego rynku żywn-
ościowego?, TL, No. 298/December 15, 1980. Market halls and bazaars were tradition-
ally a place where effective black market strategies in trading meat were developed. 
In 1948, before Christmas, a newspaper described the market hall on Koszykowa 
Street in Warsaw in the following way: “A fellow walks around and takes orders from 
numerous lady clients. One can order everything there, even quarters of a calf or a 
pig. Of course, at a much higher price… After taking an order, the dealer sends the 
customer to a vegetable booth, where the transaction is executed. Several minutes 
later the customer, clutching the precious package, sneaks out of the market hall. At 
the “small Karcelak” marketplace at Grójecka Street […], the customer pays cash and 
the meat is delivered a little later, from a private apartment or some kiosk”; “Express 
Wieczorny”, No. 349/December 18, 1948.
745 AAN, URM, 32/64, fol. 46.
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From the late 1940s, if not earlier, janitors had been playing an important role 
in the unofficial distribution of meat. They were usually born in small villages, 
where they still had relatives and friends. Their job was to look after an apart-
ment block, and so they had regular contact with the residents without raising 
suspicions, and they knew their preferences well. “Wyglądała, the janitor, always 
had some meat for sale,” the Polish writer Maria Dąbrowska wrote in her diary on 
March 22, 1949.746 The role of janitors in meat distribution did not disappear when 
they became “building caretakers” in high-rise buildings. For example in February 
1984, a profiteer was arrested “in a trash chamber in a building at 6 Grzybowski 
Square as he was engaged in the processing of 21 kg of meat into kiełbasa, using a 
meat grinder. He was aided and abetted by the caretaker’s husband.”747
Private customers were not the only clients of the itinerant farmers. In 1981 es-
pecially, many workplaces had the tacit agreement of management and the enthu-
siastic approval of the personnel, supported by the unions, which often organized 
“provisions operations”, to taking advantage of provisions arriving from farmers’ 
stables and pigsties. For example, in late November 1981, police in Rychtal near 
Kalisz stopped a “bus, which belonged to Creativity the Invalids’ Coop (Spółdziel-
nia Inwalidów “Twórczość”). It was reported that the bus was carrying the half-car-
casses of twelve pigs with a total weight of 1 847 kg. During the investigation it was 
established that the pigs had been purchased from individual farmers at 200 zloty 
per kilo of live weight. The persons transporting the meat were delegated by the 
workers of the above mentioned Coop.”748 This was not an isolated case.
Often in the transactions between workplaces and farmers no money changed 
hands; they were instead based on barter – factory cars transported to the vil-
lages their products, such as cement or coal and returned with a load of meat 
or potatoes. For example in 1981, a brewery in Brzesko received 1 500 chickens 
in return for regular deliveries of beer to villages. The Fixture Plant in Kraków 
exchanged radiators with farmers for 83 sheep.749
This phenomenon was so widespread and universally accepted that it made the 
large-scale anti-speculation operations (with the code names “Rynek” and “Mięso”) 
and periodical inspections at market places and means of transportation (espe-
cially before the holidays), largely ineffective. For example, in the last quarter of 
1984 including the Christmas period, the inspections conducted in Warsaw, Łódź, 
746 M. Dąbrowska, Dzienniki powojenne, vol. 1: 1945–1949, ed. T. Drewnowski, Warszawa 
1997, p. 413. 
747 AAN, URM, 32/64, fol. 46. 
748 AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 39.
749 Owce za kaloryfery, czyli nielegalny obrót mięsem, TL, no. 292 /December 12/13, 1981.
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Gdańsk, Lublin, and Wrocław and in the mainly rural voivodships of Skierniewice, 
Siedlce, Ostrołęka, Radom, Płock, and Ciechanów revealed illegal slaughter and 
meat trading worth 22 million zloty. Criminal investigations were instigated 
against 73 people.750 The black marketeers immediately found loopholes in the ex-
isting regulations. “It is difficult for our policemen to arrest a suspect at the point 
of being engaged in an act of illegal trading,” Andrzej Szymanowski, in charge of 
economic crime in Warsaw Police Headquarters, commented in September 1984. 
“They are often recognized and closely watched by criminals. And it is not easy to 
obtain proof from the suspect or testimony from a witness, either, since they don’t 
want to lose an additional source of meat supply.”751 Some meat dealers took care to 
legitimize their activities, for example by obtaining permits allowing them to sell 
products from internal export including meat and deli cuts.752
The black marketeers used different defense strategies when they were finally 
arrested. For example, each time that a pensioner from Wołomin was caught sell-
ing meat, which happened repeatedly, she “creates a situation where emergency 
paramedics don’t allow her arrest, which in turn makes it impossible to use accel-
erated summary proceedings.”753 In consequence, the most common punishment 
for the “veal woman” was a fine. She regarded the amount part of her opportunity 
cost and in no time at all made up for it in sales.754
5.2. 5.3  “Legalize the Illegal Just a Little”: 1984–1989 
Paradoxically, the dynamic growth of the meat black market in the first half of 
the 1980s contributed to its legalization. First of all, it proved there was sufficient 
meat in Poland and if society were to accept it being priced higher, no rationing 
would be necessary. After analyzing the black market mechanisms, Polish econ-
omists were again hopeful that the market could be balanced. While in late 1981 
the ratio of black market to retail prices was 4:1, after the steep price hikes in the 
early part of the following year, it went down to only 1.3:1 and this remained the 
average until mid-decade. Of course, a lot depended on the range of products 
750 AAN, URM, 32/75, CKWS session on counteracting irregularities in the meat 
industry, May 2, 1985, fol. 107–109. For example in Płock viovodship in the first 
eight months of 1984 only six proceedings in illegal slaughter cases were initiated; 
ibid., 32/64, fol. 195.
751 AAN, URM, 32/64, fol. 47.
752 Ibid., fol. 44.
753 Ibid., fol. 46.
754 Ibid., fol. 157; Wacława Grzelak’s testimony, Stary Kraszew, February 22, 2004, in the 
author’s possession.
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available and the circumstances prevailing locally; prices tended to be higher in 
big cities and in industrial areas. In rural voivodships such as Zamość, Koszalin, 
Zielona Góra, and Olsztyn, free market prices were very close to official prices 
and sometimes, as in Olsztyn – even lower, and, the “rationing coupon crimes” in 
consequence almost non-existent.755
Significantly, it was representatives of the Voivodship Commission for Com-
bating Speculation, from rural voivodships such as Ostrołęka, Skierniewice, 
Ciechanów, Płock and Radom, that proposed the reinstatement of legal meat 
trading in marketplaces. The chairman of the parliamentary Internal Market 
Commission (Komisja Rynku Wewnętrznego) and soon to be a minister, Jerzy 
Jóźwiak, voiced this idea during a meeting on September 27, 1984, declaring, 
“personally I would prefer to give some thought to this other meat market, which 
has many features of a legal market, as to how we could, ahem… take control of 
it…”756
What was postulated was not revolutionizing the distribution but only partial 
legalization of the status quo and control over at least some of the meat sold via 
unofficial channels. The idea did not fly – mostly due to fears that loosening the 
rigors introduced in August 1981 would not so much constrict the black market 
as rather reduce official deliveries to state purchasing stations and, in effect, re-
duce the supply to state-owned stores. Such fears were real – a significant part of 
the Polish population had gotten used to the security of life with a ration coupon 
in hand and did not want to give it up. Especially when wage increases kept 
ahead of official meat prices: between 1982 and 1986 wages grew on average by 
207.2% while prices rose by 148.2%.757
In the spring of 1985, a well-known journalist, Krystyna Zielińska, who later 
became a deputy chief of the parliamentary Commission for the Internal Market, 
during a radio broadcast proposed an “experiment” to be conducted in one or 
two voivodships to “return to the question of marketplaces and legalize the ille-
gal trade just a little”, since it was so “widespread”.758 The solution that she raised 
was also being discussed in the Ministry of Internal Trade and Services but the 
debate did not set the wheels in motion. The Ministry was worried that, once the 
755 Ceny mięsa na czarnym rynku, “Życie Gospodarcze”, May 9, 1982; AAN, KC PZPR, 
2015, Prerequisites of abandoning rationed sales of meat, June 1987; see: W. Starzyńs-
ka, Rynek żywności w warunkach niedoboru. Studium statystyczno-ekonometryczne, 
Łódź 1990.
756 AAN, URM, 32/64, fol. 66.
757 Ibid., fol. 81–83; AAN, URM, 32/75, fol. 114–115.
758 AAN, URM, 32/75, fol. 15.
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rigid regulations were relaxed, ordinary citizens would not be able to buy their 
rations because restaurant owners and artisans would snap up all meat. In early 
May 1985, referring to meat prices, Deputy Prime Minister, Zenon Komender, 
admitted openly, “If we raised the price, we would be able to abolish rationing. 
We keep the rationing coupons so we can guarantee eight kilos for the miners, 
four for the hard physical workers, and two kilos for the rest of us. The point is 
that if we decide […] in favor of the free market […], the next day there will be 
terrible outcry, above all in Łódź, Katowice, Warsaw, and Gdańsk. So, we have to 
remind all those who propose an easy departure from rationing what would hap-
pen if people did not have that certainty…”759 The authorities decided to revisit 
the issue in the second quarter of 1986.
In the event, this happened much sooner. In the fall of 1985, the Polish par-
liament, the Sejm, took on the question of re-instating marketplace trading and 
the issue hit the headlines.760 Finally, in February 1986, in three voivodships, 
followed by another four in March, (Warsaw, Leszno, Tarnobrzeg, then Łódź, 
Katowice, Bielsko, and Siedlce) the “experimental marketplace sale of meat” was 
introduced, planned to take effect from August 1986. The goal was to take over as 
much black market meat as possible and “to draw preliminary conclusions about 
conditions and about the future prospect of revoking the rationing.”761 Without a 
doubt, getting people used to high prices was also high on the agenda.
Apparently, some meat black marketeers, especially those who had cars and 
could trade wholesale, did switch to the new modus operandi, which they, howev-
er, approached as always with a twist, selling meat also outside of the marketplaces 
and sourcing meat from non-designated voivodships.762 This posed yet another di-
lemma for the authorities. “Until the experiment started in the seven voivodships, 
nothing was in doubt,” members complained during the CKWS meeting in April 
1986. “Now there are doubts. As things stand, we should regard the sale of meat 
from private slaughter also in those seven voivodships but outside of the market-
places as harmful to the public. Those responsible should be prosecuted.”763
759 Ibid., fol. 27.
760 A. Mozołowski, Na kartki i na targu, “Polityka”, No. 48/November 30, 1985. 
761 AAN, URM, 32/183, fol. 25. The “experiment” introduced was based on a regulation 
of the Minister of Internal Trade and Services of January 2, 1986 (“Monitor Polski” 
No. 1, item 3 and No. 8 item 59); see: AAN, MHWiU, 17/2.
762 According to official data, 51.7 tons of meat was sold in the free market system in 
three voivodships in February 1986 and in March (already in seven voivodships) – 
257.6 tons; AAN, URM, 32/183, fol. 25. 
763 AAN, URM, 32/88, fol. 34–35.
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Although the authorities did not entirely give up on the idea of prosecut-
ing the “veal woman”, at the same time the worsening supply and growing infla-
tion forced them not only to extend marketplace meat vending to all the other 
voivodships but also to embark on mapping out methods of abandoning ration-
ing. In late 1986, a new, cross-industry commission presented the first draft of a 
paper on “Conditions for Abandoning Rationing of Meat and Meat Products”. 
The next draft, from June 1987,764 appeared on July 28, at the discussion forum 
of the Politburo. Despite the ordinance of the Tenth Congress of the Polish Unit-
ed Workers’ Party of June 1986 anticipating the end of rationing by 1990, there 
were suggestions to introduce it earlier, in 1988. The year 1989 was expected to 
be challenging in terms of meat supply. There were fears that – since incomes, 
although high, failed to put food on the table – social tensions might rise higher 
and would be difficult to appease with yet another price hike. “Market self-regu-
lation” was deemed more rational.765
Out of the three possible strategies, the government experts rejected the safest 
option: abolishing rationing accompanied by a small price increase of 8–10%. 
They also vetoed the most radical option – the introduction of free market, with 
supply and prices completely unregulated. The authorities chose the path that, 
while unlikely to result in a resounding victory, ought at least to minimize losses: 
to reach market equilibrium by continuing to drip-feed appropriate official price 
rises. The manual market regulation was to be maintained, in the expectation 
that central “direction of bulk meat coming from central state purchasing” would 
preserve the status quo for a while.
With a “positive news offensive”, the government Press Bureau launched a 
propaganda strategy in which marketplaces and bazaars, until recently consid-
ered the lair of speculators, were painted as effective bulwarks of the free market. 
The emphasis was on showing that although the market stalls were groaning 
with meat, the prices were high. To fight the assumption that the free trade relied 
on flogging meat from pickup trucks and station wagons, the new propagan-
da images were to show “nationalized, and occasionally also non-nationalized, 
stores where meat was sold at contract prices (ceny umowne)” and “highlight 
the glaring discrepancy in the hygienic conditions between the state stores and 
marketplaces.”766 
764 AAN, MHWiU, 10/8, fol. 1–42.
765 AAN, KC PZPR, 2015, fol. 97.
766 Ibid.
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The Politburo and the government accepted the plan in September 1987 and, 
for the time being, the matter was put to rest. In the tense political situation of 
1988 and 1989, the authorities were wary of taking any decisive steps on the meat 
minefield. In the spring of 1989, the situation grew paradoxical to the point of 
schizophrenic. On the one hand, there was unrestricted economic freedom, Pol-
ish citizens were allowed to keep their passports at home (rather than, as before, 
having to hand them in immediately on return from abroad, which let the state 
monitor closely their international comings and goings) and were free to use 
hard currency. On the other hand, the bulk meat trade was still being steered 
manually so that, as the explanation went, mass catering such as that in schools 
and hospitals and rationed supply would not suffer. The only concession, in 1988, 
was that artisans were now allowed to purchase livestock at contract prices and 
to sell meat production outside of the rationing.767 
The cross-industry commission persevered, every so often releasing a new 
version of “Conditions for Abandoning Rationing”.768 The material presented in 
January 1989 made no bones about the fact that the days of ration coupons were 
numbered and they would end soon enough, best of all, with effect from March 
1, since there were no guarantees that implementation at a later date would be 
any easier. However, nobody wanted to make any unpopular decisions during 
the momentous Round Table Talks, which took place in Warsaw from Febru-
ary 6, to April 5, 1989, and in which the government initiated discussions with 
the banned trade union Solidarity and other opposition groups in an attempt 
to defuse growing social unrest. And so, all voivods continued to receive their 
non-negotiable quotas of “bulk meat” for distribution.
The ambitious decisions of the Economy and Social Policy Team (Zespół 
Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej) at the Round Table Talks intended to improve 
market supply and the standard of living and bring about the necessary abolition 
of the rationing of goods and deregulating market prices turned out to be more 
difficult to put into practice than changes in the Constitution and calling an elec-
tion. As soon as the agreements had been signed, the Ministry of Internal Market 
started backpedaling, suggesting that it would perhaps be wiser to rephrase the 
statement that the improvements “would take place in 1989” to “would take place 
from 1989”. The voivods continued to be bombarded with official letters urging 
increased “discipline in comprehensive and timely current account-keeping for 
767 AAN, Ministry of the Internal Market (Ministerstwo Rynku Wewnętrznego, MRW), 
6/1, fol. 5. 
768 AAN, MRW, 6/4 and 6/1.
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rationed meat sales”.769 It is ironic that in order to feed the election commissions, 
over 86 tons of meat had to be found outside of the rationing system.770 
Immediately following the elections in 1989, there was still no-one eager to 
take any radical steps. The situation became a virtual stalemate: with inflation 
accelerating rapidly, the hot money put more and more pressure on the increas-
ingly depleted market. Farmers also bided their time, resignedly waiting for the 
promised free market that would bring higher prices for their produce. As they 
did in 1981, they preferred to sabotage the compulsory state deliveries and fa-
vored alternative distribution channels. In July 1989, this led to a situation that 
those living in the cities were unable to buy meat with their coupons and were 
forced to use the free market. 
As if nothing had happened, the coupons for August 1989 were nevertheless 
issued as usual. These were, however, soon destined to remain forever in home 
archives – as the poignant memento of the eight years of rationing that Poland 
had lived through. On July 27, with little prior discussion, the Politburo approved 
the government motion to deregulate meat sales and introduce a free market. 
From August 1, “any restrictions on the purchase and trade of meat, meat prod-
ucts and livestock” were abolished.771 Two days later, the Council of Ministers 
rubber-stamped the decision with Official Act Number 109.772 This was the end 
of rationing. It was also the beginning of the end of the – half-a-century long – 
Polish meat psychosis.
769 AAN, MRW, 6/2, fol. 59v.
770 Ibid., fol. 69.
771 AAN, KC PZPR, 2149, fol. 185.
772 “Monitor Polski” no. 24, item 185.
 229
6.  Alcohol
The excessive alcohol consumption in communist Poland has been a topic 
of extensive research. We therefore need not dwell on the social and cultur-
al context of the phenomenon and focus instead on its most important black 
market aspects such as illegal alcohol production and unofficial distribution of 
state-produced alcohol.773 
In communist Poland’s second economy, alcohol vied for top position with 
meat and the US dollar. Without a doubt, however, it was alcohol that had the 
longest tradition on the black market. Polish peasants became adept at breaking 
the state spirit monopoly as early as the 19th century. High alcohol consumption 
was traditional in their way of life, the ingredients necessary for alcohol produc-
tion, such as grain and potatoes, were within easy reach and their natural habitat 
was less easy to keep under official supervision than the cities. No wonder that 
when the monopolist state encountered financial problems and tried to reach 
deeper into the wallets of Polish alcohol drinkers, they reacted by developing 
effective defense strategies. 
Ubiquitous moonshine distillation began in the Polish territories at the out-
break of the First World War, with the introduction of prohibition in the Rus-
sian Empire. Alcohol production was banned and most of the supply destroyed. 
German and Austrian occupation of the Kingdom of Poland made little differ-
ence, since the new occupiers did not resume local alcohol distillation and rigidly 
controlled both production and consumption. Unsurprisingly, illegal breweries 
began to pop up like mushrooms.774
Experience acquired during the First World War was put to good use after the 
end of hostilities, when alcohol production failed to keep up with demand and 
the majority of the pauperized population could not afford the alcohol produced 
by the state monopoly, and worth 10% of state revenue. This situation led to a 
proliferation of illegal breweries. In 1919, it was estimated that there were 20 000 
773 See the substantial bibliography in the almost 700-page work by K. Kosiński, Historia 
pijaństwa w czasach PRL. Polityka – obyczaje – szara strefa – patologie, Warszawa 
2008. About the alcohol black market: ibid., pp. 525–578; B. Sygit, Nielegalny wyrób 
spirytusu, Warszawa 1987; B. Sygit, Potajemne gorzelnictwo (przed, w okresie regla-
mentacji i obecnie). Studium z dziedziny kryminologii i polityki kryminalnej, Bydgo-
szcz 1996; S. Galarski, Kryminologiczne i prawne aspekty nielegalnego gorzelnictwa, 
Warszawa 1976.
774 B. Sygit, Nielegalny…, pp. 12–14.
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industrial-scale, illegal distilleries (more than the legal ones!) in the territory of 
the former Kingdom of Poland alone.775 The illegal production of alcohol de-
creased in the middle of the 1920s when the economic situation improved, only 
to increase again during the Great Depression. The pauperized rural population 
was the least able to afford the “monopoly” vodka, the price of which was many 
multiples of that of moonshine. Naturally, for the connoisseur, the quality and 
flavor of home-distilled bimber, as moonshine was known during the war and 
continued to be referred to thereafter, were not on a par with the officially pro-
duced liquor but what counted first and foremost for the rural drinker were its 
price and potency. In the first half of the 1930s, the authorities ruthlessly com-
bated illegal distillation, each year closing down between three and five thousand 
such distilleries, mostly in central Poland and in the Eastern borderlands. 
In the latter part of the 1930s, bimber production fell in step with the improv-
ing economy but during the Second World War, especially in the territory of 
the General Government, it acquired the status of a “national industry”. Alcohol 
became both a substitute currency and a basic remedy to help one survive the 
horrors of the occupation.776 As Kazimierz Brandys remarked in 1945, “alcohol 
did not hinder the fight and every German defeat was celebrated with an ocean 
of spirits.”777 The loosening of social and moral norms, the weakening of social 
discipline, and the absence of firm authority and social control that had prevailed 
during the war all contributed to the increased consumption of alcohol. Moon-
shine, until then drunk mostly in the countryside, became common also in the 
cities and was by no means shunned by the middle class. The demand was so 
enormous that huge moonshine centers appeared in the vicinities of big cities, 
such as Legionowo and Jabłonna near Warsaw. The distilleries and distribution 
networks operated very effectively and bimber became one of the less laudable 
icons of the time of the German occupation. At the same time, however, since 
the Germans had monopolized both alcohol production and its profits, making 
moonshine was a sui generis patriotic act. 
775 Ibid., p. 22.
776 S. Buryła, Wojna i alkohol. Zaproszenie do tematu, in: Wojna. Doświadczenie i zapis. 
Nowe źródła, problemy, metody badawcze, ed. S. Buryła, P. Rodak, Kraków 2006, 
pp. 205–230. See: K. Janicki, Pijana wojna. Alkohol podczas II wojny światowej, 
Warszawa 2012.
777 K. Brandys, Wódka, bimber i Frank, “Przekrój” 1945, no. 28, as cited in: J. Jaworska, 
Cywilizacja “Przekroju”. Misja obyczajowa w magazynie ilustrowanym, Warszawa 
2008, pp. 155–156.
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The “heroic” period of moonshine production was over as soon as the German 
occupation ended but what did stay with the Poles was a deep conviction that 
illegal production of alcohol did not constitute a crime. The habit of drinking 
moonshine or indeed moonshine dependency also survived the war. Official pro-
duction could not satisfy the demand exacerbated by the trials and tribulations 
of the war and, just as had been the case after the previous world war, many could 
not afford the expensive officially produced alcohol, revenue from which made a 
significant contribution to the state budget. Last but not least, all those who had 
benefited from moonshine – producers, middlemen, and distributors – had no 
intention of foregoing any opportunity of a healthy profit. The circumstances 
were perfect for business: the state was weak, there was no shortage of drinkers, 
and the production and distribution infrastructure was in place. Little wonder 
that the bimber industry made a smooth transition to peacetime and maintained 
a, sometimes stronger sometimes weaker, presence during the post-war period. 
Indeed bimber is not entirely absent from the Polish economy even today.
The price of monopoly alcohol regulated the level of the illegal distillation. 
The state justified the high price with seemingly contradictory reasons – the 
well-being of the state budget and the battle against the scourge of alcoholism. 
Limiting the accessibility of alcohol (by introducing a minimum age to buy it, 
decreasing the number of sales outlets and shortening their opening hours) were 
the measures deployed to the latter end. However, their effectiveness was ques-
tionable since they immediately triggered the development of illegal channels of 
alcohol distribution, usually through melinas, as the drinking dens were called. 
The phenomenon of these speak-easies was closer to the standard definition of 
the black market than illegal distillation; they were often run to satisfy the illegal 
brewers’ own drinking requirements and with no market transaction involved. 
Thus, for a considerable period, the melinas did no more than recycle – at a high-
er price – alcohol bought in state stores. It was the introduction of rationing in 
1981 that led to the modification of the existing strategies and the development 
of sophisticated new ones – from producing fake coupons, through intercepting 
alcohol from official production or shipment, to re-distributing vodka purchased 
in the “internal export stores” – that is to say, stores where purchases could only 
be made by those with a handful of greenbacks.
For the record, let’s not forget that it was not only in the internal Polish mar-
ket that the social players competed with the state but also in the international 
trade. While the Żytnia and Wyborowa brands of vodka were too expensive for 
the average Polish consumer, they were very attractively priced from the point 
of view of a foreign, and particularly Western, buyer. Polish sailors, tourists, and 
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athletes (not to mention Polish diplomats and other officials) did a good job of 
transferring alcohol abroad on a mass scale, especially to the Scandinavian coun-
tries, where the mark-up was the most gratifying.778
6.1  A National Hobby: Illegal Alcohol Production
6.1.1  The Clandestine Distilleries: Moonshine and the Authorities
Illegal alcohol production is at all times a painful blow to any state budget. And 
so it proved for the post-war, socialist Poland that came into being on July 22, 
1944. As early as December 12, 1944, the first Act on combating this practice 
was issued. Concise, no more than a single sentence, it provided stringent sanc-
tions for illegal alcohol production.779 The new law did not change much, what 
with the inadequate alcohol supply in official stores and the agencies created to 
investigate economic crimes merely going through the motions. The Treasury 
Revenue Protection Department (Ochrona Skarbowa) had no appropriate appa-
ratus at its disposal, and as for the policemen of the recently established “Citizen’s 
Militia” (MO), as the police were called, they themselves were commonly sus-
pected of excessive consumption of moonshine. All the more so since – after the 
war, and particularly in rural areas – the police were recruited mostly from the 
locals, and not eager to make enemies among their neighbors in the closely-knit 
communities.
In early October 1945, the government approached the Polish People’s Par-
ty (PSL), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and Wici the Rural Youth Association 
with the suggestion of cooperation “in the field of combating moonshine”. The 
Propaganda Minister was ordered to “develop a propaganda campaign for fight-
ing bimber” and the Minister of Justice was told to order the courts to deal with 
moonshine cases as a priority.780 The results however, were less than satisfactory 
– in 1945, no more than 7 100 distilleries were shut down, in spite the fact that 
illegal alcohol production was common and conducted openly.781 
778 A. Markiewicz, Przemyt napojów alkoholowych w porcie morskim, WC, 1974, no. 12, 
pp. 24–26; W. Brzeziński, Przemyt na barkach, ibid., 1974, no. 15; Wpadki, ibid., 1990, 
no. 51.
779 “Anyone who distils alcohol beverages from grain, potatoes, sugar beets, sugar, mo-
lasses, and other resources without a permit shall be subject to a penalty of up to 
five years’ imprisonment and a fine of between 10 000 and 500 000 zloty”, Journal of 
Laws, 1944, no. 15 item 85.
780 AAN, URM, 5/613, fol. 2–3.
781 AAN, MS, 558, fol. 147.
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Stanisław Cieloch, Spirits Séance, “Szpilki”, no. 30, 25 September 1945.
In 1946, mostly thanks to input from paid informers, almost 28 000 distilleries 
were uncovered. The number looked impressive but in practical terms the oper-
ations failed to achieve radical eradication of illegal distillation, which continued 
to flourish. The penalties meted out were no more than symbolic (the Special 
Commission sent ninety three bimber distillers to the camps), the demand for 
moonshine was enormous (in 1946, the state monopoly satisfied barely half of 
the demand) and the low price of grain made individual production highly prof-
itable. One indication of the scale of the phenomenon was the fact that in 1946, 
sales of yeast, an ingredient used in distilling, re-attained the pre-war level de-
spite the decreased population and lower consumption of bread.782
On January 26, 1947, Maria Dąbrowska wrote in her diary after watching 
the film Forbidden Songs (Zakazane Piosenki), the popular post-war musical 
that mocked the Germans: “The songs have been changed […]. Instead of ‘Axe, 
hoe, down the bimber’, the actors sing ‘Axe, hoe, ball, glass’ (because bimber is 
782 AAN, URM, 5/229, GIOS report for August 25 – September 24, 1946, fol. 57.
234
now banned)”.783 The year 1947 indeed did not look good for the illegal alcohol 
producers. Not only did the Polish Spirit Monopoly (Polski Monopol Spirytu-
sowy, Polmos) now become more competitive, expanding in 1947 to cover the 
whole country with a network of sales outlets but weather anomalies caused the 
free market price of agricultural products to rise – which included the ingredi-
ents used to make moonshine, and the legal system clamped down on the illegal 
distiller with radically more severe penalties. The Special Commission now took 
an active part in combating the illegal alcohol production and took over the bim-
ber cases from the courts. The Commission was now also better equipped – on 
April 11, the Treasury Criminal Law was passed (Journal of Laws, no. 32, item 
140). This specified in greater detail crimes against the state monopoly. 
Although fewer illicit distilleries (some 20 300) were exposed in 1947 than 
in the previous year, the sanctions were now drastically steeper – 1 016 bimber 
manufacturers ended up in labor camps and they constituted almost a quarter 
(23.4%) of all new prisoners.
Table 5.  Number of detected illegal distilleries and labor camp sentences for illegal alcohol 
production in years 1947–1954.









1 016 509 1 278 1 260 1 401 250
Source:  K. Kosiński, Historia pijaństwa w czasach PRL. Polityka – obyczaje – szara strefa 
– patologie, Warszawa 2008, pp. 527, 532 (The years 1950 and 1953 have been 
omitted due to incomplete data). 
The fight against illegal alcohol production began slowly to lose its momentum 
in 1951 when the police took over the duties of the experienced but now defunct 
Treasury Revenue Protection Department (Ochrona Skarbowa). The year 1953 
783 M. Dąbrowska, Dzienniki powojenne, vol. 1: 1945–1949, ed. T. Drewnowski, Warszawa 
1997, p. 122.
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brought important changes with the Act of June 24 (Journal of Laws, no. 34, item 
143) on the production and processing of spirits – the first attempt in post-war 
Poland to regulate all legal issues surrounding the illegal production of alcohol 
and marked the end of a fiscal penal approach in favor of administrative penal-
ties.784 Even though the number of labor camp sentences for illegal distilling, at 
1 127 in 1953, was still high, the authorities decided the problem was fizzling out 
and the police stopped recording individual cases. 
The decline proved short-lived. In 1955, the two factors that had always encour-
aged illegal alcohol production re-appeared simultaneously: the price of alcohol 
went up and, with slacker sentencing, courage became cheaper. Although illicit dis-
tilling did not reach the level of the late 1940s, the number of alcohol-related crim-
inal offences such as bimber production and large-scale theft from state distilleries 
went up, even in hitherto relatively quiet regions such as the Poznań and Bydgoszcz 
voivodships.. The moonshine trade re-entered the market in the big cities.785 
The problem hit home after the authorities added up the profits of the official 
spirit industry for the first quarter of 1958. It turned out that Poles had bought 
3.6 million liters fewer, calculated in pure alcohol, in comparison with corre-
sponding period of the previous year. Initially, this was taken as a positive out-
come of the fight against alcoholism; soon, however, a more rational explanation 
had to be considered, particularly since in the same period sales of sugar and 
yeast, especially in rural areas, had grown significantly, for example by 60% in the 
Warsaw and 40% in the Kielce voivodships respectively.786 
It is now difficult to establish whether the wave of anti-bimber coverage that 
swept through the Polish press from the early spring of 1958 was part of an or-
chestrated campaign. The news items identical in respect of facts, people, and 
places – a fact which, since they were not always supplied by the press agencies, 
could point to their origin in government briefing – that appeared in newspapers 
in different parts of the country seem to favor such a hypothesis. The war on ille-
gal distilling was a perfect fit with the crackdown on the economic underground, 
which began in the middle of 1957. The law and the law-makers were commonly 
accused of being too lenient towards the self-appointed distillers. Over 25% of 
all cases were dropped straight away by the prosecutors, and those that ended 
up in front of a judge usually ended either in a suspended sentence, a small fine 
or a few months of suspended prison sentence. The light sentences were often 
784 B. Sygit, Nielegalny…, pp. 35–36.
785 AAN, MS, 558, k. 150.
786 Spadek sprzedaży alkoholu, “Sztandar Młodych”, no. 118, 1958/May19,; J. Horodecka, 
Bimber wyżej, ŻW, no. 233, 1958/September 28/29.
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due to the perpetrators pointing their finger as the guilty party at the elderly, 
single mothers, and the disabled, who could always count on the leniency of the 
judges.787 
In July 1958, police bonuses introduced in 1957 for uncovering illegal dis-
tilleries doubled. Policemen who found the whole “works” – the full apparatus, 
moonshine mash, and moonshine, complete with the perpetrator – could expect 
a reward of between 500 and 1 000 zloty and 25–50 zloty for each liter of pure 
alcohol.788 In the summer of 1958 at Police Headquarters, representatives of the 
Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Finance met with local police 
chiefs from the voivodships where illegal distillation was the most prevalent 
(Białystok, Lublin, Łódź, Rzeszów, and Warsaw). The conclusion was unanimous: 
tougher sanctions.789 
The press changed the mood music to match: the focus was now on “public” 
expectations of the government and the Sejm, its tardiness gently criticized, to 
take care of the problem urgently.790 The authorities rose to the challenge and 
in the spring of 1959, the newspapers featured a steady flow of coverage on the 
progress of the new law upping the penalties for the illegal distillers. The head-
lines said it all: Illegal distilling will not be worth it (in Trybuna Ludu), Pogrom of 
bimber producers imminent (in Słowo Powszechne). The draft of the bill received 
the “full support of all MPs“,791 as it did in parliament. 
The Act of April 22, 1959 on combating the illicit production of spirits792 was to 
remain in force, with small changes, for over forty-two years, until April 26, 2001! 
The secret of its longevity was in the permanency of the phenomenon of illegal 
distilling as well as in the detailed presentation of the regulations and the severity 
of the sanctions provided. The fines stipulated were high enough to feel painful 
even when applied at the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s. The production of bim-
ber even in the smallest quantity for personal use carried a penalty of up to three 
years in prison and a fine of upwards of five thousand zloty. Where “significant 
quantities” were involved, the distiller was subject to a prison term of between 
two and five years and a fine of not less than 30 000 zloty. The offender no longer 
787 D. Słoń, Bimbrownie i walka z nimi Milicji Obywatelskiej, “Słowo Powszechne”, no 
113/May 13, 1958; R. Młodar, Bimber, PiŻ, nos. 26, 27 /1957.
788 J. Horodecka, Bimber wyżej, ŻW, no. 233/September 28/29, 1958.
789 Uwaga – bimber. MO proponuje zaostrzyć sankcje, TL, no. 199/August 18, 1958.
790 Prosimy o chwilę uwagi, “Słowo Powszechne”, no. 216/September 16, 1958.
791 TL, no. 97/1959.
792 Journal of Laws 1959, no. 27, item 169.
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needed to be arrested red-handed. The possession or storage of the even the sim-
plest moonshine production apparatus was a punishable offence under the Act. 
The authorities were keen to prove that the new law was not mere token-
ism. Soon after it had entered into force on June 1, 1959, the papers were filled 
with news of harsh prison sentences and high fines for illicit alcohol producers. 
Whereas a few months earlier, the tone assumed in the press coverage was por-
tentous, now the matter had become a fait accompli (Illicit distilling is not prof-
itable any more793). Indeed, the number of detected distilleries began to decrease 
and in 1961, only 1 002 cases of illicit alcohol production were uncovered by the 
authorities. “The current year,” a journalist on Polityka wrote in spring of 1963, 
“will be one of the last in which we write about moonshine. Soon enough, it will 
have become mere folklore, a funny story about an individual case or two but no 
longer a topic. Bimber as a problem and as a scourge of society will safely descend 
to its grave.”794 
These hopes did not materialize. The alcohol price hike in the fall of 1963 im-
mediately thinned out the customers of the official alcohol stores and triggered 
increased demand for the raw materials and paraphernalia involved in its pro-
duction such as sugar, yeast, big kettles, and glass pipes. The number of detected 
distilleries increased from 1 153 in 1963 to 1 549 in the following year and stayed 
at that level for several years. The next price hike, in 1969, coincided with the 
deep economic crisis that was responsible for renewed interest in independent 
alcohol production. In 1969, the authorities detected 1  847 distilleries, and in 
1970 another 2 908, and in 1971 as many as 5 378.795 The significant escalation 
in 1971 was a result of the operation to “restore public order”, undertaken by the 
new Minister of Interior Affairs, Franciszek Szlachcic. The operation was intend-
ed to remind Poles that the Ministry of Finance would reward the reporting of 
clandestine distilleries to the authorities. The average reward was 3 000 zloty but 
it could go as high as 15 000 zloty.796
Somewhat paradoxically, illicit alcohol production was a much bigger, and 
certainly more visible, problem in the first – prosperous – half of the decade than 
in the second, when the crisis came knocking at the door. This was mostly due 
to high prices of alcohol so, when in the second half of the decade, they became 
relatively lower, the wave of illicit alcohol production receded and stabilized at 
793 “Express Wieczorny”, no. 148/June 22, 1959.
794 A.K. Wróblewski, Bimber, “Polityka”, no. 23/June 8, 1963.
795 K. Kosiński, Historia pijaństwa…, p. 532.
796 Nagrody za ujawnienie nielegalnych gorzelni, TL, no. 260/September 17, 1971; “Kurier 
Polski”, no. 225/September 26, 1971.
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the level of the mid-1960s. For example in 1977, when vodka was at its cheapest, 
the number of detected distilleries in comparison with the previous year fell by 
1 300 (from 2 878 to 1 568). 
All the more shocking was the size of the moonshine boom triggered by the 
1981 crisis, declining production, rationing and partial prohibition during Mar-
tial Law. Whereas in 1981, 1 435 cases of illegal distilling had been recorded (most 
of them in the last quarter of the year, after the introduction of rationing), in the 
following year there were ten times as many – 14  067. Despite the increased 
detection rate (and accelerated sentencing) due to the strict requirements im-
posed by Martial Law, only a small number of illicit distilleries were uncovered. 
According to the probably very conservative estimates of the time, there were 
approximately 150 000 distilleries in Poland during the period of rationing.797 
The easing of alcohol rationing in July 1982 (free market sales at higher prices 
were authorized) and its withdrawal in March 1983 only temporarily diminished 
the demand for moonshine. After a temporary decrease in 1983 (9 696 detect-
ed distilleries), drinking habits accompanied by prevalent alcoholism as well as 
continuous price hikes of legal alcohol and its limited availability, especially as a 
result of the Act of October 26, 1982 on education in sobriety and counteracting 
alcoholism, caused the statistics to spike (14 817 distilleries exposed in 1984 and 
15 262 in 1985).
There is no doubt that the lifting of Martial Law in July 1983 and revocation 
of the harsh regulations that allowed summary sentencing once more fanned 
enthusiasm for illegal distilling. The great majority of illicit distillery production 
from the early 1980s was for distillers’ own needs, which resulted in relatively 
mild sentences. For example, from January to November 1984, in the Krakow 
voivodship 357 cases of illegal distilling were discovered and as many legal pro-
ceedings were brought but in only four cases were the accused held on remand.798 
The sheer scale of illegal distilling worried not only the police and the Fi-
nance Ministry but also the state employees responsible for introducing and later 
ending the alcohol rationing system. Illegal alcohol production turned out to be 
one of the most important reasons to postpone the abolition of the rationing of 
sugar which some decision makers were concerned would be mostly used for 
moonshine production – a conclusion based on the fact that the ratio between 
the price of one kg of sugar and 0.5 l of “official” alcohol was 1:12 (and had gone 
797 K. Kauba, Za wcześnie na toast, “Tygodnik Kulturalny” March 3, 1985.
798 Z. Krzysztofiak, Pędzą wszyscy, “Polityka”, no. 2/January 12, 1985.
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down to 1:7 a decade earlier).799 Against such pessimism, there were also voices 
of reason: “For those who were making moonshine 15 or 10 years ago and still 
do so today,” the deputy chair of the National Price Commission (PKC), Antoni 
Gryniewicz, argued in January 1985, “there is no such thing as the ‘correct’ rela-
tion between the price of vodka and the price of sugar. I think we are demonizing 
the moonshine problem in Poland, even on such scale as it is occurring currently. 
Let me quote Police Headquarter estimates of how much moonshine is produced 
in Poland today. These estimates are based on research, on reports from inspec-
tors, on the convictions. These estimates are that it is approximately 40 million 
liters […]. How many more moonshiners could we have, well – how many? Dou-
ble the number? I don’t think so, but let’s assume pessimistically that there might 
be 50% more. What would it mean? Another 20 000 tons of sugar…”800 A number 
of that order was irrelevant to the stability of Polish economy. 
Indeed, abolishing the rationing of sugar (on November 1, 1985) did not bring 
about any bimber revolution, unless we consider as significant the fact that the 
number of distilleries detected halved (to 7 134) in 1986. This was mostly due 
to the gradually stabilizing economy and the fact that the profitability of moon-
shine production was decreasing due to the rise in the price of sugar following 
the abolition of rationing and above all – the harsher sanctions. The Act of May 
10, 1985 (mentioned earlier, see chapter 3.5.3) played a deterrent role, since it 
created a situation where even indirect contact with illegal distilling could end 
in a prison sentence.
While the repressive measures certainly shrank the amount of illicit distilling 
(4 789 distilleries in 1987 and 3 418 in 1988), they frequently bordered on the 
absurd. It was easy to arrive at a decision which, while consistent with the rule 
of law, simultaneously made a mockery of the whole idea of war on illegal dis-
tillation. In late 1985, the story of a pensioner from Katowice riveted the public. 
A man with no previous criminal record, he was arrested for helping a neighbor 
suffering from back pain to move a jar of moonshine mash from the floor to the 
table, for which he was charged as an accomplice. When during the investiga-
tion he artlessly admitted that in the previous several months he had given his 
799 Demand for sugar was, indeed, enormous. In 1982, at its highest, the black market 
price of 1 kg of sugar was several times higher than the official one (it reached 
200 zloty); unrationed artificial honey, glucose and jam were also bought in high 
quantities; AAN, URM, 32/114, Third National Anti-Speculation Meeting (Krajowa 
Narada Antyspekulacyjna), January 27, 1983, fol. 53; ibid., 32/115, Fourth National 
Anti-Speculation Meeting, January 26, 1984, fol. 42. 
800 AAN, URM, 32/69, CKWS session on rationing questions, January10, 1985, fol. 42–43.
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neighbor two kilos of sugar while being fully aware of its purpose, the pensioner 
was additionally charged with illegal alcohol production, and sentenced to eight 
months in prison (without suspension) and a 50 000 zloty fine.801
It is ironic that after 1989, illicit distilling did indeed become, as Andrzej 
Krzysztof Wróblewski predicted it would, “exotic” – but not due to the activities 
of the government or increased social awareness but thanks to cheap alcohol 
smuggled in from abroad. One could say that the moonshine industry was beat-
en at its own game. 
6.1.2  “He Has a Drinking Habit but Not a Lot of Money”:802 
Determinants, Technology, Geography
Shortage of alcohol was a leading factor in the development of the black market 
trade only during the first few years after the war (between 1945 and 1947) and 
the first half of the 1980s, mainly when alcohol rationing was in force (between 
1981 and 1983). The decisive factor was the high price of the monopoly alcohol; 
kept high since its sales accounted for a significant percentage of state revenue, 
rarely falling below 10% and usually hovering between 11 and 15.5% (with the 
record year in 1985).803 The authorities showed great determination in fighting 
the moonshiners who, in turn, were very good in devising strategies to outsmart 
the state. Only after 1989 would this vicious circle be broken. 
Research on illegal distillation in Poland indicates that the phenomenon dis-
appears when average monthly pay is sufficient to buy between 60 and 70 bottles 
of vodka. In communist Poland this rate was no more than approximately 30 
bottles! In 1970, the average monthly salary could buy 30 bottles, in 1974 it barely 
increased, to just 31, and in 1978 it nudged up to a mere 33 but after the price 
hike in December 1981, an average Pole’s monthly pay was the equivalent of no 
more than 22 bottles. In communist Poland, vodka was twice as expensive as it 
had been in pre-war Poland and was one of the most expensive in Europe.804 The 
illegal distilling industry grew with each hike in the price of alcohol (in 1953, 
1957, 1961, 1963, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1980, and annually throughout the 1980s). 
801 J. Dziadul, Pożytki z bimbrownika, “Polityka”, no. 50/December 14, 1985.
802 R. Młodar, Bimber, PiŻ, 1957, no. 26/27.
803 K. Kosiński, Historia pijaństwa…, pp. 44–48.
804 P. Kapuściński, Ile wódki wypić musimy i ani setki więcej, “Tygodnik Solidarność”, no. 
27 /October 2, 1981; AAN, IPP, 65, Alcohol related crimes in the alcohol rationing 
system, fol. 11, 16–17; M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy. Przesłanki, mechanizmy 
i skutki w Polsce lat osiemdziesiątych, Warszawa 1992, p. 91; B. Sygit, Nielegalny…, 
p. 17.
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The rate of growth depended on the level of prices and income, the general state 
of the economy, the level of social satisfaction, and the strictness of legal sanc-
tions. Without a doubt, such correlation was systematic, and until the final days 
of communist Poland, the government applied the principle of keeping the “price 
of moonshine at a safe distance from the price of monopoly alcohol”.805 
Moonshine distilling was an excellent business from an economic point of 
view. During most of the post-war period it was common in rural areas where 
the distillers had the basic resources such as potatoes, grain, and flour to hand, 
often on their own farm. Labor was cheap, particularly in the case of a family 
business. Even when sugar became the basic feedstock for moonshine, the in-
creases in its cost were neutralized by, among others, higher productivity. As a 
result, the cost of production of moonshine was a fraction of that of the pro-
duction of the monopoly vodka, in spite of the advantages of the economies of 
scale that the state had. Other factors such as the financial circumstances of the 
customers or general insecurity also shaped the retail price of bimber. “We always 
aim for the middle ground,” a professional moonshine distiller from Sobolewo 
near Ryki explained, talking to a journalist in 1957. “The higher the price of vod-
ka, the higher the level of this middle ground gets. It works like this: it takes one 
kilo of sugar, give or take a few grams, to make one liter of moonshine. Which 
means that one liter costs me 15 zloty. How much does one liter of [monopoly] 
vodka cost? Seventy zloty. So, my figures work like this: I have to earn quite a lot, 
because otherwise why bother to go into this business, why bother to take such 
risk… But I can’t ask for too much, or else I’d lose the customers. So I have to 
charge much more than 15 zloty but much less than 70.”806 And, so, in 1957, the 
moonshine price fluctuated between 40 and 50 zloty a liter. 
The cost calculation applied also to production for personal use. We need to 
understand that “personal use” meant something quite different in Warsaw or 
Krakow and in the rural areas – where one liter of alcohol per person at wedding 
or baptism parties was the norm. Since such celebrations were usually very well 
attended, the savings to the host from buying moonshine were considerable. 
There was a fine line between the professionals and amateurs in illicit alco-
hol production; in the 1980s, the latter remained as sole winners. The post-war 
period however, belonged to the professionals, who distilled alcohol often on a 
very large scale, with – one suspects – the tacit approval of local authorities. For 
805 A.K. Wróblewski, Bimber, “Polityka”, no. 23/June 8, 1963; K. Kosiński, Historia pijańst-
wa…, p. 390.
806 R. Młodar, Bimber, PiŻ, nos. 26, 27/1957.
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instance, in Ciechomin near Łuków, the administrator of the Cooperative Jed-
ność, which was well established during the German occupation, after the war 
ended, transformed it into a large distilling enterprise, which not only produced 
but also sold moonshine.807 There is little doubt that this initiative was closely 
connected with the construction of the Soviet airport nearby, which must have 
provided steady custom.
Wholesale production proper depended on well-organized and secure sales, 
guaranteed by big cities. In the post-war period, often very large illicit distill-
eries were frequently discovered in the suburbs. For example, on July 17, 1945 
at Powiśle Street in Krakow, the inspectors from Central Office for Combating 
Speculation and War Usury (Główny Urząd do Zwalczania Spekulacji i Lichwy 
Wojennej) found a “complete set of equipment for distilling moonshine […], a 
warehouse with semi-finished and finished product, as well as tax bands and 
labels of foreign and Polish brands of vodka. The tax band templates lay beside 
the tax bands […]. The moonshine factory was located in a two-bedroom apart-
ment. Tax bands and documents related to the distillery occupied one of the 
rooms […]. The other contained bottled vodka […]. In the third room, which 
was used by the female workers of the distillery, empty bottles were found. In the 
kitchen there was a massive oven with filter tubes. In the basement …], another 
oven with filter tubes running to the janitor’s lodge […]. In the janitor’s lodge 
we found a boiler with starter mash of approximately 500 liters, a distilling oven 
with a manometer, and electric ventilators.”808 The owner of the distillery was 
nowhere to be found. 
This impressive setup is a good example of a phenomenon typical of the 
post-war period. Large, well-equipped distilleries produced alcohol of relative-
ly decent quality that could pass for not only Polish but also foreign liquor.809 
Moreover, it was rare for the elusive entrepreneur, who usually remained in the 
shadow of the cottage industry, to be apprehended. It was striking that distiller-
ies surprisingly often kept re-appearing in apartments or homesteads where the 
owners or tenants were clearly unable to afford the expensive professional dis-
tilling equipment.810 We can safely assume that they were sub-contractors using 
equipment owned by the investor. In Legionowo near Warsaw there were entire 
807 Spółdzielnia czy bimbrownia, “Sztandar Ludu”, no. 281/November 7, 1945.
808 AAN, URM, 5/31, fol. 16.
809 For example at the turn of 1945 and 1946, products of well-known brands (Belgian 
“Hulstkamp” among others) appeared in Warsaw. The authorities considered them 
as “produced from moonshine by secret bottling plants” AAN, MAP, 14, fol. 7.
810 AAN, KS, 2965.
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“firms” producing distilling equipment, which helped maintain the high quality 
of production and the quick launch of a new distillery, should the existing one be 
seized by the authorities. 
Militia raid an illegal brewery in the vicinity of Warsaw, November 1946; photo from the 
archives of the Polish Press Agency (PAP).
For example, the distillery (it would be an understatement to call it a moonshine 
plant) uncovered in October 1946 in Legionowo specialized in the purification 
of moonshine distilled at home by farmers from nearby villages (some of whom 
delivered weekly between 150 and 200 liters). In an hour, the plant was able to 
distill 10 liters of 95-proof spirit. The middlemen bought the entire processed 
amount at between 300 and 360 zloty, and transported it two or three times a 
week, sometimes in vehicles that belonged to the Ministry of Health, to Warsaw 
where they sold it for between 400 and 420 zloty.811 
811 AAN, KS, 1509. To a large degree the operations were made possible by the corruption 
of the local authorities. According to one of the employees of the distillery, the police 
station in Legionowo knew about the distillation. The owner of the illegal still, citizen 
Pios told me that policemen came to his house and he had to give them a bribe of 
7 000 zloty.” ibid.
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Thanks to the private networks of stores and restaurants distribution did not 
pose any problems. The owners of restaurants and stores, especially fruit and 
vegetable stores where “carrots are sold at the front, bimber at the back”812 on 
the one hand, naturally, sought maximum profits and were willing to take a risk, 
but on the other, sold bimber simply because there was demand for it, since legal 
alcohol was in short supply. The owner of a café at Wolska Street in Warsaw when 
arrested on July 21, 1945 and told she was not allowed to sell moonshine, asked 
rhetorically, “What else is there to sell?”813 In mid-October 1945, the Polish Spirit 
Monopoly (Polski Monopol Spirytusowy, PMS) complained to the Ministry of 
Treasury that a large number of private stores “of all kinds” were selling moon-
shine and imitation monopoly alcohol.814 By the middle of the next year “almost 
all cafes or similar gastronomic enterprises, and also many grocery stores sold 
illegal alcoholic drinks, packaged and available for on-site consumption. The il-
legal sale of alcoholic drinks in marketplaces from stands and booths or directly 
on the street [was] a common occurrence.”815 
This was an open and universally accepted practice and those who sold illicit 
alcohol were often protected. The incident in Warsaw on November 3, 1945, ex-
treme as it was, nevertheless reflected well the prevailing sentiments toward trad-
ing bootleg alcohol. On that day, the Central Inspectorate of Treasury Protection 
(Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Skarbowej, GIOS) together with the police (MO) 
and Security Office (UB) conducted inspections of all restaurants in Warsaw. “I 
gave the Investigation Office (Urząd Śledczy) orders to shut down,” wrote a GIOS 
official, “one of the illegally operating restaurants at 15 Litewska Street, which 
sold bimber and left its fate to the decision of citizen Prime Minister. After the 
search, the restaurant owner incited a Polish Army unit, stationed at 14 Litewska 
Street, to attack the police. This resulted in a shootout and assault on several 
policemen, who were then disarmed by the completely drunk above mentioned 
unit.”816 
However, the increased repressive measures on the one hand and the im-
proved supply of legal alcohol on the other forced moonshine distillers to change 
their strategies. Production ceased to be run openly. By the end of 1946, the 
 
812 R. Burzyński, O knajpach i samobójcach, “Przekrój” 1945, no. 26, as cited in: J. Jawor-
ska, Cywilizacja “Przekroju”…, p. 154. 
813 AAN, KS, 2965.
814 AAN, MAP, 14, fol. 1.
815 AAN, GIOS, fol. 14.
816 AAN, URM, 5/229, fol. 3.
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illicit distilleries were moved from suburbs to the “most remote villages, and into 
forests and swamps, which due to poor security and difficult driving conditions 
are hard for the Police and Treasury Protection (Ochrona Skarbowa) to reach. 
The clandestine distilling is moving from outbuildings into fields and abandoned 
bunkers and is changing its operating hours to night-time.”817 By the late 1940s, 
remote distillery locations had become the norm.818 In the cities, a decisive blow 
for alcohol distribution networks came with the wiping out of the majority of 
private stores and restaurants by the “battle for trade” and putting the existing 
ones under even stricter supervision. As a consequence, until the early 1980s, the 
alcohol black market concentrated in the cities in melinas, where mostly monop-
oly vodka was sold. 
Of course none of this means that alcohol was no longer distilled in the cities. 
However, it was done amateurishly and chiefly for personal use. Throughout the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, bimber distilleries were usually mentioned in the press in 
the context of rural areas or small towns. Newspaper stories, all very much alike, 
mainly focused on anti-moonshine police operations and the problems that the 
police functionaries faced. “The larger-scale production flees from the usual lo-
cations to places where a policeman will not go either by chance or on suspicion, 
because he is reluctant to venture into some backwoods. One needs a customized 
horse-drawn cart to get through, to carry boilers and the starter mash there; fire-
wood can be cut in the forest nearby and, a few days’ worth of corked and bottled 
moonshine is brought back.”819 
817 Ibid., fol. 86.
818 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/VII–2679, fol. 92.
819 A.K. Wróblewski, Bimber, “Polityka”, no. 23/June 8, 1963; see: Z. Szopiński, Lekarstwo 
na ischias, “Tygodnik Kulturalny”, no. 39 /September 27, 1970.
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The official campaign launched in 1957 to fight alcoholism by raising the price of alcohol 
and closing a proportion of retail alcohol shops resulted in no time at all in a boost to illegal 
alcohol brewing. Szymon Kobyliński, We have completely eradicated alcoholism in our 
district, “Szpilki”, no. 4, 7 December 1958 (courtesy of the author’s family).
In some regions such production was well in excess of the needs of “family” 
consumption. Unfortunately, we do not know much about the distribution chan-
nels of this surplus. Probably only a small portion was delivered to the cities, 
where since the early 1950s, different demand and consumption models had 
developed. The greater part of the product was distributed locally, and local res-
idents had easy access to the source of moonshine, also on a wholesale basis. 
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“Before,” a resident of Garwolin confided to a journalist in 1970, “you could ask 
anybody and they would show you [where to find it]. Now people are on guard. 
If they don’t know you they won’t sell it to you. But if you go with a local guy, you 
can buy as much as you want.”820 It is also hard to determine how commonplace 
the middlemen were who specialized solely in alcohol distribution. It seems 
however, that the modus operandi of a peasant woman in a village near Sieradz 
was the rule rather than the exception: “Zenobia picked up the cans herself and 
carried them on a motorbike or in her son-in-law’s Škoda. She took any amount, 
paid a thousand per liter and sold it for 400 more […]. At Zenobia’s, [alcohol] was 
available day and night, unlike at the store in [the local village of] Fajum. There 
was enough moonshine for any occasion or none. For baptisms, weddings, pig 
slaughter, for a rainy day, and a funeral. People came to Zenobia’s from near and 
far and never returned home with empty cans.”821
When moonshine producers or distributors were caught by the authorities, 
it was usually as a result of denunciation rather than any sophisticated police 
operations. “Almost all the cases that landed in court,” a journalist evaluated the 
situation in 1975, “are the result of a denunciation by neighbors. The distiller or 
the illegal dealer needs to remain on good terms with their neighbors. As soon as 
they fall out, the police get a tip off.”822 That a culprit would be found guilty was 
not, however, a foregone conclusion. The rural code of ethics which allowed the 
denouncing of neighbors did not allow one to testify against them in court.823 
Another commonly practiced strategy involved, as already mentioned, the sole 
breadwinners in the family or the elderly volunteering to take the blame. “Usu-
ally it is grandmas and grandpas who plead guilty,” a policeman from Sobolewo 
near Ryki explained in 1970. “That’s a real plague. The old granny who is pushing 
eighty stands in front of the judge and starts sobbing. What can the judge do? It 
usually ends with a suspended sentence.”824 
Policemen operating in rural areas did not have an easy job, repeatedly find-
ing themselves between a rock and a hard place when dealing at the same time 
with the demands of their superiors and of the local public. It is clear that chiefs 
of local police stations had to compromise, which often involved striking a fine 
balance. One of their strategies was to bust illegal distilleries, taking the credit 
820 Z. Szopiński, Lekarstwo na ischias….
821 R. Kubiak, Wielki zacier, “Tygodnik Kulturalny”, no. 11/March 15, 1987.
822 J. Majkut, Konkurenci przemysłu spirytusowego, “Słowo Powszechne” April 1, 1975.
823 R. Młodar, Bimber, PiŻ, 1957, no. 26/27.
824 Z. Jagielski, Dosyć zmowy milczenia, TL, 1970, no. 332; see: Z. Szopiński, Lekarstwo 
na ischias…; J. Konieczna, Śladami bimbrownictwa, TL, February 5, 1974.
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due but neglect to gather the evidence, which made it impossible to initiate the 
legal procedures and move the matter along any further.825 It is difficult, however, 
to say how common such a phenomenon was. 
The burden of keeping an eye on bimber was not evenly spread among the local 
police forces. For a long time, illicit distillation was concentrated in parts of Po-
land “where there is poverty, poor soil, and scattered farms – in Poland B”.826 These 
were also the areas with the lowest social standards and the lowest acceptance of 
the authorities as well as the longest tradition of making moonshine (going back 
to the time of the German occupation). Among the regions where the distillers 
prevailed were therefore the lands of the former Russian and Austrian partition, 
including the vicinity of Warsaw, as well as the regions of Białystok, Kielce, Łódź, 
Lublin, Krakow (where, near the city of Nowy Sącz, the famous plum vodka was 
distilled), and Rzeszów. The illegal distilling of alcohol was rarely found in the area 
of the former Prussian partition. 
Illegal brewery, late 1970s. Photo: Andrzej Baturo, FORUM Polish Photography Agency.
825 TL, no. 213/August1, 1958.
826 A.K. Wróblewski, Bimber, “Polityka”, no. 23/June 8, 1963.
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Just because in a particular area there did not happen to be many distilleries, 
this by no means meant that there was no demand for moonshine. By late 1945, 
there were cases of transporting bimber from Warsaw and vicinity all the way to 
Katowice and Bielsko.827 Returnees from the Eastern Borderlands and migrants 
from central Poland quickly transplanted their distilling traditions to these Re-
covered Territories but for a long time were unable to match the expansion lev-
els of the Krakow or Kielce region (not to mention Białystok where between 
1955 and 1958, almost a quarter of all distilleries in Poland were uncovered). In 
1958, of the total number of 2 451 bimber investigations, 536 were conducted 
in the Białystok voivodship, 524 in the Warsaw voivodship, 411 in the Lublin 
voivodship, and 211 in the Łódź voivodship. At the same time there was only one 
investigation in the Gdańsk voivodship, five in Koszalin, four in Olsztyn, two in 
Szczecin, and three in the Zielona Góra voivodships.828 
As mentioned before, at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, moonshine pro-
duction predominated in rural Poland, where 78% to 82% of all the cases prose-
cuted were uncovered.829 Reports on distilleries or moonshine sales in the cities 
were sporadic.830 After a small distillery had been raided in the Praga district of 
Warsaw, a journalist from Kurier Polski commented, “Warsaw bimber lovers have 
lost one of the very few sources for purchasing moonshine [in the capital].”831 A 
decade later, he would have probably not been able to put it like this. The social, 
economic and cultural changes taking place in the 1950s and the 1960s affected 
also clandestine distilling. Industrialization and urbanization together with mass 
migrations blurred both the lines between the regions and between rural and 
urban areas. This had a knock-on effect on patterns of consumption including 
that of bimber. 
Already during the moonshine boom in the early part of the Gierek era, 
progressive “urbanization” of the bootleg distilling had been in evidence. Now, 
city residents more and more often got involved in bimber production; initially 
these were mostly workers, and occasionally clerks supplementing their wag-
es.832 Technological changes, in particular the now widespread use of sugar as 
827 AAN, KS, 2953.
828 D. Słoń, Geografia bimbru, “Słowo Powszechne”, no. 112/May 12, 1958; see: B. Sygit, 
Nielegalny…, pp. 26–27.
829 B. Sygit, Nielegalny…, p. 29.
830 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXI–243, fol. 164.
831 “Kurier Polski”, October 11, 1965.
832 J. Olszewski, Bimber, TL, no. 270/September 27, 1971; E. Bryl, Babcia robi interesy, 
“Tygodnik Kulturalny”, no. 45/November 6, 1977.
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the main ingredient, led to a moonshine comeback in the cities. Starter prepared 
from potatoes or flour required large amounts of ingredients; the “production 
cycle was long and complex, the pulp fermenting in barrels stank horribly and 
could give away the location of the distillery.”833 In contrast, sugar-based technol-
ogy allowed one to prepare small, “domestic-use” quantities of the starter (as in 
the Grunwald recipe: 1 kg of sugar, 4 l of water, 100 g of yeast), and the produc-
tion process was easy and did not require sophisticated equipment. A small stove, 
cold running water and a modified kettle were all that was necessary. 
A real breakthrough came in the fall of 1981, together with the introduction 
of alcohol rationing and Martial Law. There were important geographical and so-
cial changes. Bimber production spread quickly in areas where earlier it had been 
almost non-existent, such as the Opole region, where the rise in distilling was sta-
tistically the greatest, as it was from a low base. It again became a city-based phe-
nomenon. Beginning in 1982, the majority of those sentenced for illegal distilling 
were city dwellers.834 The moonshine-producer identikit was changing rapidly. 
Whereas in the early months of rationing, it had been mostly workers835 who had 
been involved in distilling moonshine in the cities, Martial Law turned it into an 
activity of the intelligentsia. The “distilling fad” among the intelligentsia was only 
partly due shortage of liquor. Socio-cultural factors played an important, if not 
more important role. Intelligentsia had much spare time, with few opportunities to 
fill it up, and a liking for socializing. Moreover, to brew bimber was a form of polit-
ical, “oppositionist” statement. “Distilling is fashionable mostly among members of 
the intelligentsia. A teacher and an engineer swap recipes, taste samples together, 
and hone the equipment. At family or friends’ gatherings, it’s not the herring […], 
the apple pie or home-made liqueurs that the hosts are praised for. It’s the bim-
ber!”836 While garages or boiler rooms had been the typical sites for illicit distilling, 
now it was not uncommon to carry out the production in the workplace, even if 
this happened to be a university, or especially a science lab.837 
This fad did not last long. Homemade distilling by the intelligentsia did not 
disappear altogether but after alcohol rationing ended in spring 1983, it ceased 
833 J. Olszewski, Bimber, TL, no. 270/September 27, 1971.
834 AAN, URM, 32/182, k. 7; AAN, IPP, 65, fol. 28, 30–31.
835 “Since they introduced the rationing coupons,” Praga resident chips in, “I haven’t once 
bought monopoly alcohol. For five bills [I buy] a sack of sugar from Wedel; problem 
solved! I’ve asked my next door neighbor and he says there is no stench of bimber”; 
D. and A. Wroniszewscy, O lesie, dlaczego tak kochamy ciebie, PiŻ, 1984, no. 51.
836 Z. Krzysztofiak, Pędzą wszyscy, “Polityka”, no. 2/January 12, 1985.
837 B. Sygit, Nielegalny…, pp. 32–33.
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to play any cultural, not to mention iconic, role. Especially now that an extensive 
network of booze stores made it possible to buy liquor any time of the day and 
night to one’s heart’s content.
6.2  “Buy a Bottle, Mister!” Illegal Trading in Legal Alcohol
The state monopolist was between the devil and the deep blue sea: the budget 
demanded maximization of alcohol revenue but the scourge of alcoholism, 
which led to quantifiable losses, pointed to curtailing the sales. With that aim in 
mind, and in view of the minimal effectiveness of the anti-alcohol campaigns, 
the authorities resorted to increasingly strict measures. Until the mid-1950s, the 
inter-war legislation remained in force, slightly modified and adjusted for the re-
quirements of the new reality by acts such as the Act of 1950 on securing socialist 
discipline at work (Ustawa o zabezpieczeniu socjalistycznej dyscypliny pracy). 
The second part of the decade brought two anti-alcohol Acts838 that limited alco-
hol sales and/or consumption opportunities in the workplace, in working men’s 
hostels, and in community centers. Municipal councils were given the authority 
to limit the numbers of outlets, their opening hours and the volume of supply. 
Councils were also authorized to introduce local prohibition, for example on 
paydays or state holidays such as May 1 or July 22. From 1966, only those over 
18 were officially allowed to buy alcohol and cigarettes. The 1970s brought on 
the one hand a significant increase in alcohol consumption, on the other – more 
restrictions and a decreased number of outlets (by the Council of Ministers’ res-
olutions from May 5, 1972 and August 10, 1978). The legal crowning of the fight 
with alcoholism was the Act of October 26, 1982 on upbringing in sobriety and 
the prevention of alcoholism (Journal of Laws, no. 35, item 230).839 The most 
unpalatable change for consumers was undoubtedly the ban on selling alcohol, 
both in stores and in restaurants, between 6 am and 1 pm.
 When confronted with changing social behavior related to alcohol, such as 
increased consumption and drinking in the workplace, all the new bans and 
838 They were titled identically: Act on Preventing Alcoholism, April 24, 1956, Dz.U. no. 
12, item 32 and December 10, 1959, Dz.U. no. 69, item 434; see more: K. Kosiński, 
Historia pijaństwa…, pp. 268–275.
839 Public and the Catholic Church initiatives are also worth mentioning. Before Christ-
mas 1980, Polish Primate Stefan Wyszyński issued an order to Warsaw Archdiocese 
priests to “refuse funeral services to those conducting illegal sales of alcohol, and to 
pass by in their Christmas visits those involved in alcohol trading”; “Słowo Powsze-
chne” December 23, 1980.
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regulations led to further development of the bootleg trade. The commercial 
relationship between the state monopoly and consumers was invaded by an ad-
ditional agent – a go-between, who charged commission for the risk taken. “Each 
legal outlet that has been closed down,” the Ministry of Justice warned in 1957, 
“is immediately replaced by illegal mobile vending points at marketplaces and 
bazaars, as well as in private apartments.”840 The illicit dealing in legally manu-
factured spirits took different forms – from selling alcohol in public places that 
customers were usually very familiar with, such as squares, and marketplaces, or 
in the melinas where the underworld could buy liquor to go; some of these places 
also offered on-site consumption as well as sex or profiteering. Initially limited, 
the range of services available in due course often expanded with new business 
propositions.841 
In the early post-war years, unlicensed private stores, restaurants, and eateries 
commonly sold monopoly alcohol. “The battle for trade” drove also this practice 
onto the streets and in to marketplaces but most of all into private apartments. 
Booze dives selling “state” alcohol, which included wine and beer, were mostly 
an urban phenomenon; while until the 1980s most of those convicted of illegal 
distilling lived in rural areas, those who were apprehended in those melinas lived 
in the cities.842 In the cities there were different consumption patterns, with more 
financial resources available to numerous potential customers, and easy access 
and smaller risk. 
The workers were definitely the best customers. Booze dives, initially called 
potajemka or bunker, popped up around “excavators, cranes, bulldozers […], 
where there is a sign: structure ‘X’ or ‘Y’ under construction […]. They thrive 
when surrounded by makeshift, bunkhouse workers’ hostels, among the sounds 
of rubber boots thumping on the sticky clay.”843 But they also did quite well in the 
vicinity of already established factory plants. For example in the mid-1960s in 
Warsaw, most of the approximately 400 melinas identified by police were located 
840 AAN, MS, 558, fol. 154.
841 J.W. Wójcik, Meliny i ich klienci, “Gazeta Prawnicza” 1985, no. 4.
842 Each campaign directed against illegal distilling, also in provincial Poland, inevitably 
led to increasing the number of booze dens. In the third quarter of 1958, the author-
ities detected 149 bootleg dens in Warsaw voivodship; a year later, having embarked 
on an anti-moonshine operation – 205; Bimbrowni – mniej, melin pijackich – więcej, 
“Głos Pracy”, no. 284/November 27, 1959. 
843 E. Klonowicz, “Sasanki” przeszkadzają budować, “Słowo Powszechne”, no. 38/February 
15, 1965.
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in industrial districts – Wola, Żoliborz, Praga North, and Praga South.844 When 
dealing with regular customers, the booze dive owner was willing to wait for 
payment until the next payday or accept in lieu products and materials stolen 
from the workplace. Alcohol bought in these illegal places was often bought with 
money acquired by selling “public property”.845 
Sometimes melinas operated inside workplaces, and were usually run by 
doorkeepers, janitors or the technical staff, who adapted their methods of trading 
to the local circumstances and needs. Bimber manufacturers, who played an im-
portant role in unofficial everyday life, were appreciated and often protected by 
the employees of the plants. When one of the janitors at the Warsaw Gardening 
Cooperative was caught selling liquor and the manager decided to fire him, all 
the employees including the blue and white collar workers, and even the man-
agers protested vehemently against this decision. There is no doubt they were all 
customers of the janitor.846
Poor suburbs and city districts populated by workers who liked their drink 
were often melina hubs. In the greater Warsaw area in the 1960s, there were to 
be found in Czerniaków, Powiśle, Targówek, Wawrzyszew, Rembertów and in the 
neighborhoods of marketplaces.847 “The police are aware of these sensitive are-
as,” a Warsaw newspaper wrote in 1959, “where as many as 12 melinas, in which 
“grandmas”, “aunties”, and “uncles” conduct prohibited trading, can operate with-
in 100 meters of one another.”848 Representatives of social groups other than the 
working class, including the intelligentsia, were also at times driven to using the 
services of a melina in situations such as alcohol running out during a party or an 
unexpected guest turning up. Anonymous polls quoted by Jerzy W. Wójcik in the 
mid-1980s, conducted among 422 people with higher education concluded that 
almost 55% had had contact with melinas.849 This did not mean that illicit dives 
were easily accessible even if their addresses were an open secret – to minimize 
risk, they tended to stick to their trusted regular clientele and their doors were 
closed to strangers and random callers. 
844 B. Szykuła, Meliny i ich klienci, “Głos Pracy”, no. 139/June 12, 1967.
845 M. Regent, Z zagadnień spekulacji (Uwagi na tle orzecznictwa sądów okręgu kieleck-
iego), “Nowe Prawo” 1956, no. 10, pp. 118–119; AAN, URM, 32/112, First National 
Anti-Speculation Meeting, September 15, 1981, fol. 30.
846 J.W. Wójcik, Meliny i ich klienci, “Gazeta Prawnicza” 1985, no. 4.
847 “Waciowa” wreszcie wpadła, ale inni nadal rozpijają, “Kurier Polski”, no. 71/March 25, 
1963.
848 “Express Wieczorny”, no. 83/March 3, 1959.
849 J.W. Wójcik, Meliny i ich klienci, “Gazeta Prawnicza” 1985, no. 4.
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Naturally, law enforcement agencies took an interest in all illicit liquor vending 
dens. The police were usually able to identify their location, often not so much 
with the help of their clients, which did also happen, but from disgruntled neigh-
bors, not pleased with nightlong drinking sessions and late-night visits. Neverthe-
less, it was more difficult to shut down a melina or to arrest its owner than to close 
down an illicit distillery. The price of alcohol in these dens was often much higher 
than in stores but the customers did not feel cheated; on the contrary, they defend-
ed booze den keepers if they got into trouble. On the one hand, group solidarity 
and the code of ethics that prescribed the solving of conflicts without involv-
ing the authorities were important. On the other hand, pragmatic considerations 
played the most crucial role: although the client had to pay more, only a melina 
guaranteed access to alcohol twenty four hours a day, seven days a week and credit 
purchase for cash or barter. For many, the closing down of a melina would have 
been synonymous, at least temporarily, with losing unlimited access to alcohol.850 
A closure operation provided the police with a logistical problem: possession of 
even a large amount of monopoly alcohol, unlike possession of bimber, was not 
a criminal act. The policemen had to gather clear evidence in order to prove that 
illegal trade had taken place, and catch the perpetrators red-handed – a tall order, 
as well as find documentary evidence of the sales – again, unlikely, with cash sales 
being the norm.851
Understandably, illicit liquor vendors developed defensive strategies similar 
to those practiced by currency dealers. In their own apartments, they kept only a 
small amount of alcohol – often in opened bottles, to imply personal consump-
tion. Wholesale amounts were stored elsewhere, in a basement or in a neighbors’ 
apartment. Those who operated outside of melinas stored alcohol in their cars. 
This was, however, a risky practice especially in the 1980s, when a car could be 
confiscated as a “tool of crime”, together with its contents. It was safer to trade in 
alcohol at home, since there was no legal provision for evicting melina owners.852 
As a result, only a small percentage of these operators could be effectively 
brought to court,853 and the sentences were usually mild – a fine of a couple of 
850 W. Krasucka, Spekulacja (wybrane zagadnienia), “Studia Kryminologiczne, Krymi-
nalistyczne i Penitencjarne” 10, 1979, p. 163; “Express Wieczorny”, no. 83/March 3, 
1959.
851 M. Regent, Z zagadnień spekulacji…, pp. 118–119.
852 See: A. Cubała, Melina na czterech kółkach, PiŻ, 1986, no. 5 (Suwałki); J.W. Wójcik, 
Meliny i ich klienci, “Gazeta Prawnicza” 1985, no. 4. 
853 For example in 1962 in Warsaw, police knew about the existence of approximately 
300 alcohol dives but were able to “bring the investigation to a point of pressing 
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hundred zloty and a sentence of a few months in jail, mostly suspended. The 
average fine in the late 1960s was 500 zloty, a negligible amount that could be 
easily made on a single good day or a Saturday night.854 The reasons for such 
leniency were both economic and social. Since the dealers were selling, albeit on 
a margin, monopoly alcohol, produced by state-owned factories, the Treasury 
incurred no financial losses. As early as February 1946, the Ministry of Public 
Administration instructed the voivods that vigorous combating of illegal sales 
of monopoly vodka was “harmful for the state Treasury” because it limited the 
trade in monopoly articles, which were “heavily taxed.” “Temporary” leniency 
was advocated.855
No similar recommendations for the later period can be found but there can 
be no doubt that melina owners enjoyed mild treatment by the authorities. A 
Polityka journalist pointed this out in the mid-1980s, asking why “those who 
distil are punished severely while melina owners are treated leniently. No serious 
sentences are reported in the press, there are no immediate custodial sentences 
[…]. Smart people know that moonshine is rarely available in these dens, where 
monopoly and Pewex vodka rule.” He drew the correct conclusion that, with the 
favorable dollar exchange rate, it was worth the dealers’ while not only to resell 
monopoly spirits bought in ordinary stores but also brands bought exclusively 
for dollars and other hard currency in the also state-run Pewex stores, allowing 
not only a higher profit margin for the melina owners but also boosting earnings 
in the tills of state monopoly and Pewex stores: clearly, a win-win situation, at 
least from aneconomic point of view.856 Yet again, the social dimension of the 
problem encouraged leniency by the judges. Until the 1980s, the vast majority of 
melina owners were women, often older, burdened with child-rearing costs and 
rarely able to count on even the slightest support from their partners.857 Selling 
illegal alcohol was often a means of survival. 
charges (by the prosecutor) only in 91 cases”; “Waciowa” wreszcie wpadła, ale inni 
nadal rozpijają, “Kurier Polski”, no. 71/March 25, 1963.
854 “Express Wieczorny”, no. 83/March 3, 1959.
855 AAN, MZO, 338, The Ministry of Public Administration to the voivods and mayors 
of Warsaw and Łódź, February 26, 1946, fol. 1. However, two months later, in the 
localities where state stores had been opened, the authorities ordered that there be 
published in the press a special warning regarding the prosecution and punishment 
of all those who sold alcoholic beverages without a license; ibid., fol. 4.
856 J. Dziadul, Pożytki z bimbrownika, “Polityka”, no. 50/December 14, 1985.
857 K. Kosiński, Historia pijaństwa…, pp. 558–561; APW, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, Re-
port on the implementation the Voivodship Committee of PUWP resolution on 
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It is not surprising that closed down melinas tended to reappear quickly or 
be replaced by new ones. In 1966 in Warsaw, 119 such places were taken out 
but soon thereafter, another 250 new ones sprung up. Of those 119, thirty-five 
were shut down a second time, nine – a third time, and three – a fourth time.858 
Opening a new venture of this kind did not require great effort; it was enough to 
buy a few bottles of vodka or cheap wine in a liquor store and resell them with 
a mark-up (albeit the known dealers were charged at a premium at the stores as 
part of an informal deal struck with the store sellers). This entire system, which 
had been built over many decades, finally collapsed in 1981. 
6.3  Excursus: The 1980s
In early 1981, the situation on the official alcohol market still did not appear too 
bad – in comparison with the previous year, the supply had shrunk by only 4.1% 
and the disappearance of alcohol from store shelves was due to massive hoarding 
and market chaos rather than a genuine shortage. The latter arrived in the second 
quarter of 1981, when alcohol deliveries shrank by a quarter. In the next three 
months they dropped to no more than 71.8% of the 1980 level.859 Simultaneous-
ly, alcohol established itself firmly as a commonly accepted substitute currency 
and object of hoarding as well as being a store of value. The rationing of alcohol, 
gradually introduced from June 1981, was adopted in all Poland in October 1981. 
Since the rationing was implemented at the discretion of local authorities, the 
rules were not immediately identical in all regions, the available product range 
varied, and at best a consumer could count on one liter of spirits per month. 
After standardizing the regulations in January 1982, the ration went down to not 
more than half a liter.860 These developments created a congenial environment 
for the now exceedingly lucrative illicit alcohol trade. 
providing safety and order in the city, December 1963, fol. 90. For examples from 
Warsaw in the 1960s, see: B. Szykuła, Meliny i ich klienci, “Głos Pracy”, no. 139/
June 12, 1967. 
858 B. Szykuła, Meliny i ich klienci, “Głos Pracy”, no. 139/June 12, 1967.
859 P. Kapuściński, Ile wódki wypić musimy i ani setki więcej, “Tygodnik Solidarność”, no. 
27/October 2, 1981.
860 AAN, IPP, 65, fol. 5–7.
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Illegal brewery in Czarna Białostocka, eastern Poland. Photo: Mariusz Olkowski, FORUM 
Polish Photography Agency.
Melina owners disappeared from the media and police reports to be replaced by 
“alcohol profiteers”. This was not just a semantic change but above all quantita-
tive. Police Headquarters, which was monitoring the illegal alcohol market, em-
phasized that the introduction of rationing had radically decreased the number 
of small alcohol dealers, who now faced a challenge in purchasing alcohol in the 
first place and secondly in having to justify the possession of large amounts of 
alcohol.861 Before the introduction of rationing “one could possibly explain that 
the large quantity of alcohol was the result of long hours spent in lines”, with sob 
stories about the whole family taking numerous turns in line, until it all added 
up.862 From October 1981, this defense was no longer admissible. New trading 
strategies had to be devised, and new channels of supply and distribution chart-
ed. Wholesalers, who had capital, contacts, and operational capacity, were more 
likely to succeed than small-time dealers. They soon worked out a whole range 
of ways of acquiring liquor – from creatively taking advantage of state producers, 
through stealing and ration coupons scams to purchases in Pewex stores. Their 
risk was higher but their potential profits could be, and often were, considerable. 
861 Ibid., fol. 27.
862 Spekulacja wódką i spirytusem, TL, no. 2/January 4, 982.
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For example in late 1981, a team of seven speculators from Poznań sold 20 000 
bottles of vodka, making some 4.5 million zloty in the process.863 In the following 
years, this impressive amount proved to be far from a record!
The simplest method was getting alcohol at source, from a state distillery. 
As was the case with the meat plants mentioned earlier, under pressure from 
the unions and often with the acquiescence of local authorities, Polmos (Polish 
Spirits Monopoly) factories pursued their own distribution policy. They bartered 
products with other factories, and sold directly to institutions and private indi-
viduals.864 In 1981 alone, at least 270 000 bottles of spirits and 380 000 bottles of 
vodka “dematerialized” en route to clients.865 The practice continued when Mar-
tial Law was introduced. By then, however, the government had a number of new, 
different regulations at its disposal. In early February 1982, both employees’ spir-
its allowances and sales outside the official retail network were robustly curtailed. 
As a result, in 1982, the alcohol industry became one of the few branches of food 
industry where the employees could not expect allowances.866
It was possible to limit the quasi-legal alcohol trade with legislation but not 
to eliminate other channels for the flow of alcohol out of the distilleries. Despite 
the fact that by 1982, Polmos had conducted a staff review, replacing some of its 
security employees and giving everybody a 20 percent pay rise – intended as a 
disincentive to theft, throughout the decade fraud in distilleries was as common 
as it was in meat plants. Polmos employees tended to generate a strategic pro-
duction surplus, by such means as applying the upper limits of permitted losses 
and the so-called production atrophy. Stealing alcohol at bottling stations or in 
transportation was also common.867 
During alcohol transportation, breakage allowances were commonly used to 
the utmost. In May 1984, General Edwin Rozłubirski shrewdly pointed out that 
there were ten times fewer breakages during the transportation of vinegar or 
methylated spirits than in alcohol shipments. Crucially, the retail outlets masked 
863 Ibid.
864 AAN, URM, 32/45, fol. 90; see: ibid., 32/190, fol. 13.
865 Spekulacja w ”Polmosie”, TL, no. 215/September 10, 1982. During the first four months 
of rationing, one of the Warsaw alcohol plants sold 50 000 bottles of spirit and vodka 
outside the rationing system. The buyers, usually restaurant franchise owners, were 
selling the alcohol often outside the premises, and always at a much higher price. 
In Łódź in late 1981, another single plant bought and sold 2 250 bottles of alcohol; 
AAN, URM, 32/113, fol. 29; ibid., 32/15, fol. 22.
866 AAN, URM, 32/45, fol. 91–92.
867 AAN, URM, 32/57, fol. 95.
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theft as breakage in order to avoid investigation. In 1983, in railroad transport 
there were alcohol “breakages” to the value of 729 million zloty. 
Theoretically, instances of theft were considerably less frequent (in 1983, 50 
million zlotys’ worth of alcohol “disappeared” in railroad transportation; for 
comparison – 20 million zlotys’ worth of cars and bicycles, and 26 million zlotys’ 
worth of sugar vanished from transportation during the same period).868
Kasztel club in Warsaw, the storehouse. The haul during a raid in November 1981 included 
2 500 bottles of vodka. Photo: Polish Press Agency (PAP).
The methods of stealing were often quite sophisticated. For example in 1983 in 
Lublin, a group of drivers delivering alcohol to Pewex stores “invented a method 
of opening and closing [bottles] without damaging the aluminum caps, which 
allowed them to remove alcohol from the bottles, replace it with water and then 
deliver them to the recipient with the said content.” The culprits were never 
identified.869 The stolen alcohol was sold to small-scale melina owners and savvy 
wholesalers among whom were liquor store employees and managers of restau-
rants – either state-owned or private; these clients had the best opportunities for 
868 AAN, URM, 32/57, fol. 10–12, 70.
869 AAN, URM, 32/104, fol. 67.
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further distribution. To take one example, in 1982 the owner of a restaurant fran-
chise in Księży Dwór near Działdowo turned into cash more than 43 000 bottles 
of vodka, with a massive profit of 9 million zloty. The agents of two Poznań bars, 
Dobosz and Osiedle, made four million zloty by selling 20 000 bottles through 
other outlets. Reports about the sales of bottles of alcohol in their thousands 
were the order of the day.870 
State monopoly stores had strategies of their own, albeit not always foolproof, 
that allowed them to generate profit from legally obtained supply. The retailers 
had little faith in the viability of complete control of the rationing system, espe-
cially since the complicated rules for the barter of rationed goods such as coffee 
or chocolate for alcohol rendered any supervision impossible.871 In early 1982, 
in one of the stores in the Warsaw district of Mokotów, 6 934 bottles of vodka 
were sold without ration coupons; another outlet, in Kutno, sold outside of the 
rationing system approximately 16 000 bottles between July 1981 and July 1982 
(at a profit of 3 million zloty).872 
There were numerous attempts to obfuscate the unlawful operations by us-
ing counterfeit coupons or re-using alcohol coupons that had already been 
used. Time and time again, bogus coupons were discovered in the stores in such 
large quantities that it was impossible to put this down to accidental mistakes or 
the inattentiveness of staff members. Just in one Grocers’ Cooperative store in 
Szczecin, as many as 3 320 fake coupons were found, in another store, Farmers 
Self-Help – 615, and in the state spirit monopoly store in Inowrocław – 1 091. 
Several months later, thousands of counterfeit alcohol coupon stubs surfaced in 
stores in Upper and Lower Silesia.873 Forged alcohol coupons were widespread 
in all Poland.874
Equally profitable and certainly less risky was a creative interpretation of the 
edict that authorized state administration officials to grant special alcohol al-
lowances on account of birth and wedding celebrations as well as funerals. A 
common strategy was to submit in the registry office “documents referring to a 
planned marriage for no other reason but to acquire a permit to purchase a large 
amount of alcohol for the wedding reception. As soon as the document has been 
obtained, the couple would change their mind and the wedding was off.”875 The 
870 AAN, URM, 32/114, fol. 104; AAN, KC PZPR, WA, LI/118, fol. 155–156.
871 AAN, URM, 32/114, fol. 53.
872 AAN, URM, 1.4/21, fol. 43; ibid., 32/119, fol. 187.
873 AAN, URM, 1.4./21, fol. 36–37; ibid., 32/180, fol. 3, 18.
874 AAN, IPP, 65, fol. 27; AAN, URM, 32/13, fol. 22.
875 AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 25.
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certificates were also forged on a mass scale or used on multiple occasions by 
different people.876 In that way, with shrewd forward planning, one could acquire 
significant amounts of liquor and make a tidy profit. In February 1982, it was 
reported from Siedlce that three representatives of, as the dispatch strenuously 
emphasized, “private initiative” – the owner of a concrete making business, of a 
private cab, and of a repair work shop – were suspected of “buying alcohol with 
forged certificates and selling it at black market prices. The authorities seized a 
typewriter, stamps, and a set of print fonts used to forge the certificates author-
izing the purchase of alcohol for a wedding reception. It was established that the 
culprits had bought more than 1 500 bottles and made 750 000 zloty.”877 
The black market price of alcohol was so high and the dollar price in the 
hard-currency-only Pewex stores so low that it was worthwhile buying vodka, 
especially the cheaper brands, in Pewex and selling it on through unofficial chan-
nels with a satisfactory profit margin. By late 1981, large amounts of Pewex alco-
hol had entered the free market. Pewex vodka or cognac was commonly traded 
in monopoly stores, restaurants, and dining cars,878 as well as being routinely 
available in melinas. Not only was alcohol available in Pewex stores without any 
ration coupons but it could also be bought as soon as the store opened: early in 
the morning rather than from 1 pm, as was the case with other stores. No wonder 
that Pewex remained the supply destination of choice for alcohol dealers even 
after the abolition of rationing. 
The abolition of alcohol rationing in the spring of 1983 only minimally dimin-
ished the volume of the illegal liquor trade. Rationing coupons and certificate 
fraud became a thing of the past. With high prices and poor supply, all the above 
mentioned strategies for generating surplus remained in use. The abolition of 
alcohol rationing coincided with the introduction of sales restrictions, combin-
ing to create a perfect base for rebuilding the traditional system of underground 
alcohol dives. The majority of those waiting in line in front of a state monopoly 
liquor store before it opened at 1 pm every weekday were female owners of the 
melinas. 
Unsurprisingly, until the second half of the 1980s, alcohol was the uncontest-
ed winner in the black market statistics. Even in 1987, as much as 60 percent of il-
legal trade involved spirits. The potential profits were sufficiently rewarding that 
even the stepping up of repression at the turn of 1984 and 1985, in particular the 
876 AAN, URM, 32/113, fol. 275.
877 AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 73.
878 J.W. Wójcik, Meliny i ich klienci, “Gazeta Prawnicza” 1985, no. 4.
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Act of May 10, 1985, the introduction of higher fines and the potentially longer 
custodial sentences did nothing to curb the thriving black market in alcohol. 
“Indeed, there are still fines of five thousand each,” the Supreme Court Judge 
Ryszard Bodecki said in April 1985. “As I was just saying to the Minister, yester-
day we had the case of a retired vodka dealer. It is mainly pensioners who trade 
in vodka. No one is researching this phenomenon. One can say that 90% of them 
are pensioners, so let’s just fine them 5 000 for the hell of it…The Minister insists 
on a 50 000 zloty fine. The man’s pension is 7 900 zloty, he is old and sick but 
he’s been trading bootleg for a long time. So, to be blunt, we did up the ante and 
applied the 50 000 zloty fine. Throughout the proceedings he kept crying and we 
could not communicate with him at all. But here is the interesting thing. After the 
sentencing, we told him – after all, he is an elderly man – that there was a pos-
sibilty of paying in installments. His face brightened and he said ‘God bless you, 
Judge’. I said nothing but what I’m trying to say here is that, clearly, the 50 000 did 
not pose a problem for him.”879 
Judge Bodecki unwittingly touched upon the changes taking place in the so-
cial profile of the illicit alcohol trade, partly due to the eventful start to the 1980s. 
In 1986, the law enforcement agencies reported 2 927 cases of alcohol specula-
tion, of which 75% were in the cities. Among the 2 267 convicted offenders, 1 226 
(49.6%) were women, 1 088 (47.9%) – pensioners and retirees, 373 (16.4%) un-
employed, 352 persons with previous convictions, 1 318 (58.1%) were above the 
age of 49, and 698 (30.7%) in the 30–49 age group.880 These statistics show that 
the stereotypical image of the illicit alcohol trader as a pensioner was no longer 
accurate. Quite a number of these operators were capable of turning over vast 
quantities of alcohol. The record was perhaps set by a female janitor from Prze-
myśl who between January 1984 and June 1986 bought and sold with spectacular 
profit (9 million zloty!) at least 58 400 bottles of vodka and wine.
Just like the money changers, the melina owners were creative and flexible; 
having adjusted well to the state retail strategies, they did not shy away from at-
tempts to monopolize the local market. When in the mid-1980s, a night alcohol 
store opened in one of the big cities, the authorities received numerous letters of 
complaint. After some investigation, the police established that they were written 
by local bootleg dealers who wanted to squash the competition. When a night 
store opened in Warsaw, the nearby melina began to sell alcohol with the same 
879 AAN, URM, 32/74, fol. 25.
880 AAN, URM, 32/104, fol. 97.
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20% surcharge.881 Whereas, however, the state store was closed between 6 am 
and 1 pm, the illicit dens operated at all hours and were able to dictate the prices. 
On July 19, 1990 (Journal of Laws, no. 73, item 431), the regulations of the Act 
of October 26, 1982 were abolished with the effect of restricting alcohol sales 
and putting paid to the majority of melinas. It was only the small-fry retailers, 
however, who were eliminated from the black market. The sharks continued to 
do well and, together with gas, liquor became one of the pillars of the grey zone 
retail commerce in the era of transformation. Interestingly, in today’s capitalist 
Poland bimber has not yet become history – despite the distillation of moonshine 
by private individuals remaining illegal, it continues to be widely produced today. 
Some distil their own bimber, because they cannot afford store alcohol. Others, as 
they did in the early 1980s, enjoy the activity as a hobby. Moonshine has come to 
be an attraction on even the most sophisticated tables.




Automobiles and, as a result, the fuel that they ran on were probably the leading 
commodities traded on the black market in the Soviet Bloc countries. The mass 
prevalence of the automobile as a private means of transportation did not arrive 
there until decades later than in the capitalist world; this delayed gratification 
only reinforced the symbolic status of car ownership. Unlike in the West, where 
the automotive industry had long been considered the motor of the economy, 
and where a brand-new car was available for less than the average annual wage, 
in the countries behind the Iron Curtain it was a truly onerous endeavor to buy 
a vehicle and the coveted goal considerably more expensive, often involving a 
multiple of the Western price. Prospective buyers had to commit themselves to 
long-time money-saving, often taking a second job and making numerous sacri-
fices. In the Eastern bloc shortage economy, the automobile was not a commodity 
that was universally accessible. “To buy a car in Eastern Europe,” wrote the British 
journalist Roger Boyes, “you need the patience of a Franciscan monk, a pocket 
full of dollars or the sixth sense of a horse trader. Sometimes – all three.”882 
In the Soviet Bloc countries, the government aspired to a tight grip on the 
carefully managed automotive market. The commodity was allocated on the ba-
sic of a complex system of formal and informal rationing aided by priority lists, 
car coupons and individual allocations based on a person’s merit, rank, status or 
connections. To be able to buy a car was a privilege, a reward, a gratuity, and at 
times a form of bribery. Those whom the authorities considered useful, or those 
high in the pecking order, could expect to lay their hands on a four-wheeler of 
their own relatively swiftly. The vast majority of all others, just as eager to get 
behind the wheel, not only had to make pre-payments greatly in advance but 
also wait patiently, not infrequently for a number of years. Unsurprisingly, from 
the Elbe to Vladivostok, social strategies focused on ways of by-passing the line 
for cars or whittling down the wait. One common practice was to buy coupons 
allocated to other people – at a hefty mark-up – bought off dealers who had har-
assed the lucky recipients of the said coupons to trade them in. Another method 
was to intercept allocations for privileged groups such as the handicapped and 
882 R. Boyes, The Hard Road to Market. Gorbachev, the Underworld, and the Rebirth of 
Capitalism, London 1990, p. 128. See: L. H. Siegelbaum, Car for Comrades. The Life 
of the Soviet Automobile, Ithaca–London 2008; The Socialist Car: Automobility in the 
Eastern Bloc, ed. L. H. Siegelbaum, Ithaca–London 2011.
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farmers.883 Those who were in a hurry, who could afford it, and who cared about 
quality could bring a car from abroad, or buy it from the state for hard currency 
or for zloty on the free market.884 What all these methods had in common was 
that none was cheap; often, as a result, the “financial effort put into buying a car 
was so strenuous that it subsequently forced the driver to save on the running 
costs of the vehicle.”885 
Thus, the dream car often remained idle rather than hitting the road. Many 
owners used their car only sporadically, content purely with the ownership of the 
vehicle; the proverbial “Sunday driver”, with his less than assured driving skills, 
was a common sight on the poorly marked and signposted roads of communist 
Poland and other Soviet Bloc countries. For a significant number of the owners 
such rationed use was understandably not an optimal solution. Paradoxically, 
 
883 D. O’Hearn, The Consumer Second Economy. Size and Effects, “Soviet Studies” 32, 1980, 
no. 2, pp. 218–234; Z. Kapitány, J. Kornai, J. Szabó, Reproduction of shortage on the 
Hungarian car market, “Soviet Studies” 36, 1984, no. 2, pp. 236–256. The socialist car… 
(especially Valentina Fava on Czechoslovakia, pp. 17–29, Mariusz Jastrząb on com-
munist Poland, pp. 30– 46, and György Péteri on Hungary, pp, 47–68). In the 1970s, in 
the Polish People’s Republic car coupon made possible the quick purchase of a car at 
the wholesale price. The difference with the retail price formed therefore a handsome 
bonus. See: Rynek motoryzacyjny, ed. Z. Krasiński, Warszawa 1980, p. 85. On the Polish 
system of allocation (and especially breaking its rules) see: J. Nawrot, Talonowy biznes, 
PiŻ, 1982, no. 10; J. Nawrot, Pamiętnik młodego asystenta, ibid., no. 12.
884 D. O’Hearn, The Consumer Second Economy…, p. 220; Z. Kapitány, J. Kornai, J. Szabó, 
Reproduction of Shortage…, p. 239; S. Wolle, Die heile Welt der Diktatur. Alltag und 
Herrschaft in der DDR 1971–1989, Berlin 1998, pp. 312–315. In Poland such institu-
tions as PHZ, Pol-Mot, Pewex, and Motoimpex sold commodities for hard currencies. 
Since the 1960s, marketplaces (such as giełda, the popular public auction) sprung up 
in larger towns and cities. On these markets, car went for some 30 to 50 percent above 
wholesale prices; Rynek motoryzacyjny…, pp. 86–87. Since the mid-1960s, the number 
of cars brought privately from abroad grew systematically: 1 110 cars in 1962, 2 314 
in 1965, 5 587 in 1968, 6 198 in 1969. After raising customs duties in March 1970, 
only 558 vehicles were privately imported in the following year. In March 1972, with 
the tariffs lowered, their numbers quickly went up again, reaching 3 532 vehicles in 
1973 and 4 011 in 1974. In 1979, as many as 12 050 automobiles were brought from 
abroad. At the turn of the 1960s and the 1970s, the most popular western brand 
was Volkswagen, followed by Fiat, Ford, Opel, BMW, Mercedes, NSU, Simca, Volvo, 
Peugeot, Austin, Citroen, and Morris; AAN, GUC, 23/397, Kompendium statystyczne 
administracji celnej 1946–1974, fol. 121–126; Rynek motoryzacyjny…, p. 45.
885 J. Urban, Z głowy na szosę, “Polityka”, no. 46/November 18, 1976.
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while the communist shortage economy, on the one hand, made owning a car 
difficult, on the other hand it provided easy access to illegal gas, for which the 
state held the monopoly. The nationalized economy was wasteful and well known 
for its absurd rules and regulations. The illusory inspections and large numbers 
of eager participants, both as vendors and buyers, often led to a situation where 
fraud was practically inevitable. Due to its economic and physical characteristics, 
gasoline was the commodity par excellence for illicit trade: no gasoline substitute 
was available nor could it be produced by homegrown methods, as was the case 
with other black-market products that had been siphoned off from state supplies. 
Gasoline was relatively easy to obtain while frauds were difficult to detect. 
A peculiar characteristic of the black market and gasoline was that both par-
ties to the transaction could notch up a tangible profit. The fuel could usually 
be acquired relatively easily from official sources, since the gasoline “surpluses” 
artificially created by the employees of the state monopoly to enable themselves 
to commit fraud were quite considerable, demand was limited due to insignificant 
private car ownership. Under the circumstances, the black market price of gas 
was half the official price. As the fluctuations in the price of gas in Poland during 
the 1980s demonstrated, however, such favorable pricing could and did change 
rapidly according to the circumstances. The private demand for fuel, prompted by 
the rapidly growing number of vehicles and citizens developing a liking for the 
freedom of movement they provided, expanded so much that when gas supply 
collapsed, drivers were willing to pay multiples of the official price without batting 
an eyelid. The alternative was unpalatable to the prevailing pragmatic approach: 
pay more for gas – or travel on the overcrowded public transportation.
There is no doubt that a black market for fuel existed in all the Soviet Bloc 
countries. Its size and type depended on the accessibility of gas, the number of 
people who owned cars, and the official price of gas, as well as social determi-
nants: prosperity, level of acceptance for black market practices, etc. Unquestion-
ably Poland was similar to the Soviet Union where in the mid-1970s one third 
of private vehicles ran on state gas. Where the distances were greater and people 
earned less, between 60 and 70% (but as much as 86.5% in Omsk in 1971) of gas 
found its way to private gas tanks from illicit sources. In places where the citizens 
did not have great distances to drive and society was more prosperous, such as 
the Baltic Republics, this rate hovered between 18 and 38%.886 However, when 
in the mid-1980s state deliveries of fuel were not able to keep up with a growing 
886 D. O’Hearn, The Consumer Second Economy…, p. 221; M.V. Alexeev, The Underground 
Market for Gasoline in the USSR, “Comparative Economic Studies” 30, 1988, no. 2, p. 53.
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automobile sector, the number of people taking advantage of the illegal supply 
grew radically. Of all the Soviet Bloc countries the problems with fuel were the 
most drastic in Poland in the 1980s. Polish strategies for bypassing the state mo-
nopoly were therefore the most developed and sophisticated.
7.1  Driving on Bootleg: From the 1950s to the 1970s
Immediately after the Second World War, the only private vehicles in Poland 
were survivors from pre-war times or those released from army surpluses. Nev-
ertheless, automobiles were so few and far between that the Statistical Year Book 
from 1949, in the section entitled Transportation and Communication did not list 
private cars at all. In 1951, the Polish government factory launched the Warszawa 
trademark autos but the numbers rolling off the production line made barely a 
dent in the existing demand. In 1955, there were only 20 500 vehicles in private 
hands – a drop in the ocean in a country, the population of which in the last cen-
sus (1950) exceeded 25 million. With such insignificant numbers, the gas flowing 
from official to private gas tanks – which indubitably must have been going on – 
remained overshadowed by the large volume of other black market offences and 
remained unrecorded. This changed in 1956 when the political thaw left its mark 
also in the automobile sector. This was due to evolving models of consumption, 
with car ownership becoming socially acceptable rather than a remaining a sus-
pect sign of “conspicuous consumption”; moreover, the development of private 
enterprise was combined with increasing prosperity. In Radom, to take but one 
example, between early 1957 and May 1958, the number of private vehicles dou-
bled.887 The demand for cars triggered a black market in permits authorizing the 
purchase of a car.888 
Demand for cheap gas grew as a consequence, and gas thefts soon followed, 
albeit on a small scale in comparison to other crimes within the state transpor-
tation system. In 1956, gas thefts were estimated to have reached a value of 70 
million zloty whereas there were 200 million worth of thefts of ferried goods, 
170 million worth of tools and illegal transportation of people also took place.889 
However, it was gas theft that proved to be an increasingly prominent phenom-
enon – so widespread, in fact, that it became a running joke with the nation 
887 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/281, fol. 26.
888 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXXII–7, fol. 30; ibid., 237/XXXII–27, fol. 186.
889 Szara strefa Października. „Notatka” o nielegalnych dochodach w Polsce 1956–1957 
(The October 1956 grey zone. A “note” on illegal income in Poland 1956–1957), ed. 
J. Kochanowski, PH, 95, 2004, z. 1, p. 87.
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resigned to the ‘new normal’: “Do you drive on the right or on the left in Poland?” 
“Neither. You drive on bootleg”. Satirical magazines were not averse to ridiculing 
the situation.890 
“Do you drive on the right or on the left in Poland?” “Neither. You drive on bootleg”, 
Zbigniew Kiulin, “Szpilki”, no. 7, 15 February 1959.
890 See Z. Kiulin’s joke, on similar lines, in the satirical magazine “Szpilki”, no.7, 1959/ 
February 7. Nota bene, by 1959 the number of private autos increased threefold in 
comparison to 1956 – from 24 700 to 78 600! 
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Without a doubt, large numbers of vehicles were driven on bootleg gas. In May 
1965, Police Headquarters, the Oil Products Market, and the National Councils’ 
presidia estimated that in 1964, private vehicles used approximately 284 400 tons 
of fuel in spite of the fact that gas stations had sold only 124 400 tons to drivers. 
The remaining 160 000 tons came from state gas tanks.891 It was not very difficult 
to obtain gas illegally – the allowances in state transportation were inflated and 
state inspectors were not interested in putting a lot of effort in monitoring trans-
port. Drivers, dispatchers, and security co-existed on transport bases in mutually 
beneficial, symbiotic relationships. 
Corruption was so widespread that in workplaces where the fuel manage-
ment rules were strictly observed, workers occasionally mutinied and drivers 
quit, looking for bosses prepared to turn a blind eye.892 The substitute solutions 
offered to drivers proved unattractive. State enterprises provided a bonus of an 
amount of up to 85% of the value of the theoretically saved fuel. This was more 
than the driver could get by selling gas illegally (na lewo) or by striking an agree-
ment with employees of the Centrala Produktów Naftowych (CPN), the state 
enterprise that comprised all petrol stations in Poland. The following confession 
made in the 1980s by a driver illustrates very well the motivation of many others 
also in the earlier years: “Why are we engaging in wheeler-dealing? If I manage to 
save gas systematically, for each liter they will pay me 85% of the value but there 
are strings attached. In three months they will cut my allowance. Meanwhile the 
vehicle is getting older. It uses more gas. So I use more than my allowance. And 
for that they deduct 100% of the price from my wages. I can’t afford to be subsi-
dizing the state business.”893 
Thus, the drivers commonly recorded in their logs heavier loads than they 
had transported in reality, so as to justify higher fuel consumption. For example 
in 1962, in the Katowice voivodship, according to drivers’ logs, a shipment au-
thorized by the Ministry of Construction comprised 26 million tons of goods 
whereas in reality there was not more than 3.8 million tons – a staggering-
ly bold discrepancy. The drivers tweaked the engines and logged much longer 
routes than the ones actually covered. This led to a situation similar to that in 
the mid-1970s in the Voivodship Car Transportation Enterprise in Bydgoszcz 
where the trucks would have had to have driven with an average speed of 200 
km/h in order to cover the distance recorded in the drivers’ logbooks.894 It was 
891 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/V–615, fol. 104.
892 A. Teneta, Na jałowym biegu, “Polityka”, no. 3/January 18, 1976.
893 A.J. Socha, Kurs na lewo, “Tygodnik Kulturalny”, no. 19/May 11, 1986.
894 D. Frey, Ciemna liczba, “Tygodnik Demokratyczny” May 15, 1977.
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impossible to check how many kilometers the drivers really had covered – of the 
20 000 vehicles inspected in 1964, 7 028 had no odometers or their odometers 
were broken. In one of the firms in Gorzów, 72 out of 74 vehicles had tweaked 
odometers.895 The specialists counted thirty methods of “adjusting” an odometer 
– from basic to quite sophisticated.896 Tachographs registering all the actions of 
vehicles and drivers became more popular only at the turn of the 1970s and the 
1980s, impeding the lucrative trade. But even the most elaborate equipment was 
never an obstacle to the determined drivers. 
Every year thousands of tons of the “saved” fuel ended up in private gas tanks. 
The operation took place mostly in the garages – of which there were more than 
ten thousand in transport bases, on construction sites, in factories, mines, and 
on State Agriculture Farms (PGR). The practice was not very convenient for 
the state-employed drivers who had to look for clients and transfer fuel to their 
tanks. Drivers preferred to buy fuel at CPN gas stations, of which there were 
1 300 in Poland in the 1970s, and supplement their income in this, much easier 
way. This method, used from the 1950s until the 1980s, was not exactly a black 
market operation, since the object of the trade was not the fuel but the docu-
ments confirming its purchase. Nevertheless, it merits a mention. 
The drivers kept a running tally of the fuel saved. They would pull up at the 
gas station where they had struck up a “special” relationship with the manager 
and get from him “receipts for a larger amount of gas than they had actually 
purchased. For example the driver would buy 20 liters of gas and the manager 
would give him a receipt for 120. The fictitious number of liters appeared only 
in the top copy of the receipt given to the driver. The manager of the gas station 
kept the copy […], on which there was the actual amount of gas sold in the trans-
action.”897 Sometimes, the manager would write a receipt without selling any gas, 
which conjured up for him an instantaneous surplus. He would get rid of it by 
selling fuel to regular customers, for the official price but without providing any 
receipts. The gas station employee would typically be rewarded with a third of 
the value of the gas saved by the driver, who in turn had to share his profit with 
his partners at the workplace.898 
This practice was relatively safe. The accounts at the CPN station balanced and 
corresponded to the amount of gas remaining, and the state enterprise managers 
895 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/V–615, fol. 104–105.
896 A. Teneta, Na jałowym biegu, “Polityka”, no. 3/January 18, 1976.
897 Report on economic crime in 1959, Warsaw 1960 (Supreme Audit Office, NIK, De-
partment of Economic Fraud, copy in author’s possesion), p. 58.
898 Ibid.; Z. Branach, Przecieka nie tylko benzyna, “Życie Literackie” 1982, no. 40.
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rarely questioned the receipts submitted by the drivers for reimbursement, and 
not just because they also participated in the profits of the operation. More im-
portant was the fear that a disgruntled employee could walk out; factory man-
agers could not afford to miss their production targets – and this was likely with 
reduced worker numbers. Even if the internal inspection did find irregularities, 
which was rarely the case, the usual sanctions were no more than a warning or 
a reprimand.899 The scale of the frauds transpired only when the police investi-
gated the receipts. From mid-1958 to mid-1959, a manager of a CPN station in 
Katowice issued 1 330 fictitious receipts for 570 000 zloty (for 120 000 liters of gas 
in total); between 1962 and 1963, another gas station manager, in Praszka, sold 
1 700 receipts to the total value of 944 000 zloty to 387 drivers from 91 companies. 
Gas station attendants from Gdynia and Lębork clocked up deals to the tune of 
700 000 zloty. It transpired that the ratio of profit division was almost identical 
with the ratio of prosecuted gas station workers to state company drivers – the 
investigation conducted between 1963 and 1965 included 349 CPN workers and 
861 “nationalized enterprise drivers”900 – was this no more than a coincidence?
Whereas in the 1950s and the 1960s the CPN employees and drivers involved 
in the deals had known one another, if only because they had been based in 
the same locality, and the relationship had been built on trust, the next decade 
brought a radical change. The practice, until then local in character, began to 
function “on a mass and national scale with partners who did not know each 
other.”901 In large part, this was a consequence of the automobile revolution of the 
Gierek era coinciding with the international oil crisis and a local recession. In the 
1970s, Poland finally crossed over the great divide between the “motorcycle civ-
ilization”902 and the age of the automobile, when four wheels of one own finally 
“stopped being at odds with the acceptable socialist lifestyle.”903 Regardless of the 
government’s intentions, in the first half of the decade the number of privately 
owned automobiles grew on average by 100 000, and in the second half – by 
899 S.M. Jankowski, “Swoje chłopy” przy beczce z benzyną, “Życie Literackie” March 9, 
1980.
900 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/V–615, fol. 103.
901 S.M. Jankowski, “Swoje chłopy” przy beczce z benzyną, “Życie Literackie” March 9, 
1980.
902 While in the West cars were much more numerous than motorcycles, there were 6.82 
motorcycles to every car in Poland in 1961. In 1972 this ratio was still high – 2.84 
motorcycles per car – but falling systematically; Z. Krasiński, H. Mruk, P. Rzepczyński, 
Handel i usługi na tle rozwoju motoryzacji indywidualnej, Warszawa 1977, p. 18.
903 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/465, fol. 174.
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almost 300 000 per annum (with the increases in 1977 of 1 505, in 1998 of 1 
791 000, and in 1979 of 2 069 400).904 
The awakened appetites were brutally dampened by the international oil crisis, 
which arrived in Poland with some delay. In January 1974, gas and diesel prices 
went up significantly, 75% and 22% respectively. The reaction of the market was 
as immediate as it was typical. Whereas in 1973 deliveries for private customers 
had increased by 20%, in 1974 they shrank by 6%. The trend remained constant – 
while between 1970 and 1973 the pace of fuel deliveries to the market was related 
to the expanding number of automobiles, between 1974 and 1976, the growth in 
supply was half the rate of that of private vehicles. Initially, this was attributed 
to more rational gas usage and a larger number of more economic, low engine 
capacity cars. As time went on, it was the “leaks” from the nationalized sector that 
came to be blamed for the situation.905 
As mentioned before, in the 1970s, the “leaks” became a national phenome-
non, occurring regularly in places where before they had been sporadic. Char-
acteristically, the incidence of these “gas leaks” replicated the rate of decreasing 
purchases at gas stations. In the Krakow voivodship, several months after the 
price hike, although the number of cars had increased by a few thousand during 
the period, the sales of 78-octane gas, fell by a quarter, and diesel sales fell by two 
thirds. Only the sales of 94-octane gas – on which very few cars in nationalized 
sector were running – remained stable.906 
The fall in diesel sales was due to the fact that farmers and those who used it 
for heating had found alternative sources of supply. For example, in preparation 
for the winter of 1973, the residents of Zakopane purchased 34 000 liters of diesel 
during October alone. A year later they bought only 3 000. Private farmers were 
significant consumers of diesel. Between 1971 and 1979, the number of private 
tractors rose eight times, from 30 000 to 250 000. During the same period, diesel 
sales tripled from 94 000 to 255 000 tons. “In the vicinity of large entities such as 
the Farmers’ Cooperative Association (Spółdzielnia Kółek Rolniczych, SKR) and 
the National Machinery Center (Państwowy Ośrodek Maszynowy, POM), no-one 
buys diesel at CPN gas stations. The transaction takes place directly between the 
heavy vehicle driver and the buyer.”907 However, estimated “leaks” of 350 000 liters 
of diesel annually seem understated.908 
904 Rynek motoryzacyjny…, p. 45.
905 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/476, fol. 26–28.
906 A. Teneta, Na jałowym biegu, “Polityka”, no. 3/January 18, 1976.
907 Z. Branach, Przecieka nie tylko benzyna, “Życie Literackie” 1982, no. 40.
908 Ibid.
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The strategies used by gas station managers also changed. On the one hand, 
they continued cooperation with the drivers, based on double account keeping 
as outlined earlier. However, the practice became increasingly risky and perhaps 
insufficiently profitable. With the growing demand for fuel, a much more finan-
cially rewarding option now was to cooperate with gas warehouse wholesalers 
from warehouses and treatment plants owned by CPN instead of with retailers 
from gas stations. “Leaks” from such sources had occurred earlier but only in the 
1970s did they reach a significant scale. The best-known was the case of the Oil 
Products Management Enterprise (Zakład Gospodarki Produktami Naftowymi) 
in Mościska near Warsaw, where – manipulating the permitted wastage limits – 
from July 1977 to May 1979 the employees were able to “save” for illicit dealing 
approximately 1.6 million liters of gas, which was then cashed in in 16 CPN 
gas stations in Warsaw and its vicinity.909 As often happens, the discovery of one 
fraud had the knock-on effect of an avalanche of inspections, which resulted in 
32 investigations, the identification of 600 suspects and 180 arrests. It turned out 
that a large-scale, illegal flow of fuel was occurring throughout the entire coun-
try, with the greatest number of cases uncovered in the Białystok voivodship, 
in the vicinity of Ciechanów, and in the Warsaw, Krakow, and Tarnów voivod-
ships, replicating – interestingly, and perhaps not incidentally – the “moonshine 
geography” outlined earlier.910 And, just as it turned out to be for the illicit alcohol 
trade, the following decade was critical also for the black market in fuel. State-
owned transportation bases and CPN stations became the equivalent of melinas 
and, seeking compensation for the increasingly risky endeavor, charged increas-
ingly high commission.
7.2  “The As-good-as Private Pump”: The 1980s
In the late 1970s Polish refineries processed approximately 17 million tons of oil 
annually. Most of it, some 13 million tons, was imported from the Soviet Union, 
and 3.5 million tons came from the so-called “second payment area”, while only 
400 000 tons were from Polish resources. As a result of the economic crisis, first 
deliveries from the capitalist countries shrank tenfold, then local production fell by 
200% (hopes for “big-time oil” in Karlin failed to materialize), and imports from 
909 I. Czaplarska, Benzynowy gang, czyli okazja czyni złodzieja, TL, no. 303/December 
22, 1983.
910 S.M. Jankowski, “Swoje chłopy” przy beczce z benzyną, “Życie Literackie” March 9, 
1980. Towards the end of the 1970s, the annual fuel market reached 1.5 mln tons, of 
which some 200 000 was traded on the black market; AAN, URM, 32/84, fol. 27–28.
 275
the Soviet Union diminished. While in 1979 Poland had at its disposal 17.1 million 
tons of oil, in 1980 it had only 15.8, in 1981 – 13.8, and in 1982 –13.3 million. Al-
though every year several hundred thousand new automobiles appeared on Polish 
roads, the amount of gas sold on the official market remained unchanged. “The 
car sector grew”, a Warsaw gas station employee explained in mid-1983, “folks got 
used to driving cars, and then… no more gas! So they try to cheat whenever they 
can.”911 In the fall of 1981, the topic of the fuel trade and consumption swamped the 
anti-speculation official reports and until 1989 occupied a prominent position next 
to meat and alcohol. New strategies were added to the old tried and tested ones, 
particularly after the introduction of the fuel rationing system.
Poles experienced serious problems with fuel supplies in mid-1981, and in the 
following year the situation got even worse. Until then, driving a car remained 
the only luxury that did not require ration coupons, a luxury that was systemat-
ically curtailed due to some the gas stations earmarked exclusively for privileged 
customers. This was compounded by the ban on selling gas pumped directly into 
canisters and on selling more than 10 to maximum 20 liters at a time, by selling 
gas on odd or even dates only and according to the last digits of the driver’s 
license plate. Overcoming these obstacles had important practical implications: 
those who had a tankful of gas were able, for example, to “drive to the countryside 
and buy from a farmer more meat than the modest amount possible with food 
coupons, which also required a lot of time wasted standing in long lines. It is 
better to sit in a car waiting for gas than to stand in line for meat.”912
Those with fat enough wallets did not have to wait in line at all. In March 
1981, the authorities ended the practice of reimbursing state drivers based on 
gas receipts from CPN gas stations, which obliterated the two-decade old, suc-
cessful cooperation. Now, the basis for reimbursement became the mileage, or 
rather the kilometer count. State drivers, however, were able to sell the surplus to 
private clients, who now came in person and paid three or as many as five times 
the regular price. Some drivers of state-owned vehicles radically accelerated the 
whole process. Allowed to buy gas at designated stations, as soon as they had 
filled up their own tanks, they transferred the contents to a private customer’s 
gas tank. Some of the cab drivers that enjoyed similar privileges gave up cab 
driving altogether and focused on re-selling gas, as this was now a much better 
business.913 “When it comes to gas, 1981 was the best year,” a driver of a company 
911 M. Kwiatkowski, Kto rano. wstaje…, “Polityka”, no. 29/July 16, 1983.
912 A.K. Wróblewski, Ostatni luksus, “Polityka”, no. 47/November 21, 1981.
913 S. Drozdowski, Tajne kanały czarnego rynku, “Słowo Powszechne”, September 8, 1981; 
AAN, KC PZPR, WA, LI/116, fol. 112; AAN, URM, 32/119, fol. 21. 
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Fiat125 reminisced in 1983. “We didn’t even have to do any driving. People paid 
through the nose for a 20-liter canister.”914 Selling gas to foreigners was particu-
larly profitable. On the main routes one could get as much as 30 Deutschmarks 
for a 20-liter canister.915 
Kasztel club in Warsaw, the storehouse. The haul during the raid in November 1981 
included 1 500 litres of petrol. Photo: Polish Press Agency (PAP).
The stolen or “spirited away” gas competed with the CPN product. In November 
1981 it was officially reported that “fuel is re-sold, at steep prices, from barrels or 
canisters brought directly in horse-drawn wagons and cars parked not far from 
the gas station.”916
914 Jak za zboże, “Polityka”, no. 29/July 16, 1983.
915 S. Drozdowski, Tajne kanały czarnego rynku, “Słowo Powszechne”, September 8, 1981.
916 AAN, URM, 32/5, fol. 14.
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Gas stations had a special place in the topography of the fuel gray zone. Since 
their employees naturally had a privileged position in the pecking order of the 
unofficial gas trade, gas stations became the hub of all black market gas opera-
tions. The vast majority of automobile drivers went there first when they wanted 
to acquire extra, or indeed any, amount of gas. In mid-1983, CPN director Mari-
an Bartoszewicz admitted, “Clients are so insistent that almost all our employees 
give in to the temptation of making an illicit profit.”917 The state inspectors were 
aware of the situation and subjected all gas stations to rigorous supervision. For 
example, among the twenty-one anti-speculation operations conducted in 1983 
on a “mass and nationwide scale”, four were code-named “Gas”. Another fifteen 
operations – designated more generally “Market” – nevertheless, also involved 
tank inspections. On just a single day, March 29, 1983, frauds were uncovered 
in 78% of the 368 gas stations inspected. As the result, in the first six months of 
1983, of the 5 800 employees of 1 300 CPN stations, 1 002 were fired and 3 335 
disciplined. In the following year, 3 271 gas station managers were penalized, 1 
161 fired, and 550 cases of criminal proceedings were launched. Between January 
and September 1985, every gas station underwent five inspections on average; 
as a result, 229 managers had their contracts terminated and 1 723 were sanc-
tioned.918 The profits were considerable,919 however, and even the increased invig-
ilation inspired the perpetrators to employ more sophisticated strategies rather 
than abandon the illegal gas trade altogether.
Initially the strategies did not have to be very sophisticated. The regulations re-
stricting gas sales by customer profile, in force until early 1982, were easy to bypass, 
since to catch a gas station employee red-handed would have required an inspector 
to stay put by the pump for long periods at a time – clearly not a viable solution. In 
March 1982, new rules were introduced, stipulating that the manager had to stamp 
a car insurance document and log each transaction for every individual sale. These 
rules did little to improve the situation: in mid-1982, they were abused in every 
second gas station inspected.920
Customers got creative in devising new methods of filling up their gas tanks, 
especially after the mid-1983 exacerbation of the fuel crisis; the Main Energy 
917 AAN, URM, 32/42, fol. 8.
918 AAN, URM, 32/120, fol. 3; ibid., 32/84, fol. 90–91.
919 In 1983, the additional annual income of gas station managers derived from illicit 
gas sales was (probably under-) estimated at 2.5 billion zloty in total, thus some 430 
000 zloty per individual – approximately 350% of his official earnings; Z. Szułczyński, 
Przecieki, “Express Wieczorny”, December 9–11, 1983.
920 Jak paruje benzyna, TL, no. 177/July 26, 1982.
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Inspectorate (Główny Inspektorat Gospodarki Energetycznej, GIGE), usually 
quite generous in allotting additional gas allowances, switched to a more frugal 
policy. One ingenious method was to treat car insurance documents with wax 
so that the CPN stamps could be easily removed. Another was to insure defunct 
vehicles that had long been off the road. It was estimated that thirty percent of 
insurance documents were forged or extorted.921 Generally, however, car owners 
tried to strike a hush-hush ongoing deal with the managers of gas stations, with 
backhanders for selling additional amount of gas. This mutually profitable ar-
rangement was difficult for the authorities to uncover.922
Unsurprisingly, the situation at the pump seemed to fly in the face of the basic 
rules of an economy in crisis. Officially, in the first half of 1983, gas stations in 
Poland sold 145 500 tons of fuel monthly; during the same period, the National 
Insurance Company (Powszechny Zakład Ubezpieczeń, PZU) issued authoriza-
tion for 161 500 tons. The actual monthly consumption was estimated to be high-
er still.923 The discrepancy was obfuscated by large-scale frauds in CPN depot 
stations, by state drivers redistributing their fuel “saved” illegally, and by the leaks 
from the so-called garage stations. In the 1980s, I witnessed tanker truck drivers 
sharing fuel on the roadside while transporting it from a depot in Emilianów near 
Radzymin. They were just the retailers. The true wholesalers were the employees 
of CPN depots, who by bypassing the waste directives and mixing various kinds 
of fuel were able to put aside hundreds of tons. Frauds were uncovered in depots 
and transfer stations in Koluszki, Toruń, Nowa Sól, Działdowo, Międzyrzecz, and 
Płock. In Płock alone, 32 employees – out of 37! – were brought to court for steal-
ing at least 600 tons of fuel and several dozen tons of diesel.924 Their usual modus 
operandi was to take the fuel they had managed to “save” to CPN stations, where 
they split the profit equally with CPN management and staff. At other times, the 
gas station managers paid a backhander to an employee of the District Office 
of Weights and Measures for the service rendered: while authorizing the pump 
accuracy, he “would wind back the meter by however many thousand liters the 
customer required. The manager was then able to sell illegal gas without having 
to worry that a sudden inspection would find more fuel at the pumps than stated 
in the invoices.”925
921 M. Kwiatkowski, Kto rano. wstaje…, “Polityka”, no. 29/July 16, 1983.
922 Smutek szejka, “Polityka”, no. 13/March 31, 1984.
923 Z. Szułczyński, Przecieki, “Express Wieczorny” December 9–11, 1983.
924 Ibid.; M. Henzler, Skąd wycieka, “Polityka”, no. 29/July 16, 1983.
925 M. Henzler, Skąd wycieka, “Polityka”, no. 29/July 16, 1983.
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In April 1984, after new gas rationing rules had been introduced, it became 
indispensable for stations to have surplus gas. Now, the customer had to leave 
his rationing coupon at the gas station; in theory, these could be compared with 
the readings on the pump meters, thereby helping to eliminate illicit “leaks”. The 
method was not a success. The coupons of the state owned companies (“units of 
nationalized economy”) became the weak link. Left unused, they legitimized an 
unofficial gas surplus, which was later sold off by station managers. This practice 
continued until the abolition of gas rationing.926 
Although the authorities were far from surprised by the emergence of a black 
market involving forged and extorted gas coupons, which indeed they had an-
ticipated, the reality surpassed their expectations. The social players turned out 
to be much more creative with scams involving gas coupons than they had been 
with meat and alcohol coupons. Gas station managers, just like meat and alco-
hol stores employees, entered into their accounts the same coupons – again and 
again – generating a substantial unlawful profit. Soon after the introduction of 
gas coupons, forged authorization cards for state companies (mentioned earlier) 
started popping up everywhere in Poland. Most of the counterfeit documents 
were poorly executed but some were of high quality. In 1984, an entrepreneurial 
Polish woman residing in West Berlin ordered ten thousand fake gas authoriza-
tion cards, which looked like the originals.927 Polish-made imitations were often 
executed so skillfully that they could be only identified under ultraviolet lamps. 
From 1985, Polish gas stations began to use such lamps routinely.928 Whereas 
formerly break-ins to city or district offices resulted in meat and alcohol cou-
pons going missing, now it was gas coupons that became the main object of the 
thieves’ interest. By September 1984, some 7 300 cards authorizing gas purchases 
worth 152 million zloty had vanished from PZU offices.929 
PZU employees, in expectation of chaos similar to that which had accompa-
nied the distribution of ration coupons for other products, reached for a tried 
and tested method: “dead souls” (or rather “phantom engines”). With help from 
colleagues in the communications department, they assigned gas coupons to ve-
hicles that were no longer in use, no longer registered in other voivodships or 
simply non-existent. When in 1986, Police Headquarters in Wrocław introduced 
926 “Drivers leave unused coupons”, Słupsk voivode, Borys Drobko, admitted in January 
1985, “with gas stations managers who use them to cover fuel shortages caused by 
illegal sales”; AAN, URM, 32/116, fol. 156.
927 AAN, URM, 32/66, fol. 37; ibid., 32/122, fol. 136–137.
928 AAN, URM, 32/84, fol. 14. 
929 AAN, URM, 32/66, fol. 101.
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computers to compare lists of registered cars and gas cards, it transpired that ten 
thousand cards had been issued for non-existent vehicles.930 The police expert 
in economic crime had no doubts that this practice was prevalent in all Polish 
voivodships. 
Poles continued to discover new ways of puncturing the state rationing sys-
tem. Cars running on diesel fuel became popular since it was available on the 
free market. A car owner who had managed to misrepresent his diesel-powered 
vehicle, fraudulently, as a gas-guzzler and register it as such, was able to drive at 
almost no cost at all, after selling his allotted gas on the black market, especially if 
he bought his diesel there as well. Such cases were, however, far and few through-
out the country (in late 1984, no more than 700 were reported). Taxi drivers – of 
whom there were 80 000 in the mid-1980s – were another abundant source of 
gas coupons. Despite the fact that in Warsaw alone as many as 9 000 cabs operat-
ed – very many more than in any other European capital at the time – it was not 
an easy task to hail one. The apparent mystery was simple to explain: a taxi driver 
received a daily allowance of ten liters of gas, against a private driver’s alloca-
tion of no more than 30–45 liters a month. No wonder that carrying passengers 
ceased to be a profitable activity for Warsaw cabbies, who could make a good 
enough living just by selling the gas to gas station managers, or else sell them gas 
coupons, which they then used to sell gas at a higher price.931 As calculated by the 
Deputy Chief of the Central Commission for Combating Speculation, Colonel 
Władysław Trzaska, a cab driver who actually did work could still make a very 
satisfactory profit of up to 50  000 zloty just by selling gas.932 Cabbies did not 
put their business operations on hold even when leaving the country for spells 
abroad as migrant workers – a common Polish pursuit during the decade. Their 
families continued to receive gas coupons and put them to the same use as ever. 
For example in Wrocław in 1985, 1 500 taxi drivers out of 4 000 went abroad, 
often for several months at a time.933 All attempts by the authorities to strip them 
of their taxi licenses or withdraw their gas allowances proved futile.934
Although the authorities were to some extent able to curb the “leaks” from CPN 
stations, the gas containers in some 16 700 garage stations were more difficult to 
keep under control. This mattered; particularly if we keep in mind that approxi-
mately 70 % of all fuel in Poland (89% of diesel and 33% of gas) was distributed 
930 AAN, URM, 32/105, fol. 35.
931 AAN, URM, 32/116, fol. 70; ibid., 32/95, fol. 25.
932 AAN, URM, 32/84, fol. 38. 
933 AAN, URM, 32/95, fol. 3; ibid., 32/123, fol. 102–103.
934 AAN, URM, 32/95, fol. 50.
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via those garage stations. They were located on factory premises and serviced the 
plant’s own vehicles. It was easier to strike deals in an environment where a gas 
surplus was easy to both generate and conceal. An “understanding” among the em-
ployees did not have to be the result of deliberate and sophisticated operations. 
As was to be expected, fuel shortfalls or surpluses often materialized by accident 
– since the equipment was dramatically outdated and the style of management 
usually chaotic and sloppy. I met a man who in the early 1980s quit his job in 
the Opoczno Farmers’ Cooperative Association (Spółdzielnia Kółek Rolniczych, 
SKR) because he did not want to be having to keep going through the process of 
explaining to his bosses the reasons for the surpluses of many thousand liters of 
gas.935 But for anybody keen to lay his hands on some black-market gas, this was 
a dream-come-true environment. According to the director of the National Trade 
Inspectorate (PIH) Piotr Ostaszewski, in more than 90% of garage stations “noth-
ing works, one can steal without any consequences, the pumps are not working, 
because it’s not possible to fix them, the accounting is not updated, and so on.”936
Despite the fact that this statement was made in late 1984, the garage stations 
came under scrutiny only in 1986. The Inspection Office of the Council of Min-
isters examined 495 stations. In 79% of these it found stocktaking irregularities 
and in 48% – discrepancies between the amount of incoming and outgoing fuel. 
If one were to take at face value the curious world reflected in the documentation, 
those with their hands on the wheel would have had to either be driving like 
racing drivers or else moving along at a snail’s pace. Moreover, some appeared 
capable of performing supernatural feats such as filling up their tanks with more 
gas then their capacity permitted or – in some extreme cases – driving on no fuel 
whatsoever, with one driver apparently setting the record of “driving on empty” 
at 2 462 km.937 Between January and September 1986, 1 722 legal proceedings 
against garage stations employees were initiated. At the Council of Ministers, an 
inter-ministerial department was set up, with the mandate to target garage station 
fraud. The team, led by the deputy secretary of state in the Ministry of Chemical 
and Light Industry Stanisław Kłos, considered mass-scale inspections and tinting 
the fuel to facilitate the identification of its origin; the implementation of IT sys-
tems in 12 000 gas stations was another option on the table. In the end, however, 
cutting gas station gas allocations proved the only viable solution.938
935 From testimony by Przemysław Nowak, Opoczno, March 26, 2010; in author’s 
possession; AAN, URM, 32/99, fol. 14.
936 AAN, URM, 32/66, fol. 27.
937 AAN, URM, 32/99, fol. 14–15, 77–79.
938 Ibid., fol. 66–69, 222–225, 230–234.
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Any radical changes were simply impossible to implement. The garage sta-
tions were a crucial element of the economy in the Polish peripheries, tightly 
connected with local social networks. There was no interest in changing the sta-
tus quo. Someone ironically pointed out that the stations epitomized the work-
er–peasant alliance. Without the transfers of thousands of tons of fuel from the 
leaky state and coop distribution centers to the tanks of tractors and combine 
harvesters (conservatively estimated as some 100 000 tons of diesel annually)939 
that took place in the stations, the food supply would have been even worse than 
it already was. As things stood, not only did the average peasant obtain fuel at 
half price (in 1984, one liter cost 30 zloty at a gas station and 15 zloty on the black 
market)940 but also had it delivered to his own backyard.941 The fuel sector of the 
black market had every reason to be one of the most enduring.
The official debates on how best to deal with the thorny issue of fuel went on 
for just as long as the attempts to cut through the Gordian Knot of meat supply. 
With gas, there was even less room to maneuver, one good reason being that all 
fuel had to be imported. The proposals to sell it at an economically viable “com-
mercial price”, as it was referred to, that would allow gas to be bought outside of the 
rationing system were abandoned by 1983 and triggered social, political (“gas for 
the rich”) and economic protests, which resulted in private entrepreneurs raising 
prices, with even hitherto-uncorrupted gas station managers “enticed to specu-
late”.942 At a meeting in November 1986 of the Central Anti-Speculation Commis-
sion (Centralna Komisja do Walki ze Spekulacją, CKWS), the representative of the 
Chief Energy Inspectorate (GIGE), Jerzy Banasiuk, pointed out that, once “com-
mercial” gas was introduced, Poland would have no fewer than three different fuel 
prices: the official price requiring coupons, the commercial price – a euphemism 
for high-priced, and the black market price, somewhere between the two.943
Yet a solution had to be found since the black market had become ubiqui-
tous, revealing a consensus that high prices were acceptable; moreover, the rigid 
system of quarterly rationing forced drivers who were planning longer trips to 
hoard gas. “Comrades,” Colonel Władysław Trzaska warned members of the 
CKWS in October 1985, “Our homes are sitting on a bomb. Literally so. Our at-
tics, basements, and storage rooms are full of gas. Especially now that people are 
buying gas for the fourth quarter […] and they don’t have anywhere to store it. 
939 AAN, URM, 32/42, fol. 7.
940 AAN, URM, 32/66, fol. 26.
941 A.J. Socha, Kurs na lewo, “Tygodnik Kulturalny”, no. 19/May 11, 1986.
942 AAN, URM, 32/42, fol. 38; ibid., 32/66, fol. 42.
943 AAN, URM, 32/99, fol. 51.
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I have seen them storing it in milk cans, demijohns, plastic containers, and even 
ordinary jugs.”944
The authorities dared only to take a first tentative step in that direction in 
mid-1988. On July 1, in sixty-four designated stations, gas was sold without 
coupons at high commercial prices; 260 and 300 zloty per liter. “This makes no 
difference for the average Pole,” commented Jerzy Baczyński, “who will now be 
able to buy fuel officially for the price that, until now, he has been paying on the 
black market.”945 This would have been the case, if the “coupon-free” gas had been 
easily available. The commercial gas stations were few and far between – on av-
erage, 1.3 per voivodship and two in Warsaw – and customers had already begun 
to form lines for the “coupon-free” gas by June 29.946 At sixty-four in total, the 
paltry number of commercial gas stations was no competition for regular gas 
stations, where, in any case, the unofficial price of gas surpassed the commercial 
price and reached as much as 350 zloty per liter. “Faced with the choice between 
hours-long standing in line to buy gas for 300 zloty a liter or sticking to the tried 
and tested “devil you know “– a deal with a gas station manager and paying 350 
or 400 zloty, many drivers pick the second option.”947
It was not until January 1, 1989 that ration coupons for fuel were abolished, al-
beit only for Polish nationals. There were no shortages of gas through the winter, 
as people drove less. However, in the spring, problems returned, when drivers hit 
the roads in their masses. State pumps could not keep up with the demand. The 
shortages were painful and yet again, rationing began to look like an attractive 
option; gas station employees refreshed their strategies from the recent past.948 
Until the early 1990s, the authorities persevered in their efforts to calm down the 
market in gas. However, even once the pumps had become fully privatized, shady 
dealings in gas did not disappear completely, but merely – as they had always 
done – evolved.
944 AAN, URM, 32/84, fol. 38–39.
945 J. Baczyński, Przelewanie z pustego, “Polityka”, no. 28/July 9, 1988.
946 W. Markiewicz, Ludzie są wyposzczeni, ibid.
947 J. Baczyński, Przelewanie z pustego, ibid.
948 P. Tarnowski, Kartki były lepsze, “Polityka”, no. 18/ May 6, 1989.
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8.  Dollar and Gold949
8.1  Dollar and Gold: A Panacea for Tough Times
There are good reasons why gold and the dollar have been treated together in 
this chapter. What they had in common was not just that they were both used as 
stores of value and referred to by Polish economists by the collective name “hard 
currency assets”950 but also that both merited the equal and special attention of 
the law enforcement agencies.951 
Gold and hard currency in general, and US dollars in particular, played a spe-
cial role in the social, economic and political life of post-war Poland, providing a 
panacea during the hard times which the 20th century brought to the country in 
abundance. Two world wars, frequent changes of the political system involving 
the moving of borders, economic crises, (hyper)inflation, and the absurdities of 
the communist economy made Poles only too acutely aware of how fragile human 
life was and how unreliable any investment, be it bank savings, stocks and shares, 
or even real estate. With the outbreak of the First World War, coins made from 
precious metals disappeared immediately from circulation. Those lucky enough 
to have any hid them well and spent sparingly, to protect themselves from the 
fast-growing inflation that was eviscerating paper money. Another side effect of the 
First World War was to bring the USA and its currency to Europe. The US dollar 
challenged the supremacy of the British pound in a number of countries, including 
the Second Polish Republic, coming to the fore. The hard currency bonds issued 
by the Polish Ministry of Treasury in the 1930s were denominated in US dollars.
In the interwar period, gold continued to be a “symbol of wealth, happiness 
and power; it was the lever of industry, trade, and art that brought beauty into 
everyday life; the dream of the poor, the measure of all values, blood that pulsat-
ed throughout the economic organism of the world, the only true currency since 
949 I wrote about this in the articles: Zysk i strach. Z dziejów peerelowskiej “gorączki złota”, 
in: Od Piłsudskiego do Wałęsy. Studia z dziejów Polski w XX wieku, ed. K. Persak et 
al, Warszawa 2008, pp. 276–290; and “Niepewne czasy, pewny dolar”. Szkic do obrazu 
warszawskiego czarnego rynku walutowego, PH, 100, 2009/1, pp. 29–46.
950 Such as “foreign legal tender, documents confirming funds and precious metals (gold, 
platinum)”, AAN, IPP, 123, Note on researching hard currency and smuggling crimes, 
1977, fol. 4.
951 K. Madej, Wszyscy byli przemytnikami. Obraz przestępczości przemytniczej i dewizowej 
w latach 1956–1970, “Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2008, no. 2, p. 124.
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time immemorial.”952 The lower classes such as peasants and petite bourgeoisie 
had never had much trust in the banks and put their savings in gold items and 
coins as much as possible. What was different was that, unlike before, besides 
gold rubles, marks, and Austrian crowns they could now invest in American 
twenty-dollar pieces.
Hard currency and gold really came into their own during the Second World 
War – a time when to lose all one’s possessions in an instant was not only possible 
but indeed common. Under such precarious circumstances all stores of value 
such as hard currency, gold and diamonds that were easy to hide and easy to 
carry about one’s person gained tremendous importance. Those who owned such 
valuables had a greater chance of survival. Many Holocaust survivors owed their 
life to being able to pay in hard currency or gold for a hiding place “on the Aryan 
side”.953
The war and the German occupation brought an unprecedented boom to the 
gold and hard currency black market. This was when the very term “hard dol-
lars” – referring to coins made of precious metal – originated, as opposed to “soft 
dollars” – paper money. During the German occupation, most major financial 
transactions in Poland were conducted in hard currency. Wartime diary entries 
often began with quoting the dollar exchange rate for the day.954 Even though 
anyone trading in hard currency or gold faced a high risk of being sent to a 
concentration camp or the possibility of a death sentence, there was no shortage 
of those eager to act as buyers, sellers, or middlemen. It is difficult to assess how 
many Poles from different social backgrounds survived the war thanks to the 
black market in hard currency and gold. We do not know much about the details 
of such transactions, the scale of profit and turnover or whether the occupiers 
or any foreigners were involved. This side of the everyday history of the Second 
World War still awaits its historian.
Paradoxically, the social and economic changes brought about by the war ef-
fectively democratized the US dollar and the precious metal. During the German 
occupation the dollar and gold trade entered the streets, alleys, eateries, and pri-
vate apartments with a new status that was to endure for the next fifty years. With 
unprecedented frequency, dollars and gold found their way to the countryside 
– whether in exchange for food delivered to the cities, or received in payment 
952 M.K. Wołowski, Złoto, Warszawa 1933, p. 5.
953 L. Landau, Kronika lat wojny i okupacji, vol. 2: Grudzień 1942 – czerwiec 1943, Warsza-
wa 1962, p. 164.
954 Ibid., vol. 1–3, Warszawa 1962–1963; F. Wyszyński, Dzienniki z lat 1941–1944, ed. 
J. Grabowski, Z.R. Grabowski, Warszawa 2007.
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for hiding Jews or shelter offered to refugees from the Warsaw uprising. A large 
part of the expenses of the Polish Government Delegation to the Home Country 
(Delegatura Rządu RP na Kraj) and the Home Army (AK) were covered with 
hard currency and gold bullion sent from London.
After the war, both American dollars and the yellow metal continued as the 
only durable assets universally accepted not just in Poland but everywhere in the 
rapidly changing world. In February 1965, General Charles de Gaulle demand-
ed, albeit unsuccessfully, that the French economy return to the gold standard. 
“There cannot be any other criterion, any other standard than gold. Oh yes! Gold 
which never changes its nature, which can be shaped into bars, ingots or coins, 
which has no nationality and which is eternally and universally accepted as the 
unalterable fiduciary value par excellence.”955 In 1966, at least 16 000 tons of gold 
were stored in private hoards – 1.5 times as much as in the US reserves; this was 
two thirds of all the globally accounted-for metal. Thirty years later, half of global 
gold production was being used as value storage.956 Each significant incident of 
economic turbulence such as the oil crises in 1973 and 1974, the gas price hike 
in 1978, political upheavals such as the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the war 
in Afghanistan in 1980 immediately resulted in gold soaring, with little trust in 
the authorities that themselves were busy swapping paper money for gold bars 
and bullion.957
Gold is considered insurance for a rainy day in countries that are poor and 
unstable, and less so – in those that are affluent and peaceful. Yet even the res-
idents of such prosperous European countries as France and Italy, enjoying a 
sound economy, have been known to keep their savings in gold coins and ingots. 
Even in those societies, however, the “yellow devil” tended to be a pursuit of the 
poor, misers and the less educated – peasants rather than city dwellers, workers 
rather than engineers.958 In countries where demand for the precious metal was 
high but local production small or non-existent, the state often introduced a ra-
tioning system to restrict the trade and instituted a monopoly in the export and 
import of gold. This usually led to smuggling, at times quite sophisticated, which 
955 P.L. Bernstein, The Power of Gold: The History of an Obsession, Wiley 2000, p. 364; 
see: R.T. Naylor, The Underworld of Gold, “Crime, Law and Social Change” 25, 1996/3, 
pp.191–241.
956 H. Cywiński, Złoto. Skąd pochodzi, dokąd idzie?, Warszawa 1987, p. 129; R.T. Naylor, 
The Underworld of Gold…, p. 195.
957 P.L. Bernstein, Historia złota…, pp. 393–395.
958 A.W. Anikin, The Yellow Devil, Progress Publishers 1978, p. 74; see: T. Green, The 
World of Gold Today, London 1973.
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resulted in higher gold prices. In the early 1970s, in Egypt and India an ounce of 
gold cost 20 to 30 dollars more than in Great Britain; inevitably, such profitable 
arbitrage opportunities led to extensive smuggling that no official restrictions 
could curb.959 Post-war Poland was another good example of this syndrome. 
Gold’s unique position had been established over thousands of years but it was 
the American dollar that – after the end of the Second World War – triumphantly 
became the global reserve currency and the dominant means of exchange not 
only of official but also black markets round the world.960 The greenback was 
more than a universally accepted unit of value; it acquired a symbolic meaning 
and became an icon of freedom and prosperity. In 1948, a Polish worker donated 
as his contribution for the construction of the Party House in Warsaw the “one 
dollar he had received from relatives from abroad, the first and the only dollar he 
had ever had.”961 Poignantly, he gave away his most valuable possession.
The US dollar was not the only hard currency that mattered on the black mar-
ket. Which currency dominated the illegal trade in a given country depended on 
many factors, such as in what currency the government conducted its accounts 
with foreign trade partners and which was its reserve hard currency of choice. 
Local history and tradition also played a part. For example, in Cuba, the US dol-
lar was the one and only foreign currency; the West German mark ruled in the 
GDR, and the Turkish lira in Bulgaria, whereas in Yugoslavia the US dollar and 
the West German mark shared second currency status. In Poland, the greenback 
ruled supreme both throughout official economy and on the black market.962
959 A.W. Anikin, Yellow Devil…, p. 71.
960 On the post-war history of the dollar, see: W. Morawski Zarys powszechnej historii 
pieniądza i bankowości, Warszawa 2002, pp. 179–191; R. Sédillot, All the Monies of 
the World – a Chronicle of Currency Values; Moralna i niemoralna historia pieniądza, 
transl. K. Szeżyńska-Maćkowiak, Warszawa 2002, pp. 228–232. In 1995, more than 
half of the 375 billion dollars remaining outside the banks circulated outside of 
the US borders; A. Mourmouras, S.H. Russell, Smuggling, Currency Substitution and 
Unofficial Dolarization: A Crime-theoretic Approach, “IMF Working Paper” 00/176, 
October 2000, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00176.pdf (March 
10, 2014). 
961 “Robotnik” 1948, no. 133; I am grateful to Andrzej Skalimowski for bringing my 
attention to this case.
962 R. Boyes, The Hard Road to Market, Gorbachev, the Underworld, and the Rebirth 
of Capitalism, London 1990, pp. 49–54. See: P.A. Wingender, Westdevisen und De-
visenschwarzmärkte in sozialistischen Planwirtschaften, Stuttgart–New York 1989. On 
Yugoslavia: J.W. Dawson, S.W. Millsaps, M.C. Strazicich, Trend Breaks and Non-sta-
tionarity in the Yugoslav Black Market for Dollars, 1974–1987, “Applied Economics” 
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In post-war Poland, the dollar and the yellow metal began their black-market 
career level pegging as stores of value. Gradually, they parted ways. Hidden in the 
attic or buried in the backyard, gold remained a rainy-day reserve until the last 
days of communist Poland. Hard currency was a long-term, safe investment and, 
increasingly, a form of working capital, which not only enabled more sophis-
ticated consumption but also helped generate profits. At the turn of the 1970s 
and the 1980s, a fully-fledged, dual-currency system took hold in Poland. “In the 
1970s, all children growing up in the People’s Republic of Poland knew very well 
from early childhood that money came in two kinds – the real money and Polish 
money.”963 
The authorities, that during the post-war period had experienced a painful 
shortage of “real” money, tried to acquire it by means fair and foul, happy to 
pass on the cost of their actions to citizens. As always, Poles refused to play ball, 
instead developing highly effective defense strategies. Polish society and those 
in power continued to play the dollar and gold game until 1989. As with any 
long-term game plan, there had been turning points, changes of rules, periods of 
respite and of increased effort, as well as occasions of turning a blind eye to the 
enemy’s unfair play. In the end, it was the authorities that lost miserably. 
8.2  Power, Dollar, Gold
8.2.1  1945–1950–1956
While visiting Soviet Union in 1929, a Warsaw journalist, Mieczysław Weinryb, 
experienced an unpleasant surprise involving hard currency as soon as he got 
to the border. “The customs officer asks how much cash I have and specifically 
if I have any rubles. Apparently, one cannot bring them into Russia. At the same 
I have to show how much foreign currency I have with me. This information is 
then written down on a special receipt and everything is meticulously itemized. 
This receipt is a treasure I must not part with until I go back home. After the 
search has been conducted comes the surprise. There is a special cashier’s coun-
ter, a branch of the State Bank, where all foreign currency must be exchanged 
39, 2007/1, pp. 43–51; on Cuba: E. Facio, A.R. Roschelle, M.I. Toro-Morn, See You in 
Havana!, “Peace Review” 13, 2001/1, pp. 121–127; M. Jastrząb, Kilka uwag o funkcjach 
walut obcych w rzeczywistości Polski Ludowej, in: Społeczeństwo PRL. Historia. Kul-
tura. Pamięć, vol. 1: Historia, ed. S. Jankowiak, D. Skotarczak, I. Skórzyńska, Poznań 
2011, pp. 143–153.
963 W. Orliński, Dzieci Pewexu. Muzeum narodowe kultury masowej, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 
December 20, 2000.
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into rubles. Only now do I understand why the checking of currency was so 
scrupulous. The cashier exchanges my dollars at the official rate – very painful for 
the visitor, who receives a mere 1.9 rubles to a dollar, while at home for a dollar 
you get five rubles. […] The foreigner experiences this as a great injustice.”964 This 
was a feeling shared by all Western travelers to the Soviet Union. Useful tips on 
ways of bypassing the official currency obstacles quickly spread on the Polish 
grapevine, reported by those that had taken a trip to the east. Recommended (by 
such as Henryk Szoszkies) methods were either to smuggle into Russia rubles 
bought in Poland or to buy some on the Soviet black market (as advocated by 
Zygmunt Nowakowski).965
The tone of such reports was reminiscent of travelers’ tales describing adven-
tures in “primitive” countries; the account invariably ended with self-satisfied 
declarations to the effect that “This would have been unthinkable in Poland”.966 
Yet, less than two decades later the same mechanisms became part of Polish real-
ity. In post-war Poland, the trade in foreign exchange assets, as hard currency and 
gold were referred to in official parlance, had been taken over by the restrictive 
state monopoly long before the new political system entrenched itself. A local 
resident or a visitor could sell foreign currency only to the state, and then at a 
low, arbitrarily determined rate, but he could not buy it legally or in unlimited 
quantity. Only the state was empowered to administer such valuable assets and 
rationed them out rarely and only to its trusted agents.
In its announcement of June 20, 1945, the Treasury Minister recalled the 
pre-war laws (from April 26, 1936 and September 2, 1939) passed by the Pol-
ish President, which banned all trade and export of “foreign means of payment”. 
Breaking those rules carried a penalty of five years in prison and a fine of 200 000 
zloty. In extreme cases, if a “perpetrator turned such crimes into regular practice”, 
he could be sentenced to life imprisonment. The amount of the fine did not have 
964 As cited in: Spojrzenie na Rosję, ed. J. Kochanowski, Warszawa 1994, pp. 15–16.
965 Ibid., pp. 20, 57.
966 A Polish engineer, Jan Błeszyński, who worked in the Soviet Union at the turn of the 
1920s and 1930s had this to say about torgsins, state-run hard currency stores, where 
gold was also accepted in payment: “This institution could operate only in the Soviet 
Union, with the backdrop of apathy, slavery, and lack of social energy evident in the 
Russian population. If communism were established for example in France or even 
here, people would destroy such stores, as they would be considered a slap in the face 
for citizens condemned to suffering while exposed to the tantalizing sight of tasty 
products they were unable to buy”; ibid., p. 33. 
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a ceiling.967 It was, however, easier to issue an ordinance than to implement it. 
Whereas people were highly motivated to get involved in black market trans-
actions, the law enforcement bodies were modest in size (in 1945 only GIOS 
actively participated in the operations), and the state itself benefited from the il-
legal market. If we are to believe Leon Chajn, by 1945 the state Treasury was itself 
supplementing its modest supply of hard currency on the black market.968 In late 
November 1945, the Treasury Minister ordered that the illegal currency market 
be monitored closely; it certainly proved a useful barometer of the economic 
situation.969 Bank employees and state officials able to travel abroad commonly 
participated in illegal operations.970
The district around the Hotel Polonia, the only Warsaw hotel to have survived intact,  
which immediately after the war provided premises for the majority of embassies, became 
the nerve centre of illegal trading of hard currency and gold. Stanisław Łuckiewicz, In New 
York: Damn it, not a single dollar in my pocket, even though my uncle is hanging around 
outside the Polonia in Warsaw, “Szpilki”, no. 16 z 16 IV 1946.
967 AAN, URM, 5/30, fol. 46.
968 L. Chajn, Kiedy Lublin był Warszawą, Warszawa 1964, p. 144.
969 AAN, GIOS, 121, unpag.
970 AAN, URM, 5/637, fol. 1.
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The low official hard currency exchange rate (black market rates could be ten 
times higher) upped the living expenses of foreign diplomats in Poland. It was 
probably their complaints that, in mid-1946, led the Prime Minister, Edward 
Osóbka-Morawski, to intercede with the Treasury, asking it to “rationalize” 
the official dollar rate, at least for the representatives of foreign states. The tax 
authorities were adamant. All they did was turn a blind eye when the diplomats 
availed themselves of the black market. Polish representatives abroad behaved 
similarly.971 This was not an isolated case of hard-currency pragmatism. When 
in the fall of 1946 the black-market exchange rate reached an exorbitant 1 000 
zloty to the dollar, the Treasury eased the repressions against the currency black 
market, which lowered the rate and “brought a positive psychological influence 
to bear on the stalling of speculation tendencies.”972
The liberalization did not last long. In mid-1947, the “battle for trade”, which 
pushed affected merchants and artisans into investing their savings in durable 
stores of value, emboldened the police, the Special Commission and GIOS func-
tionaries to intensify operations directed against the currency black market. The 
absence of conclusive evidence was no longer an obstacle to sentencing a black 
marketeer to several months in a labor camp. Often a mere suspicion, lack of per-
manent employment, or a policeman’s hunch sufficed. “Although the body search 
did not reveal the presence of any foreign currency on the suspects,” a report stat-
ed on May 8, 1947 after a round-up of money changers operating in front of the 
Hotel Polonia in Warsaw, “ it revealed only 3 600 zloty on Mr. Lipiński and 3 042 
zloty on Mr. Jarzębowski. Nevertheless, the testimony of the witness Orłowski 
combined with the fact that the suspects do not have a permanent job bring us 
to the conclusion that they are middlemen who solicit in the foreign curren-
cy trade.”973 Antoni Szymański was arrested during the police raid organized in 
the same location five days later; “After checking with the Investigative Office, it 
turned out he already had a record as a suspect in foreign currency trading. […] 
Considering the facts that suspect Szymański was arrested during a roundup at 
971 A. Bliss-Lane, Widziałem Polskę zdradzoną, Warszawa 1984, p. 91; AAN, URM, 5/638, 
Edward Osóbka-Morawski’s correspondence with MS, September 1946, fol. 1–3. Most 
European countries acted in a similar manner directly after the war. Often, the gap 
between the official and black market price was even larger. For example in the Soviet 
Union the official dollar exchange rate was 5.30 rubles whereas the black-market rate 
– approximately 80, while in Austria 10 and approx. 70 schilling, and in Germany 
2.50 and up to 200 marks respectively.
972 AAN, URM, 5/229, fol. 89.
973 AAN, KS, 2651.
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the money changers’ haunt, that on two previous occasions he had been recorded 
by the Investigative Department as being suspected of trading foreign currency, 
and that he has admitted in his testimony to not being in employment, the War-
saw Delegation of the Special Commission has come to the conclusion that he is 
a “konik”, or a “waluciarz” [illegal currency dealer] and as such he is socially and 
economically a destructive type.”974
Whereas in 1946, 106 persons had been sent to the Special Commission camps 
for trading foreign currency, in 1947 the number grew to 180, in 1948 – it reached 
189, and in 1949 – 196 people suffered a similar fate.975 Increasingly harsh repres-
sion, which threatened a common black marketeer with a sentence of between 
three to six months of labor camp, even when based on circumstantial evidence, 
led to the development of adaptive strategies such as equipping standard jackets 
with additional pockets, upping the level of conspiracy, and storing the money 
or gold with friends, or fellow employees, who were not subject to suspicion.976
Truly tough times for the hard-currency black market came in the fall of 1950. 
The Act of October 28, 1950 (Journal of Laws no. 50, item 459) on changing the 
monetary system, prepared and enacted in secrecy, became the basis for a savage 
currency revaluation and deprived the population of two thirds of their savings 
stored at home, mostly in cash. The trauma was so deep that until the last days 
of communist Poland the smallest rumor of any possibility of a currency reval-
uation immediately triggered defensive strategies: depositing money in banks 
and searching high and low for reliable stores of value, also on the black market. 
Putting Polish zloty at par with the ruble and setting the new official dollar ex-
change rate at four zloty – which allegedly strengthened the zloty – did nothing 
to inspire trust in the new national currency.
With the Act of October 28, 1950 (Journal of Laws no. 50, item 460), the second 
of the hard currency laws, the government not only banned all illegal trading 
in hard currency and precious metals but also prohibited the possession of any 
foreign currency and precious metals, the latter in “utility form”, or scrap metal.977 
974 Ibid.
975 Komisja Specjalna do Walki z Nadużyciami i Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym 1945–
1954, ed. D. Jarosz, T. Wolsza, Warszawa 1995, pp. 9, 104. 
976 AAN, KS, 2657, 2651.
977 The “utility” criteria were specified in some detail: “For example a broken wedding 
band or chain […] but not […] incomplete parts of a pocket watch, fragments of 
rings, bands, etc.”; Komunikat Narodowego Banku Polskiego w sprawie obowiązku 
sprzedaży walut obcych, monet złotych oraz złota i platyny, “Trybuna Ludu” November 
2, 1950.
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Hard currency, gold and platinum had to be either sold to the state at a ridiculous-
ly low price or deposited with the state. Possession of gold bullion or bars carried 
a punishment of up to 15 years in jail; trading could trigger a death sentence.978 
Nevertheless, apparently only a relatively small number of Polish citizens obedi-
ently sold their precious belongings for a fraction of their real value, as instructed. 
Most gold and paper dollars or rubles remained buried or otherwise hidden.979 
By the third day of the new law being in force, Ministry of Public Security agents 
reported: “due to the currency revaluation, black marketeers […] refrained from 
trading in gold bullion but focused instead on divesting themselves of “soft” for-
eign currencies. On a mass scale, however, they began to melt scrap gold and gold 
coins no longer in circulation and quickly began production of rings in order to 
retain the gold. […] Also jewelers are secretly melting gold and engaging in the 
production of rings and bands. There are rumors that the owners of gold coins 
currently still in circulation will keep them hidden.”980 Another agent mentioned 
a “conversation with private enterprise traders from the Różycki Market” and re-
ported that “they all have “soft” dollars that they will be selling in order to buy gold 
pieces, which they intend to bury in the ground.”981
It is not surprising that the authorities had little faith that the provisions of 
the law were going to be effective. By November 2, 1950 the Minister of Public 
Safety, Stanisław Radkiewicz, issued Order No. 050 calling for show trials of 
money traders as a “deterrent, and to curb the unbridled hard-currency crimi-
nals”.982 The penalties became indeed tougher; beside fines and imprisonment, 
they included forced banishment from big cities, especially the capital of Poland, 
Warsaw. The essence of instilling terror in the population relies not in inflict-
ing penalties on those who knowingly violate the law of the land but rather on 
sending to jail innocent people, often quite unaware that they had committed 
any unlawful act – pour décourager les autres. The Special Commission docu-
ments recorded many cases in which individuals were sentenced for possession, 
often accidental, of small quantities of dollars. A good example was the case of 
978 Ibid.
979 AIPN, 01521/2035, Jacek Oleś, Smuggling of Currency Assets, the Academy of Inter-
nal Affairs, Institute of Criminology, Warszawa 1978, p. 25; A. Jezierski, C. Leszczyńs-
ka, Historia gospodarcza Polski, Warszawa 1999, p. 537. 
980 AIPN, The Ministry of Public Security, the Minister’s Office, 1572/553, fol. 249–250.
981 Ibid.
982 A. Kochański, Polska 1944–1991. Informator historyczny, vol. 1: Podział administracy-
jny, ważniejsze akty prawne, decyzje i enuncjacje państwowe (1944–1956), Warszawa 
1996, p. 353.
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Katarzyna Mościcka from Zacisze near Warsaw. At her trial on December 20, 
1950 the court proved that the accused “had in her possession without the au-
thorization of the Currency Commission one dollar bill, which she had received 
in 1947 from Zofia Gawarecka in exchange for a chicken.” Ms. Gawarecka was 
charged with “putting into circulation, at an unspecified time in 1947 and con-
trary to existing regulations, one US dollar by giving it to Mościcka in return for 
the chicken.”983 In July 1951, a woman from the small village of Ciepielin near 
Pułtusk was charged by the Special Commission with “failing, by February 9, 
1951 […] and against the laws in force, to re-sell to the National Bank of Poland 
two US dollars which had been in her possession since mid-January 1951 and 
which she had at that time received in a parcel from abroad.” Another person 
put on trial in this case was a friend of the accused, who had received from her 
the two dollars and failed to deliver them to the Bank within seven days.984
Despite the new, strict law on hard currency of March 28, 1952 (Journal of 
Laws 1952, no. 21, item133), which specified two- to ten-year prison sentences 
for currency traders and life sentence for “professional” dealers, the black mar-
ket in foreign currencies and gold remained active. As ever, Poles learned to ac-
commodate themselves to the restrictive rules and find ways of bypassing them. 
When they were caught, usually due to a neighborhood snitch, they often used 
legal loopholes985 to protect the assets and the family members who had been 
arrested or appealed the sentence at the State Council. After, in October 1953, 
the female owner of a private restaurant was charged with possession of and 
speculative trading in dollars and jewelry, and sentenced to a fine, a prison term 
and a five-year exile from Warsaw, her husband wrote to the President of the 
State Council, Aleksander Zawadzki: “The jewelry and the money constituted the 
fruit of thirty years of hard work and were collected with the goal of securing our 
983 AAN, KS, 2651. Mościcka was sentenced to pay a 1 500 zloty fine or two months of 
prison, Gawarecka – to a 60 zloty fine or one week of prison.
984 AAN, KS, 2673.
985 The Act of 1950 forbade the ownership of hard currencies and precious metals but 
it penalized exclusively the legal owner. Supplementary Acts of 1952 allowed the 
possession of hard currency (legally owned, of course), providing this was authorized 
by the state. Defense lawyers interpreted this law as releasing a “person accepting 
foreign currencies for the purposes of storage” from the obligatory confirmation of 
legal ownership. Some, a clerk at the Ministry of Justice commented, use the defense 
line stating their innocence even when currencies are illegally owned as they claimed 
there is no ‘trading in currency assets’ since they do not share the ownership; AAN, 
MS, 3019, fol. 83.
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livelihood in our old age. Some of the jewelry was my wife’s daughter’s property. 
The instinct to accumulate valuables is a result and leftover of the past political 
system with its living conditions under which a person could at any moment 
face poverty. This instinct is very strong and not everyone is able to cut free 
from its influence especially if that someone spent most of her life under the 
hostile political regime of the past, having to struggle for survival […] The pres-
ent verdict will only serve to break up a family, which in the socialist system is 
the fundamental unit of the social fabric and remains under the protection of 
the state. This sentence demonstrates that a human being who has erred and 
redeemed her faults is, nevertheless, dispensable – and should be isolated from 
her family and society. To whom is my wife a threat, and who will benefit if, for 
five years, she will have been removed from Warsaw like a leper? I have heard on 
the radio about such methods, but they were used in America, where blacks are 
put in ghettoes and re-settled outside of the cities.”986 The husband’s judicious 
eloquence did the trick. According to the notes of December 11, 1953, following 
his appeal, it was ruled that “there was no case to answer”. 
Professional money dealers were not deterred by show trials.987 Some were in 
fact sentenced to capital punishment but, as a rule, this was not carried out. The 
case of Adam Sawicki is instructive. In 1952, he received the death sentence but 
it was soon changed to a life sentence, and with consecutive amnesties decreased 
to 12, and subsequently to eight years of prison. In fact, the currency dealer left 
prison a mere five years after the initial verdict, in January 1957.988 Stanisław M. 
Korowicz explained such a turn of events matter-of-factly: “In the six months 
that followed the money reform, several profiteers were caught and subjected to 
a show trial in order to intimidate everybody. As a result, only a minimal amount 
of dollars and pounds were exchanged in banks and the rest disappeared, for a 
while, from the black market. And so people began to marvel at a new political 
and economic phenomenon: a political regime in need of dollars and pounds. 
[…] Government agents knew very well that there were a lot of dollars in Po-
land. In the end, show trials for currency dealers faded away, and profiteers were 
no longer threatened in the press. The regime, in various indirect ways, began 
to purchase the valuable dollars and pounds on the black market.”989 We do not 
986 AAN, KS, 1325, fol. 49.
987 Funty i dolary stałym pieniądzem w Polsce. Procesy przeciw “waluciarzom” dla zas-
traszenia publiczności, “Dziennik Polski” (London), no. 286/November 29, 1952.
988 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, fol. 60–61.
989 S.M. Korowicz, W Polsce pod sowieckim jarzmem, London 1955, pp. 235–236.
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have a reliable source to corroborate this version of events; we cannot, however, 
dismiss it out of hand.
8.2.2  1956–1981
Those who were able to keep their hard currency and gold safely hidden until 
the fall of 1956 could then breathe easy. By early November 1956, the Minister of 
Finance issued an ordinance, and soon thereafter the parliament passed the Act 
(Journal of Laws 1956, no. 50, item 223) rescinding the ban on the possession of 
hard currency, gold, and platinum. Poles were now allowed to withdraw from the 
bank “hard currency assets” that they had deposited after October 1950 and were 
allowed to take outside of Poland and bring back precious stones and articles 
made from precious metals. A ban on private trading in hard currency and pre-
cious metal scrap was upheld. On November 9, 1956, during a press conference 
given by the Ministry of Finance, it became clear that the relaxation of the rules 
was intended to “release stored hard currency in order to improve the supply of 
resources and equipment for small manufacturing industry and fertilizers, in-
secticides, building materials and machinery for farmers. […] Allowing those in 
possession of hard currency in order to pay for having a house built, to invest in 
a small manufacturing enterprise, or in increased agricultural production, etc. 
should encourage such activity and should result in bringing more goods on to 
the national market.”990 All hard currency operations were taken over by Bank 
PKO (Polska Kasa Opieki), which since the late 1920s had already been facilitat-
ing similar transactions between Poles at home and abroad. PKO clients could 
use the money officially sent to their accounts from abroad to purchase from the 
Bank industrial goods and food, unavailable on the local market.991
This was a time of prosperity for the hard currency and gold black market. 
The authorities were weakened and confused and the law enforcement agen-
cies operated without conviction. There was no shortage, however, of factors to 
encourage illegal currency dealing. The borders opened wider, both for tourists 
and emigrants; those who were about to leave Poland were eager to buy hard cur-
rency, while repatriates from the West and from the Soviet Union brought with 
them US dollars acquired at a lower price than in Poland, which they were eager 
990 TL, November 10, 1956.
991 Stefan Atlas wrote in 1960: “The Bank was established in order to enable Poles living 
abroad to help their relatives in Poland; it allows the beneficiaries to choose from 
a wide range of products and delivers much needed hard currency to the state”; S. 
Atlas, Paragraf zero – raz jeszcze, TL, no. 145/ May 26, 1960.
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to sell. Consumption patterns were changing and the private sector, which on 
the one hand needed equipment and resources from the West, and on the other 
needed to store the profits, was growing. Suddenly, courage got cheaper – those 
who had previously been afraid to even own gold bullion were now happy to 
act on the principle of “uncertain times, certain dollar” and began to invest their 
savings in the American currency.992 The times certainly were uncertain, and the 
demand so great that in 1957, the US-dollar black market exchange rate reached 
220 zloty, twice as much as a year earlier. Treasury authorities drove the demand 
even higher when in early 1957 they began to scrutinize the sources of income 
of individuals suddenly flaunting “significant monetary assets”. As predicted by 
Stefan Bobrowski, the better-off Poles stopped building villas and buying cars but 
instead put their savings in hard currency and gold, the increased demand soon 
taking the black market price higher.993
As a result of the state of the market and the intentional operations of the 
government, from the beginning of 1958 the dollar exchange rate began to fall 
– in other words, the Polish currency became stronger. By the end of the decade, 
the greenback had stabilized at around 90 zloty. This was due partly to the in-
creased supply of American banknotes, brought into Poland by the ever-grow-
ing numbers of visitors arriving from the West, as well as Poles resident abroad 
sending cash to their relatives in Poland, both the sender and recipient well 
aware of the value of such tangible support. On the other hand, dollar demand 
had diminished. Those going abroad still needed hard currency; however, the 
wave of, mostly Jewish, emigration subsided, and tourist trips abroad were not 
as easy to arrange as in 1957. The use of dollars on the internal Polish market 
also lessened somewhat. In December 1957, Bank PKO, the only legal interme-
diary between foreign agencies and private individuals in possession of hard 
currency backed away from supplying artisans with imported materials, such as 
polyethylene. And vigorous persecution of economic crimes also brought some, 
if modest, results.994 
992 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 612, Item 5169/57, Dollars brought from the USSR. The 
black-market rate for gold. In the first six months of 1957, 35% more hard currency 
crime was recorded in Warsaw than in a comparable period in 1956; APW, KWar. 
PZPR, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, fol. 35.
993 W. Teliga, Czy złotówka staje się droższa, “Słowo Powszechne” March 12, 1958.
994 In 1958, law enforcement dealt with 3 524 hard currency cases, in 1959 with 1 781 and 
in 1960 with 1 201; AAN, NIK, 18/33, Note on economic crime in 1960, Warszawa 
1961, p. 21. 
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Currency dealers customarily took advantage of provincial visitors to the capital, who were 
unfamiliar with the current foreign exchange rates and who had dollars that they had been 
sent by their family in the USA or Canada. Jerzy Zaruba, Currency dealers in front of the 
PKO bank, 1960. Photo: Warsaw Museum of Caricature, sign. 9928.
Nevertheless, the gradually developing system of internal export and the differences 
between the official and black market dollar exchange rate kept the illegal currency 
trade in good shape. From 1957 the official dollar rate, now at 4 zloty, was applied 
exclusively in settling Poland’s international accounts. This exchange rate had very 
little in common with the different exchange rates applicable within the country 
itself. At the official exchange rate offered by banks, tourists visiting Poland re-
ceived 24 zloty for one dollar. But only first-time visitors or those completely clue-
less bothered to stock up on all the zloty they required from official sources. Most 
were well aware that they could get four times as many zloty for their foreign bank-
notes on the black market! The authorities were just as aware of the exchange-rate 
discrepancies that worked to their disadvantage and evolved ways of tempting 
the flow of dollars towards the government outlets, with the law treating “hard 
currency natives” – as Poles receiving dollar consignments from relatives abroad 
were known – more leniently. The money they had been sent was exchanged at the 
comparatively generous rate of 72 zloty. They also were able to obtain in branches 
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of PKO dollar checks, allowing them to buy foreign goods or spend them in special 
PKO stores. These, however, were poorly supplied, especially in the 1950s; moreo-
ver, they were only to be found in the capital, where initially hard currency opera-
tions were exclusively performed. Visitors from outside of Warsaw, often confused 
by the complicated procedures, were easily persuaded to sell their checks for a few 
zloty more than the official going rate. “Much effort has been wasted,” complained 
Kierunki journalists in 1957, “campaigning for a network of stores where citizens 
can buy attractive goods using hard currency. Not everybody can afford peregri-
nations to PKO stores from remote Polish cities. It is much easier to sell the dollar 
checks to a random dealer who will then transfer them abroad, than wait for weeks 
for attractive goods at the PKO stores. And thus the repeal of the inane, anti-dem-
ocratic law prohibiting possession of foreign currency benefits only black market 
dealers and smugglers.”995
Since complete and effective eradication of the black market was deemed to 
be not feasible, the authorities aimed their efforts at re-directing at least part of 
the stream of foreign currency flowing into the black market to the Treasury. 
On June 18, 1958, the Minister of Finance issued a new regulation, which was 
implemented swiftly – barely a month later; it allowed “hard currency natives” to 
open non- interest-bearing, hard currency accounts in a number of banks. The 
account holders were allowed to make unlimited deposits and spend unlimited 
quantities on goods within the “internal export” system. All other withdrawals 
required special authorization. A year later, another regulation (MP 1959, no. 60, 
item 295) made it possible to buy goods in Bank PKO stores using undocument-
ed hard currency.
The introduction, in 1960, of PKO dollar coupons was a truly revolution-
ary step. The coupons were not a currency sensu stricto but rather an auxiliary 
means of settlement effective only within Poland. The foreign currency that Pol-
ish citizens received from abroad and the apportionment of their wages earned 
abroad while employed on state contracts were paid out to them not in bank 
transfers or foreign banknotes but in PKO dollar coupons. On the black market 
they were worth only slightly less than US dollars, because – importantly – trad-
ing in them was not restricted. If one wanted to buy or sell dollar coupons – un-
like in the case of dollars – one could advertise one’s intention in a newspaper ad. 
In time, well-understood codes of communication developed: a small ad offering 
995 J. Koźliński, K.W. Olszewski, Dwie stopy na złotym wybrzeżu, “Kierunki”, no. 36/
September 8, 1957.
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a coupon transaction was understood to refer potentially also to trading hard 
currency.996
With its many loopholes, PKO-coupon circulation was a system that provided 
black marketeers with numerous opportunities for quasi-legal operations, which 
greatly frustrated law enforcement efforts. If we are to believe the press, the situ-
ation “threw the Police Station in Waliców Street [in Warsaw] into a blind rage”; 
under the circumstances, they were reduced to observing and analyzing the 
money changers’ modus operandi and once in a while staged, mostly unsuccess-
ful, roundups.997 The law enforcement forces counted on the new criminal law 
passed on April 13, 1960 (Journal of Laws 1960, no. 21, item 123, in force from 
June 30, 1960) and largely dedicated to hard currency crimes. The new law raised 
fines, with a new maximum of one million zloty – an unimaginable amount at 
the time;998 it did not pander to the wishes of the police who would have pre-
ferred to see longer prison sentences and left the maximum term at three years 
in jail. Following the tried and tested practice of demonstrating the effectiveness 
of any new law in action, the authorities instantly launched show trials of money 
dealers. On July 26, 1960, for the crime of purchasing a $100 bill, a Warsaw cur-
rency dealer was fined 40 000 zloty – more than two years’ average salary! – and 
given the option of eight months of prison instead.999 In spite of the toughened 
sanctions, the money changers exploited expertly numerous loopholes such as 
the absence of restrictions on transactions involving PKO dollar coupons. As 
a result, fighting hard currency crimes was an exercise in futility, with the press 
incessantly urging more effective law enforcement. It was not the PKO coupons 
but hard currency that shaped the image of the foreign money black market. 
From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, one of the most important driving forces 
behind this black market sector was the illegal import of luxury articles such as 
clothing and watches but above all gold, where the stakes were at their highest. 
This was one type of contraband that could always rely on solvent customers and 
was immune to the vagaries of fashion. In the seemingly stable 1960s there was 
996 A system of similar codes probably existed in all the Soviet Bloc countries. For ex-
ample in the GDR, an advertisement for “blue tiles” (blaue Fliesen) meant an offer of 
selling or buying West German marks (hundred-mark bills were blue); S. Sommer, 
Das große Lexikon des DDR-Alltags, Berlin 2002, pp. 47–48. 
997 S. Atlas, Paragraf zero – raz jeszcze, TL, no. 145/May 26, 1960.
998 L. Hochberg, Przestępstwa dewizowe w nowej ustawie karnej skarbowej, “Państwo 
i Prawo” 1960, no. 8/9, pp. 303–309.
999 ŻW, no. 178/July 27, 1960.
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no shortage of buyers among private businessmen, professionals and assorted 
shady operators. 
Stefan Brzozowski, The speculator’s last currency deal, circa 1960.  
Photo: Warsaw Museum of Caricature, sign. 3616.
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During the Gomulka era, the newspapers never ceased to report how yet anoth-
er “gold gang” had been exposed, typically buying hard currency, transferring it 
abroad and bringing back the precious metal. The government’s perennial dilem-
ma was whether to support the existing anti-speculation laws or favor sound eco-
nomic considerations such as the profit principle. Firstly, the state had a monopoly 
in hard currency and gold transactions, and besides, smuggling and illegal cur-
rency trading and hoarding were against the law. Secondly, gold bullion and bars 
hidden in attics and buried in backyards played the useful role of partially elim-
inating the monetary overhang, which would have otherwise flooded the poorly 
supplied food and general goods market, leading to inflation. Moreover, the state 
itself needed gold and private individuals were as good a source of supply as any. 
This consideration alone caused the government to tread gently when it came to 
repressive measures. The upshot was that the official approach towards citizens’ 
activities in the field of currency and precious metals was bipolar and irrational. 
On the one hand, customs officials and police did their job of prosecuting smug-
glers and investigating currency smuggling gangs. On the other, institutions au-
thorized by the state to buy precious metals such as Veritas, Ars Christiana, and 
above all the state-owned Jubiler1000 were busy buying gold so as not to antagonize 
sellers unduly by being excessively inquisitive about its provenance; managers’ 
eyes were firmly on the business goals and satisfaction of their customers. Intro-
duced in 1957, the regulations pertaining to the purchase of goods by the state 
were much more liberal in the case of gold and platinum, than food and industrial 
articles. The gold purchase price was set at a level (164 zloty per gram) sufficiently 
high to make smuggling the precious metal to Poland in order to sell it to the state 
a worthwhile pursuit. The authorities chose to overlook the fact that only a small 
portion of the gold purchased by state institutions from citizens was of the “util-
ity” kind – that it that is to say, jewelry and watches. Most of it was gold bullion 
gold bars, which must have entered Poland as contraband.1001
In 1961, the state purchase of “goods of foreign origin” became subject to new 
regulations. With goods worth more than six thousand zloty, sellers were now 
obliged to show their ID, with all the particulars duly recorded, as well as a cus-
toms receipt to prove that the goods had entered the country legally. When it 
came to such popular petty contraband as razors, sweaters or cognac, both buy-
ers and sellers mostly ignored the new regulations by immediately developing 
1000 All institutions had to re-sell precious metals to the Polish Mint, where their further 
fate was decided. 
1001 Alicja w krainie towaru, TL, December 16, 1960.
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defensive strategies; selling gold was, however, more complicated. In spite of 
Deputy Prime Minister Eugeniusz Szyr urging that the rule should also apply 
to gold, this was initially rejected by the Ministry of Internal Trade, clearly gov-
erned by different objectives. The requirement to present personal identification 
documents at the time of purchase was temporarily abandoned whereas the pur-
chase price of gold by state institutions was lowered to 115 zloty per gram. The 
effects of this move soon followed. Whereas in 1960, authorized institutions had 
purchased 1 997 kg of gold to the value of 322 million zloty, in 1961 they bought 
only 138 kg for a total of 152 million zloty; of this amount, 942 kg was purchased 
in the first half of the year and only 196 kg in the second.1002 Gold drifted away 
to the black market, which offered higher prices. The growth of the illegal market 
forced the repressive state apparatus to enhance and professionalize its anti-prof-
iteering operations. Tellingly, in 1962, Police Headquarters published a manual, 
featuring photographs of gold bullion from all over the world.1003 On September 
26, 1963 the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court adopted the resolution 
that the “unauthorized purchase of foreign gold coins used in payment of foreign 
bills constitutes a trade in hard currency executed as a purchase-sale transaction 
as defined in item 45 paragraph 1 of the Fiscal Offences Act of April 13 1960.”1004
The calls of economists advocating a more flexible state policy in regard to 
precious metals were brushed aside. This did not mean the decision makers 
stopped paying attention to gold. To the contrary, some of the motions sug-
gested at the time now appear shocking. On November 8, 1966, at a meeting 
of the representatives of various government departments including the Police 
and the Prosecutor’s Office, the chairman of the State Price Commission Janusz 
Strzemiński proposed, in all seriousness, that – since Poles were able and willing 
to pay a great deal for “hard-currency gold” – in order to meet demand, the State 
Mint should embark on the production of coins of defunct states such as replica 
tsarist rubles or Austro-Hungarian ducats. In the event, common sense prevailed 
and the motion was not approved.1005
1002 AAN, Supreme Audit Office II, 19/46, fol. 59–60.
1003 Album złotych monet, eds I. Skolimowski, S. Tarko, Warszawa 1962.
1004 A. Kochański, Polska 1944–1991. Informator historyczny, vol. 2: Ważniejsze akty 
prawne, decyzje i enuncjacje państwowe (1957–1970), Warszawa 2000, p. 365.
1005 AIPN, KG MO, 35/1927, fol. 3–4. This idea was discussed again on the NBP’s initiative 
in July 1969. Once more it was decided that the “benefits of the operation would 
not outbalance the negative political and social repercussions”. The production of 
collector’s coins such as the pre-war 10-zloty piece with Boleslaw I the Brave was 
accepted as a feasible alternative; AAN, National Bank of Poland (Narodowy Bank 
Polski), 8/7, Minutes of Ministry of Finance Council meeting, July 19, 1969, fol. 234.
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The official purchase price of gold did not go up until 1969, differentiating be-
tween scrap, at 140 zloty per gram, and undamaged coins – at 200 zloty per gram. 
In 1971, the customs duty on gold, until then – at between 25 and 120 zloty per 
gram – prohibitively high, decreased to between 5 and 10 zloty. A year later, the 
regulations yet again became lax: those selling precious metals to “nationalized 
entities” were no longer required to show their ID. This led to increased purchas-
es of gold by the state: in 1972, a ton more than in the previous year. Citizens 
of Yugoslavia sniffed out a good business opportunity and, taking advantage of 
freedom to travel, flooded the Polish market with Austrian ducats (which until 
1972 had been cheaper on the black market than on the official one).1006 The 
rigid official prices did not reflect the global price of gold, which skyrocketed in 
1973. The black market, always flexible, was once again in a privileged position. 
In 1973, despite the rising price, the Polish state bought a mere 81 kg of gold 
(only a year earlier, in 1972, it acquired as much as 1 476 kg). History repeated 
itself during the next global gold boom at the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s. 
The Polish state remained commercially defensive until 1989 and in this field 
also conceded to the black market. 
Some of the gold found in October 1983 at the house of a manager of a shop in Kutno 
charged with speculation offences. Photo: Polish Press Agency (PAP).
1006 AIPN, 01521/2035, Jacek Oleś, Smuggling of currency value, The Academy of Internal 
Affairs, Institute of Criminology, Warszawa 1978, pp. 39–40.
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The liberalization in the gold trade evident in the early 1970s had an impact on 
the dollar trade. At the end of the Gomułka era, the Ministry of Finance regula-
tion of April 4, 1970 (MP 1970, no. 11, item 95) introduced private, interest-bear-
ing hard currency accounts. These came in two kinds. In Account A, Poles were 
able to deposit foreign funds of documented origin; they could withdraw them 
at will and take them out of the country. There was no obligation to document a 
legitimate origin of foreign funds deposited in the Account B, also interest-bear-
ing; these, however, could be used solely for purchases in the internal export 
market. Three years after the date of the original deposit, the funds would auto-
matically acquire legitimate status. In 1970, 4.9 million dollars were held in 7 000 
private accounts; barely two years later, in 1972, the deposits had increased dra-
matically to 24 million dollars held in 37 000 accounts, and in 1975 – they shot 
up to 125 million dollars held in as many as 245 000 accounts.1007 
It is difficult to establish beyond doubt whether the large operations against 
hard currency and gold dealers organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MSW) in the fall of 1971 were part of the government’s general hard currency 
policy. They were probably unconnected with the Fiscal Offences Act of October 
26, 1971 (Journal of Laws 1971, no. 28, item 260). Had the operations been part 
of standard communist propaganda-in-action that usually accompanied the im-
plementation of a new law, they would most likely have been conducted immedi-
ately after the law came into force on January 1, 1972, especially since it provided 
a much more detailed classification of hard currency crimes and violation than 
previous legislation had and included harsher sanctions. The operations were 
probably merely a law-enforcement blitz typical of the new political era, an at-
tempt to demonstrate the determination of the new political team to eradicate 
the “pathologies of social life”. In August 1971, the Minister of Interior Affairs, 
Franciszek Szlachcic, approved “Guidelines for the Operation of the Department 
of Interior Affairs for the Benefit of Public Safety and Order.” In the same month, 
the operation optimistically named “Order” began. It was directed primarily 
against currency and gold dealers, smugglers and pimps. The “W” office in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) was put in charge of the “surveillance of the 
correspondence of people who receive substantial amount of hard currency”; in 
practice, this involved opening, often at random, large numbers of private letters 
often sent by post by and to people quite unconnected with any illegal activity. 
In the period August 14 to 28, 1971, 32 610 police officials, 6 560 members of 
1007 M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy. Przesłanki, mechanizmy i skutki w Polsce lat 
osiemdziesiątych, Warszawa 1992, p. 119.
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the Volunteer Reserve Militia (ORMO), 4 500 MSW and Police Headquarters 
employees and “public activists” (2 242 persons) took part in the operation. By 
early October, 4 559 people had been arrested and over 47 000 cases had been 
sent to police courts. On September 17, 1971 “Operation Rubin” began. It was 
directed against currency changers and gold dealers operating in Gdańsk, Ka-
towice, Krakow, Łódź, Szczecin, Warsaw and Wrocław. Several days later “Oper-
ation Korona” was launched, aimed at money changers and prostitutes working 
in Warsaw’s best hotels. Following that, Gdańsk, Bydgoszcz, Katowice, Wrocław, 
Łódź, Kraków, Szczecin were targeted.1008
The wave of large-scale actions against the black market quickly receded, 
with no similar action replays taking place for the rest of the Gierek era but of 
course investigation and prosecution of “hard-currency smuggling gangs” con-
tinued. Krzysztof Madej got it right with his comment: “This approach was part 
of the bigger picture of the Gierek team approach to phenomena perceived as 
pathological and unwelcome. Instead of radical repression or show trials, the 
authorities preferred to monitor the undesirable phenomena or, using today’s 
terminology, to “manage” them.”1009 This became especially true when the gov-
ernment’s new legislation concerning hard currencies turned black market cur-
rency dealers into an important institution performing a sui generis service for 
the benefit of the state. In early October 1976, a Ministry of Finance resolution 
(MP 1976, no. 38, item 173) did away with accounts B, leaving only accounts A. 
This move proved extremely effective – by 1979, the deposits in these accounts 
grew to 438 million dollars.1010 Not only did Poles empty their drawers and oth-
er domestic hidey-holes of dollars and marks but also bought additional hard 
currency on the black market in order to maximize their deposits into these 
legitimate bank accounts, which were treated as investment. The bank offered 
a relatively high interest, which considerably increased the return on deposits, 
since the black-market dollar exchange rate kept rising.1011 One could support 
oneself nicely just by living off this interest if the deposit was large enough. Even 
the interest on smaller savings represented a significant supplement to a family 
budget. Another reason that made account A immensely attractive was the fact 
1008 AIPN, 0296/113, vol. 3, fol. 7–8, 30, 45, 77, 100, 123, 153, 156–157; ibid., 0296/114, vol. 
1, fol. 2, 4, 45, 60, 82. See: F. Szlachcic, Gorzki smak władzy. Wspomnienia, Warszawa 
1990, pp. 182–184.
1009 K. Madej, Wszyscy byli przemytnikami…, p. 139.
1010 D. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949–1989, Warszawa 2010, p. 301.
1011 In 1974, the black-market average dollar exchange rate was 91 zloty, in 1975 – 105.5 
zloty, in 1976 – 127 zloty, in 1977 – 141 zloty, in 1978 – between 133 and 138 zloty.
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that it was useful in facilitating trips abroad. Let us not forget that this was still a 
time when travelling outside of Poland, particularly to a Western country, could 
by no means be taken for granted and required elaborate strategies – such as for 
example having to obtain a formal invitation from an identifiable foreign citizen, 
the paperwork verified by a foreign consulate. Another method was to apply for 
an allocation of hard currency by the state, which was far from generous or in-
deed adequate to meet the cost of staying however briefly in a Western country. 
In contrast, hard-currency account holders were entitled to a passport that could 
be used to travelling outside of the Soviet Bloc countries without the necessity to 
resort to such elaborate maneuvers. Each trip to the West and occasionally even a 
sojourn in the East offered opportunities to acquire foreign money, which could 
then be brought back to Poland. “The increase in the numbers of citizens making 
trips abroad using their own hard currency”, the chief of the Przemyśl police 
noted in his report to headquarters in Warsaw in November 1978, “is related to 
the increasing numbers of hard-currency account holders. These accounts are 
opened with dollars that the holders bring from capitalist countries or which 
they buy while visiting Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary. From our 
reconnaissance it is clear that the majority of trips based on hard currency are 
not of a tourist character but they serve rather as an opportunity to conduct all 
kinds of trade and smuggling transactions. In contrast to previous years, instead 
of gold and attractive goods, today’s “tourists” bring home foreign currency – 
mostly dollars. Some citizens use foreign currency brought back to Poland to 
augment their deposits in their foreign currency accounts or to open new ones. 
The accounts make it possible for them to organize trips abroad in subsequent 
years.”1012
This diminished interest in bringing back from abroad attractive Western 
goods with the goal of reselling them at home at a profit was largely due to the 
reform of the hard-currency stores. On January 1, 1974 the Internal Export 
Company (Przedsiębiorstwo Exportu Wewnętrznego, Pewex) began its oper-
ations. Pewex took over from Bank PKO “internal export trading” and rapid-
ly expanded into a dense network of stores, which offered attractive goods at 
prices often lower than in the West. For the Polish state it was more profitable 
to sell products made in Poland in Pewex (which thus hardly merited the term 
“export “) – in1977 sales of such goods made up 60 percent of the stores’ reve-
nue. It was more profitable than selling goods genuinely imported from abroad, 
and in particular Western goods, to obtain which the centralized economy had 
1012 AIPN, MSW II, 21052, fol. 12–13.
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to waste precious reserves of hard currency. Besides, it was easier to “export” 
Polish goods internally within the country to a hard currency store than to the 
demanding West, where they were often found to be substandard or otherwise 
failed to meet Western expectations. The government developed a system of 
incentives for buyers. The price of the two most important articles on sale at 
Pewex – cars and Polish alcohol – when calculated at the black market hard 
currency exchange rate was somewhat lower than the price of that same alco-
hol in regular stores and the price of new cars on the free market. The same was 
true of the price of apartments and farming equipment. Pewex revenue grew 
fast allowing the state treasury to replenish its coffers. No wonder that – faced 
with the reality that illicitly obtained money ended up as a legitimate deposit in 
a foreign currency bank account or was used for legal Pewex purchases – even 
the courts were inclined to be lenient towards those facing criminal charges 
involving hard currency.1013
Nevertheless, the dual currency system was a source of numerous econom-
ic, social, and political concerns for the Polish authorities in the second part of 
the 1970s. Increasing numbers of Western tourists visiting Poland bought Polish 
currency from state outlets in no more than the obligatory minimum quantity 
of dollars, which was hardly surprising. Bearing in mind the derisory official 
exchange rate of 31zl, they were able to complete their currency exchange at a 
much better rate on the black market. In 1971, unofficial transfers of hard cur-
rency from foreign visitors were estimated at ten million dollars. In 1977 the 
estimate swelled to 120 million dollars while the state officially purchased 23% 
fewer. Thanks to the unofficial rate of exchange, foreigners were able to buy – 
for, in their perception, next to nothing – leather goods, silver, and clothes with 
the zloty purchased from money dealers (estimated at eight billion zloty). The 
authorities worried not only about foreign tourists draining the increasingly de-
pleted Polish market but also about the “transfer of the national income to the 
capitalist countries, with no recompense whatsoever.”1014
The progressive “dollarization” of Poland gradually undermined trust in the 
national currency. Worse than that: it also made jobs remunerated in zloty un-
attractive. In the second part of the 1970s, the average net wage calculated at the 
black market exchange rate was approximately $35 per month, or $420 annu-
ally. To be in possession of dollars became a criterion of social class. Privileged 
1013 G. Kurkiewicz, “Change money”… czyli dolary dla operatywnych, “Czas” 1978, no. 41; 
R. Czerniawski, Gra w zielone, PiŻ, 1983, no. 15.
1014 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/511, fol. 12.
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holders of hard currency bank accounts traveled abroad and shopped at Pewex. 
The rest had only Polish zlotys in their wallets and shopped in regular stores, 
where the choice was limited. For someone upwardly mobile socially, to break 
the law by availing themselves of the black market seemed a small transgression 
that could open the door to the exclusive dollar group.1015 In the column written 
for the Warsaw magazine Kultura that the writer Bohdan Czeszko sent in weekly 
from the small town provincial town where he lived, he told the following story: 
“The ultimate example of extreme aversion to our native currency is the attitude 
of a certain farmer. One day, this reasonable fellow brought potatoes to sell in the 
market. This was just a typical small town market that takes place once or maybe 
twice a week. […] The farmer had an extraordinarily cunning plan for selling his 
potatoes. He would only part with the product in exchange for hard currency. 
Specifically, he was happy to accept US dollars and West German marks, charg-
ing $2.50 for a sack of potatoes. You can see that not only was he familiar with 
the black-market dollar rate but was an honest merchant to boot, since the price 
was nothing if not eminently reasonable.
And he would have likely been willing to go even lower, had the transaction 
actually taken place. But it didn’t. People fell about laughing. Asked what had in-
spired this absurd idea, the farmer explained that he was having a house built but 
construction materials where only available via the internal export system – so 
he had decided to ‘internally export’ his own product.”1016
Not all the dollar-less pariahs were as desperate as this provincial farmer. The 
majority were simply bitter or mad as hell, and kept complaining. In the fall of 
1978, the Department of Planning and Economic Analysis at the Central Com-
mittee prepared a package of remedial measures, which included tightening for-
eign exchange controls for non-residents, and lowering the internal-export and 
black-market price ratio to 90 zloty to a dollar in 1979 and down to 70 zloty 
in 1980; to look at it in a different way, this simply meant higher prices in the 
Pewex and Baltona stores. Another measure was to maintain the hard-currency 
stores only in big cities and in hotels for foreign visitors. By 1980, all domestic 
articles in short supply on the domestic market were to be withdrawn from inter-
nal export stores.1017 The striking workers on the Baltic coast were in agreement 
with most of those proposals, as could be seen from their demands in August 
1015 Ibid. fol. 13.
1016 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/472, fol. 33.
1017 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/511, fol. 18–21.
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1980.1018 Ironically, all that the revolution they ignited achieved was to accelerate 
the dollarization of Poland.
8.2.3  1981–1989
The changes in hard currency policy in the preceding quarter of a century had 
been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Even the dollar exchange rate did 
not change much, and in 1980 it was on average 125 zloty. However, the 1980s 
had its share of extremities, from quasi-Stalinist restrictions to extreme liberal-
ism. Historical analogies come to mind. For example, 1981 was reminiscent of 
1957. The government and its agencies were weak and confused. The gates to the 
West opened wider: in 1981 Poles traveled to other Soviet Bloc countries half as 
often (from 6 157 000 trips in 1980 the number dwindled to 2 984 000 in 1981) 
but twice as frequently to capitalist countries (from 695 000 to 1 248 000). Most 
trips had commercial goals – the travelers were planning to work or engage in lu-
crative trading. Increasing amounts of hot money in the wallets of Polish citizens 
(just as in 1957) and rapidly growing shortages made selling foreign goods un-
usually profitable. It paid to bring gold home – always an attractive investment, 
as well as any other marketable goods. The authorities turned a blind eye to the 
private imports, which in 1981, according to the estimates, was worth 310 mil-
lion dollars.1019
In 1981, just as it had done a quarter of a century earlier, the dollar exchange 
rate went crazy – in May it was 200 zloty, and by early December it had shot up 
to 500 zloty. When Martial Law was imposed on December 13, there were many 
desperate enough to be prepared to pay as much as 1 000 zloty for a dollar. The 
panic was short-lived but in the following weeks the rate oscillated between 800 
and 900 zloty, to again halve in 1982 (to 360–400 zloty). The restrictions im-
posed on hard-currency bank accounts worked in favor of the black market.1020 
By October 1982, withdrawals were only possible if paid out in dollar coupons 
rather than actual hard currency, and the onerous limitations remained in force 
1018 Postulaty 1970–71 i 1980. Materiały źródłowe do dziejów wystąpień pracowniczych 
w latach 1970–1971 i 1980 (Gdańsk i Szczecin), ed. B. Chmiel, E. Kaczyńska, Warszawa 
1998, pp. 185, 186, 194, 202, 206, 209.
1019 W. J. Kostrzewa, Devisenschwarzmarkt in Polen. Seine Eigenschaften, sein Modell und 
seine Bedeutung für die polnische Wirtschaft, Kiel 1987, pp. 24–25. According to the 
estimates of the World Currency Yearbook (1984, p. 871), in 1980 alone, and just from 
Great Britain, three tons of gold were transferred to Poland, ibid., p. 29. In 1981 this 
amount was probably much larger. 
1020 AAN, URM, 32/6, fol. 5.
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for some time. Trips abroad ended and, with them, the trade in goods brought 
from abroad. Large hikes of food prices in February 1982 led to many of those 
with savings in hard currency selling their store of value in order to put food 
on the table; this supported the black market and at the same time lowered the 
dollar rate. 
For the first few months after the imposition of Martial Law, the law enforce-
ment agencies paid little attention to the black market, preoccupied as they were 
with other plentiful problems. Rather, they went through the motions, mostly to 
appease public opinion particularly in large factories where workers protested 
against the speculative trade in goods purchased within the internal export sys-
tem.1021 The hard currency black market re-appeared on the government’s radar 
in mid-1983, after Martial Law had been lifted and cross-border traffic again 
given a green light, resulting in increased export-import activities by Polish cit-
izens.1022 The regulation issued by the Minister of Finance and the chairman of 
the National Bank of Poland on November 30, 1984 (MP 1984, no 27, item182) 
, with effect from January 1, 1985, which abolished all restrictions on the use of 
foreign currencies deposited in A accounts ” (with documented origin), provid-
ed a massive boost for the hard-currency black market. Nevertheless, funds of 
undocumented origin could be deposited in account N; from there – after only a 
year – they would graduate to account A status.
The interest paid on hard-currency accounts was sufficiently high to cushion 
the effects of the high inflation that was devouring all savings denominated in 
Polish zloty. Unsurprisingly, as much as two billion dollars had been parked in 
individual hard-currency accounts by 1987. This helped the state alleviate some 
of its hard-currency problems but it had nevertheless to find a compromise be-
tween the existing law and socio-economic reality. This frequently resulted in 
paradoxical situations. In spite of being subject to the law and censorship, in 
the mid-1980s, the consumers’ weekly Veto as well as automobile and computer 
magazines carried information on the current black market currency exchange 
rates.1023 The state bank was buying from the citizens gold coins and bars that 
clearly must have been smuggled from abroad and paid for them with hard cur-
rency calculated at a fair exchange rate; the sellers could deposit the proceeds 
1021 AAN, URM, 32/114, fol. 73.
1022 AAN, URM, 32/171, fol. 137. According to estimates, 40 million dollars left Poland 
for Turkey and 100 million dollars left for West Germany with the goal of importing 
goods, W.J. Kostrzewa, Devisenschwarzmarkt in Polen…, p. 25.
1023 M. Gruszczyński, M. Stokłosa, Efektywność nieoficjalnego rynku walutowego w Polsce 
w latach 1982–1989, “Bank i Kredyt” 37, 2006, p. 39.
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legally in their account A – today, the process would be described as mon-
ey-laundering, with the state and its institutions colluding with the citizens.1024 
Ostensibly, the government frowned upon Polish travelers abroad engaging in 
trade activities – yet, apparently incongruously, it also instructed them on how to 
avoid the repressive measures of the customs agencies of the Soviet Union, Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, and other Soviet Bloc countries – which, if applied successfully, 
would have been detrimental to the interest of the Polish Treasury. Ultimately, 
the government was obliged to engage in a price war with the black market and; 
in 1984, in a singular acknowledgement of free market mechanisms, Pewex was 
obliged to drop the price of VHS cassettes in order to compete successfully with 
private importers.1025
Simultaneously, the government maintained that hard-currency trade based 
on high exchange rates had a negative effect on the “process of shaping social 
perceptions and behavior. It [increased] negative attitudes towards working in 
Poland and undermined trust in the national currency. Simultaneously it [cre-
ated] a cult of the dollar and glamorized the status of a job in the West.”1026 The 
police continued the crusade against currency smuggling; by mid-1986 it had 
identified “693 sites and locations where illegal hard currency transactions [were] 
conducted” and “3 582 individuals conducting illegal trade in public places”.1027 
The operation continued in 1987, with the clear-up rate for currency smuggling 
offences increasing by 128.6%; the result was used to justify extending the “oper-
ations for 1988.”1028
Police operations dealt with the tip of the iceberg and were unable to halt the 
pro-active approach and initiatives in relation to matters of foreign currency of 
Polish citizens, who gradually abandoned the national currency for the US dol-
lar. Whereas 1976, savings in foreign currency constituted a mere 7.8% of those 
in Polish zloty, in 1980 this had increased to 16.6%, in 1983 – to 45.1%, and in 
1986 – to 78.7%. By 1987, Poles had abandoned all hope of any re-animation of 
the communist economy, as is evident in the fact that dollar deposits shot up to 
a massive 137.2% of those in zloty, only to triple a year later, to 319.4%.1029 For a 
young person, the only way of saving enough to buy quickly even the smallest 
1024 W.J. Kostrzewa, Devisenschwarzmarkt in Polen…, pp. 29–30; W Warszawie płacą 
dolarami, “Veto” 1985, nr 41.
1025 W.J. Kostrzewa, Devisenschwarzmarkt in Polen…, pp. 24–25.
1026 AIPN, KG MO, 35/554, fol. 40.
1027 Ibid., fol. 46, 50.
1028 Ibid., fol. 82–83.
1029 M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy…, p. 120.
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apartment was to earn the money abroad. With the high black-market dollar 
rate in relation to Polish wages – in 1981, the average monthly wage could buy 
a paltry 35 dollars; by 1988, this had dwindled to a pitiful 22 dollars – it became 
a way of life to make money “over there” and spend it “over here”.1030 In addition, 
the foreign currency deposited in the bank yielded healthy interest and such sav-
ings enabled the holder to shop in Pewex stores rather than in the depressingly 
grey, and usually quite bare, regular stores. Whereas in 1982 internal export turn-
over had been 366.3 million dollars, by 1988 it had grown to 700 million dollars, 
approximately a quarter of all retail sales in the country. All private transactions 
that involved purchasing a larger item such as a car or an apartment were con-
ducted in hard currency. In newspaper small ads and real estate sections the 
rubric, “Will rent/sell to a person returning from abroad” became common. This 
was a coded message, which indicated that the advertiser was interested solely in 
a hard currency transaction.
The authorities recognized the necessity of finding a way out of this prepos-
terous situation. In May 1987, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) proposed in-
tervention in the dollar market in order to lower the absurdly high black market 
exchange rate, which had outpaced both price increases and income growth.1031 
The proposal included long-term strategies such as bringing down inflation, 
improving the supply of up -to-date consumer goods and doing away with or 
curtailing of hard-currency rationing. Immediate measures were also proposed, 
such as the purchase of dollar coupons by state institutions at a price close to 
the black-market level, the introduction of zloty-denominated credit lines using 
hard currency as collateral, selling foreign currency to Polish tourists at a “bal-
anced rate” (but with a “tourist surcharge”) and, above all, allowing internal ex-
port prices to find their market level. Prices in Pewex stores – especially for goods 
made in Poland such as alcohol or cars – were calculated so as to be relatively 
low compared to elsewhere, even though the dollars to be spent there had to be 
bought on the black market. In turn, the coffee or wool purchased in Pewex was 
sold at a profit on the black market. Thus, Pewex generated demand for hard cur-
rency and powered the black economy; the dollars spent there kept in business 
many an illegal currency dealer…
1030 See: D. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia?…
1031 Propozycje działań zmierzających do zmniejszenia czarnorynkowego kursu walut ob-
cych, NBP, Warszawa, May 1987 (I am grateful to Grzegorz Sołtysiak for sharing this 
material).
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In the fall of 1987, eleven branches of the National Bank of Poland in the 
largest cities embarked on the purchase of dollar coupons at prices close to the 
market rate. In no time at all, money changers demonstrated the superiority of 
the private-enterprise economy over the communist one. In order to be able to 
sell dollar coupons, state institutions first had to buy them. As for the money 
changers, they had no problem at all carrying out both operations regardless of 
the time of the day, amount or currency involved. “Their small, pocket banks, 
portable currency exchange offices […] win the competition […] up front”, a 
journalist observed in the spring of 1988. “If the state bank paid 980 zloty for 
a coupon, the dealers would offer 1 030 zloty. If the bank quoted 1 150, they 
would topped it with 1 200. When finally the bank raised the price to 1 300, 
they immediately offered 1 350 zloty. No wonder that people would rather sell 
to the money changers. The public sell them anything going – coupons, dollars, 
marks, rubles, and forints. And anything they need, they buy from the dealers, 
too. Where else?”1032
 A year later, new opportunities arose. The rigid and restrictive hard curren-
cy law was one of the main obstacles in enforcing the Act on Economic Free-
dom, passed on December 23, 1988. In the new Hard Currency Act of February 
15, 1989, (Journal of Laws 1989, no. 6, item 33) the most important provision 
for the business-oriented citizens was item 10, which stated: “Having obtaining 
a currency permit and in accordance with the stipulations set out by the Chair-
man of the NBP, Polish citizens may conduct and manage economic activity in-
volving the purchase, sale, and brokerage of hard currency assets.” First off the 
block was a businessman by the name of Aleksander Gawronik, who had prior 
experience in the hard-currency black market and had collaborated with the 
secret services. Despite the existence of a complicated verification procedure, 
Gawronik was able to start his business a mere couple of days after the new 
law had been implemented on March 13, 1989, (MP 1989, no. 6, item 35). It is 
anybody’s guess whether it was his business experience or his special connec-
tions in the secret services that enabled Gawronik to launch his new lucrative 
business before all competition. 
1032 J. Nieporowski, Raj dla cinkciarzy, “Tygodnik Kulturalny”, no. 14/April 3, 1988; see: 
J.S. Jóźwiak, Cinkciarz prezesa, ibid., no. 29/July 17, 1988.
316
Advertisement for the Foreign Currency Exchange in Aleje Jerozolimskie in Warsaw, 
December 1989. Photo: Aleksander Jałosiński, FORUM Polish Photography Agency.
The first private Bureau de Change in post-war Poland opened its doors to the 
public near the border crossing in Świecko on March 16, 1989, at 12.01 am. The 
first customer appeared barely 15 minutes later – a border guard from East Ger-
many. A 100 DM bill in hand, he put the functioning of Polish capitalist enter-
prise to an empirical test.1033 It worked perfectly! In the first few months, the NBP 
issued some two thousand permits to run money exchange businesses. They were 
springing up everywhere: in banks, in the branches of the Orbis travel agency, in 
1033 P. Pytlakowski, Krótki spacer Gawronika, “Polityka”, no. 46/November 19, 2005.
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Pewex and Baltona stores, and in travel agencies but first and foremost they were 
being set up by, according to Paweł Tarnowski, “individual citizens with cash 
and business talents, who came to the conclusion this was the best way to mul-
tiply their already considerable wealth (with the initial capital to launch such a 
business estimated at tens of millions of zloty).”1034 There can be no doubt that 
many of those investors had amassed the necessary financial resources changing 
money in front of state banks and Pewex stores. The hard currency chapter of 
the Polish black market culminated in March 1990, with the regulation issued 
by the chairman of the NBP (MP 1989, no 15, item 119) which authorized the 
circulation of gold bullion, bars and gold scrap; soon, the price of Krugerrands 
and twenty-dollar gold coins became part of the staple information on boards at 
money exchange kiosks.
8.3  The Greenback Game: Mechanisms and Players
The illegal trade in hard currency and gold was a complex and multilayered phe-
nomenon, as enduring as it was universal. Invariably, it was powered by fear and 
greed. This chapter attempts to present – without any prospect of exhausting the 
topic – the players in this game, their motivation and ways of operating.
8.3.1  Motivation
During the Second World War, some had sold the gold and valuables that they 
had stockpiled earlier in order to survive, while others engaged in buying, thus 
creating great fortunes.1035 Gold, jewelry, precious stones, and hard currency were 
relatively easy to hide and escape with, even during such a cataclysm as the War-
saw Uprising. “It was becoming apparent,” the historian Kazimierz Wyka, who 
lived near Krakow, noted about refugees from Warsaw, “that in crafty hidey-holes 
in their shoes, clothes or inside toothbrushes, they had salvaged from the burnt 
city unexpectedly large quantities of dollars. The hard currency trade revived.”1036 
1034 P. Tarnowski, Rok dolara, “Polityka”, no. 51/52/December 23–30, 1989.
1035 Post-war finds testify to the extent of the storage of value. For example in early May 
1947, four people found approximately 35 kg of gold in a destroyed building at Nowy 
Swiat 64, which they shared among themselves. Once the Special Commission had 
been put in charge of recovering hidden treasures, in March 1948 it hauled in 2 269 
five ruble coins, 1 112 ten ruble coins, 84 fifteen ruble coins, and eight coins to the 
value of 7.50 rubles, two twenty-dollar coins and several dozen assorted gold items; 
AAN, KS, 808. These were not isolated cases (see: AAN, KS, 2656). 
1036 K. Wyka, Życie na niby, Kraków 2010, p. 256.
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Gold dollar and ruble coins helped to rebuild post-war life in Poland. They were 
used as capital to open a store or a workshop, to start a business and to renovate 
a house or an apartment. A pharmacist, Michał Albrecht, during his testimony in 
January 1948 to the Special Commission stated that when he was “running away 
from Warsaw during the Uprising he took with him $5 000, a $1 000 of which he 
exchanged into zloty in 1945 when he opened the pharmacy on Targowa Street, 
and that in 1946 and in 1947 he was selling and buying dollars according to his 
needs. He explained that when he did not have the money to buy a supply of 
pharmaceuticals, he would sell some dollars on the black market to get the funds 
necessary but when he had cash on his hands and nothing else to spend it on at 
the time, he would buy dollars.”1037
After the war ended, a large number of private entrepreneurs engaged in sim-
ilar activity. In 1946, officials at the Main Inspectorate of Treasury Protection 
(Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Skarbowej, GIOS) identified as the most impor-
tant black market – besides “emigrants of Jewish nationality” – millers, manufac-
turers of milling equipment, restaurant owners, jewelers, and “criminal elements 
from among the functionaries of nationalized industry and trade.”1038 The more 
worrisome the international situation became during 1946 and 1947 and the 
more the “battle for trade” jeopardized the future of business, the more private 
citizens turned to honing their strategies for hoarding stores of value. Between 
1948 and 1949, when the government’s economic endeavors left no illusion 
about the intentions of the state, private manufacturers and merchants began to 
buy greater amounts of hard currency and gold, which in accordance with the 
laws of supply and demand caused their prices to rise.1039
This form of investment continued in the first part of the 1950s. The revalu-
ation of the national currency in October 1950 proved an extremely traumatic 
experience for citizens. The fear of having to relive the upheaval stayed with Poles 
until the last days of communist Poland and often motivated their actions. Rum-
ors about a forthcoming money reform cropped up repeatedly – always creating 
a panic, deepening a distrust of the domestic currency and spurring Poles to 
invest their savings in foreign currency or gold. The Six-year Plan and the war 
in Korea not only impoverished Polish society, but also brought inflation and 
rapidly devalued the national currency. Those who had more courage and more 
1037 AAN, KS, 2651.
1038 AAN, URM, 5/637, GIOS do PRM, March 6, 1947, fol. 6.
1039 AAN, KS, 2651. The rise in black-market gold and currencies was the most marked in 
Warsaw; this siphoned off dollars from other cities. AAN, KS, 1289, Documentation 
in the case against Abraham Danziger.
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money immediately swapped their Polish zloty for more enduring valuables. 
Those who had run out of national banknotes but had been prudent enough to 
bury dollars, pounds or rubles in their backyard, every so often sold some of their 
strategic hoard to make ends meet.
Undoubtedly, until 1956/1957 this phenomenon appeared on a modest scale 
and stayed mostly underground. Especially in big cities where enforcement was 
rigorous, the black market went deeper underground. Apparently, in smaller 
towns and rural areas, hard currency and gold operations were conducted more 
openly. In August 1952, a helpful anonymous zealot, signing off only as “Honest 
Citizen”, reported to the local authorities in Zamość that every miller in the re-
gion was engaged in trying to “save as rapidly as possible not zlotys but dollars in 
large denominations or gold bullion and willing to pay generously.”1040 Hoarding 
gold had been traditional among the Polish peasantry and not even Stalinism 
was able to eradicate it. In the area of the former Russian partition, the farmers 
tended to recycle the proceeds of sales of grain, vegetables, and meat into gold 
rubles. In the fall, they would buy the popular five-ruble coin, commonly referred 
to as the “piggy”, and – after food supplies had dwindled through the winter – sell 
it the following spring.1041
Beginning with the fall of 1956, such operations became relatively safe and 
thus commonplace. Whether a small storeowner or an experienced black-market 
swindler with cosy connections in governmental echelons of power, their pre-
ferred method for the preservation of capital was the same: bury a jar with gold-
en rubles, dollars or Austrian ducats in the backyard. “There he stands behind the 
till of his small local store, a jar full of candy on the counter, dreaming about gold 
filling up his stocking – gold that neither water nor fire nor the financial depart-
ment will take away.”1042 This little vignette epitomized the petty-bourgeois gold 
1040 ODZP TVP, Newsletter of Radio Committee Letter Office, 1050/3, no. 75, September 
30, 1952.
1041 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6211, Item 8798/56. Foreign exchange trade flourished. The 
case of a family doctor from Tuliszków near Konin shows that hoarding valuables 
was ingrained and socially acceptable in provincial Poland. In August 1977, he was 
arrested for buying scrap gold and 1 279 dollars, as well as taking part in other, much 
larger transactions. Soon, the prosecutor office and Voivodship Party committee 
received letters signed by hundreds of Tuliszków community residents demanding 
the release of the doctor. The letters emphasized that he was an “honest and diligent” 
citizen, indispensable to the community. In the local church, a mass was celebrated 
for a “positive outcome” of the doctor’s case; AAN, KC PZPR, WO, 3095, fol. 5. 
1042 J. Tetter, Wolność, złoto i hazard, “Tygodnik Morski” 1967, no. 19. Not much had 
changed by the end of the 1970s. “Part of smuggled gold goes literally ’into the 
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hoarding in 1967. In 1964, a raid on just some of the perpetrators in the “meat 
affair” uncovered 17 285 dollars in gold dollar pieces and another 15 000 in bills, 
1 500 gold rubles, 2 000 gold crowns, 22 gold ducats, 1.7 kg of gold bars and a 
substantial amount of gold items “of value yet to be established.”1043 The volume 
of gold accumulated in communist Poland is hard to estimate but it is reasonable 
to assume that the practice must have been widespread through social groups 
other than storekeepers and criminals.1044
Whenever political or market conditions worsened, nervous gold and curren-
cy hoarders became more active. The waves of panic that kept erupting on the 
market due to international crises and the fear of war (the Berlin crisis in 1961, 
Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 
1968) and recurrent rumors about currency revaluation (notably in September 
and October 1963, January 1968, and October and November 1969) not only 
prompted runs on stores, denuding them completely of pasta, sugar and canned 
goods but also resulted in a soaring black-market dollar price and increased de-
mand for gold.1045 The 1968 political crisis, which came to be known simply as 
“March 1968” or the “March events”, was characteristic in that regard. The events 
of March 1968 put black-market activities on hold until April. During that pe-
riod, the demand for hard currency and gold soared. Due to scarce supply, the 
price soon followed the upward path. Dollar bills rose accordingly: bills of small 
denominations up to 125 zloty and in larger denominations up to 132 zloty for a 
dollar; the price of 100g gold bars exceeded 20 000 zloty. […] Between mid-Au-
gust and mid-October, the hard currency trade diminished. Small denomination 
dollar bills rose to 131 zloty and larger ones to 134–135 zloty per dollar; gold bars 
ground’ as a ‘rainy day’ backup. The owner often lives frugally and sometimes dies 
before divulging his secret to anyone. Recently, employees of one of the voivodship 
police headquarters seized 12 kg of smuggled gold buried by a vegetable stall owner”; 
A. Kłodzińska, Wyprawa po złote runo, ŻW, January 25, 1979.
1043 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XIV–305, fol. 45.
1044 AAN, IPP, 123, fol. 8v. Professionals such as lawyers, physicians, and dentists com-
monly used gold as a store of value. See: J. Niczyporowicz, Ballada do żółtego kruszcu, 
PiŻ, 1978, no. 17.
1045 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/775, April 1970, fol. 25–26; AIPN, 0296/66, vol. 2, Notes on public 
mood, fol. 67, 84, 92. Another indication was the growing volume of gold seized at the 
border. In 1968, custom officials found 93.5 kg gold bullion, bars, and jewelry, but in 
1969 – almost 162 kg; AIPN, 01521/876, vol. 1, Bogdan Chybowski, Nielegalny skup 
dewiz (Taktyka ujawniania i zwalczania). Departament Szkolenia i Doskonalenia 
Zawodowego MSW, Warszawa 1973, p. 11. 
 321
from 170 to 180 dollars, thus from 23 600 to 24 500 zloty. In gold transactions, 
Polish cash was rarely used.”1046
The government policy towards private entrepreneurs – the main buyers of 
dollars and gold – had a significant effect on the going market rate. The restric-
tions implemented in 1969 that lasted until the early 1970s, which included in-
creasing taxes, limiting state sector cooperation, and media propaganda accusing 
entrepreneurs of “unjust enrichment”, temporarily impoverished private business 
owners. As a result, the price of valuables fell. Between December 1970 and June 
1971, the dollar went from 127 down to 97 zloty, a 100g gold bar from 23 000 to 
19 000 zloty, and a twenty dollar coin from 8 200 to 6 800 zloty. In consequence, 
the state jewelry enterprise Jubiler increased its purchase of gold by several 
times.1047 When the green light for private initiative was again given, coinciding 
with symptoms of the national crisis becoming more visible, the demand for gold 
rose rapidly. A similar mechanism could be observed in the following decade.
Apart from the internal economic factors, the Polish gold market was also 
affected by the fluctuations in international markets. From 260 dollars per ounce 
in 1979, gold shot up to 850 dollars in late 1980. In Poland, the black market 
price of gold grew much more slowly, which made bringing the precious metal to 
Poland gradually less profitable and there were instances of trade reversal, with 
gold bars and bullion taken to the West.1048 However, when, in the second half of 
the 1980s, gold went down on the global market, while the monetary overhang 
and thus the possibility of price hikes in Poland increased, gold once more began 
to pour into the country in quantity. Interestingly, it was largely paid for with the 
proceeds of the illegal export of silver, a natural resource abundant in Poland, 
hence cheap – whereas in the West its price was rising rapidly.1049 
Polish migration, temporary and permanent, was of vital importance in shap-
ing the black market in hard currency and gold. This was particularly noticeable 
immediately after the war. The returnees were bringing back to their homeland 
foreign money and gold; those leaving, whether legally or not, tried to take val-
uables with them. Refugees from Poland, both Poles and Jews, exchanged their 
possessions for gold and money, which were to help make their new life easier. 
Those who were already abroad and had no intention of coming back but had 
left behind some belongings, exchanged them for valuables that were easy to 
1046 AIPN, KG MO, 35/1740.
1047 AIPN, MSW II, 1149, fol. 1–3, 6–7.
1048 AIPN, MSW II, 10780, fol. 40–41.
1049 AIPN, KG MO, 35/554, fol. 25.
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smuggle out of the country.1050 The scale of the transfers can be gathered from 
a note referring to the UNRRA camp for Displaced Persons (DPs), which was 
published in the Special Bulletin of the Polish Military Mission to Germany in 
April 1946. The majority of those in the camp were Jewish refugees from Poland. 
“Jews are complaining about the stricter recent checks at all the border crossing 
points. The border guards confiscate something from every single person. This 
“something” ranges from $1 000 to $2 000 in cash or items of jewelry of similar 
value. […] The camp residents are in possession of huge amounts of foreign cur-
rency, as is evident from the fact that last week, in the Russian zone near Szczecin, 
NKVD officials confiscated from Hersz Mandelbach from Łódź $11 200. He had 
made this fortune by smuggling saccharine.”1051 As could be expected, rumors 
that “emigration of the Jewish population” was soon to be suspended and a 
“group of emigrants would be returning to Poland from Austria and Czechoslo-
vakia” contributed to the short-lived decline in gold and hard currency price in 
August and September 1946.1052
This mechanism was repeated with each subsequent wave of emigration from 
Poland – Jews between 1956 and 1957, and again between 1967 and 1968, Ger-
mans between the 1950s and the 1970s, and the mass exodus in the 1980s. Stud-
ies to date have focused more on the political circumstances of emigration from 
Poland,1053 rather than the mechanisms that facilitated the financial aspects of 
the move such as prospective émigrés selling their assets in order to transfer their 
value into hard currency or gold (not to mention the legal and illegal transport 
of personal effects) – which await future research. There is no doubt that both 
1050 AAN, URM, 5/229, fol. 61. A similar strategy was implemented during forced mi-
grations such as the resettlement of the Germans. Since they were not allowed to 
leave the country with hard currency and precious metals, they tried to hide them. In 
1946 the Polish authorities issued guidance to border crossings on the hiding places 
most frequently used by the resettling Germans (such as buckets, suitcases, strollers, 
toys and pipes); Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku, Oddział w Gdyni, Dyrekcja Ceł, 
91/123.
1051 AMSZ, z. 6, w. 42, vol. 668, fol. 7, 8; Polska – Niemcy Wschodnie 1945–1990. Wybór 
dokumentów, ed. J. Kochanowski, K. Ziemer, vol. 1: Polska wobec radzieckiej strefy 
okupacyjnej Niemiec: maj 1945 – październik 1949, ed. J. Kochanowski, A. Krajewski, 
M. Mazurek, Warszawa 2006, pp. 115–116.
1052 AAN, URM, 5/229, fol. 63. Since gold jewelry could be legally taken out of Poland, 
gold coins were often made into rings or bracelets; ibid., fol. 90.
1053 See: D. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia?… 
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gold and hard currency played an important role,1054 and that the emigrants pro-
vided a solid base for gold and currency cross-border trade operations. MBP/
MSW officials responsible for the prosecution of currency smuggling pointed 
to the significant participation in this type of crime by the Jewish population in 
Poland and abroad. Indeed, by the end of the 1960s Jewish-sounding surnames 
kept appearing in investigation and court reports. It is hard to determine if this 
over-representation genuinely reflected the fact that a large number of emigrants 
settled in Germany, Austria or Belgium were actively participating in illegal trade 
with the homeland, or whether the focus of the interest reflected the bias of the 
state agencies. The fact remains that soon after 1968, names stereotypically con-
sidered Jewish disappeared from the reports on currency smuggling. As a mat-
ter of fact it was not ethnicity or nationality that was most important, since the 
police had representatives of many countries documented in their files, but the 
expected profit. Contrary to popular opinion, currency smuggling was not an 
easy way to make a living.
8.3.2  Transfer
By the late 1950s, dollars and gold had assumed distinctively separate functions 
in Poland. Dollars became a form of working capital, often assembled with an 
investment in mind (for example in international trade) or used to finance con-
sumption while gold maintained its role as a long-term investment to be de-
ployed only in emergencies. One thing had not changed – a potential Polish 
investor had to purchase gold abroad and bring it back, usually having to pay for 
it in hard currency. These were indeed large-scale operations: according to police 
estimates, between 1945 and 1971, an influx from abroad of 273 million dollars 
and of approximately 40 tons of gold penetrated the area of the economy not un-
der state control.1055 A large proportion of the gold arriving in Poland had been 
obtained in Germany, Italy, and Austria and paid for with smuggled currency, 
which, according to the Prosecutor General, was the domain of both “accidental 
criminals” and “professional hard currency dealers and smugglers”.1056 
1054 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 612, RFE-Research, Item 5169/57, Dollars brought from the 
USSR: The pricing of black-market gold. ibid., P 6211, RFE-Research, Item 5594/57, 
History of the dollar black market in Poland. Just a single issue of the “Biuletyn Szko-
leniowy” GUC (no. 37/July 1967) provides many examples of individuals emigrating 
to West Germany, Israel, and France smuggling out of Poland hard currencies and 
gold bullion and jewelry.
1055 K. Madej, Wszyscy byli przemytnikami…, p. 127.
1056 AAN, KC PZPR, WA, LI/18, fol. 10. 
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Smuggling watches in walnuts, pre-1958; photo from a private collection.
Those who used their trip abroad to smuggle items at their own risk – whether 
as tourists, visiting family, or doing business – could be classified as being in the 
first category. The mass scale of the phenomenon put a large amount of goods 
on the market, including hard currency and gold. The retailer smugglers merit a 
chapter to themselves; here I would like to focus on the wholesale – large-scale 
business that significantly influenced the Polish black market. In the Gomułka 
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and Gierek eras, the media regularly reported on the successes of the authorities 
in smashing “currency smuggling groups”, portrayed as gangs of shady mafiosos. 
A group liquidated in the spring of 1971 was nicknamed “Red Inn”; its boss, Jan 
Kucharski, the owner of a café in Szaflary, was dubbed by the press the “Banker 
of Podhale”.1057 Most of the gangs, usually named after their most prominent fig-
ure (Oksztel, Laster, Głogowski, Smoliński, Mętlewicz, etc.), were networks that 
included officials higher in the pecking order, customs officers, private operators, 
railroad workers, and housewives who all shared an appetite for profit-yielding 
pursuits. “The ‘gold gangs’,” an Odgłosy journalist wrote in 1973, “have always 
operated, and continue to do so, through such incongruously diverse personal 
configurations, bringing together people so different in their social demeanor, 
mentality, knowledge, and position held, that nothing would surprise us any 
longer. Thousands of people follow the example of the legendary Midas and want 
to be surrounded with gold.”1058
Membership of the gang was usually unstructured and determined by utilitar-
ian factors. Profit from currency transactions was earned in addition to official 
wages, which it often exceeded many times over. Drivers and railroad workers 
provided safe transportation for smuggled goods; customs officials made sure 
there were no unpleasant surprises at the border. Store managers and craftsmen 
could, without attracting suspicion, store the hard currency and distribute the 
gold that had been smuggled in. From analysis of the social composition of gang 
members it is plain that they were more likely to wield a pen than a gun as their 
weapon of choice – this was often a white-collar crime. For example in February 
1964, the Wrocław Security Service identified a group of hard currency criminals 
which, from the late 1950s, had been bringing illegally to Poland gold coins and 
bars as well as precious and synthetic stones. All the goods were bought with dol-
lars and with the silver smuggled out of the country. Sixty people were arrested, 
and 19 were charged. Among them, four watchmakers, four Jubiler store manag-
ers, a toy store owner, three owners of a synthetic products factory, employees of 
the Polish Tourist and Sightseeing Society (PTTK), the Pharmacy Board, a pen-
sioner, a waitress and four unemployed persons.1059 The makeup of other groups 
was not very different. 
1057 M. Osiadacz, Bankier Podhala, PiŻ, May 28, 1972; S.A. Siwek, “Bankier Podhala” 
i spółka…, “Słowo Powszechne”, no 225/September 20, 1973.
1058 Z. Tarnowska, Oczarowanie złotem, “Odgłosy” 1973, no. 37; see: F. Graboś, Dewizowe 
podziemie, PiŻ, 1965, no. 18.
1059 AIPN, MSW II, 4368, fol. 109.
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We know from court records that the gangs were impressively effective; their 
success relied on tight logistics and extensive knowledge of the market in Po-
land and abroad, where gangs often had a resident insider.1060 For example, be-
tween 1960 and 1963, the Leonard Smoliński group1061 “smuggled out of Poland 
more than 765 000 US dollars, 50 000 rubles, and 600 000 Polish zloty in cash, 
and also brought in illegally over 10 000 twenty-dollar gold coins, with a total 
weight of approximately 300 kg.”1062 In early 1976, the trial of ten large-scale hard 
currency and gold illegal traders began. One of the accused, Wiktor Mętlewicz, 
had between 1963 and 1973 traded in Warsaw and Vienna 502 million zloty of 
“currency assets”; another, Mieczysław Młynarczyk, had shifted approximately a 
billion zlotys’ worth. He was accused of purchasing or acquiring for the purpose 
of re-sale 96 000 dollars, 113 920 gold twenty-dollar, 14 000 5-ruble coins, and 
2 245 kg of gold bars. “From this amount, however” – as the indictment pointed 
out in all fairness, “one should deduct the 80 kg of gold that had been smuggled 
in, although it was subsequently smuggled back abroad due to the rapid gold 
price hike in the West.”1063 Such cases provide some indication of the size of the 
transactions made by specific groups but not of the nationwide scale of the gold 
black market. In 1972, some 10 million dollars were estimated to be smuggled 
out of Poland annually and exchanged abroad for 2.5 tons of gold and approxi-
mately one ton of artificial gems and similar goods1064 but we shall never know 
how accurate those estimates were.
1060 “Visitors from Warsaw,” the writer Marek Nowakowski reminisced, “stayed in 
Budapest for months at a time, networking, buying forints and swapping them for 
dollars, and even along the way picking up a little, notoriously difficult, Hungari-
an…; M. Nowakowski, Moja Warszawa. Powidoki, Warszawa 2010, pp. 131–132.
1061 On March 27, 1965 in Warsaw, Smoliński was sentenced to nine years in prison 
and 12 of his closest collaborators were also found guilty. Their educational and 
employment backgrounds are interesting. The boss had completed only three grades 
of vocational school, three persons graduated from secondary schools, nine – from 
primary school, with or without a certificate. The group included a manager of a shoe 
kiosk, a driver, railroad employees, a blue-collar worker from the League of Nature 
Conservation, two locksmiths, a nurse, and four unemployed persons; AIPN, MSW 
II, 4370, fol. 123–125.
1062 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XIV–305, fol. 45.
1063 B. Seidler, Krach wyznawców Midasa, “Życie Literackie” February 4, 1976; B. Wró-
blewski, Złotogłowi. Największe złoto Polski Ludowej, “Gazeta Wyborcza” (supplement 
“Ale Historia”), September 28, 2012.
1064 AAN, GUC, 2/18, fol. 221.
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The practice of smuggling rubles and zloty out of the country requires 
additional clarification. The secret of its success lay in the grassroots crea-
tive approach prevalent in the socialist states including Poland: the officially 
non-convertible rubles, forints and korunas were not only treated as convert-
ible but indeed backed by gold. In Vienna, it was more profitable to buy gold 
ducats paying with Hungarian forints (often called Carpathian dollars), Czech-
oslovakian korunas or Soviet rubles than to buy them with US dollars smug-
gled out of Poland. Occasionally, Poles would sell dollars in order to buy the 
currencies of Soviet Bloc countries’, then smuggle these out to Vienna, Trieste, 
Hamburg, or West Berlin.1065 No wonder that on the black market, socialist 
state currencies were valued almost as highly as US dollars or West German 
marks. 
Until the late 1950s, smuggling was the domain of diplomats on official trips 
abroad, sailors, and railroad workers who took advantage of the opportunities 
provided by their professional circumstances. After 1956, when the borders re-
strictions were eased, the situation changed. In the 1960s and the 1970s, smug-
gling became a mass pursuit; Polish illegal traders ventured as far afield as the 
Middle and Far East and America, now with varied means of transportation such 
as private cars and airplanes at their disposal. The job of customs officials became 
more onerous. The customs trade newspaper commented on the ruses of aircraft 
passengers: “Gold products smuggled in [to Poland] – mostly rings and chains – 
are hidden in hollowed-out citrus fruit, shoe heels and inside women’s wigs. […] 
One well-known Warsaw entertainer returning from a tour of the Soviet Union 
used a sizeable fake microphone to smuggle in a substantial number of gold ob-
jects.”1066 Those who stuck to traditional travel by trains and bus developed tricks 
to surprise even the most experienced customs officer. A dental technician from 
Łódź, Jerzy Paszkowski, had an original idea: between 1959 and 1964, he smug-
gled into France 38 thousand dollars in hollowed-out kiełbasa and brought back 
approximately 30 kilos of gold. On other occasions, powdered gold traveled to 
Poland in seemingly factory-sealed coffee or cocoa cans. Upon arrival, the gold 
powder was separated and melted into bars – not a very complicated task.1067
Poles took advantage both of the well-established practice of smuggling 
across the “green border” – crossing the border at random, unguarded places 
1065 AIPN, 01521/2035, Jacek Oleś, Przemyt wartości dewizowych, Academy of Internal 
Affairs, Institute of Criminology, Warszawa 1978, pp. 45, 54–56.
1066 J. Kulak, O przemycie w Urzędzie Celnym Port Lotniczy w Warszawie – uwag kilka, 
WC, 1974, no. 15, p. 13.
1067 AIPN, MSW II, 4369; F. Graboś, Dewizowe podziemie, PiŻ, 1965, no. 18, fol. 233.
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in the countryside (a specialty of the Podhale region, with its many miles of 
mountainous borderland) – as well as through mass tourist travel, assuming cor-
rectly that backpackers would not be subjected to thorough checks at the border. 
With the gold smuggled in from Turkey and southern Europe the trick was for 
the traveler returning, for example, from Italy, with jewelry that he intended to 
take illegally across the border, to pass the goods on to someone about to cross the 
border into Poland, someone who had traveled into Czechoslovakia no further 
than the narrow strip of the designated mass tourist zone, where there were no 
opportunities to buy gold. The customs checks for such tourists were much less 
thorough. This method was probably used on numerous occasions – until June 27, 
1970, when, at a border crossing in Łysa Polana, customs officials searching four 
tourists who had been no further than the “convention zone” happened on 1.8 kg 
of gold jewelry worth 433 000 zloty.1068
The most effective smuggling method for currency assets was to use as mules 
people who traveled frequently, or, best of all diplomats, who were protected by 
their prestige and professional immunity. In the first group were Polish athletes 
who engaged in contraband activities on a mass scale. In the mid-1960s, the 
javelin thrower Janusz Sidło and Władysław Komar, later an Olympic shot-put 
medalist, were charged with smuggling. “According to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs,” the Prosecutor General wrote to Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz in 
March 1965, “this type of fraud is quite common and prosecuting all those guilty 
of such abuses could lead to the breaking up of the track and field national team 
and those of other athletic disciplines.”1069 Since to bring to justice members of 
national sports teams – household names in Poland and abroad – would have had 
negative repercussions, the prosecution of famous athletes was swept under the 
carpet.1070 However, the cases of less popular athletes who ostentatiously engaged 
in currency smuggling usually landed up in front of a judge. In 1971, the Army 
Prosecutor’s Office charged athletes of the Warsaw Legia team with smuggling 
hard currency out of the country and bringing back gold, which they later sold 
to “owners of private crafts shops.”1071 Members of the Duplicate Bridge Union 
were involved in smuggling on a mass scale, and between 1968 and 1972 brought 
to Poland more than 76 kg of gold.1072 In 1973, verdicts were handed down in 
1068 J. Koczorowski, O wynikach zwalczania przemytu w 1971 roku, WC, 1972, no. 6, p. 25.
1069 AAN, URM, 1.2/1, fol. 18.
1070 Ibid., fol. 20.
1071 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, fol. 445.
1072 Byli reprezentanci w brydżu sportowym przed sądem, “Głos Wielkopolski” October 
17, 1973; Brydżowy nokaut, “Wieczór Wybrzeża” July 30, 1973; J. Kołodziejski, Nokaut 
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the “ski gang” case; Stefania Biegun, a cross-country skier who had represented 
Poland three times in the Olympics, was found guilty.1073
The transfer of hard currency and gold by diplomatic routes was also thriving. 
In 1962 it turned out that Ministry of Foreign Affairs couriers and employees of 
Department I (Intelligence) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, by taking advan-
tage of the diplomatic bag, had spirited out of Poland at least 160 000 dollars and 
brought back, also via diplomatic mail, 4 000 twenty-dollar gold coins, gold bars 
and other valuables. “Our employees,” the Ministry of Internal Affairs comment-
ed, “and those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ admit their guilt. They blame 
the climate prevailing at the MFA. They add that almost all MFA employees who 
travel abroad and/or are stationed abroad have been involved in illegal trade, 
even those who occupy top positions in Poland and abroad.”1074 Foreign diplo-
mats were not far behind. From the late 1940s until the late 1980s, there were 
persistent reports about the mass-scale involvement of foreign diplomats in the 
trading of hard currency and gold. There was no particular pattern – all employ-
ees of foreign embassies were implicated, Italian as much as Iranian, Finnish as 
much as Brazilian or Mexican.1075
Until the late 1980s, the foreign agencies covered a significant part of their 
costs by selling their currencies on the black market. Every so often, especially 
when hard currency was in short supply, the issue would appear on the radar of 
the Polish authorities. In the late 1970s, foreign embassies and Polish branch-
es of foreign companies complained that the legally exchanged currencies did 
not cover the wages of even their Polish employees. And thus the Warsaw black 
market received annually no fewer than 5 million dollars.1076 At the same time, 
diplomats residing in Warsaw made full use of their diplomatic immunity and 
exemption from border controls by using their privileges for their own black 
market operations. These were the rule rather than the exception, and the very 
scale of the trade makes it noteworthy. Conchita Partillo, employed at the Mex-
ican embassy during her posting in Warsaw “personally and with the help of 
 
brydżowy, PiŻ, 1973, no. 17; J. Kołodziejski, Przemytnicy i kibice, PiŻ, 1973, no. 34; K. 
Jagiełło, Wszystkiego za mało, “Literatura” 1973, no 40.
1073 Stefania Biegun was found guilty of smuggling 25 kg of gold in bars, more than 300 
gold coins, 4 kg of jewelry, 47 kg of silver, and approximately 53 000 dollars; TL, no. 
100/April 11, 1973; ŻW, April 12, 1973. 
1074 AIPN, MSW II, 97, fol. 1.
1075 AIPN, MSW II, 4369, fol. 120–121; ibid., 4370, fol. 89.
1076 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/511, fol. 9–10. 
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other employees” brought to Warsaw 165 kg in gold bars and 2.4 kg in gold ruble 
coins.1077 In 1949, a Polish employee at the Brazilian embassy offered to act as a 
go-between in selling hard currency on the black market. Soon this local busi-
ness turned into a fully blown international enterprise that involved a network of 
diplomatic outposts and which no longer required any Polish middlemen. Bra-
zilian diplomats “brought [to Poland] large quantities of gold, sold it for dollars, 
then smuggled the dollars out to use them to buy gold.”1078
It was not only diplomats who shaped the cosmopolitan image of the Polish 
black market in gold. Rank-and-file citizens from the East and the West were 
willing to take the risk, acutely aware of the potentially handsome profits. Danes 
found it worthwhile to smuggle into Poland the gold that had been stolen at Co-
penhagen’s Kastrup airport between 1971 and 1972.1079 Between 1968 and 1970, 
a representative of the French branch of General Electric, one Jean Teophile Gi-
rardot, brought to Poland approximately 35 kg of gold bars and seven thousand 
gold 10-ruble coins. He smuggled out of Poland 170 000 dollars.1080 The citizens 
of Yugoslavia became very adept at channeling gold to Poland. Czechs, Slovaks, 
and Hungarians followed suit. Budapest’s Keleti railroad station was considered 
an important European center of illicit gold and hard currency trading. “This is 
where the European routes cross. Organized groups of dealers work there. For-
eigners coming to Hungary from Yugoslavia and Italy exchange gold products 
for hard currency. Others pay hard currency for gold. Yet others exchange Soviet 
Bloc currencies for forints.”1081
We touch here upon the geographic aspect of communist Poland’s “gold rush”. 
Italy and the Soviet Union were the traditional sources of gold jewelry. Gold 
coins and bars were usually bought in Hamburg or Amsterdam, if to be trans-
ported by sea, and Vienna or West Berlin, if destined as overland contraband. In 
all those cities there were companies mostly run by Jewish refugees from Poland 
(a fact emphasized in Polish police reports in the 1960s) that specialized in sup-
plying goods sought after on the Polish market, in particular – gold. There were 
1077 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 49, fol. 68–69.
1078 B. Seidler, Krach wyznawców Midasa, “Życie Literackie” February 4, 1976.
1079 B. Kołodziejski, “Złote ptaki” z Kopenhagi, “Dziennik Łódzki” February 28, 1973; B. 
Kołodziejski, Tragarz z lotniska Kastrup, “Kurier Szczeciński” March 21, 1973.
1080 M. Bekajło, Doigrałeś się amatorze, “Życie Literackie” 1971, no. 23; APW, KWar. PZPR, 
30/VII–43, vol. 49, fol. 68–69. 
1081 K. Świątecka, Waluciarze, “Perspektywy” 1977, no. 49.
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rumors that a significant number of gold $20 coins were manufactured locally 
with a reduced content of the precious metal.1082
Travelers were always on the lookout for new, effective methods of smuggling 
but also for new markets, where they could profitably sell Polish products, often 
not very attractive by international standards, in order to spend the proceeds on 
buying gold. In the 1970s Poles zeroed in on Egypt, Turkey and the Middle East. 
“Those countries,” a journalist of the Main Customs Office magazine wrote in 
1974, “eager to vacuum up all kinds of goods, are the focus of attention for many 
Polish tourists. The customs clearance of almost every Orbis group traveling 
there begins to resemble an Eastern bazaar even before leaving Warsaw Interna-
tional Airport. During the customs inspection, the counters quickly pile up with 
sewing machines, tape recorders, crystal vases, glass products, irons, fans, coil 
heaters, paintbrushes, beauty products and many other goods. Every tourist has 
one main goal – to bring as much gold back home as possible. For many of them 
this end justifies the means even though they risk losing all their undocumented 
hard currency. Citizens of Middle Eastern countries behave in a similar fashion. 
They not only try to smuggle valuable goods out of Poland but have recently also 
been striking deals with our citizens who give them dollars in advance to buy 
particular articles.”1083
For commercially gifted and inventive individuals, the world was their oyster. 
By the late 1970s, Poles had discovered that in Cuba, gold jewelry, and American 
and Mexican coins – bought, naturally, on the black market – were relatively 
cheap.1084 Importantly, Poland was often not the final destination but simply a 
transit point between the Soviet Union and the West. Groups of Polish smugglers, 
at times aided by trading partners in Austria and West Germany, masterminded 
the logistics – spiriting away to the East tsarist 5- and 10-ruble pieces, the favorite 
store of value for Soviet hoarders. Dollar bills and platinum – much cheaper in 
the Soviet Union – kept arriving in Poland, to be transferred to France, Austria, 
or Germany. The operation required substantial capital and in-depth preparation 
but merited the effort. Certainly, all the organized groups that found themselves 
facing the Polish justice system at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s were charged 
1082 J. Tetter, Wolność, złoto i hazard, “Tygodnik Morski” 1967, no. 19. In the mid-1960s 
the price of an American 20-dollar gold coin in Swiss banks oscillated between 42 
and 44 dollars, while in Poland the going rate was 54 dollars. The profit of 25% was 
a given; AIPN, MSW II, 4369, fol. 120. 
1083 J. Kulak, O przemycie w Urzędzie Celnym Port Lotniczy w Warszawie – uwag kilka, 
WC, 1974, no. 15, p. 12.
1084 AAN, KC PZPR, WO, 541, fol. 50–52.
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with smuggling thousands of gold coins, kilograms of platinum and tens of thou-
sands of dollars in cash.1085 
It was not, however, the big boss of the smuggling gang who would remain in 
the collective memory as a symbol of the hard currency black market but rather 
the nameless money changers – without them this whole enterprise could not 
have existed.
8.3.3  Money Changers: A Portrait Study
“In the mid-1950s,” Jan Nieporowski wrote in 1988, “the rivulets of dollars seep-
ing through the concrete barriers put up by bureaucrats converged into a single, 
rapidly flowing river, full of whirlpools frothing with scum but worth millions. 
It was a strange river, partly running on the surface but with stretches flowing 
underground, one shore somewhat regulated and the other still wild. Decision 
makers, policemen, and bankers were bustling all along its course. But the most 
important were the indestructible money changers.”1086
The term “cinkciarz” is not new; it came into mainstream Polish usage in the 
1960s, when Polish currency dealers endeavored to accost in broken English the 
growing numbers of visitors arriving in Poland from the West with offers to buy 
and sell dollars, pounds, and marks. The opening gambit in English did not usu-
ally live up to its promise; “change money” were usually the only two English 
words the dealers knew.1087 The phrase “change money” was initially polonized as 
the onomatopoeic cinksiarz or cynkciarz1088 and by the early 1970s had evolved 
into the current form cinkciarz. Regardless of the name, for half a century these 
one-man, peripatetic banks were a fixture in the social, economic, and cultural 
landscape of Polish cities.1089 To sketch a collective portrait of this underground 
1085 Kurier Polski”, no 260/November 3, 1959; ibid., no. 156/July 2/3, 1960; ibid., no. 79/
April 3, 1962; AAN, KC PZPR, WA, 275, fol. 35.
1086 J. Nieporowski, Raj dla cinkciarzy, “Tygodnik Kulturalny”, no. 14/April 3, 1988.
1087 By 1957, the term had appeared in a Gdynia Security Service report, AIPN Gd. 
0046/158/2, fol. 170.
1088 T. Kur, Gorzki smak miodu, PiŻ, 1968, no. 7; M. Brzeszczot, Konie, koniki i białe kołni-
erzyki, PiŻ, 1971, no. 10.
1089 This was mostly an urban phenomenon; its presence in resort towns such as Zako-
pane and Sopot was the exception rather than the rule. According to police estimates 
from 1985, of the 3 939 persons suspected of dealing in hard currency, 89.8% (3 537) 
lived in cities; of which 40% (1 471) – in larger cities with at least 200 000 inhabitants; 
AIPN, KG MO, 35/554. In Zakopane, in early 1970s, there were approximately 180 
local black-market currency dealers and 250 from other regions of the country, while 
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contingent is more difficult than may appear at first glance. The rules of the black 
market game were the reverse of those in the theatre – the more important the 
actor, the more he kept to the back of the stage, with the bit-part actors hogging 
the limelight.
None of this of course meant that the walk-ons and extras were any the less 
interesting. After the Second World War, which effectively tore down the old so-
cial barriers and conventions, the moneychangers became a colorful and diverse 
group. Alceo Valcini, who in 1945 and 1946 resided in the Hotel Polonia – at the 
time Warsaw’s most prestigious hotel and home to diplomatic missions, in spite 
of being located in the midst of the post-war black market bustle, reminisced 
that on the black market one could meet “an intellectual, a teacher, professionals 
and young thugs […] ex-students, former servants and common criminals; all 
those whom war had displaced from regular walks of life and who, with patience 
and cunning, were making a splendid job of remaining afloat.”1090 Attempts to 
return to the old ways of life were often wrecked on the rocks of post-war reality. 
The official wages of workers and the intelligentsia were insufficient to survive 
on whereas illegal trading guaranteed a much higher standard of living. In the 
pioneer period immediately after the war the risks were negligible and thus the 
currency black market was a natural transition for those who had honed their 
skills during the German occupation but it also quickly attracted new blood. 
The majority of these money changers, who plied their trade more or less in 
the open, were sub-contractors who operated with capital supplied by dealers 
higher in the black-market hierarchy. They worked on commission and some-
times dealt in significant amounts of money.
As mentioned before their main clients were merchants and craftsmen who 
invested their profits in gold and hard currency. Private stores were often the 
clandestine money exchange counters. While trading bimber was a natural side 
line for restaurant and food kiosk owners, jewelers took over the trade in gold 
in Szczecin there were some 300, and in Krakow – 370; J. Wołoszańska, Nie tylko przez 
pryzmat prawa, ŻW, April 22, 1971; APKr, KW PZPR, 293, Posiedzenie egzekutywy, 
October 14, 1969, fol. 247.
1090 Cf.: A. Valcini, Ballo all’hotel”Polonia”, Edizioni del Moretto, Brescia 1983. In her 
diaries, Maria Dąbrowska mentions the Kelles-Krauz family, who made a living in 
Radom by “manufacturing soap and selling UNRRA gifts and hard currencies”. “In 
the morning,” Dąbrowska noted on November 12, 1945, “the other Krauz daughter 
arrived; she sells hard currencies. […] She is the one who wears the trousers in 
the family and makes the most money.” M. Dąbrowska, Dzienniki powojenne, vol. 1: 
1945–1949, ed. T. Drewnowski, Warszawa 1997, p. 85.
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and hard currency. Jan Łada, the owner of two jewelry stores on Warsaw’s most 
prestigious thoroughfare, Marszałkowska Street, engaged “from 1945 until Febru-
ary 1949 in illegal, large-scale hard currency trading. He networked closely with 
numerous well-known hard currency dealers, conducting transactions worth 
on average two to three hundred dollars. He bought foreign currencies from 
well-known dealers and others who were not hard currency professionals.”1091
In the first half of the 1950s the money dealers’ modus operandi evolved out 
of necessity. The traditional markets, located in well-known places where the dis-
tinctive figures of touts (koniki) offered, sotto voce, transactions in foreign money 
and gold, disappeared. Now, the dealers were operating clandestinely but they 
were easy to find. In mid-1956, an emigrant from Poland reported on Radio Free 
Europe: “In comparison with the early post-war years, the situation has changed: 
no longer are there specific areas where one can find money dealers and do busi-
ness. One does have to know where to look but anyone with their head screwed 
on straight can still find them.”1092 “Cafés, archways, stores”, recalled another visi-
tor from Poland, “served as [the dealers’] meeting places.” In the morning, usually 
at around 11 am, a handful of those with the most authority would gather to co-
ordinate the exchange rate. […] In Warsaw, the daily rate was set under the clock 
at the suburban commuter train station (EKD) at Nowogrodzka Street, where 
“come 11 am, there were always some individuals moving through the crowd 
and nervously exchanging opinions on the current value of the dollar, only to 
disappear quickly in different directions.”1093
The transactions were usually not conducted directly but via a contact “box”. 
This was a third person whom the buyer approached for the goods after paying 
the amount due. Sometimes it was a woman with a stroller, who, if the need 
arose, could plausibly explain that a stranger must have planted a roll of bills 
under her baby’s blanket. Sometimes a store was used as the box, since this was 
a place where this was unlikely to arouse suspicion. Only rarely would deals be 
struck in private apartments. That was too high-risk for all those involved.1094 The 
post-October 1956 political thaw “re-opened the gates to the dealers’ paradise. 
They could once more carry cash about their person and meet in the open.”1095
1091 AAN, KS, 1303. On other jewelry stores see ibid., 1274, 2646.
1092 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6211, RFE-Research, Item 87/56, Foreign exchange trade flour-
ished.




Boom time for the hard currency dealers had arrived, and was to continue for 
another three decades. It was favored by variable exchange rates, the temporary 
weakening of the political regime and the easing of the repression, the develop-
ment of the internal export system and the introduction of PKO coupons, as well 
as less strict border controls, which meant a greater influx of foreign visitors and 
more Poles traveling outside of the country. The enduring prosperity shaped in 
a natural way the image of the black market milieu and influenced the develop-
ment of its hierarchical structure with its distinct division of tasks and roles, idio-
syncratic language, customs, behavior and rituals, and its characteristic methods 
of operation and defense strategies.1096
The big shots stayed in the shadows. The “bankers”, “merchants” (in the Warsaw 
terminology) or “organizers” (as they were called in Krakow) were often big-time 
businessmen operating with sums of money that, for that era and political sys-
tem, were truly staggering: thousands of dollars and gold by the kilogram. It was 
they who coordinated the rules of the black market game and to a large degree 
controlled its course. “Their working day,” a Życie Warszawy reporter wrote in 
1971, “begins early in the morning with numerous phone calls followed by ‘office’ 
time at a café […]. There, they clinch the deals and deal with their minions – the 
money changers and touts. They focus on wholesale deals; petty cash is of no 
interest to them.”1097 The dollars, marks and pounds these black market would-be 
tycoons bought in bulk were simply the operating capital used in a wide range 
of foreign trade transactions, such as the import of gold and synthetic precious 
stones1098 or consumer articles unavailable in Poland.
Most of the operations were of course unrecorded and their scale could only 
be estimated from such unreliable and speculative sources as investigation files. 
1096 AIPN, 01521/2035, J. Oleś, Przemyt wartości dewizowych…, p. 60.
1097 A. Kłodzińska, Waluciarze, ŻW, April 10–12, 1971.
1098 Why did the smuggling of synthetic gemstones to Poland take off? From October 
1967, the state jeweler Jubiler was permitted to buy and sell second-hand jewelry 
and watches, fetching a much higher price per weight of precious metals than for 
minted coins. It made sense to melt down the gold bullion brought to Poland illegally 
and turn it into pieces of jewelry such as rings – and these often required stones. A 
four-ducat coin yielded four rings. Even after adding the cost of the synthetic stone 
and labor, and providing the hallmark, in the early 1970s the profit was as much as 
9 000 zloty. A Krugerrand provided enough gold for ten rings, with a potential profit 
of 12 000 zloty; AIPN, 01521/2035, J. Oleś, Przemyt wartości dewizowych…, pp. 51–
53. In 1973, the police closed down 37 illegal jewelry manufactories; AIPN, KG MO, 
35/289, Biuletyn Instruktażowo-szkoleniowy no. 6, Biuro do Walki z Przestępstwami 
Gospodarczymi KG MO, Warszawa, February 1974.
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The authorities were out to prove the crime was being committed but the usual 
suspects were determined to frustrate these efforts. Even if we assume that the 
indictment data were only estimates, they are nevertheless impressive in the con-
text of the economic reality of the time. The five-year turnover of Henryk Płoski, 
“the prince of Warsaw money dealers” put on trial in 1966, was allegedly some 
eight million zloty including 54 000 dollars in cash, 62 000 dollars’ worth of gold 
and 5 kg of gold bars.1099 Wiktor Mętlewicz and Mieczysław Młynarczyk who 
came before the court in 1976 have already been mentioned.
Among the leading lights of the Warsaw black market were such colorful fig-
ures as Andrzej Rzeszotarski aka “Count Lolo” or “Uncle”, who was an engineer 
by profession and a bon vivant by inclination; rumor had it that he was in cahoots 
with those in the high echelons of power.1100 A typical black-market “banker” 
posed as a Mr. Average and tried to keep a low profile so as not to attract the 
attention of the authorities. Tomasz Szczypułkowski, arrested in 1973 and sen-
tenced in 1976 to 12 years in prison, worked as a teacher in a secondary technical 
school and his wife was an usher. Bolesław Krasucki, a waiter also on trial at the 
same time (who received a six year sentence), between 1960 and 1973 handled 
389 kg of gold, 1 850 $20 coins, 820 5-ruble, and 410 10-ruble coins, and 100 Aus-
trian ducats, together valued at 57 000 dollars.1101 Piotr Ambroziewicz comment-
ed in 1976: “It is ludicrous to attempt to depict the score-settling between Polish 
black-market currency marketeers as some kind of professional gun-slinging 
gangsters in action. Rubout is a noisy business that stinks to high heaven and this 
is a business that is very hush-hush.”1102 
These “bankers” managed both the rank-and-file traders who worked on 
the streets and the middlemen, the “studs” (ogiery) and “hacks” (szkapy) buy-
ing hard currency both from regular suppliers – who had access to foreigners 
through prostitutes, cabdrivers, waiters, or hotel doormen – and from random 
sellers. If the average tout (konik) was usually a small-time dealer, the “stud” was 
a semi-wholesaler who operated with much larger sums of money.1103
1099 Książę warszawskich waluciarzy przyznaje się do winy, “Kurier Polski”, no. 208/ 
September 3–4, 1966.
1100 AIPN, MSW II, 4370, fol. 222–224. On Rzeszotarski see J. Karaszkiewicz, Słodkie lata, 
“Gazeta Wyborcza” May 15, 1998; J. Głowacki, Z głowy, Warszawa 2004, pp. 29–31.
1101 “Dziennik Polski” (London), no 151/August 12, 1976; P. Ambroziewicz, Historia wzlo-
tu i upadku Bolka-kelnera, PiŻ, December 26, 1976. 
1102 P. Ambroziewicz, Historia wzlotu i upadku Bolka-kelnera, PiŻ, December 26, 1976.
1103 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6211, RFE-Research, Item 2794/60, Illegal currency transactions 
flourished in Poland.
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The low-ranking money changers could be seen on city streets, in ports, in 
hotels, restaurants, train stations, on international trains, outside of banks and 
Pewex stores. Some became dealers by chance; others were “pros”, able to size 
up their clients at a glance, browbeat them into accepting the price offered and 
clinch the deal there and then. Warsaw currency dealers were not very different 
to those in Krakow, Poznań or Gdańsk; they could all tell straight away who was 
likely to have hard currency or dollar coupons to sell. They only offered 80 zloty 
to a dollar and upwards – the going rate at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s – to 
clued-up city dwellers; the out-of-towners and country bumpkins would at best 
get half that.1104
In the money changer and client relationship there quickly developed a code 
of behavior that both sides easily got the hang of. “The sale is the most interesting 
part,” Radio Free Europe commented, presenting scenes from the Warsaw black 
market of 1950/1960, “Our interviewee accosted a tout and asked about ‘paper’. 
It is a bad idea to ask for dollars – it would scare the dealer away or else make 
him think that he was dealing with a greenhorn and up the price. If his client is 
fluent in black market vernacular, the money changer concludes that his client is 
a ‘badass’ who won’t be easily bamboozled. The client settled for 99 zloty a dollar 
and was then told to go to a nearby café […] and wait. As a security precaution, 
the dealer never carries hard currency. Meanwhile a ‘tout’ or a ‘bitch’ [a woman 
brought along to provide a cover] runs to the ‘banker’ to buy the required cash, 
paying a price that reflects for how much the ‘hack’ had sold the currency to the 
‘uncle’ beforehand, which was more or less three to four points below 99 zloty 
(one point equaling one zloty), so that the ‘touts’ can make some money too. The 
‘tout’ accompanied by the bitch’ can then deliver the dollars without raising sus-
picion. The transaction is conducted in secret.”1105
This author has no wish to idealize the dealers. The money changers rare-
ly focused exclusively on money deals; they would never say no to any prof-
itable business coming their way.1106 Some would not shy away from cheating 
1104 Sometimes the transactions were very advantageous. From a member of the Glen 
Miller Orchestra visiting the Polish capital , a Warsaw tout managed to buy a sizeable 
number of dollar bills at 27 zloty each – a rate that was three zloty more than the 
official rate at the bank; HIM, Pressearchiv, P 612, Item 5169/57, Dollars brought 
from USSR. The black market rate for gold.
1105 HIM, Pressarchiv, P 6211, RFE-Research, Item 2794/60, Illegal currency transactions 
flourished in Poland.
1106 See: P. Wojasz, Niebieski ptak. Absurdy peerelowskiej rzeczywistości we wspomnieniach 
byłego cinkciarza, Chorzów 2011.
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by slipping in fake money in the last phase of the transaction (in the 1980s in 
Warsaw, Aleksander Gawronik – who went on to become a controversial busi-
nessman and politician, serving as senator during 1993–1997 – was cheated out 
of 100 000 dollars in one fell swoop1107) or by using sophisticated social engi-
neering tricks. In the early 1970s, after a large transaction, one of the Warsaw 
money changers had a habit of flashing a court officer’s ID and announcing: “I 
am arresting you for trading hard currency”. Begging for mercy, the customer 
would usually be only too content to be allowed to walk away without – needless 
to say – his money. Another cinkciarz, in an effort to get rid of 5 000 counterfeit 
dollars that someone had conned him into accepting earlier, ordered a bishop’s 
cassock from a tailor and, thus attired, passed himself off as a bona fide trust-
worthy trader. At other times he would gain credibility by dressing as a railroad 
worker or miner.1108 
Karol Ferster, I buy dollars, circa 1970. Photo: Warsaw Museum of Caricature, sign. 1247.
1107 P. Mączyński, L. Kostrzewski, Przed mafią pistolet by mnie nie ochronił. Wywiad 
z Gawronikiem, “Gazeta Wyborcza” June 29, 2009. On ways of cheating clients see: 
AIPN, 01521/876, vol. 1, Bogdan Chybowski, Nielegalny skup dewiz (Taktyka ujawnia-
nia zwalczania). Departament Szkolenia i Doskonalenia Zawodowego MSW, Warsza-
wa 1973, pp. 86–89.
1108 “Express Wieczorny” March 11, 1973.
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It is difficult to establish today what form, if any, “corporate inspections” took in 
the money dealers’ world. Until the 1970s, while the money changer community 
was still small and compact, its members shared a certain esprit de corps and 
closed ranks against those who blatantly broke the accepted rules of the game. 
Certainly, one reason for radical exclusion and a ban on carrying on with the 
trade – or, in extreme cases, physical “elimination” of the undesirable individual 
– would be close contacts with the police and Security Service.1109
The money changers continuously developed and perfected this internal de-
fense mechanism. It was very effective and uniformed police forces usually made 
no attempt to confront the hard currency underground. In the early 1970s, a 
police analyst observed that the money changers “do not acknowledge the pres-
ence of police. They keep a safe distance. When ordered to halt, they don’t; if 
chased, they run. Once the police are gone, they go back to their trading spot. 
The only police officers to command their respect are the dewizówka [hard cur-
rency department].”1110 But even for those specialized police units, the dealers 
were a tough nut to crack. Despite the fact that the police were well aware of the 
identity of the “bankers” and “touts” working the streets, arrests, not to mention 
court sentences, rarely followed. The law enforcement and justice system were 
often helpless in the face of hard currency black market defense strategies such 
as multi-level networking, the rule of not carrying money about one’s person, 
money-laundering (usually via a bank account in a bank conveniently close to 
the transactions taking place) but above all extreme vigilance. The dealers were 
at all times on high alert, ending a transaction abruptly at the slightest whiff of 
suspicion. Often, the money changers were as au fait as any law graduate with 
the intricacies of the law, especially those pertinent to hard currency policies. 
“Unless they catch someone red-handed, they can’t do much,” a currency dealer 
from Gdańsk confided to a journalist in the early 1970s. “And catching them is 
not that easy. Dewizówka guys [the police unit designated for dealing with hard 
currency offences – JK) know almost all the dealers and often organize raids in 
the places where we work but we have our ways. We often have the doorman on 
our side and when something is up, he’ll tip us off. At that point anyone who has 
any compromising evidence will quickly hide it in an abandoned coat hanging 
for that purpose in the cloakroom and all is cool. At other times, we just pass the 
1109 K.W. Dębicki, Komu zielone, komu…, “Tygodnik Morski” 1973, no 38; Na nasze 
konto. Rozmowa Wojciecha Koczanowicza z naczelnikiem wydziału w Biurze do Walki 
z Przestępstwami Gospodarczymi KG MO mjr. Janem Stępniem, “Sztandar Młodych” 
October 5, 1979.
1110 AIPN, 01521/876, vol. 1, B. Chybowski, Nielegalny skup dewiz…, p. 80.
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dollars or pounds on to friends of ours sitting at the next table, who are not in 
the dewizówka’s black books.”1111 In Krakow, pretzel sellers and store managers 
cooperated with the money dealers.1112
No wonder that the repeated operations undertaken every so often against the 
hard currency black marketeers brought meager results. Between April 4, 1961 and 
April 30, 1962, although 253 dealers were apprehended in the Warsaw hard-cur-
rency hub around Jasna, Mazowiecka, Traugutta, and Świętokrzyska streets, only 
20 investigations were embarked on, with just 13 people arrested. The low effective-
ness of the police raids is apparent from the existence of repeat offenders: 15 peo-
ple were arrested five times, eight people seven times, and one record breaker was 
arrested 13 times.1113 Between 1965 and 1969, in the Krakow voivodship including 
Zakopane, the police uncovered 2 781 hard currency offences, 52% of which had 
been committed at border crossings. However, only 51 cases against 89 individuals 
in total ended up in the county courts, including 22 cases (against 53 people) in 
Krakow itself. In 43 cases those found guilty received sentences of between two 
months to three years of prison and fines of 1 000 – 200 000 zloty.1114 Occasionally, 
the authorities tried to implement non-standard solutions. In the early 1970s in 
Łódź, when dealing with the cinkciarze, the police resorted to harassment and in-
timidation, with arrests on charges of disorderly conduct and fines running into a 
few thousand zloty. Whenever the police were able to make an arrest at the time of 
an actual transaction taking place, the case was passed on to the Finance Depart-
ment where the sanctions applied were much more severe.1115 
Police and media reports made no secret of the fact that operations against 
money dealers were limited in their effectiveness; the culprits would pay the 
fines and serve prison sentences, only to return to their previous occupa-
tion with new ideas on improving the defense strategies, sometimes acquired 
in prison. It had been reported in Warsaw in 1962 that the “profiteers used 
very specific conspiracy techniques such as ways of alerting one another or 
1111 K.W. Dębicki, Komu zielone, komu…, “Tygodnik Morski” 1973, no. 38. A common 
ploy was to use a “pocket” – which was a “briefcase stored by a friendly cloakroom 
or restroom attendant”. When the need arose, this supply of emergency cash could 
be accessed rapidly; the main rule was that a dealer should carry no more than a 
minimum amount of cash; R. Czerniawski, Gra w zielone, PiŻ, 1983, no. 15.
1112 ”Gazeta Krakowska”, no. 26/January 31, 1973.
1113 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 1, fol. 306–307.
1114 APKr, KW PZPR, 293, fol. 247.
1115 Nie ma miejsca dla dolarowych “koników” przed łódzkim PeKaO, “Express Wieczorny”, 
no. 147/June 24, 1970.
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organizing counter-espionage.”1116 Following the anti-money dealer operations 
in the fall of 1971, the media reported: “The cinkciarze have turned their cars 
into taxis. They have now more opportunities to carry out hard currency ex-
change. Restaurant staff are surprised that the police have not revoked the cab 
permits, aware as they have been of the money changers’ questionable past.”1117
The money changers’ attachment to their occupation is easy to explain. No-
where else could they make financial gains of a similar order having, as they 
often did, little education and no qualifications. According to police estimates, in 
a month a professional money changer bought approximately 600 dollars’ worth 
of hard currency and with that outlay made between 15 and 20 000 zloty – al-
most ten times more than the average wage! If he was a shrewd operator and 
had a smattering of foreign languages, he could expect to achieve as much as 150 
000 zloty a month – a no-brainer.1118 Best of all, the hours were flexible; there 
was the risk of going to prison, true… but this went with the territory and had 
been taken into account. No wonder that when in 1970 the authorities yet again 
attempted to encourage “social parasites” (as the official classification had it) – of 
which there were estimated to be some 12 000 in Warsaw alone – to consider tak-
ing up lawful employment, the interviews with these candidates for self-reform 
followed the familiar, less-than-promising pattern: “P.M., hard currency and for-
eign pharmaceuticals dealer; prior convictions. When asked by the Commission 
panel in what capacity and where he would like to work, he replied: ‘I can be a 
counter-intelligence agent in space’”. “J.T., a well-known hard currency dealer, 
criminal record includes numerous prior arrests. He told the Commission that 
he would be willing to take up any job with wages of at least 6 000 a month [an 
optimistic, or more likely cheeky target, bearing in mind that the average month-
ly wage at the time was 2 235 zloty! – comment by JK]. He has primary education 
and no skills.”1119
Much as the authorities might sanction or attempt to re-socialize black mar-
ket currency dealers, their attitude to this group remained ambiguous. It is dif-
ficult to establish whether officials also used the black market to buy and sell 
hard currency, whether institutionally or in their personal capacity, as they had 
in the 1940s and 1950s. In October 1969, the Chief of the Office for Combat-
ing Economic Crime Janusz Neldner, – interestingly – felt obliged to emphasize, 
“We are not purchasing any hard currency and gold for the Ministry of Internal 
1116 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/VII–43, vol. 1, fol. 306–307. 
1117 AIPN, 0296/114, vol. 1, fol. 2, 9.
1118 AIPN, 01521/876, vol. 1, B. Chybowski, Nielegalny skup dewiz…, p. 76.
1119 APW, KWar. PZPR, 30/XVIII–7, vol. 1, fol. 400–405.
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Affairs, nor for the Ministry of Finance, or the NPB.”1120 We have no data to either 
confirm or negate the veracity of this statement. Certainly, functionaries at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs had plenty of opportunity to make such purchases on 
their own account during the Zalew affair or as part of secret operations (such as 
Operation Iron).1121 One can assume, however, that – aware of their own ineffec-
tiveness in fighting the money changers, yet recognizing the pro-state aspect of 
the dealers’ activities – the authorities resigned themselves to mere surveillance. 
By virtue of their positioning, cinkciarze were a good source of information on 
foreigners who were of interest to intelligence, as well as on private entrepreneurs 
and, in the 1980s, also on the democratic opposition – supported financially by 
foreign institutions – whose members sold some of their foreign currency on the 
black market. 
It is impossible to come to any definitive conclusion on the effectiveness of 
government surveillance. In 1985, the authorities boasted that they had attracted 
5.7% more collaborators than in the previous year but at the same time complained 
about the rigid protocols limiting the range of their operations.1122 However, in the 
mid-1980s it was intelligence that provided more than 88% of the “grounds for 
initiating an investigation”. Anonymous letters and citizens’ reports were respon-
sible for only 2.8%.1123 The reason for such low civic participation in squealing on 
dealers was simple: Polish society was de facto dual-currency and no amount of 
legislation could alter the status quo or diminish mass participation in currency 
exchange transactions. By the 1970s, the tight-knit group of money changers with 
loyalty-based gang mentality was a thing of the past. Previously, cabdrivers, waiters, 
and bartenders had commonly assisted in illicit hard currency operations, but now 
the circle of occasional participants encompassed new groups such as students or 
even school pupils.1124 The development of tourism encouraged people in all walks 
of life to engage independently in hard currency operations.
1120 APKr, KW PZPR, 293, fol. 217. 
1121 K. Madej, Wszyscy byli przemytnikami…; J. Morawski, Złota afera, Warszawa 2007; 
Raport z działalności Komisji powołanej dla wyjaśnienia charakteru operacji krypton-
im “Żelazo”, ed. P. Gontarczyk, “Glaukopis” 7–8, 2007, pp. 233–271.
1122 AIPN, KG MO, 35/554, fol. 45–47. There is no doubt that former police and security 
service employees were part of the group. In 1969 in Krakow there were at least five 
among local money dealers (“which does hinder surveillance”), and four ex-function-
aries “broke off criminal involvement with touts after preventive/repressive actions 
had been directed against them”; APKr, KW PZPR, 293, fol. 250.
1123 AIPN, KG MO, 35/554.
1124 Na nasze konto…, “Sztandar Młodych” October 5, 1979.
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By the 1980s, all these new social players who had joined the hard currency 
game caused the money changers to complain about the “bunglers” spoiling their 
business. A bartender in one of the most elegant hotels in Warsaw told me at that 
time that he was one of the last links in the hard currency chain. A hard currency 
foreigner was usually first offered the “change money” service when still onboard 
the airplane or at the border and by the time he found himself at the hotel bar 
he would have been similarly accosted at the airport, train station, in a cab, at the 
hotel’s reception, and by the hotel porter. In June 1985, Warsaw police were not 
surprised to arrest an 80-year old who was exchanging money and were not un-
duly surprised to find on this unlikely culprit approximately 14 000 dollars, 5 000 
schillings, 500 West German marks, more than two million zloty, several dozen 
gold coins and two gold bars.1125
The money changers’ milieu continued to evolve, as attested by a 1985 police 
report on their social composition. Police had taken a close interest in 3 939 in-
dividuals who were engaged in illicit currency exchange. The vast majority, 2 726, 
were in permanent employment (the question remains whether this was their 
genuine status quo or merely a fake stamp in their ID document), 515 (13.1%) 
were retired or receiving welfare benefits, slightly fewer than 14% did not work 
at all and were not at school or in any other educational institution. The stereo-
typical image of a cinkciarz, prevalent in the post-1989 Polish cinema, was of a 
flashy young man in a skimpy jacket. This image is misleading. Although police 
data did not record the sartorial habits of the dealers, dwelling instead on the 
social structure of the group, these did not correspond with the swanky, youthful 
perp profile. Over 27% (1 062) of the sample were women, 20% (792) were over 
50 years old, just over half (50.4%/, 1 992) were between 40 and 49 and only 17% 
(675) were in the 25 to 29 age group.1126 
1125 AAN, URM, 32/172, fol. 49. 
1126 AIPN, KG MO, 35/554, k. 45–47. We do not have reliable data allowing comparisons 
with earlier periods. Some insight was provided by a 1969 survey of 78 Krakow touts, 
their number unchanged since the late 1950s. Of these, 74.3% – including 10 retirees 
– had no jobs; the others worked periodically. A majority (47) had completed sec-
ondary education, with or without a certificate, and another 27 – primary education, 
with or without a certificate; there are no gender data, the inference being that the 
touts were all males. APKr, KW PZPR, 293, fol. 249–250. According to the handbook 
for MSW and MO functionaries, published in 1973, money dealers were usually “in 
their prime, between 19 and 40, with primary or incomplete secondary education. 
Approximately 60% do not work, others perform odd jobs”; AIPN, 01521/876, vol. 
1, B. Chybowski, Nielegalny skup dewiz…, pp. 77–78. 
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Illegal currency dealers in front of the NBP at Powstańców Warszawy Square in Warsaw, 
February 1990. Photo: Krzysztof Wójcik, FORUM Polish Photography Agency.
Although the late 1980s saw a spectacular boom for money changers working 
on the street, it was also their swan song. Their epic hard currency journey had 
continued successfully after Polish banks began to trade in the PKO coupons in 
1987. However, the introduction of internal convertibility of the zloty in March 
1989 was the beginning of the end; it marked the arrival of licensed money ex-
change counters, known as kantors. Some dealers perceived this development as 
a business opportunity and legalized their operations, moving from the street 
to behind the till in a kantor. Others, perhaps the majority, decided to contin-
ue their old practices, reasoning correctly that the legal kantor currency dealer 
would have to pay taxes. “And I won’t,” a Warsaw money dealer told a journalist, 
“They will have to deal with bureaucracy and I won’t. They will have the daily rate 
and I will have my hourly rate, they will have an hourly rate and I will do it by 
the minute. Walkie-talkies will get more expensive.”1127 Although in the first few 
days after the opening of the first-ever money exchange counter, the newspapers 
1127 Nie pójdą na zieloną trawkę, PiŻ, 1989, no. 2.
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confidently forecast the “end of the fair-weather season for the money dealers1128”, 
for a while they still managed to stay on top of their game: on April 5, 1989 they 
offered to buy dollars from the public at a much higher rate than the banks; this 
move effectively paralyzed the sale of US dollars in three Warsaw branches of the 
PKO bank.1129
In the second half of 1989, the rapidly growing inflation which soon billowed 
into hyper-inflation kept all those involved in currency exchange, whether le-
gal or not, extremely busy. Those who had excess zlotys immediately exchanged 
them into hard currency which, unlike the national currency, kept its value, and 
spent it gradually as required to buy back zlotys needed for day-to-day expens-
es. In the new free market economy with a freshly deregulated banking sector 
that allowed public and private ownership, the money changers may have been 
quickly becoming a relic but they were refusing to leave the stage in a quick 
and orderly manner. “One can always bump into them,” a journalist from Gazeta 
Bankowa wrote as late as 1993, “usually in the same spots where they have been 
standing for years, in front of a bank or hanging around in the marketplace. They 
are natural competition for the money exchange counters. They allegedly offer 
better deals, ‘I will sell cheaper, will pay better’, but those who engage in a trans-
action with these characters often risk incurring a serious loss, since they are 
hardly model citizens. The money dealers do offer a better – but only slightly 
so – deal than that to be had at the official counters. Illegal dealers don’t have 
any overheads such as rent, or wages. Many of their clients, who for years had 
conducted transactions on the street, prefer to avoid coming under the spotlight 
of the brightly lit places. Another group of clients are visitors from the East who 
cannot legally take advantage of money exchange counters.”1130 Gradually cink-
ciarze were losing their client base; now, for the majority of customers a minimal 
difference in the price offered or paid was less important than the comfort and 
safety of the transaction to be conducted. And so the familiar cinkciarze disap-
peared from the streets. They stayed in the collective memory and became as 
much a notorious icon of communist Poland as an empty butcher’s store. The 
first online exchange portal opened in 2012 under the name cinkciarz.pl.
1128 Kurier Polski” March 21, 1989.
1129 Czarny wtorek na walutowym rynku, ŻW, no. 260/November 8, 1989; see: M. Smog-
orzewski, Nim bank się ocknie – cinkciarz zarobi, “Gazeta Wyborcza” July 4, 1989.
1130 A. Zeibel, Zielone okienka, “Gazeta Bankowa” December 10, 1993.
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9.  The Tourist Trade in Communist Poland1131
9.1  Trading Tourism:1132 Introduction
“Friends of mine often go on trips abroad by car. I asked them once where they’d 
been that summer. ‘Bulgaria,’ the husband said. ‘No, Romania,’ the wife put him 
straight. He was not at all sure where he had been. What he was sure about was 
how the prices in that country related to prices in Poland. He boasted that he had 
never spent a cent on a trip abroad.”1133
This anecdote illustrates very well one of the most enduring and ubiquitous 
black market phenomena. The tourist trade – which at a stroke broke the state 
monopoly of foreign trade, and made a mockery of customs, tax, and hard cur-
rency regulations – reached a mass scale in the second half of the 1950s when the 
borders became less impermeable and lasted, albeit only by a few years, beyond 
the fall of the communist system in 1989. This phenomenon was more complex 
than it seemed: its range and scale were broader, the group of participants – larg-
er, and the motivation behind their involvement diverse.1134
Shortages were a permanent feature of the economies of the Soviet Bloc; some 
argued that they were a systemic flaw rather than merely a matter of malfunc-
tioning. They were painful for the citizens, who developed endemic accommoda-
tive and defensive strategies, similar in all the countries behind the Iron Curtain. 
Local strategies alone were not sufficient to allow consumers to fulfil all their 
needs, which by the early 1950s had expanded beyond basic necessities. The end 
1131 See: Jerzy Kochanowski, Pionierzy wolnego rynku? Nieoficjalna wymiana handlowa 
między społeczeństwami krajów socjalistycznych. Lata 70. i 80., in: Bocznymi drogami. 
Nieoficjalne kontakty społeczeństw socjalistycznych 1956–1989, eds. W. Borodziej, J. 
Kochanowski, Warszawa 2010, pp. 109–144; Jerzy Kochanowski, “Jesteśmy za biedni, 
aby urlop spędzać w kraju”. Masowa turystyka i nielegalny handel w latach sześćdziesią-
tych XX w. Perspektywa polska, “Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych” 68, 
2008, pp. 125–150. 
1132 W. Dymitrów introduced the term in “Życie Warszawy” in 1968.
1133 Kapiści, “Dziennik Ludowy”, no. 244/October 12, 1962.
1134 It should be emphasized that by the early 1960s, tourist commerce had become 
an object of interest for Polish sociologists; see: J. Węgleński, Wyniki badań nad 
handlem uprawianym przez uczestników wycieczek zagranicznych, Ośrodek Badania 
Opinii Publicznej, Warszawa 1964; Społeczeństwo polskie w badaniach ankietowych 
Ośrodka Badania Opinii Publicznej przy Polskim Radio i TV: lata 1958–1964. Przegląd 
zebranych materiałów, ed. A. Siciński, Warszawa 1966. 
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of Stalinism accelerated the modernization process in the Soviet Bloc countries; 
citizens were now eager to make up for lost time and yearned to see the outside 
world, where they soon discovered – and came to crave – an astounding choice 
of consumer goods that they had never seen before, in the process developing as-
pirational needs for products beyond the drab, grey and often poor-quality basics 
that socialism had on offer.1135 Anything at all, as long as it was foreign, and this 
showed at a glance, became all the rage, bestowing on its proud new owner ku-
dos, sex appeal and brownie points in the social pecking order.1136 Copycat mech-
anisms were uncritically and slavishly obeyed: every male craved Levi’s jeans, 
every woman – Max Factor cosmetics or a fashionable Italian synthetic-fiber 
raincoat. This was before the Chinese mass production of fake designer labels 
and so every product purchased was authentic. What to a Westerner represented 
a few hours’ wages, to a Pole was often a matter of weeks or months of squirre-
ling every cent away to acquire the coveted item, worth paying any price for! At 
least until the late 1980s, colorful chocolate and soap wrapping and “Western” 
beer bottles were often cherished elements of house decoration, whereas a plastic 
carrier bag proudly displaying the name of any Western chain store or boutique 
was an item of envy per se.1137 This feverish pursuit was the order of the day in 
the Eastern Bloc, whether in Warsaw, Bucharest, Prague or Moscow, much to the 
chagrin of the authorities, who frowned on such decadent tastes; the craze for 
all things Western also highlighted the inadequacies of domestic supply and the 
1135 J. Misala, Nieoficjalna wymiana handlowa obywateli polskich z zagranicą, Warszawa 
1989, p. 4; K. Karcz, Efekt naśladowania zewnętrznych wzorców konsumpcji jako 
czynnik utrudniający sterowanie spożyciem indywidualnym, in: Narzędzia polityki 
gospodarczej i społecznej w procesie kształtowania konsumpcji. Ogólnopolska konfer-
encja naukowo-dydaktyczna Katedr i Instytutów Obrotu Towarowego i Usług Uczelni 
Ekonomicznych, Ustroń, September 1987, vol. 1, Katowice 1987, pp. 201–205.
1136 In 1958 a visitor from Poland recounted to a member of Radio Free Europe staff: 
“What do people want in today’s Poland? Well, practically anything that comes from 
the West, especially from the US. It has to be a brand name product, though. Poles 
are very good at recognizing counterfeit products. Fake American cigarettes, which 
have no problem selling in Spain and Northern Africa, Parker pens manufactured in 
Italy […] – in Poland these fakes are exposed within a couple of weeks and people 
stop buying them”; HIM, Pressearchiv, P6211, RFE-Research, Item 3691/58, Soviet 
goods smuggled into Poland. On Varsovians aspiring to the Western “new look” see: B. 
Brzostek, Za progiem. Codzienność w przestrzeni publicznej Warszawy lat 1955–1970, 
Warszawa 2007, pp. 260–277. 
1137 L. Chelcea, The Culture of Shortage during State Socialism. Consumption Practices in 
a Romanian Village in the 1980s, “Cultural Studies” 16, 2002, no. 1, p. 35.
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quality of its products. Of course, the products that the people wanted had to 
come from the West so, when in the second part of the 1950s travelling abroad at 
last became feasible, Poles and other Eastern Bloc citizens were quick to spot its 
trade potential for improving their everyday life. During the next three decades 
they systematically modified and perfected strategies of using foreign travel as a 
means of meeting their own and others’ domestic demand.1138
The communist authorities, who by the turn of the 1950s and the 1960s had 
become fully aware of their citizens’ expectations, dealt with this pent-up con-
sumer frustration by paying lip-service to providing “citizen satisfaction”, while 
a tourist trip abroad acquired a political significance. However, leaders in Mos-
cow, Warsaw, Prague and East Berlin were not keen to facilitate the desperately 
hankered-after trips to the West. Only the citizens of Yugoslavia, perceived as a 
half-way house to the West, enjoyed the freedom of traveling outside of the Iron 
Curtain1139 – to the envy of all other citizens in the Soviet Bloc, who had to settle 
for being able to travel to other Soviet Bloc countries as part of the state-sanc-
tioned “new consumerism”. This was a gift with strings attached and opportuni-
ties to travel tended to be seasoned with more than a pinch of ideology: “Tourism 
to other socialist countries has been granted a high social and ideological status, 
thanks to its significance in the broader humanist sphere. This aspect is particu-
larly relevant in the case of tourist exchange between socialist countries. The 
emergence of the socialist bloc has created a new, formerly unknown kind of 
international relations. In conjunction with the political and military alliance 
and economic integration, there has arisen a wider platform of cooperative real-
ization of ideological and educational tasks resulting from the identical political 
and ideological objectives of individual communist parties.”1140
As it turned out, however, as far as tourism was concerned, the apparent coin-
cidence of objectives was illusory. Whether state-owned or co-op, travel agencies 
were not charities – they strived for profit or at the very least aimed to minimize 
their losses. From the mid-1960s, in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgar-
ia, and other Soviet Bloc states, the authorities were keen to promote growth in 
incoming tourism from the capitalist states and to develop their own tourism to 
1138 See: A. Wessely, Traveling People, Traveling Objects, “Cultural Studies” 16, 2002, no. 1, 
pp. 5–6.
1139 See: P.J. Patterson, Dangerous Liaisons: Soviet-bloc Tourists and the Yugoslav Good Life 
in the 1960s and 1970s, in: The Business of Tourism: Place, Faith, and History, ed. Ph. 
Scranton, J.F. Davidson, Philadelphia 2006, pp. 186–212.
1140 AAN, GKKFiT, 11/67, fol. 3–4.
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other countries of the Warsaw Pact.1141 Local tourists were only granted a very 
modest allowance of hard or indeed socialist currency to take with them, which 
inevitably led them to embark on various novel and ingenious methods of mak-
ing money once they found themselves abroad. Holidays in one’s own country 
were cheaper, but not always satisfactory even when partially funded by the state. 
For an enterprising Pole, thanks to the ample arbitrage opportunities due to an 
unbalanced market and the different range of prices and shortages in socialist 
countries, a much more expensive trip abroad could not only cover the cost of 
travel but even generate a profit.
9.2  The 1950s and the 1960s: “We Are Too Poor  
to Vacation in Our Own Country…”
After 1956 Poles increasingly traveled to the West and frequently used their pri-
vate trips to conduct illicit trade.1142 However, their westward excursions repre-
sented only a fraction of the volume of tourist traffic to the socialist countries, 
encouraged by ideological factors which also had an impact on bilateral tourist 
agreements. Although in theory every Pole was entitled to a passport, in practice 
it was not a foregone conclusion that one would be issued automatically and 
applicants were scrutinized for possible reasons for refusal. Moreover, after the 
trip, the passport had again to be surrendered to the authorities and the potential 
traveler had to reapply for each successive prospective trip abroad, his move-
ments thus easy for the authorities to monitor and keep track of. Since 1959 it 
had been easier to get a passport for a socialist destination especially when “pass-
port inserts” made traveling to some of these countries much easier. The first 
bilateral agreement, signed in 1955 with Czechoslovakia, allowed relatively prob-
lem-free trips to border zones. With these cheap passes, citizens of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia could visit the neighboring country twice a year for a maximum 
of six days and exchange a fixed number of korunas and zloty. Between 1957 and 
1958, tourism across Poland’s southern border became a mass phenomenon. The 
1141 This was also true about Poland, where according to the official data from 1963 the 
revenue from Western tourism (not including black-market hard currency exchange) 
exceeded the cost – unlike Polish tourism to socialist states, which had to be subsi-
dized by the Polish state; Rocznik statystyczny 1970, Warszawa 1970, p. 491. 
1142 See: P. Sowiński, Wakacje w Polsce Ludowej. Polityka władz i ruch turystyczny (1945–
1989), Warszawa 2005; P. Sowiński, Merchand adventures komunizmu. Handlowe 
podróże Polaków na Zachód w latach 1956–1970, in: Od Piłsudskiego do Wałęsy. Studia 
z dziejów Polski w XX wieku, ed. K. Persak et al, Warszawa 2008, pp. 291–306.
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agreement signed on August 24, 1960 by Poland and Czechoslovakia waived visa 
requirements for private travel.
In the early 1960s, other countries of the Bloc also embarked on similar tour-
ist swaps. On October 19, 1961, Poland and East Germany signed an agreement 
to increase tourist flows between the countries, introducing the concept of “hol-
iday traffic”, which came into force on January 1, 1963. Despite the fact that East 
Berlin implemented the new regulations quite strictly, the headcount across the 
Oder-Neisse border (especially from East Germany to Poland) rose systematical-
ly. In July 1964, tourist traffic visa requirements were waived between Hungary 
and Poland, as a consequence of Hungarian social policy initiated in 1964.1143 
By the mid-1960s travel to Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet 
Union, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia had become commonplace for Poles. 
As had cross-border black-market trade.1144
Table 6.  Tourist traffic from and to Poland*
Years
Tourist trips abroad by Poles
(in thousands)









1956 256.7 242.7 14.0 78.2 64.1 14.1
1958 163.8 117.5 46.3 123.1 81.2 41.9
1960 216.4 175.0 41.4 184.0 130 53.9
1962 446.5 395.4 51.0 405.3 350.1 55.3
1964 577.3 505.8 71.5 586.9 500.7 86.1
1966 949.0 858.3 90.7 1 280 1 064 215.8
1968 728.1 635.7 92.3 1 712 1 487 225.7
1143 The change was indeed significant. Whereas in 1963, 569 775 Hungarian tourists 
had gone abroad and 921 021 foreign tourists had arrived in Hungary, in 1964 the 
numbers were respectively 1 485 712 and 1 799 932; T. Dessewffy, Speculators and 
travellers: The Political Construction of the Tourist in the Kàdàr Regime, “Cultural 
Studies” 16, 2002, no. 1, pp. 44–62, p. 50.
1144 In 1960, the Soviet Bloc customs service published a magazine in Russian and Ger-
man (“Socialisticzeskij Tamozennyj Kontrol” / “Sozialistische Zollkontrolle”), devot-
ed in large part to tourist commerce and smuggling. 
352
Years
Tourist trips abroad by Poles
(in thousands)









1970 871.3 757.2 114.1 1 888 1 610 279.3
1972 10 600 10 391 208.5 8 399 7 964 374.7
1974 8 287 8 007 280 7 893 7 221 672.1
1976 10 512 10 110 402 9 623 8 839 784.0
1978 11 141 10 602 539 10 695 9 712 983.0
1980 6 852 6 157 695 7 080 6 205 875.0
1981 4 282 2 984 1 248 2 172 1 594 578.0
1982 995 678 317 1 404 1 016 388.0
1984 3 289 2 550 739 2 997 2 235 761.9
1986 4 313 3 356 956 3 851 3 105 745.9
1988 6 924 5 259 1 665 6 196 5 092 1 104
1989 19 313 – – 8 233 6 645 1 588
Source:  P. Sowiński. Wakacje w Polsce Ludowej. Polityka władz i ruch turystyczny 
(1945–1989). Warszawa 2005, pp. 285–288. 
*The table shows the number of border crossings, which was not identical to the 
number of participants in trans-border crossing.
Whereas at the turn of the 1950s and the 1960s, food consumption in Poland had 
been more or less on a par with that of other countries, when it came to industrial 
consumption, an abyss separated Poland not only from the capitalist but also the 
other socialist countries (especially Czechoslovakia).1145 “In terms of industrial 
goods, our market is insatiable. […] Unfortunately there is a shortage of almost 
everything in Poland: artificial-fiber sponges, chewing gum, nylon socks, and 
1145 V. Holešovský, Personal Consumption in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1950–
1960: A Comparison, “Slavic Review” 24, 1965, pp. 622–635; M. Rogowiec, B. Tylec, 
Kierunki przemian konsumpcji w latach 1960–1973 w wybranych krajach RWPG, 
Warszawa 1977.
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costume jewelry.”1146 The next decade brought quantitative but not qualitative 
changes. The only source of higher quality goods was abroad where prices were 
much lower than in Poland. “Professional” smugglers and sailors supplied wares 
such as nylon raincoats and watches manufactured in the West, often on a mass 
scale, since they had capital at their disposal. Tourists delivered the rest. 
Alcohol was one of the principal goods smuggled out to the West. It was traded also by 
tourists on elitist group trips organised by Orbis. Ryszard Winiarski, Tourist Sales, 1962. 
Photo: Warsaw Museum of Caricature, sign. 6109.
There are no data to establish whether illegal tourist commerce was the domain 
of people traveling individually or in organized groups. It is reasonable to sur-
mise that decisive factors were geographic ease of access as well as individual 
logistical skills and business acumen. For example the mass-scale tourist trade 
in the Poland-Czechoslovakia border zone was a specialty of group tours organ-
ized by workplaces and travel agencies, usually involving day trips based on ex-
changing the maximum currency quota and targeting the nearest town that had 
a large number of stores. The results of an opinion poll conducted in 1962 left no 
doubt that, in the general perception, the main reason for the trips was to make a 
quick buck and this was bitterly resented by those not involved in the trade: “The 
numbers of trader group trips to Czechoslovakia need to be cut down. These are 
day trips that the same individuals go on repeatedly. The same surnames keep 
1146 J. Hibner, Uwaga – przemyt!, PiŻ, 1957, no. 15.
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cropping up on the lists.” “Only back-packers traveling on foot should be allowed 
in the Tatra Mountains. The ‘Polish locust’ travels by bus for a three-day trip and 
for the entire three days swarms the stores and engages in backstreet trading. 
Trips like that are nothing to do with tourism. It is hard to find a Pole in the Tatra 
Mountains but there are hundreds of them in the local stores. I could not buy a 
single biro in the border zone because my fellow Poles had bought them all out 
by the hundred.”1147
Similarly, Slovaks and Czechs did not need any encouragement to buy Pol-
ish cured meat, chocolate, cigarettes and vodka. Another respondent in the poll 
observed that it was unfair to blame Poles for “teaching Czechoslovak citizens 
to smuggle and profiteer. I was not the one accosting the hosts with goods for 
sale but the other way around. Everywhere I went, I was hassled for cigarettes, 
alcohol, and German watches. Staff in the mountain lodge were just as bad.”1148 
Czechoslovaks engaged in trade on the other side of the border, taking advantage 
of the Polish legislation permitting sales to the state of goods up to the value of 
6  000 zloty without having to show any custom receipts. Thanks to this loop-
hole, in 1958 alone stores in Podhale received goods worth 1.2 million zloty.1149 
High-value items changed hands in private. It is difficult to say whether the case 
of the Prague resident Miroslav Honcu was an isolated one. Starting in 1961, he 
progressed from buying contraband goods from Poles in the border zone to set-
ting up a full-blown underground Polish-Czechoslovak foreign trade office. Once 
a fortnight, together with his partner, another Czech, he would illegally cross the 
border in the Karkonosze Mountains, and smuggle into Poland fake fur and cos-
tume jewelry. He subsequently distributed goods all over the country through a 
network of his Polish friends. In Poland, he stocked up mainly on American ciga-
rettes for the return journey. His luck held until November 1967.1150
1147 AAN, GKKFiT, 16/83, Józef Krynicki, Evaluation of polls conducted among conven-
tional zone tourists Poland–Czechoslovakia, (ed. R. Łazarek), January 1963, fol. 203, 
204.
1148 Ibid., fol. 165.
1149 E. Orkiszewski, Turystyka, podróże, lecz nie tylko…, “Tygodnik Demokratyczny” 1958, 
no. 31.
1150 WC, 1972, no. 6, pp. 16–19. Czechoslovak citizens’ trading contacts extended deep 
into Poland. At the turn of 1964 and 1965, the Czechoslovak security service asked 
its Polish equivalent for help in checking up on the Warsaw contacts of a group of 
“Czech citizens who use the tourist traffic between the CSRS and the PRL to conduct 
criminal activity, transporting to Poland by train large amounts of counterfeit fur 
fabric”; AIPN, MSW II, 1913, fol. 110–118.
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The chapter on the geography of the black market referred to the tradition 
of smuggling amongst the highlanders living along Poland’s southern border. It 
is interesting to examine the effect that the expansion of mass travel had on the 
development of smuggling techniques and strategies. When, in the second half 
of the 1950s, tourism became a mass phenomenon in Poland, it radically altered 
local smuggling methods and transformed old, accustomed social roles. “In old 
Poland [pre-1939 – JK] we were busy smuggling,” a highlander declared in early 
1960s, “and we still do today – but now we use the lowland mugs from Warsaw 
or Łódź to do it for us.”1151 The findings of the border authorities bore this out. 
Whereas in 1959, Border Defense Troops had arrested 865 smugglers crossing 
the southern border illegally, only 171 were stopped in 1960, and a paltry 139 in 
1966. Fewer arrests did not mean that the number of smuggling operations had 
decreased but rather that goods were now carried across the border under the le-
gitimate guise of tourism.1152 The traffic helped smugglers make contacts abroad 
and organize the transport logistics, setting up complex cross-border delivery 
channels (these were also used in particular during the illicit trading of farm 
animals, usually horses.) Potential buyers would arrive in Poland as tourists, pick 
the animals to be bought, make a down payment or pay the full price outright 
and wait for delivery. A Pole would then cross the border “legally, with a pass or a 
passport. Once in Czechoslovakia or Austria, he would buy goods and return to 
Poland illegally or pass the contraband on to a person waiting for him at the bor-
der while he entered the country legally, now without any suspicious baggage.”1153 
Large amounts of goods such as gold and textiles from Italy smuggled from cap-
italist states were dispersed in the border zone via a larger group of carriers who 
brought the contraband into Poland relatively safely in the guise of tourists.1154
The development of both private and official tourist infrastructure facilitat-
ed contacts and provided a convenient and relatively safe forum for trade. On 
both sides of the border, whether in the Tatra or Karkonosze Mountains, moun-
tain shelters, tourist lodges and hotels were hotbeds of commercial activity. To 
give one example, as early as the 1950s, the manager of a PTTK (Polish Tourist 
1151 HIM, Pressearchiv, P 6221, RFE-Research, Item 2823/61, 3 IX 1961, The highlanders 
– the privileged class in Poland. Tourists were allegedly paid 500 zloty (half of the 
average monthly wage) to transport 20 kg of goods across the border; ibid.
1152 AIPN, 01521/784, Stanisław Banaszek, Marian Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemyt-
nicze i zasady ich zwalczania, Warszawa 1969, WOP, p. 59.
1153 Ibid., pp. 102, 105.
1154 A. Kłodzińska, Waluciarze, ŻW, April 10–12, 1971; J. Koczorowski, O wynikach zwal-
czania przemytu w 1971 roku, WC, 1972, no. 6. 
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and Sightseeing Society) tourist lodge in Podhale set up a distribution channel 
supplied by smugglers at one end with a private textile manufacturer in Łódź 
receiving the goods at the other end; the enterprise flourished, shifting Czech 
zippers and press-studs wholesale.1155 
Józef Kaczmarczyk, New design for a tourist bus for Polish group excursions abroad.  
On the windows – details of the goods most frequently traded by Polish tourists abroad  
in the 1960s: vodka, underwear, radios, sweaters, bedspreads. “Szpilki” 1962, no. 40.
While in the Polish-Czechoslovak border zone the old smuggling strategies were 
being modified only slightly, trips to more remote destinations required new 
methods. Individual tourists traveled in groups, for greater safety and to make 
the border crossing process easier. Since goods carried had to be declared at the 
border in writing, those traveling with many items for sale entered some of them 
in the custom declaration forms of those of their traveling companions who had 
no contraband. This method of tackling the border was used for trips to Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and from there onward to Yugoslavia, Austria, Italy, and 
the return leg of the journey.1156 In Bulgaria and Romania, where Poles began to 
arrive in increasing numbers in the early 1960s and where the greatest percentage 
1155 AIPN, 01521/784, S. Banaszek, M. Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze i zasady 
ich zwalczania…, p. 81. 
1156 Ibid., p. 83.
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of Polish tourists participated in all kinds of commerce, the locals were interested 
not only in articles manufactured in Poland1157 but also in those imported by Poles 
from Austria and Italy, such as watches. After 1965 tourists traveling individually 
to Hungary – on trips that were usually self-financed through trading conducted 
en route – replaced the former organized group excursions. “As a result, instead 
of pursuing appropriate tourist goals, in individual cases the travelers’ undesirable 
endeavors came to the fore.”1158
The commercial activities of Polish tourists were motivated by striving to ac-
quire goods unavailable in Poland, recoup their travel expenses and of course gain 
as much profit as possible but they were also legitimized by the fact that Romani-
ans, Bulgars, Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, Hungarians and citizens of East Germany 
acted in just the same way. It is difficult to establish credibly to what extent these 
were the grass-roots commercial initiatives of individual citizens or whether they 
were indirectly inspired by the respective governments, themselves short of foreign 
reserves, as a way of enabling their citizens to travel abroad without the burden of 
having to supply them with other socialist currencies. In 1968, the financial author-
ities of Czechoslovakia announced that they would permit each individual traveler 
to “exchange no more than 200 zloty, regardless of the duration of their stay in Po-
land. This encourages engaging in illegal trade.”1159 Certainly, in the Polish percep-
tion, Czech and Slovak tourists complied by “refusing to take checks denominated 
in zloty and opting to take goods instead of Polish money. Those they sell here, and 
pay with goods for private board and lodging.”1160
In the mid-1960s this began to pose quite a problem, especially since the 
number of Soviet Bloc tourists visiting Poland grew more quickly than the traf-
fic in the opposite direction. For example in 1967 the number of inbound trips 
grew, year on year, by 25% (1 330 807) surpassing the number of Polish trips by 
1157 By the early 1960s, everybody knew what was selling well in Bulgaria. J. Węgleński’s 
research confirms this: “When buying bedspreads at the Sukiennice stalls in Krakow, 
the questionnaire’s respondent had no need to ponder his choices, since the sales clerk 
asked him, ‘For the Soviet Union or Bulgaria?’ and went on to offer two bedspreads of 
precisely the kind that was sought after in Bulgaria”; J. Węgleński, Wyniki badania…, 
p. 14. On Polish commercial tourist trips to Bulgaria and Romania, see: Kapiści, “Dzi-
ennik Ludowy” no. 244/October 12, 1962; W. Strzelecka, Szczypta dziegciu w beczce 
miodu, TL, no. 65/March 6, 1962.
1158 AAN, GKKFiT, 16/92, fol. 6.
1159 AAN, GKKFiT, 16/84, fol. 135.
1160 E. Orkiszewski, Turystyka, podróże, lecz nie tylko…, “Tygodnik Demokratyczny” 1958, 
no. 31.
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495 681 – a massive 59%! Revenues, however, failed to keep up. Between 1966 
and 1967 arrivals from Czechoslovakia alone (including border zone traffic) 
increased by 29% (342 174 and 443 975) and the revenue remained on a par: 
2.92 million and 2.9 million zloty dewizowy –a convertible zloty, nominally 
worth 0.222168 grams of gold. Zloty dewizowy was a currency unit used until 
1982 for accounting purposes in foreign trade conducted by the state. Similarly, 
Hungarians officially spent much less in Poland than Poles did in Hungary (in 
1968 – 21.09 and 185.5 zloty dewizowy per capita). “This proves that the sale of 
goods brought from abroad or illegal currency exchange remains [their] major 
source of finance for their stay in Poland.”1161 
In Bulgaria, there was great demand for textiles sold by Polish tourists, such as plush; this 
provided the basis for the pun that Jerzy Srokowski used in 1969 in his cartoon ‘On our 
holiday in Bulgaria we have made plush-or-minus 10 000 zloty’. Jerzy Srokowski,  
Plush-minus, 1969. Photo: Warsaw Museum of Caricature, sign. 7255.
The first of the unofficial “tourist customs wars” between the socialist countries 
took place in 1968. The GKKFiT (Central Committee of Physical Culture and 
Tourism) approached the Polish government with a proposal to tighten customs 
checks for individual tourists from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and 
Hungary “in order to counteract the import of goods destined for sale in Poland 
1161 AAN, GKKFiT, 16/93, fol. 190.
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and intended to recoup travel costs.”1162 For its part, the government tried to curb 
the travel aspirations of its citizens, decreasing the foreign currency allowance and 
imposing limits on the number of Polish zloty permitted to be taken out of the 
country; moreover, each citizen was allowed to only one trip annually. For trips in 
the border zone the daily exchange was limited to 80 zloty.1163 The restrictions did 
not appear to reduce the number of trips to Poland nor make a dent in the bilateral 
illicit trade. On the contrary, as always, they seemed to inspire Polish tourists in 
particular to be more effective and look for new trading routes. In 1970, due to 
stringent currency limits and the rising price of Hungarian tourist services, a two-
week vacation on Lake Balaton, an old Polish cheap favorite, became a thousand 
zloty more expensive than a comparable stay in Bulgaria or Romania. Poles soon 
readjusted to the circumstances, re-directing their illegal trade to the shores of the 
Black Sea.1164
In the 1960s, both foreign travel and black-market commerce became com-
monplace and taken for granted. As Maciej Krasicki put it in 1967, “Exonerated 
from moral ambivalence, smuggling has become the measure of ingenuity and 
intelligence. Smuggling and common theft can no longer be treated on a par 
without risking social uproar.”1165 The communist party cell in a Warsaw enter-
prise “refused to condemn its secretary when caught red-handed smuggling into 
the Soviet Union goods worth several thousand zloty. Party members argued that 
‘everybody does it’ and that the authorities ‘should not penalize the guy who’s al-
ready suffered a loss’. Moreover, with the support of the director of the enterprise, 
the secretary was expected to be re-elected to his post.”1166 Commercial activity 
made trips abroad possible for growing numbers of people of lesser means and 
those lower down the social ladder and traditionally less mobile.1167
1162 Ibid. In January 1969, the Polish authorities began to insist that Hungarian visitors 
have enough money to cover the cost of their stay in Poland; there was a provision 
to deny entry to tourists without any Polish currency.
1163 It proved to be effective to an extent. In 1967 the deficit fell to 77.5 million, in 1968 
– to 22.1 million, in 1969 – to 14.3 million zloty dewizowy; AAN, GKKFiT, 16/3, 
fol. 44.
1164 Rocznik statystyczny 1975, Warszawa 1975, p. 496.
1165 M. Krasicki, Przemyt turystyczny, “Polityka”, no. 38/September 23, 1967.
1166 K. Madej, Wszyscy byli przemytnikami. Obraz przestępczości przemytniczej i dewizowej 
w latach 1956–1970, “Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2008, no. 2, pp. 123–124.
1167 It is difficult to say how representative such statements were but those who supervised 
the foreign tourist traffic pointed out that members of the intelligentsia were involved 
less frequently with trading; AAN, GKKFiT, 16/10, fol. 68, 101. 
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Already in the mid-1960s, many Poles claimed, not entirely as a joke, “We are 
too poor to take our vacation in our own country”.1168 For many of the travelers, 
trips abroad were a source of relatively high, tax-free income, only part of which 
was put aside to pay for the next trip.1169 Due to the large number of participants 
and the sheer expanse of the geographic area involved, we can only guess at the 
scale of this surplus. There had evolved a network of trade connections encom-
passing all the European socialist states which extended out to the West and even 
beyond the European sub-continent. Sometimes smuggling had all the hallmarks 
of a professional activity that required managerial skills, an understanding of the 
markets and at times a touch of creative flair. In the late 1960s, the media reported 
on the business activities of sailors’ wives who, with leisure time and capital on 
their hands, were no longer content merely to sell goods smuggled in by their hus-
bands and embarked on cross-border operations of their own. ”One of the wives 
was buying fishnet stockings in Hungary, dyeing them dark colors in Gdańsk and 
then selling them on in Moscow, turning 11 forints into 15 roubles.”1170 It was an 
excellent exchange rate.
The media gave nicknames to the well-traveled routes, eg the “lamb road” 
to Bulgaria or the “cosmetics and clothing road” to Romania; similarly, it was 
common knowledge that crystal glass and hard currency went to Yugoslavia and 
linen to Hungary. The collective sharing of knowledge established which prod-
uct was best sold where, for how much and to whom and this information was 
disseminated by word of mouth. In the later decades of the 1950s, such activities 
involved literally millions of people.In the late 1960s, the greater part of tour-
ist trading consisted of simple barter, the exchange of goods for other goods 
or selling goods for money only to buy other goods. These transactions were 
conducted on a square in Budapest, a beach on the Black Sea or in a moun-
tain lodge in the Tatra Mountains. But, even within this type of exchange, spe-
cialization evolved. Mass-scale tourist traffic, now also across the Iron Curtain, 
led to professional market penetration, as well as evaluation of the scale of local 
shortages, needs and the opportunities and profits to be had, resulting in new 
trade strategies independent of state institutions. The profitable exchange of so-
cialist currencies such as Hungarian forints, Czechoslovak korunas, and Soviet 
rubles in the West led in the late 1960s to the emergence of an unofficial social-
ist currency-and-goods market, where rates of exchange were set according to 
1168 G. Gałuszczyńska, O ludziach, metodach i sposobach myślenia, PiŻ, 1966, no. 6.
1169 W. Nowierski, Komisy nie powinny być “centralą skupu” przemycanych towarów, “Ex-
press Wieczorny”, no. 271/November 15, 1961.
1170 T. Kur, Czas orki i podorywek, PiŻ, 1970, no. 10.
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international circumstances.1171 The expected profit determined the attractive-
ness for tourist of a particular country and a choice of strategies (such as whether 
rubles should be sent to Frankfurt am Main or perhaps swapped in Budapest for 
forints that could then be used to buy gold bars and bullion in Vienna.1172
By then, the socialist authorities had already missed the boat for a decisive 
battle against the tourist trade. In just a single decade, Poles, Hungarians, and 
Romanians were able to build a lasting foundation upon which mass-scale coop-
eration would be based in the 1970s and ‘80s. 
9.3  The 1970s: “Who Are the Smugglers? Every Single Person 
that Travels Abroad!”1173
With these words, the journalist Wojciech Markiewicz referred not just to Poles 
but also all those representatives of the entire socialist bloc, who, every Thursday 
during the tourist season, transformed Nowy Targ in southern Poland into the 
largest marketplace in Europe. Never before had so many Poles, Czechs, Hun-
garians, and Romanians traveled abroad and they were not willing to give up the 
privilege lightly.1174 They did not have to. Allowing citizens to have relatively free 
movement within the Soviet Bloc was one of the main ways of defusing social 
unrest. For a Hungarian, a trip to the Polish mountain resort of Zakopane, or 
for a Pole – to the beaches of Varna, helped to appease the yearning to ski in the 
Alps or sunbathe on the French Riviera. The pent-up demand for foreign travel 
became apparent after the introduction of free tourist travel between Poland and 
East Germany on January 1, 1972. By the end of the year every fourth statistical 
Pole and every third East German citizen had visited their neighboring state.1175
Whenever politically and economically feasible, the authorities simplified the 
travel regulations. By the end of the 1970s, many Soviet Bloc citizens needed 
1171 A significant example was the correlation between the Czechoslovak koruna exchange 
rate in Poland and the turbulence of the Prague Spring events, during which there was 
a “high demand for Czech korunas from Austria and West Germany (undoubtedly a 
result of mass commercial tourism from these countries to Czechoslovakia) which as 
a knock-on effect resulted in a rising Czechoslovak koruna exchange rate in Poland 
that took place mainly near the southern border”; AIPN, KG MO, 35/1740, fol. 2.
1172 AIPN, 01521/2035, J. Oleś, Przemyt wartości dewizowych…, pp. 65–70. 
1173 W. Markiewicz, Przyjedź pan w lipcu…, ŻW, no. 101/April 20, 1976.
1174 The dynamic expansion of foreign travel in Poland is telling: while 2.7% of the (sta-
tistical) population ventured outside of the country in 1970, five years later the per-
centage rose to 25; AAN, GKKFiT, 11/58, fol. 4.
1175 For more, see chapter 4.4.
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only their ID card to visit a fraternal state. The reasons were both ideological and 
pragmatic. With cross-border traffic expanding dynamically, the formerly com-
plex system of passports, passport inserts and visas was inefficient and time-con-
suming. In November 1975, the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs put forward 
a proposal to change the regulations for travel to socialist countries in Europe 
and replace the multiple passport inserts with an ID card with an appropriate 
permanent stamp. The full implementation of the new regulation was possible 
only after overcoming the reluctance of the main opponent, Czechoslovakia.1176 
The final agreement was signed on July 20, 1977. From then on, Poles were al-
lowed to travel from the Elbe in the west to Vladivostok in the east with no more 
than the appropriate stamp in their ID card.
Poland’s growing crisis made other socialist countries reluctant to follow in its 
footsteps in relaxing travel restrictions. Governments in East Berlin and Prague 
feared that the authorities in Warsaw would try to ease the country’s painful short-
ages by encouraging tourist commerce. It was hardly coincidental that on June 24, 
1976 – simultaneous with the announcement of price hikes in Poland – Czecho-
slovakia banned all private export of food, clothing and shoes, clearly fearing that 
with tourists from north of their borders vacuuming up industrial quantities of 
these goods, Poland’s shortages would soon spill over into their own country. At 
the same time the East German customs service introduced “rationed export of 
selected food products”. The restrictions were ostensibly aimed at citizens of all 
countries but there can be no doubt that they were introduced specifically to curb 
Polish appetites.1177 In July 1976, the Czechoslovak customs began to check Polish 
travelers thoroughly on their way back from Turkey and the Middle East, looking 
in particular for undeclared gold. Poles traveling to Turkey were also stopped and 
had their goods confiscated. There were even cases of automobile confiscation.1178 
The Polish side soon began to give as good as it got. From June 1977, the Polish 
customs also started to implement rigidly their own stringent regulations.1179
Such were the administrative responses to the commercialization of tourist 
trade, which expanded dynamically in the 1970s changing both in quantity and 
1176 AAN, GKKFiT, 18/5, fol. 1–2, 4, 9; ibid., 18/54, fol. 10.
1177 AAN, GUC, 31/1, fol. 85, 125–126.
1178 Ibid., fol. 58–59.
1179 AAN, Główny Komitet Turystyki (Main Tourism Committee, GKT), 10/100, fol. 
181. In border zones the authorities regularly monitored categories of goods sought 
by foreigners to such an extent that they stripped entire stocks of retail supplies. 
The results were often surprising. In 1976, East German citizens “imported” from 
Poland approximately 6 800 fan heaters per month; AAN, GUC, 31/1, fol. 155–157. 
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quality. In comparison with the 1960s, the number and type of participants mul-
tiplied dramatically, and tourists now ventured considerably further afield, with 
financial gain as their prevailing goal, responding instantly to the changing needs 
of the market and to any new administrative obstacles.
In the mid-1970s, an official dispatch of the Central Customs Office estimated 
that not more than 20 percent of travelers were genuine sight-seeing tourists. 
Rather than referring to the “tourist season”, it resignedly acknowledged the 
existence of a “commercial tourist season”, taking it for granted that the term 
“professional tourism” was self-explanatory.1180 Those prosecuted for smuggling 
were increasingly people with higher education and the involvement of entire 
families ceased to raise eyebrows.1181 Małgorzata Mazurek describes a typical 
case. In the early 1980s, a man from Bydgoszcz secured a temporary contract in 
the Soviet Union. This put him in a position to earn money by bringing back as 
contraband attractive goods, difficult to obtain in Poland. The opportunity meant 
a revolution in the family’s way of life. The younger generation spotted the com-
mercial opening and rose to the occasion. Now, the daughter, Jola, busied herself 
sewing fake “Levi’s”, and organizing their export to the Soviet Union, while her 
parents took over the child care of the grandchildren and helped to sell the con-
traband from the USSR in Bydgoszcz marketplaces.1182
Similar scenarios became commonplace throughout the 1970s. In Soviet, East 
German, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian customs reports listing Polish citizens 
who had broken custom regulations between 1976 and 1980, what stands out is 
the high percentage of women. The geographic dispersal of those apprehended 
in the act is also striking: they came from all over Poland, including small towns 
1180 M. Pietraszek, O niektórych problemach w ruchu osobowym, WC, 1974, no. 12, p. 16; 
A. Wantuch, Przestępczość celna i graniczna dewizowa w latach 1970–1973, ibid., no 
15, p. 7. Dariusz Stola tried to estimate the number of participants in tourist trading. 
He cautiously assumed that 30%–50% of tourists on group tours, 10%–20% of in-
dividual travelers, and 5–10% of athletes traveling to sports events were involved in 
tourist commerce. In the 1970s, this would have translated into “one to 2.3 million 
people during the particularly active year 1976–1978, and in less active years such as 
1973 and 1980, somewhere between 800 000 and 1.5 million annually. If we take into 
consideration the increase in trading trips in the late 1970s, the number was likely to 
have been in excess of three million each year”; D. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia?, p. 292.
1181 Na nasze konto…, “Sztandar Młodych” October 5, 1979; J. Kulak, O przemycie w Urzędzie 
Celnym Port Lotniczy w Warszawie – uwag kilka, WC, 1974, no. 15, p. 13; P. Worsnip, 
Die Polen schmuggeln jetzt Devisen, “Oberhessische Presse”, no. 93/April 21, 1978.
1182 M. Mazurek, Społeczeństwo kolejki. O doświadczeniach niedoboru 1945–1989, Warsza-
wa 2010, pp. 55–56.
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and villages.1183 Cross-border illicit commercial activities were no longer a way of 
supplementing a home budget but had become a main source of income. Writing 
in 1977 about Keleti railroad station in Budapest, a Polish journalist observed, 
“From every train arriving from Poland there spill out two or three hundred 
dealers. They make no attempt to pretend they have come to do some sight-seeing. 
They are quite brazen about having arrived in order to trade. Sophisticated ladies 
mingle with underage prostitutes, high-ranking gentlemen with callow youths. 
[…] They all have permanent lodgings close to the Keleti station, and their own 
pitches at the marketplace where they sell their specialized goods. Many of them 
approach this occupation professionally as their main source of income. They 
come regularly, on the same days of the week.”1184
Cross-border travel swelled into a mass phenomenon and became so diversi-
fied that Polish consular and custom authorities lost the ability to control it effec-
tively. In late 1972 it was not unusual for up to 2 000 passengers to board a train 
to Budapest – several times more than the permitted number. This rendered any 
effective supervision impossible.1185 At the end of the decade, the Polish consul in 
Moscow reported, “The diverse forms of tourism between Poland and the Soviet 
Union, the decentralization of travel and the continuously growing numbers of 
travelers make any kind of complex evaluation of the tourist phenomenon by 
the Polish consular agencies in the USSR impossible.”1186 Similar complaints were 
pouring in from Budapest, Sofia, Prague, and East Berlin.
The sheer volume of tourist traffic made it easier to dodge getting caught. The 
repeat-business traffickers to Hungary learned to return to Poland via Czechoslo-
vakia and East Germany, on the way destroying the compulsory border-crossing 
cards that had to be filled out at each border so as to enable the authorities to mon-
itor their route. They got back into the country by crossing the East German-Pol-
ish border at Görlitz / Zgorzelec or Frankfurt (Oder) / Słubice, and got away with 
showing only their ID, which would have raised suspicions anywhere else but at 
these extremely busy crossings.1187 After 1972, the institutionalization of smug-
gling became noticeable not only, as covered briefly in Chapter 4, on the west-
ern border of Poland – where smuggling groups appeared in towns on the Polish 
side of the border, and engaged local people often employed in East Germany1188 
1183 AAN, GUC, 23/76, 24/103, 24/108, 24/110, 24/125, 24/130, 24/137, 32/1.
1184 Komu majtki, komu krem, “Słowo Powszechne” August 3, 1977.
1185 M. Pietraszek, O niektórych problemach w ruchu osobowym, WC, 1974, no. 12, p. 16.
1186 AMSZ, DK, 6/83, w. 59. 
1187 AIPN, Biuro Paszportów MSW, 21052.
1188 Łańcuszek, WC, 1975, no. 17, p. 20.
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– but also on other cross-border routes. A cottage industry developed, in which 
the investor would provide the travelers with goods, tickets, and other necessities, 
subsequently cashing in on the transactions or the goods brought back. A Polish 
trafficker, an engineer by profession, who worked the route to Romania, explained 
to a German reporter how it all worked. During transit of the Soviet Union, in 
the vicinity of Gorodok, the last larger town on the way to Lvov, someone would 
activate the train’s emergency brake. Local Ukrainian dealers would already be 
waiting for the Poles in cars at the station, ready to spirit them away for a bout of 
brisk trading. Denim jeans brought from Poland would be swapped for goods in 
high demand in Romania. When the delayed train finally made it to Lvov, 30 km 
further on, the Polish traders – delivered to Lvov station by the Ukrainian accom-
plices – would already be waiting, ready to re-board the train.
They would then continue to Bucharest, where they traded the contraband ac-
quired in the USSR for jeans sold by Romanian Roma. On the way back, Romani-
an customs officers, plied with Kent cigarettes, which in Romania functioned as 
hard currency,1189 turned a blind eye to the luggage-laden travelers. More trading 
would take place in Lvov, selling, for example, jeans in order to buy gold. Back 
in Warsaw, the spoils of the sojourn were handed over to the “capo di tutti capi”. 
Such a trip, repeated two or three times a month ensured a decent standard of 
living. The introduction of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981 put an end 
to such enterprise and the Polish engineer was obliged to live off a “meager sala-
ry, hoping that the travel regulations would soon be liberalized again.”1190 Many 
others shared his hopes.
The above case study encapsulates neatly a number of factors typical of the 
tourist trade of the 1970s, which Polish traders developed and perfected in the 
subsequent decade. They would go on to gain a professional edge, expanding 
their geographic horizons and “go native” in the foreign trading outposts of their 
choice. Whereas in the 1960s an average Polish tourist seldom visited countries 
outside the European part of the Communist Bloc, in the 1970s capitalist Eu-
ropean countries such as Greece, Finland, and Sweden became the new normal, 
joining traditional destinations such as Austria, Italy and France. For the growing 
numbers of Polish tourist traffickers with a vehicle of their own, who now also 
covered Turkey and the Middle East, this expansion meant adjusting their trading 
strategies when passing through socialist states. A stopover in Lvov was popular: 
1189 On this phenomenon see: M. Kuczewski, Rumunia. Koniec złotej epoki, Warszawa 
2008, pp. 66–73.
1190 K. Stipsicy, Schmuggeln nach Plan, “Die Zeit”, no. 37/September 9, 1983; see: AIPN, 
Biuro Paszportów MSW, 21052.
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goods in demand in the Soviet Union such as jeans, wigs, and clothing in general 
were sold and articles purchased that sold well in Turkey, including sports equip-
ment and tools. The city of Lvov soon became a notable hub of illegal trading and 
the new term “Lvov transit” entered smuggling as well as diplomatic jargon. Other 
smugglers undertook multiple trips to Hungary and Romania, where they had 
prearranged to store goods to be sold in Turkey.1191 Increasingly more complex 
and profitable, in the 1980s, these operations escalated to a truly mass scale. 
Trading relations between socialist countries were becoming specialized. Po-
land continued to be a source of clothing, shoes, objects made out of crystal 
and food products (although by the mid-decade it could no longer be taken for 
granted that “any product from these categories” would find a buyer1192) but the 
objectives of the transactions changed. The proceeds from selling goods abroad 
were increasingly used to purchase currency; throughout the 1970s, hard cur-
rency played an increasingly important role in Poland. It made sense also to buy 
currencies of other socialist states, where the US dollar exchange rate against the 
domestic legal tender was usually lower than in Poland: American dollars bought 
with Hungarian forint, Czechoslovak koruna or East German marks were con-
siderably cheaper than when acquired with Polish zloty. As a result, a black mar-
ket in socialist currencies rapidly developed.1193 Poles now brought dollars or 
marks from Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany.1194
This black market was also stimulated by another factor: gold remained the 
ultimate means of storing value. The yellow metal could be bought at attractive 
prices in Vienna or in Trieste not only with the greenbacks smuggled out of Po-
land but also for Hungarian forints, Czechoslovak korunas or Bulgarian lev. The 
traffickers’ modus operandi was flexible and depended on the circumstances. For 
a while it was profitable to smuggle rubles into Hungary and swap them for for-
ints, which were then spent on gold bullion in Vienna.1195
On the one hand, the black market created a huge demand for socialist cur-
rencies in Poland, causing their prices to rise; on the other hand, it made visiting 
Poland more profitable for other Soviet Bloc citizens. During the 1970s, thanks 
1191 AIPN, Biuro Paszportów MSW, 21052, fol. 2–5. 
1192 J. Kulak, O przemycie w Urzędzie Celnym Port Lotniczy w Warszawie – uwag kilka, 
WC, 1974, no. 15, p. 12.
1193 K. Świątecka, Waluciarze, “Perspektywy” 1977, no. 49.
1194 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/511, 1978, fol. 1–21. By at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, 
hard currencies were brought in from the Soviet Union, usually obtained by Soviet 
currency dealers from Finnish tourists. A. Panow, Farcowszcziki, London 1971, p. 91.
1195 AIPN, 01521/2035, J. Oleś, Przemyt wartości dewizowych…, pp. 43–46, 54–56.
 367
to the as many as 30 000 Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Bulgars, Yugoslavs, and 
East Germans that descended on the Polish city of Nowy Targ each Thursday, 
the weekly market turned into one gigantic Bureau de Change. The visitors sold 
their own home currency at a black market rate that they found very advanta-
geous when shopping in Poland for locally produced goods such as food, textiles, 
auto parts, sport and audio equipment.1196 The socialist currencies had entered 
Poland illegally and – just as illegally – they were subsequently once more taken 
abroad by Poles.1197 In the 1970s, black market individual trade became an ac-
knowledged, and probably the principal, forum for relations between socialist 
societies. Yet, despite the large-scale turnover of goods and people, these bonds 
were not strong. For Poles, the closest links that they had established were in 
Budapest – by the 1970s the “traditional smuggling and transit center, the junc-
tion where the interests of criminals organizing international contraband from 
the Arab countries, Yugoslavia, Austria, Italy, and West Germany converged”.1198 
Poles accounted for no more than a fraction of those groups, in which they did 
not have a dominant role; they acted, rather, as middlemen and small retailers, 
albeit enjoying support among the local criminals”.1199 
At the turn of 1978 and 1979, two journalists – one from Poland and the other 
from Hungary – provided an interesting insight into this underworld. Swapping 
their country of origin for the duration of the experiment, they posed as dealers, 
the Hungarian playing the role of a Pole trading in Budapest, and the Pole imper-
sonating a Hungarian dealer in Katowice. Their observations revealed remarka-
ble similarities in the behavior of both trader cohorts. The active players, whether 
buyers or vendors, who operated in the railroad stations of the two cities, were 
only interested in profit; their trade and all their marketing strategies, including 
the sourcing of contacts, were at all times based on the timeless principle: sell 
1196 As frequently pointed out in 1978, between 1971 and 1976 the amounts spent by 
the statistical foreign tourist (including the Soviet Bloc) halved, despite the rising 
prices of tourist services. As an example, in 1977, in the Nowy Sacz voivodship 7 000 
Hungarians bought Polish currency in a state bank, even though as many as some 
600 000 tourists from that country had visited the region; J. Maziarski, Turystyczne 
dewizy, “Polityka”, no.16/April 22, 1978.
1197 AAN, GKT, 10/100, fol. 152.
1198 Ibid.
1199 Ibid. See: Ujawniono i zlikwidowano, TL, no. 229/September 29, 1979; Koniec prze-
mytniczo-dewizowego biznesu, TL, February 7–8, 1981. See: Komu majtki, komu krem, 
“Słowo Powszechne” August 3, 1977; K. Świątecka, Waluciarze, “Perspektywy” 1977, 
no. 49; P. Worsnip, Die Polen schmuggeln jetzt Devisen, “Oberhessische Presse”, no. 93/
April 21, 1978.
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high, buy low. The price was all that mattered.1200 We can safely assume that this 
Polish-Hungarian illicit trade scene was no exception within the Warsaw Pact.
9.4  The 1980s: “The Phoenicians Are on the Move!”
Whereas the 1970s had brought rapid, if still evolving, development of the tourist 
trade in socialist countries, the 1980s were truly revolutionary. At the beginning 
of the decade, the awakened social and consumption aspirations of Soviet Bloc 
citizens encountered formidable economic and political barriers; the events of 
August 1980 – a memorable month that made an indelible mark on the history of 
the country, with its workers’ strikes on the coast that led to political agreements 
with the government – had repercussions beyond the borders of Poland. The 
markers of that decade were defined also for tourist trading, by political events 
such as the introduction of Martial Law in Poland and the coming to power of 
Mikhail Gorbachev, the architect of the perestroika that was to culminate in the 
demise of the Soviet Union. The decade ended with the momentous year 1989, 
which changed fundamentally the political map and economy of the region. In 
Poland, a breakthrough for tourism was a harbinger of the political transforma-
tions to come. From 1989, Poles could keep their passports at home. This may 
seem trivial to a Westerner, who naturally takes for granted taking possession of 
his or her passport as an identity document that should at all times remain with 
its rightful bearer. Yet, in socialist Poland, this precious document was deemed 
the property of the state and was only ever released for the specified period of 
travel, to be returned promptly to the appropriate administrative office – which 
effectively precluded unauthorized travel abroad. With the dawn of new freedom, 
it came as no surprise that in 1989 three times as many Poles went abroad as had 
done so in the previous year – 6 924 000 in 1988 and 19 313 000 in 1989. The 
changes were not only quantitative but also qualitative. Whereas at the beginning 
of the decade the government had had to deal with the issue of tourist trading, 
by the end of the 1980s it was faced with a huge, highly specialized commercial 
activity that involved considerable capital and increasingly extended beyond the 
borders not only of the Soviet Bloc but of Europe as well.1201
1200 K. Horváth, Jak się nie podoba mogę zawołać policję!, “Kultura”, no. 4/January 28, 1979; 
M. Listkiewicz, Cipu jest?, ibid.; see: H. Jankowski, Okazyjnie od Polaków, “Polityka”, 
no. 3/January 20, 1979.
1201 M. Irek, Der Schmugglerzug Warschau–Berlin–Warschau. Materialien einer Feld-
forschung, Berlin 1998, pp. 8–9. 
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In the summer of 1980 the Polish authorities introduced “Smuggler” – an 
electronic system intended to “collect data on violations of customs and curren-
cy border regulations”1202 that reflected symbolically the extent of the changes 
in cross-border activities since the 1970s. Initially, in the following few years, the 
scope of observation was limited as the economic and political crisis mounting 
in Poland in the second half of the 1970s prompted the neighboring countries 
to introduce restrictive customs regulations. However, the events triggered by 
the strikes in the Polish cities on the Baltic coast in August 1980 brought about 
decisive, systemic restrictions on travel. The East German authorities were the 
first to react, on October 30, 1980 in a unilateral decision suspending passport- 
and visa-free traffic across the Poland-GDR border, although individual Polish 
tourists continued to be free to cross if equipped with official invitations – a 
document executed in a consulate by a named individual or business guaran-
teeing to take care of the Pole in question. At the same time the East German 
government launched a propaganda campaign aimed at discouraging trips to 
Poland by its own citizens.
Of the other socialist states, only Czechoslovakia unilaterally suspended, on 
December 4, 1981, free travel. Earlier, anxious to avoid being infected with the 
“Polish virus” of social disorder and afraid that the Poles who no longer had 
shopping access to the GDR would now swamp Czechoslovak stores, Prague 
looked for other ways of shutting the borders. In the fall of 1980, the Czecho-
slovak authorities imposed limits on currency exchange with Poland. Both sides 
pledged to undertake efforts aimed at limiting the “transportation of goods for 
black market purposes”.1203 Prague, following in the footsteps of East Berlin, dis-
couraged its own citizens from visiting Poland. The official Czechoslovak propa-
ganda created an atmosphere of fear, intended to keep potential travelers out of 
Poland where they were told they would be confronted with strikes, and unable 
to buy food or gas – all actually not far from the truth.1204 In December 1980, 
the government implemented, and proceeded to enforce strictly, unusually harsh 
customs regulations. State enterprises were no longer allowed to fund business 
1202 AIPN, MSW II, Passport Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs (Biuro Paszportów 
MSW), 104/778, Central Custom Office (GUC) to Voivodship Police Headquarters 
(KW MO), March 17, 1981.
1203 AMSZ, Departament Polityczny, 32/83, bundle 1, Notes on talks between Polish 
and Czechoslovak delegation on passenger traffic between October 30, 1980 and 
November 6, 1980.
1204 AMSZ, DK, 22/87, bundle11, Consulate General of the Polish People’s Republic in 
Ostrava, report for 1981. 
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trips to Poland and all advertising of trips to Poland ceased. Meanwhile Czechs 
were encouraged to visit other socialist countries instead – so successfully that 
travel agencies could not keep up with the demand for travel to the Soviet Un-
ion, Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany or Romania. As a result, in the summer of 
1981, only 5% of the expected tourists from Czechoslovakia arrived in Poland.1205
Similarly, other countries of the Bloc found ways to gradually reduce tour-
ism to and from Poland. The Hungarian authorities drastically cut funding for 
foreign exchange with Poland, the resultant cash shortages curtailing not only 
the numbers of individual tourists but also those using state travel agencies.1206 
Although the propaganda in Hungary was not as aggressive as in Czechoslo-
vakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union, it nevertheless discouraged many 
Hungarians from choosing Poland as their destination. The rising cost of liv-
ing was another contributory factor in discouraging Hungarians from traveling 
in general. In 1981 there was a 74.8% fall in the number of tourist arrivals in 
Poland from Hungary in compared with 1979 and a 68.2% fall in comparison 
with 1980.1207 The Soviet authorities initially limited organized travel (in 1980, 
as many as 57 “friendship trains” arrived in the USSR from Poland whereas in 
1981 – only two1208) and between May and June 1981, individual trips to and 
from Poland were limited by the cautious rationing of invitations and permits for 
visiting Poland. Transit regulations were observed with unprecedented scrutiny, 
which limited Polish citizens’ visits to the Balkans.1209 The only country to receive 
more Poles in 1981 than before was Romania. This can be attributed not so much 
to the liberalism of its authorities as to the sums owed by Romania to Poland, 
which were settled through the medium of tourist services. Like other socialist 
countries, Romania limited access to its own currency thus reducing the number 
of visitors from Poland.1210
The imposition of Martial Law in Poland on December 13, 1981 effectively 
stopped Polish cross-border traffic. If from the Polish government’s perspective, 
1205 AAN, GKT, 10/53, fol. 119–120; AMSZ, DK, 22/87, bundle 12, Polish Embassy in 
Czechoslovakia, Consular Department, report for 1981.
1206 AAN, GKT, 10/100, fol. 8.
1207 AAN, GKT, 10/102, fol. 58–59.
1208 AMSZ, DK, 19/91, bundle 20, Consulate General of the Polish People’s Republic in 
Kiev to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 13, 1983; AAN, GKT, 10/100, fol. 35.
1209 AMSZ, 19/91, bundle 20, Consulate General of the Polish People’s Republic in Kiev 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 15, 1983; AMSZ, DK, 22/87, bundle 7, Polish 
Consulate General in Kiev , report for 1981.
1210 AAN, GKT, 10/100, fol. 39.
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military rule had closed the borders with the socialist countries only temporar-
ily, for Berlin, Prague and Moscow the measures provided a convenient pretext 
for cutting off travel to and from Poland for the foreseeable future; little wonder 
then that the Polish authorities undertook relatively quickly measures to reinstate 
tourist exchanges with the socialist countries, both as relief for its citizens from 
the rigors of Martial Law and to provide Poles access to well-stocked stores at a 
time of hardship. “In view of the fact that travel to the capitalist states has stopped,” 
the argument went, “widening the possibilities for travel to the socialist countries 
[…] will be a factor in calming the mood in Poland and will help citizens to satis-
fy their social needs.”1211 The measure was intended to drain some of the savings 
accumulated by society and at the same time to protect the almost completely 
depleted Polish internal market. The Polish authorities planned to ease the pres-
sure on the consumer market in Poland by shifting the onus of satisfying demand 
on to the better-supplied socialist countries and “allowing tourists to bring back 
goods in short supply in Poland.” This aim was both deliberate and explicit.1212
In the assessment of the Polish Passport Bureau, by May 1982 there was no 
obstacle to the resumption of individual travel to the socialist countries, espe-
cially in view of the fact that none of the bilateral agreements had been formal-
ly rescinded but had been merely unilaterally suspended. However, the socialist 
partner countries voiced strong opposition; they were fearful that traveling Poles 
would bring with them democratic ferment and that Polish shopping sprees 
would destabilize their own fragile domestic markets. None of the fraternal so-
cialist states countries was therefore in a hurry to reinstate the formerly liberal 
border regulations. The Soviet authorities allowed only organized tourism con-
trolled by political, social, and professional organizations.1213 Czechoslovak bor-
der control at times went as far as breaking international law by refusing entry 
to travelers with valid passports and invitations.1214 Traffic across the Oder and 
the Neisse rivers was maintained only by a trickle of Polish workers employed in 
East Germany. Hungary, increasingly more interested in attracting tourists from 
the West, was no longer interested in hosting large number of visitors from the 
impecunious East. In an interview with Der Spiegel, the Hungarian Secretary for 
Tourism stated firmly: “Hungary does not subscribe to socialist tourism”.1215
1211 Ibid., fol. 10.
1212 Ibid.; AAN, GKT, 10/26, fol. 68. 
1213 AMSZ, DK, 22/87, bundle 10, Consular Department of the Polish Embassy in Mos-
cow, report for 1982; ibid., bundle 8, Consulate General in Leningrad, report for 1982.
1214 AMSZ, 19/81, bundle 19, Report “Ruch osobowy z CSRS”, June 27, 1982.
1215 AAN, GKT, 10/103, fol. 104.
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For East German, Czechoslovak and Hungarian citizens, the attractiveness of 
Poland also waned. Before 1981, it had relied not so much on the beauty of the 
landscape and gourmet cuisine but on providing vacationing that was relatively 
free of state interference and, above all offered profitable shopping. Now that 
the Polish retail market was virtually exhausted – and attractive goods such as 
cosmetics, audio equipment and shoes were nowhere to be found, not to men-
tion the now much stricter customs control – the commercial appeal of travel to 
Poland declined rapidly.1216 In fact, 1982 was the first and only year since the late 
1950s in which the problem of illicit trading did not loom large in Polish police 
and consular reports.
The problem was indeed insignificant but it did not go away completely. Com-
bined with the economic crisis in Poland, restrictions on cross-border traffic in-
spired new strategies in individual cross-border trade in socialist states. Just as 
in the free market economy, the profit motive proved capable of over-riding all 
obstacles, with the players zeroing in on the right object and opportunity to make 
a trade – the reduction in the flow of illicitly imported goods combined with the 
increased risk helped to raise profit margins. Among the articles smuggled from 
Poland by Czechoslovak citizens between November 1982 and April 1983 and list-
ed in Central Customs Office (GUC) reports, there were audio/TV equipment and 
miscellaneous items such as glasses, leather belts, and Christmas decorations but 
also Polish zloty, Czechoslovak koruna, and hard currency.1217 In the absence of 
reliable sources we can only speculate that a large proportion of the articles for sale 
had not been purchased in official stores but acquired through private networks.
Under Martial Law, the character of cross-border trade changed. Given that 
the internal market in Poland was in a catastrophic state, it made more commer-
cial sense to smuggle in goods rather than currency. Until the lifting of Martial 
Law in 1983 when tourism began to flourish again, cross-border trade was the 
domain of Polish contract workers, especially those employed in East Germany. 
For a considerable number of guest workers, a job in the GDR was above all a 
source of capital to finance the trading that was their staple income. The profits 
were enormous (see chapter 4.4) and Poles working in the GDR were develop-
ing highly specialized security strategies, among them – “partnerships” which 
increased the safety of the transactions, with accomplices hiding the goods in 
transit on trains or bribing railroad employees. Such strategies were so effective 
that in 1987 the number of identified smuggling cases where the perpetrators 
1216 AAN, GKT, 10/55, fol. 64–66.
1217 AIPN, MSW II, 104/265, fol. 1–12.
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could not be apprehended rose to 63.6%. The losses might be great but the ad-
vantages of working in East Germany – even greater.1218
It is relatively easy to assess the volume of trade by looking at turnover and 
profit or even at the severity of legal sanctions; it is more difficult to assess the 
level of commercial penetration of markets abroad, including those of the socialist 
countries, or of the steering and stimulating of demand, which led to the creation 
of shared areas of business activity and niche markets. Contract workers were in an 
ideal position for such a commercial assault: they had spent a considerable amount 
of time in the country in question; meeting the locals daily and were able to build 
informal relations, often based on economic need, with the local community.1219 
When in the first half of the 1980s the smuggling of Polish silver to East Germany 
suddenly became the trade du jour, mixed groups of Poles and East Germans who 
specialized in such transactions sprang up almost overnight.1220
It was not only Poles working long-term in socialist countries that were able 
to bond with local communities. For a while there had been other groups of 
Poles that had economic ties with Budapest, East Berlin, and Lvov. As long as 
travel was relatively easy, these ties remained fairly loose; however, as soon as, in 
December 1981, the borders were closed, Polish drifters living, often illegally, in 
socialist states were forced by circumstances to cooperate more closely with local 
communities. Out of choice, they settled in locations that promised business op-
portunities without excessive exposure to risk. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, a group of some 60 or 70 such Poles lived in 
Budapest, divided into the “Keleti people” – so known as they tended to congre-
gate on the square near the Keleti railway station in Budapest, where trains from 
Poland arrived – and the “city people”. The former operated among Polish tourists, 
the latter had connections with local criminal gangs.1221 With time, the geography 
of such “free trade zones” in socialist states changed. On the one hand, their lo-
cation depended upon evolving trading strategies and trade routes; on the other, 
1218 M. Olszewski, Przestępczość celna i graniczna dewizowa w 1987 r., WC, 1988, no. 41, 
p. 22. Import policies targeted specific products. In the late 1980s, Simson motorbikes 
were popular; the customs in Zgorzelec often came across more than 200 per day; 
WC, 1989, no. 45, p. 14.
1219 For literary rendition see: H. Sekulski, Przebitka, Olsztyn 2001.
1220 AIPN, KG MO, 35/154, fol. 17–18. For a kilogram of silver, the vendor would be paid 
more than 6 000 marks net, which at the black market rate yielded between 250 and 
350 000 zloty. The Polish black market price of gold was at the time approximately 
80 000 zloty per kilo. 
1221 Rzucają cień na polskich turystów, ŻW, no. 139/June 28, 1982.
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there was a growing conflict between the aspiration to consumption of society 
and official regulations. Although in the second half of the 1980s the liberaliza-
tion of travel regulations resulted in literally millions of people joining the trade 
routes, the freedom of movement was nevertheless limited by the requirement 
for tourists to carry “currency books” that were an official record of all legally ac-
quired socialist currency in their possession. Moreover, rather than notes or coins, 
state-owned tourist agencies sold tourists talons or vouchers nominated in a spe-
cific currency. For those tourists who wanted to get their hands on foreign cash it 
was not unusual to apply for a transit visa to, say, Bulgaria or Turkey. Having got 
one, they would linger for months or sometimes years in Hungary, not bothering 
to proceed to their destination, busy organizing trading trips to the neighboring 
countries. Thus the Poles who lived in the town of Szolnok on the river Tisza 
operated as middlemen in the bulk trade in coffee, buying it in Vienna for $3.50 
per kilo and reselling in the city of Timisoara in Romania for twice as much. The 
profit was several hundred dollars per transaction. The average salary in Poland 
averaged between $22 and $32 per month (at the black market exchange rate). 
This was a no-brainer. Hungarians rated Polish middlemen as good customers 
who rented rooms, frequented local restaurants and used local transport. Their il-
legal presence was tolerated as long as they refrained from trading in currency.1222
Highest in the pecking order of Polish currency black marketeers in the so-
cialist countries were the dealers who lived in a Bucharest hotel called Dunavea, 
situated close to the Bucharest North (Gara de Nord) train station – the largest 
in Romania, which played a crucial role in their illicit operations. By the second 
half of the 1980s, stores in Romania had even less to offer than those in Poland, 
and Polish trains in transit to Bulgaria became retail outlets on wheels. Once 
they had sold their contraband to Romanian peddlers, the passengers would end 
up with wallets full of Romanian lei, for which they had little use. This is where 
the Polish money changers stepped into action: faced with such a perfect captive 
market, they were able to exchange – at desultory rates – the tourists’ lei for hard 
currency, which they went on to resell at a regular black market rate to Romanian 
money dealers.1223
1222 Janusz Nowakowski to the author, January 26, 2005.
1223 Janusz Nowakowski to the author, December 27, 2004. Polish money changers had 
been active in socialist countries since the 1970s. In Hungary, Romania, and Bulgar-
ia they were under the surveillance of Polish agencies. “In Bulgaria alone,” an MO 
functionary reported in 1979, “we have conducted 400 preventive interviews. We 
made arrests and confiscated illegally acquired goods”; Na nasze konto…, “Sztandar 
Młodych”, October 5, 1979.
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The cost of living continued to rise in all the countries of the Soviet Bloc, with 
signs of impending economic crisis visible even in such model socialist states as 
East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Although the aspirations of con-
sumer were leveling out within the Bloc and were increasingly influenced by 
Western standards, disparities in the supply and price of the desired goods re-
mained and were enormous. Unofficial trade between the countries of the War-
saw Pact began to flourish again immediately after the lifting of Martial Law 
and, with it, the travel restrictions. Momentous political transformations in the 
socialist Bloc were favorable to commercial activity not generated by the state. 
Grass-roots cross-border trade spread and flourished – from the Adriatic to the 
Baltic, from the Elbe to Vladivostok.
In the latter half of the 1980s, Poland once again became a desirable destina-
tion on the economic map of the Bloc. Entry into the country was easy, official 
prices were low and, in non-official outlets, there was an abundance of attractive 
goods. The Polish authorities now acquiesced in the existence of numerous pri-
vate producers (including many new Polonia* firms); this policy helped to make 
Poland an important supplier for the countries of the Bloc of goods known in 
the 19th century as “Nuremberg products” – accessories, toys, and clothing, which 
the key industries in Brno or Dresden were unable to manufacture at the time. 
In the 1980s, Poland established for itself within the Soviet Bloc the position 
held in today’s global economy by China. In the second half of the decade, the 
country extended its trading routes to India and the Far East – in the mid-1980s, 
Polish Airlines LOT opened new connections with Dubai, Singapore, Bangkok, 
and Taiwan – and so Poles also became middlemen for Asian products such as 
clothing and computers.1224 A Polish journalist commented at the time, “A Polish 
trader can afford to sell cheap. It makes sense to an East German customer to buy 
1224 M. Olszewski, Przestępczość celna i graniczna dewizowa w 1987 r., WC, 1988, no. 41, 
p. 23. See: W. Markiewicz, Nasz człowiek w Stambule, “Polityka”, no. 44/November 2, 
1985; P. Waromski, Pan Jasiek w Bangkoku, “Polityka”, no. 29/June 20, 1985; A. Person, 
Złota trasa, “Polityka”, no. 13/March 28, 1987; Dzień przemytnika, “Kurier Polski”, July 
28–30, 1989. One could do business in Japan selling even classical music records; 
Bazariada wykształciucha, “Gazeta Wyborcza”, July 11–12, 2009.
 *“Polonia” is the Polish term for the Polish diaspora outside of the country. From 
1979, foreign capital was allowed into Poland in order to be used for business 
start-ups in selected branches of production. Since the majority of these companies 
(of which by 1988 there were more than 700, with 80 000 employees) were set up 
by Polish emigrants, they were known as Polonia businesses, and produced clothes, 
cosmetics, and food. 
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goods that would cost him twice as much back home, as well as to pay over the 
odds for things that are unavailable in the GDR, such as Polish golden dress belts 
that are very popular with the fashion-conscious German women. Polish jeans 
that carry Western brand tags even though they are manufactured near Łódź 
also sell quickly. Equally, electronic watches made by Polonia firms are in high 
demand. […] And moreover, Polish traders can supply their clients with goods 
made to order.”1225
As soon as the Polish borders opened to a wider public in 1983, the sub-
ject of tourist commerce returned to the headlines and again began to feature 
in police and diplomatic reports. The dealers now came in two varieties: the 
stick-in-the-mud ones, who continued to use the labor-intensive and not very 
profitable old smuggling methods, going back to the 1950s, and those who had 
evolved with the times and worked out new effective, foolproof ploys. The former 
relied on buying large amounts of cheap, basic products, thus risking attracting 
the attention of customs officers and likely confiscation of the goods. The latter 
had the foresight to invest in the safety and convenience of their operations – an 
approach that in spite of a higher capital outlay improved profit margins. One 
such operation, used in the mid-1980s, went as follows: Polish dealers would buy 
video cassette recorders in Poland – legally, with hard currency. There was no 
prohibition on goods such as these, purchased in state shops, being taken abroad, 
so the dealers now could – and did – take the VCRs quite legally, where – now 
entirely illegally – they would proceed to sell them in Budapest and Debrecen at 
a 100% profit.1226 It also paid to bring hard currency to Hungary – again a per-
fectly legal operation, if superficially expensive, since in Poland Western curren-
cies were twice as expensive. Nevertheless, once in Hungary, they could be sold 
on the black market, strategically to a known dealer. Forints acquired in such 
transactions were then used to buy luxury items that yielded significant profit 
when sold in Poland.1227
In the mid-1980s, the improved supplies in Polish stores and the deteriorat-
ing supplies in the stores in other countries of the Bloc, combined with price 
and currency exchange rates that were advantageous for foreigners, made Poland 
an attractive shopping destination. Visitors from Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were well-informed about what was and what 
was not available on the Polish market; equally, they were aware of what would 
1225 W. Faściszewski, Przemytnik, “Sprawy i Ludzie” 1984, no. 4.
1226 AIPN, KG MO, 35/185, fol. 206.
1227 J.S. Mac, Znajomi z Dworca Wschodniego, PiŻ, 1984, no. 17.
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sell in their own country. Often, they made no effort to act like tourists.1228 In the 
second half of the 1980s Hungarians, citizens of Yugoslavia and Czechoslova-
kia descended en masse on the cities of southern Poland, stripping store shelves 
bare, and frequently got as far as Warsaw. Each nationality had slightly different 
trading strategies. Hungarians were now came mostly with goods and brought 
their own currency less frequently than they had in the 1970s. “The experienced 
ones go to the ‘dens’, i.e. to the dealers that they already know, and barter goods 
for goods. By a conservative estimate, in Katowice alone there are several dozen 
such ‘dens’ where goods change hands efficiently and the “tourists” get straight 
back on the express train home the same day. They take with them anything and 
everything – anything they can lay their hands on. Shoes are very popular but 
only those of lesser quality, bought in sales, and the truly hideous items bought 
in private stores. They will pay top dollar for T-shirts with ‘Made in France’ labels 
produced in… Częstochowa.”1229
The strategies of the Yugoslavs were more varied. Some brought to Poland goods 
such as cheap electronic watches that they had bought in Vienna; others brought 
hard currency, which they immediately sold to Polish money-dealers. They took 
back silver, Soviet Bloc currencies, which they sold on in Vienna and […] men’s 
suits. Bytom, the Polish producer of men’s suits calculated that in 1986 foreigners 
accounted for a quarter of its revenue, 100 out of 400 million zloty. Their most 
expensive suit, which at the black market exchange rate cost approximately twenty 
US dollars in Katowice, sold easily in Belgrade and Zagreb for a hundred.1230
Although higher in comparison with those in Hungary and Yugoslavia, retail 
prices in Poland were still attractive enough that visitors from those countries 
bought in Poland “everything they could: wool and ribbons, buttons and lingerie. 
They buy twenty and more item of underwear, blouses, and sweaters. […] For-
eign tourists are also buying shoes, auto parts, electronic equipment, electric 
tools, and fabric.”1231 Comments such as this were common: “A Hungarian in 
Katowice or a Yugoslav citizen in Krakow is the mirror image of the Pole at the 
Keleti railroad station in Budapest. […] The sight of a Pole wearing a fox fur coat 
and a hat in the middle of summer at a Budapest marketplace is as common as 
that of a Hungarian laden with bags groaning with goods to be taken home.”1232 
Indeed, this reciprocity of smuggling was reflected in the statistics. In 1987, more 
1228 Turyści zagraniczni na “handlowych szlakach” w Polsce, TL, no. 170 /July 24, 1987.
1229 D. Tresenberg, Przemyt lub słotę, “Panorama”, August 9, 1987.
1230 Ibid., Na zarobek do Polski, “Polityka”, no. 11/March 16, 1985.
1231 Turyści zagraniczni na “handlowych szlakach” w Polsce, TL, no. 170/July 24, 1987.
1232 D. Tresenberg, Przemyt lub słotę, “Panorama”, August 9, 1987.
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than half (51.7%) of customs and currency offences in Poland were committed 
by Poles, against 22.4% by foreigners; 25.9% were recorded as the work of uni-
dentified perpetrators and it is impossible to fathom out how many of these may 
have been Polish. Nevertheless, compared with previous years, the percentage 
of Poles charged with such offences decreased, while the percentage of foreign 
nationals, and in particular those from other Soviet Bloc countries, rose. For ex-
ample 1 015 Yugoslav citizens were charged with criminal offences (an increase 
of 24.5% compared with 1986), 301 Hungarians (59%), and 170 Czechoslovak 
citizens (67%) were also held criminally responsible.1233 In 1987 the Hungarian 
customs authorities initiated 5 400 investigations against Poles – twice as many 
as in 1986.1234 
Border crossing in Świeck – “Operation Barrier” designed to make smuggling goods out of 
Poland impossible, 9 April 1989. Photo: Polish Press Agency (PAP).




If Soviet Bloc citizens had come to the conclusion that “smuggling makes you 
rich”, so had the socialist authorities, going increasingly after foreigners, espe-
cially those involved in large-scale operations. Thus, the Czechoslovak customs 
service paid close attention to smuggling taking place on the transit routes be-
tween Austria and Poland and repeatedly made a killing on the confiscated con-
traband.1235 In the mid-1980s, customs officials in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary 
and the Soviet Union – faced with increased transit traffic to Greece and Turkey 
and other destinations that involved higher value smuggled goods, gold, and 
currency – followed the Czechoslovak example. A wave of protest from hapless 
Polish would-be smugglers forced Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal 
with the problem,1236 especially since, as a knock-on effect, the state treasury had 
suffered significant losses as a consequence of having “lost the hard currency 
profits of our banks and Pewex stores as well as the loss of the tax revenue and 
customs charges due”. The Polish authorities urged travelers to carefully read and 
fill out transit declaration forms as well as use bank wire transfers and direct air 
mail rather than risk carrying vulnerable items across the border.1237
In the 1980s, in a striking development, Soviet citizens joined in the unofficial 
trade across the Soviet Bloc’s borders. Western consumerism and its style icons 
had reached the USSR, fueling demand for outward symbols of social status 
such as clothes and accessories, yet, until the end of the decade, opportunities for 
cross-border contacts for Soviet nationals were limited; this naturally enhanced 
the role of, mostly Polish, middlemen. It was much easier for Poles to establish 
trade contacts in Lvov, Grodno, Minsk and Moscow than in East Berlin and 
Prague, if only because Russian was a compulsory subject on the primary school 
national curriculum in Poland at the time and the language became the lingua 
franca of the Soviet Bloc. The transit routes running across the Soviet Ukraine to 
Hungary, Romania, the Balkans and Turkey were an important trade-booster for 
unofficial commerce.
The Soviet Union was a very attractive market for Polish tourists and 
in 1982 even the carefully vetted (for instance on the grounds of their Party 
1235 According to the Polish consul in Ostrava in 1981, “In the previous year, in our con-
sular region alone, the value of the confiscated property [5 532 675 korunas – JK], 
which should have become property of the State Treasury, would have covered all 
hard currency expenses of the Polish Consulate in Ostrava for five years”; AMSZ, 
DK, 25/84, bundle 10, Consulate General of Poland in Ostrava, report for 1980. See: 
ibid., 22/87, bundle 3, Consulate General of Poland in Bratislava, report for 1983. 
1236 AAN, GKT, 10/27, fol. 27, 47.
1237 Ibid., fol. 28.
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membership) participants of organized trips to the USSR engaged in illicit 
commercial activities.1238 That same year, the Polish consul in Kiev suggested an 
in-depth analysis of previously used smuggling practices in order to “prevent a 
spontaneous rebirth of the ‘Lvov transit’ with all its negative characteristics and 
consequences.”1239 The consulate’s concerns proved prescient, and within a year 
Lvov had reclaimed its commercial position. In 1983, according to the Soviet 
authorities, more than 430 000 Polish citizens in 75 740 cars transited the city. 
“[Ukrainian] comrades,” the Polish consul in Kiev noted, “agree with us that 
crime and fraud especially that involving hard currency and custom violations 
are down to no more than a few thousand people, who have turned tourism into 
an excellent source of exceptionally high profits. They have contacts and part-
ners in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Visa and Registration 
Department (Oddział Wiz i Rejestracji, OWiR) in Lvov maintains that they had 
imposed sanctions on three to four times as many of their own citizens and that 
the penalties were tougher.”1240
The clamp-down on black market participants failed to curb the illegal opera-
tions, particularly since the approach of the Soviet authorities was not consistent. 
On August 23, 1986 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued 
an Act enhancing legal measures against illegal profits, including those derived 
from trade. However, several days later the Council of Ministers of the USSR 
made a regulation making travel in and out of the country much easier. From 
January 1, 1987 the regulations were further relaxed (for example, the limit on 
the number of border crossings permitted per person was abolished). Needless 
to say, tourist numbers shot up. In 1986 more than 800 000 Poles crossed the 
Soviet borders – more than all other visitors from socialist countries combined, 
including 200 000 from the GDR, 120 000 from Hungary, 100 000 from Romania, 
166 000 from Czechoslovakia, 70 000 from Bulgaria, 4 000 from Mongolia, and 
1238 AMSZ, DK, 22/87, bundle 10, Consulate General in Minsk, report for 1982. Visitors 
from Poland showed a pragmatic approach to ideology. “The comrades from Lvov 
told us with profound disproval about smugglers and other law-breaking people who, 
when caught red-handed, showed their Party membership cards and professed their 
devotion to socialism and Polish-Soviet friendship in order to ensure more lenient 
treatment”; AMSZ, 19/91, bundle 20, Consulate General in Kiev to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, July 20, 1984.
1239 AMSZ, DK, 22/87, bundle 7, Consulate-General in Kiev, report for 1982. 
1240 AMSZ, 19/91, bundle 20, Polish Consulate-General in Kiev to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, July 20, 1984.
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2 500 from Cuba.1241 In 1989, the number of visitors to the Soviet Union doubled 
and the number of transit travelers tripled.1242
Polish domination of the Soviet tourist routes was not only quantitative, 
but also qualitative. “Interestingly, back then in the 1980s,” recalled one of the 
participants of trading trips to the USSR, “I never met en route Czechs or Hun-
garians, and traders from other socialist countries only rarely.”1243 The Poles 
were quick to find common commercial ground with the Ukrainians, Belaru-
sians and Russians and soon diversified. Some concentrated on trading locally, 
and others focused on transit operations; there were also those who combined 
both strategies. Between 1987 and 1988, Polish trading operations developed 
to such extent that the authorities in the Soviet republics bordering Poland 
began to consider methods of legalizing the phenomenon and channeling it 
into official outlets. Initially, as mentioned in the chapter on the geography of 
the black market, there had been attempts to introduce free market principles, 
with organized marketplaces in Vilna, Zaslawye near Minsk, Brest and Grodno 
among others.1244 These were soon closed down and replaced with official komis 
stores.1245 This move did not prove to be a serious obstacle for the population 
of the trading cities, who soon developed individual commercial relations with 
the visitors from the West. “We should emphasize,” the Polish consul in Minsk 
wrote in a dispatch, “that Polish trading tourists are not deterred by any obsta-
cles or new regulations limiting the volume of goods brought to the country 
nor do they care about the attitude of the local administration. Recently, our 
tourists have been trading religious objects and anything else that will sell”.1246
The new strategies, presented above, tried and tested by Polish “tourists” in 
Hungary in the 1980s, mentioned earlier, were quickly adopted by those trav-
eling to and through the Soviet Union. Poles now planned their trips carefully 
and had a detailed business plan. Little was left to spontaneity and chance. Deal-
ers who were after quick, big-time profit no longer engaged in time-consuming 
1241 Ibid., Consul General in Kiev, note on the meeting in the Consular Department of 
the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 20, 1987.
1242 AMSZ, DK, 29/97, bundle 20, Consular Department of the Polish Embassy in Mos-
cow, report for 1989.
1243 R. Geremek, Pokój, przyjaźń, dieńgi, “Życie”, June 3–4, 2000. See: M. Fish, L. Edwards, 
Shadow trading by international tourists in the Soviet Union, “Journal of Criminal 
Justice” 17, 1989, no. 5, pp. 417–421.
1244 AMSZ, DK, 29/97, bundle 20, Consulate-General in Minsk, report for 1989. 
1245 AMSZ, DK, 21/93, bundle 5, Consular Agency in Lvov, report for 1987. 
1246 AMSZ, DK, 29/97, bundle 20, Consulate-General in Minsk, report for 1989. 
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chain trading which involved tedious, risky, and often outright dangerous deals, 
buying and selling stuff in countries en route. From 1986, they no longer took 
to Turkey and Bulgaria small items to trade but instead carried hard currency 
legally bought in Polish banks and goods purchased legally at hard currency 
stores. Even when they did buy en route items for sale in the destination coun-
try, they were in modest quantities so as not to complicate the procedure of 
border crossing. “Four or five cars leave Poland for Bulgaria with travel vouchers 
valid for several days,” Przemyśl policemen reported to Warsaw Headquarters. 
“Upon arrival, the visitors busy themselves establishing contacts with prospec-
tive local buyers. One or two from the group in possession of entry visas for 
Turkey (these can be obtained in the Turkish consulate […] in Bulgaria or in 
Poland) go there in order to buy merchandise. After coming back from Turkey, 
they sell all the goods in Bulgaria. The average load per car is 300 pairs of pants 
and jackets. […] In Turkey, the wholesale price for a pair of pants is five dollars; 
in Bulgaria they are sold, also wholesale, for 14 or 15 dollars a pair. All in all, the 
profit on selling in Bulgaria 300 pairs of pants and jackets brought from Turkey 
is 2 100 dollars.”1247
Compared with average Polish wages, calculated at the black market exchange 
rate, these gains were enormous. All the same, this was no more than petty retail 
trade, with a small turnover and relatively small profits when compared with 
the operations of the true wholesalers. For example, during the course of a few 
months in 1989, one person was able to transport from Poland to the Soviet Un-
ion 304 desktop computers. In the same year, the Polish passengers on a single 
Black Sea cruise brought to the Soviet Union from Turkey 100 thousand pairs 
of jeans, 700 000 beauty products, 500 000 meters of fabric, 500 000 electronic 
watches, and four tons of chewing gum. The value of all these goods, probably 
only a fraction of what did reach Poland, was estimated by the Soviet customs 
service at 50 million rubles or 10 million dollars calculated at the black market 
exchange rate! By some estimates, in the late 1980s in the Lvov region alone, Pol-
ish citizens turned over goods worth a billion rubles.1248
These estimates, even if exaggerated, are impressive especially when we re-
alize that they take into account only the initial gains. These would frequently 
1247 AIPN, KG MO, 35/185, fol. 170. Sales in Romania were even more profitable. However, 
very restrictive border inspections made this route less attractive; ibid. 
1248 Spekulatiwnaja gorjaczka: istoki i łabirinty, in: Tenewaja ekonomika, Moskva 1991, 
pp. 91–92.
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be multiplied as a result of consecutive transactions.1249 Not surprisingly in the 
late 1980s, the profitability of trading operations in the East matched those 
conducted in Western Europe. In the second part of 1988, the wholesalers 
brought from the Soviet Union gold (which had the best rate of return), hard 
currency, and rubles. The retailers, who usually operated only on the territo-
ry of the Soviet Union, stuck to merchandise-trading operations and beside 
currency and gold also brought to Poland caviar, cocoa, cameras, fishing rods, 
and color TV sets. In 1988 alone and just from Lithuania and Belorussia, Poles 
“imported” approximately 120 000 TV sets, which prompted the authorities in 
Minsk and Vilna to limit their sale and export.1250
The authorities in Prague and East Berlin reacted strongly to the trading 
operations of the Poles, and in the fall of 1988 forced Warsaw to wage a cus-
toms war on two fronts. The first took place at the border with Czechoslovakia, 
after the local authorities had on November 15, 1988 unexpectedly introduced 
a ban on exporting 366 categories of goods, ranging from car equipment to 
citrus fruit. Extremely rigorous customs inspections often assumed the form 
of “nationalist discrimination against Poles” and, as a rule, ended with a confis-
cation of goods that could not be appealed against. No receipts were issued.1251 
Although the East German customs implemented similar regulations on No-
vember 18, 1988, in contrast to their Czechoslovak counterparts, they at least 
provided statements acknowledging the confiscation.1252 Representatives of 
both countries were summoned to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – an 
almost unprecedented move – which resulted in the situation changing for the 
1249 Electronic watches are a good example here. A watch manufactured in the Far East 
would be purchased at a wholesale price of $2 and resold in the Soviet Union for 45 
rubles ($9 to the ruble at the black market exchange rate). According to the Polish 
security agency, Poland found itself on the smuggling route for this type of contra-
band which was controlled by emigrants from the Soviet Union; AIPN, MSW II, 
01304/529, December 1987, fol. 128–139.
1250 Ibid.; AMSZ, DK, 21/92, bundle 9, Consulate-General in Minsk, report for 1988; 
M. Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy. Przesłanki, mechanizmy i skutki w Polsce lat 
osiemdziesiątych, Warszawa 1992, pp. 138–139. Soviet rubles, easily exchanged for 
hard currency in port cities such as Gdańsk and Szczecin, were much sought after. 
Rubles were brought to Poland on a massive scale by Soviet citizens; AIPN, KG MO, 
35/185, fol. 41.
1251 T. Urban, Zollkrieg zwischen sozialistischen Brüdern, “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, no. 47/
February 25/26, 1989; AMSZ, DK, 21/92, bundle 8, Report of the Consular Dept. of 
the Polish Embassy in Prague, January 1, 1988 – December 31, 1988.
1252 T. Urban, Zollkrieg zwischen…, ibid. 
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worse: the border inspections became even more ruthless and grueling. To-
wards the end of November 1988, under the pretext of “protecting the internal 
market”, Warsaw embarked on a counter-offensive, conducting thorough cus-
toms inspections of all Soviet Bloc (and Yugoslavia) citizens departing from 
Poland. By November 30, Polish custom officers had extracted 81.5 million 
zloty of export customs duty including 64.4 million zloty from Yugoslavian 
citizens, 2.5 million from Czechoslovaks, and 15.6 million from Hungarian cit-
izens. Moreover, 5 526 travelers were denied entry into Poland, among them 
3 026 from Czechoslovakia. This time, a Polish diplomat was summoned to the 
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with no discernible outcome.1253 The 
conflict escalated in 1989 when it became possible for Polish citizens to trav-
el with almost no restrictions and although the “peak tourist season usually 
occurred in the summer, it started as early as the beginning of the year. The 
liberalization of passport regulations brought immediate results, with millions 
of Poles traveling East and West.”1254 The main goal of the trips was to acquire 
hard currency, which would help survival in times of rapidly growing inflation, 
soon followed by hyperinflation. Entry to Austria and West Berlin no longer re-
quired a visa. Poles conducted supplementary transactions in transit countries, 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where the length of a transit stay 
could no longer be limited.1255 
1253 AAN, KC PZPR, LII/125, fol. 5–7.
1254 E. Pawełek, Fenicjanie ruszyli, ŻW, April 24, 1989. On trading operations of the Poles, 
see a series of articles: “Bazarowa odyseja Polaków ’89” in “Gazeta Wyborcza”: P. 
Głuchowski, M. Kowalski, Wieszak umiera ze strachu (July 6, 2009); P. Głuchowski, 
M. Kowalski Katastrofa w złotym trójkącie (July 7, 2009); P. Głuchowski, M. Kowal-
ski, Solidarność tanio (July 8, 2009); W. Szabłowski, Donos na własną rodzinę (July 9, 
2009); Bazariada wykształciucha (July 11–12, 2009). 
1255 Thanks to cheap, state-subsidized train tickets within the Soviet Bloc, travel abroad 
was available also to those who did not own a car and had limited resources (chang-
ing in Bratislava for Vienna or in East Berlin for West Berlin did not pose any 
problems). For example, in summer 1982, a train ticket from Poznań to Berlin cost 
2 000 zloty or one West German mark. No wonder the trains were overcrowded. 
On September 8, 1989 on the Batory train equipped with 956 seats there were 3 900 
passengers; M. Hradil, Podloudnictví: nevítaný host, “Tribuna”, 1989, no. 45. New 
transportation enterprises specializing in commercial transfers to Vienna and Berlin 
appeared in no time. 
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The “Polish market” in Berlin, 1989. German customs officers checking the luggage of a 
Polish trader. Photo: Andrzej Stach (courtesy of the author).
Polish flea markets on the Potsdamer Platz in West Berlin and around the 
Mexikoplatz in Vienna quickly became the largest black markets in Europe, with 
“traders from the East – to the shock of local residents – proving the better cap-
italists.”1256 However, the Polish trade invasion of Berlin and Vienna was nothing 
in comparison to the veritable burst of Polish commercial creativity displayed 
in the small town of Záhony at the border with Ukraine. An agreement between 
the Soviet Union and Hungary on limited cross-border traffic, signed in 1985 
and implemented in early 1989, permitted residents of a 30 km radius zone on 
both sides of the border to visit the neighboring country using a special visa 
valid for one month. In a mere three months, 1.5 million out-of-towners vis-
ited, or rather overran, the borderlands in Hungary and turned Záhony into a 
1256 Największy supersam Europy, WC, 1990, no. 49–50, p. 19. On Berlin “Polenmarkt” see: 
U. Weber, Der Polenmarkt in Berlin. Zur Rekonstruktion eines kulturellen Kontakts 
im Prozess der politischen Transformation Mittel- und Osteuropas, Neuried 2002; M. 
Irek, Der Schmugglerzug…
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bustling Eastern bazaar.1257 In no time at all, Poles also showed up, effectively 
redistributing among the Ukrainians goods the majority of which had come 
from other socialist countries.1258
This Polish commercial activity was, for many reasons, increasingly difficult to 
handle for the authorities in Prague, East Berlin, and Budapest. The Poles acted as 
middlemen in distributing the often highly subsidized goods extracted from the 
less and less affluent markets of the socialist countries. The costs to the East Ger-
man or Czechoslovak economies were high, laying respective governments open 
to criticism from their own citizens, who blamed the foreigners for the rapidly 
emptying store shelves. The free-traveling and free-trading Poles brought with 
them news about the political transformations taking place in Poland, which fur-
ther destabilized the places they visited. Thus, the anti-black market initiatives 
undertaken in early 1989 were not merely about the safeguarding of local mar-
kets but also aimed at the prevention of social unrest, and, were, ultimately about 
the communists staying in power. All the Soviet Bloc countries visited by Poles 
undertook massive propaganda campaigns directed against the “Polish peddlers”.
As a new measure, in the border regions of the Soviet Union and in places on 
transit routes such as Lvov, it was only local residents who were now permitted to 
buy food products and industrial goods.1259 In January 1989, in the East German 
town of Lubmin, a group of Polish traders was assaulted by local perpetrators; ac-
cording to Polish authorities, this was a “showcase event staged in order to contain 
the growing phenomenon of illegal wheeling and dealing by Polish citizens.”1260 
Germans had for a while voiced the opinion that Poles were buying out goods 
that they were “incapable of producing themselves”, warning that such behavior 
would not be tolerated.1261 The anti-Polish propaganda intensified in the days im-
mediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when Polish “tourists” monopolized the 
headlines.1262 In early February 1989, the Czechoslovak authorities banned the 
1257 In 1988, 2.1 million people crossed the Hungarian-Soviet border, in 1989 more than 
11.2; B. Cichocki, Wschodnia granica zewnętrzna poszerzonej Unii Europejskiej, “Prace 
Ośrodka Studiów Wschodnich” 14, 2004, p. 17.
1258 Mafia der Armen, “Der Spiegel”, no. 39/September 25, 1989; Bordering on Capitalism, 
“The Economist” (US), July 1989.
1259 AMSZ, DK, 29/97, bundle 20, Polish Consular Agency in Lvov, report for 1989.
1260 AAN, KC PZPR, X/47, fol. 12.
1261 In Ost-Berlin droht polnischen Händlern jetzt die Ausweisung, “Die Welt”, no. 182/
August 8, 1989.
1262 H. Haibach, Ärger zwischen Polen und der DDR, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, 
no. 275/November 27, 1989.
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export of practically everything, and at the same time upped the propaganda of-
fensive against the Poles. The Czechoslovak tactics included concentrated acts of 
petty harassment, such as issuing parking tickets for cars displaying Polish license 
plates as well as confiscation of goods and cash; there were cases of the Czecho-
slovak police using physical violence against Polish tourists. Prague and Budapest, 
egged on by an Austria that was also inundated by Polish peddlers, stepped up 
restrictive measures against transit travelers. Instances of denying entry to Austria 
and applying the principle of shared responsibility were common.1263
There was, however, the other side of the coin. While Czechoslovak police and 
custom officials were battling Polish hawkers, every Sunday tens of thousands 
of people from all over Czechoslovakia would arrive in Ostrava, on the Czech-
oslovak side of the border “interested in the Polish commercial offer, buying in 
the market place above all goods unavailable at their own stores such as denim 
clothing, fashionable shoes, tape recorder cassettes, video equipment, and auto 
accessories. One could buy everything there, from keys to sheepskin coats.”1264 
This demonstrated eloquently that all ideologically justified restrictions had to 
give way to the laws of the free market: supply and demand, profit and loss, and 
price and turnover. The creative tourism1265 practiced in communist societies did 
much to oil the creaking cogs of the malfunctioning economic apparatus. 
1263 AMSZ, DK, 29/97, bundle 18, Consular Dept. of the Polish Embassy in Prague, re-
port for January 1, 1989; December 31, 1989; January 17, 1990; ibid., Polish Consu-
late-General in Bratislava, report for 1989; ibid., Polish Consulate-General in Ostrava, 
report for 1989; see: M. Hradil, Podloudnictví: nevítaný host, “Tribuna” 1989, no. 45. 
International agencies acknowledged the scale of the smuggling operations conduct-
ed by Poles. In June 1989 at a crossing between Czechoslovakia and Austria, customs 
officers arrested a taxi driver from Zakopane and a hair salon owner from Nowy Targ. 
The two men had attempted to smuggle into Austria 355 300 rubles, 255 000 forints, 
5 990 lei, 30 000 Czech korunas, 6 120 wedding bands and 4.8 kilos of scrap gold; L. 
Mazan, Obiecujący początek lata, “Polityka”, no. 26/July 1, 1989.
1264 Grzywny i konfiskaty towaru polskim handlarzom w Ostrawie, TL, no. 207/September 
6, 1989.
1265 See: R. Boyes, The Hard Road to Market: Gorbachev, the Underworld, and the Rebirth 
of Capitalism, London 1990, p. 189.
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Closing Remarks:  
Through the Back Door – or the Front? 
In all the Soviet Bloc countries, a similar mechanism had been at work: political 
revolution, imposed from above and often coming from abroad, had abolished 
the free market and replaced it with a hand-steered, centrally planned econo-
my, resulting in intrinsic consequences: shortages, followed by spontaneous so-
cial strategies devised to alleviate them. Even the most restrictive communist 
regimes such as North Korea, Cuba, and Romania in the 1980s were incapable 
of eradicating completely the capitalist mindset.1266 The communist black mar-
kets displayed distinctive, sometimes unique characteristics that depended on 
the scale of shortages, historical experience (including the degree of lawlessness), 
social structure, political and national determinants, and the size of the country. 
The larger the state and the more diverse economically, geographically, socially, 
and ethnically, the more distinct were the internal commercial flows. This was 
the case in China1267 and in the Soviet Union, where the most important inter-
nal commerce routes were circumscribed by the meridians. The European North 
was in charge of industrial products and contacts with the world, while the Asian 
South supplied Soviet Union markets with fruit and moreover had a vast surplus 
of manpower and more liberal Party personnel, who turned a blind eye to the 
illicit economic initiatives of its citizens.1268
However, in countries where the “desertification” effect of communism was 
apparent, from the River Elbe to Vladivostok and from Tirana to Murmansk, the 
basic social strategies were very similar. Residents of port cities effectively proved 
that the sea could fill their pockets. Farmers “privatized” large state and coop 
farms and initiated more or less official exchange with the cities, where unofficial 
artisan shops responded much more quickly to market demand than bureaucrat-
ic, state-owned factories. The production of counterfeit Western products would 
1266 AIPN, 01521/784, Stanisław Banaszek, Marian Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemyt-
nicze i zasady ich zwalczania, Warszawa 1969, WOP, p. 29.
1267 A. Chan, J. Unger, Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China, “Pacific 
Affairs” 55, 1982, no. 3, pp. 452–471, here p. 458.
1268 G. Grossman, The Second Economy of the USSR, in: The Underground Economy in 
the United States and Abroad, ed. V. Tanzi, Lexington–Massachusetts–Toronto 1982, 
pp. 254–255; H.E. Gramatzki, Schattenwirtschaft, in: H.G. Bütow, Länderbericht Sow-
jetunion, Bonn 1988, pp. 427–431, here p. 431. 
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not have been possible without state resources and equipment. The strategies of 
private legal entrepreneurs were even more elaborate. Workers in state factories 
supplemented their wages with petty theft and jobs on the side and took ad-
vantage of state owned equipment and resources. Drivers employed by the state 
commonly used state-owned trucks and buses as their own transportation and 
sold the gas they saved to private car owners. Administrative officials forged any 
and every document: reports, payroll lists, sales and purchase contracts, and of-
ficial travel reimbursements. All used informal connections and contacts among 
family, friends, and acquaintances to obtain desired goods or services.1269
In the late 1980s, the size of the Soviet “second economy” was estimated at 
between 120 and 130 billion rubles, approximately 20% of the gross national 
income.1270 In the countries of the Bloc considered by Moscow and Warsaw as 
affluent and prosperous, the results of the unofficial activities of their citizens 
were similar. For example in Hungary in the mid-1980s, approximately 10% of 
GNP was being generated in the grey zone,1271 while in Czechoslovakia, stealing 
socialist, or communal, property constituted 20% of all crimes.1272
1269 K.M. Simis, USSR. Secrets of a Corrupt Society, London–Melbourne–Toronto 1982, 
pp. 103–104; A. Arp, VEB – Vaters ehemaliger Betrieb. Privatunternehmer in der DDR, 
Leipzig 2005; AAN, MS, 5489, Economic crime problems in Hungary (WRL), Octo-
ber 10, 1959, fol. 11–12; F.J.M. Feldbrugge, The Soviet Second Economy in a Political 
and Legal Perspective, in: The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information 
Distortion, ed. E.L. Feige, Cambridge–New York–New Rochelle 1989, pp. 297–338; 
A.V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange, 
Cambridge–New York 1998; B. Rumer, The “Second” Agriculture in the USSR, “Soviet 
Studies” 33, 1981, no. 4, pp. 560–572; “Schwarzer Markt” in der CSR, “Volkszeitung” 
March 19, 1958; HIM, Pressearchiv, T 6211, RFE-Research 29/53, Smuggling and 
Winning of Informants on the Elbe, March 20, 1953; ibid., 7047/54, Great demand for 
American cigarettes and chewing gum on the Prague black market, August 13, 1954; 
ibid., 8417/54, Illegal watch business in Prague, October 6, 1954; ibid., 11480/54, Spot 
searches in Praque hotels, cafes and night spots, December 24, 1954; ibid., 11183/56, 
Black market in Swiss watches, December 19, 1956.
1270 K.A. Ułybin, Znakomaja neznakomka, in: Tenewaja ekonomika, Moskva 1991, p. 21.
1271 I. Kemény, The Unregistered Economy in Hungary, “Soviet Studies” 34, 1982, no. 3, 
pp. 349–366; I. Kemény, The Second Economy in Hungary, in: The Second Economy in 
Marxist States, ed. M. Łoś, Houndmills–London 1990, pp. 50–68; E. Sik, From the Sec-
ond to the Informal Economy, “Journal of Public Policy” 12, 1992, no. 1, pp. 153–175. 
See: I.R. Gábor, The Second Economy and Socialism: the Hungarian Experience, in: 
The Underground Economies…
1272 “Polityka”, no. 26/June 25, 1987.
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An evaluation of this half-a-century long black market ordeal of communist 
societies (and one which lasted even longer in the Soviet Union) is as difficult as 
the present attempt to define it. Undoubtedly, these unofficial strategies made it 
easier to live and indeed survive in Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia. The worker enjoyed a bigger pork chop on his plate, citizens 
were more stylish, and some of the charms of foreign lands could be sampled in 
reality and not merely in the imagination. All this did, however, carry a price tag.
The economic strategies developed by Soviet Bloc societies were a reaction to 
the actions of the state, which in the black market theatre was not only the di-
rector and censor but also, depending on the circumstances, an actor, stage de-
signer, and prompter. While the authorities put much effort into combating the 
economic underground, they also grew dependent on it and replicated its modus 
operandi. Thanks to black market operations, society was able to solve some of 
its own problems that the state had ignored or was unable to tackle. The status 
quo forced upon both citizens and the authorities a “make-believe” life, in parallel 
with the real one – the pragmatic, some would say, hypocritical one, symbolically 
represented by the prosecutor in post-war Germany who wrote anti-speculation 
indictments on paper bought on the black market, a cup of contraband coffee next 
to his typewriter. This was a self-perpetrating systemic spiral; ordinary social play-
ers watched the behavior of the elites – from the local community’s administrative 
chief to the Politburo – and felt largely justified in their own illicit endeavors. “I 
am quite convinced,” observed Bolesław Karski in 1963, “that it would be possible 
to bring criminal charges of profiteering against many Poles with a reputation as 
pure as the driven snow and prove them guilty. After all, how many of us do not 
write with foreign pens, buy foreign refills or shave with foreign razors; and what 
about the many women who use Cutex lipstick […]. Often, those who can afford 
it, will have a glass of Martell cognac. Yet most of these products entered Poland 
illegally, as contraband. Since smuggling is a crime, it follows that to buy goods 
that come from smuggling has to be a crime too.”1273 State-owned travel agencies 
were fully aware that the majority of tourists participating in official organized 
trips abroad used them as a pretext for and as a means for illegal trade operations. 
There was a clear, unwritten agreement between a young person hired to work in a 
center of foreign trade and his superiors: the official salary would be low but there 
would be opportunities to travel. It was up to the employee to take advantage of 
these. Such informal packages applied equally to a company truck driver and the 
pilot of a government airplane.
1273 B. Karski, Przemyt w majestacie prawa, PiŻ, 1963, no. 14.
392
Factory management tended to turn a blind eye to employees doing a job on 
the side during working hours. An intricate system of vouchers, additional allo-
cations and internal trade facilitated access to scarce and often rationed products 
at prices usually lower than the official ones or those of the black market. These 
policies were ostensibly meant to “attract employees and mitigate tension […], 
maintain staff stability and improve team integration”, yet in fact they brought 
about a spontaneous, grassroots re-privatization of “state property while main-
taining the nominal status quo of its ownership.”1274 Needless to say, employees 
were much in favor of such rules of engagement and any attempt to tamper with 
them was met with angry protests, in which both unions and management took 
part. “There appears to be an idea prevalent among work crews”, a report noted 
in 1984, “about what constitutes a good manager or a good trade unionist: it is 
someone who takes care of the workers by facilitating the purchase of everyday 
manufactured goods or food. There also persists a fallacy that there is another 
kind of management altogether, who gives priority to the regulations in force 
and is not willing to assist employees in a similar manner; this stance leads to 
dissatisfaction among the workers.”1275 Workers did not perceive such practices 
as speculative; if anything, they thought that it was easier for goods sold via the 
traditional process through retail stores to become objects of black market trade 
whereas informal “inter-factory exchange” was bound to reach directly those that 
it should.1276 When in 1984, the Minister of Internal Trade and Services asked 
ninety seven trade unions to express their opinion on the issue of inter-factory 
barter, it turned out that “unions representing employees of enterprises produc-
ing non-market goods opted for keeping and strengthening a ban on the prefer-
ential sale of market articles, whereas unions representing the employees of the 
plants producing market goods were in favor of maintaining the current prac-
tices.”1277
Factory management was primarily concerned with timely execution of the 
economic plan – the “plan” being a key concept in the planned socialist economy 
– since, if the preset targets were met, the managers would receive bonuses. Thus, 
management cared little about the quality of the work of private co-operators or 
the provenance of the resources and semi-finished products – in sourcing these 
or the raw materials indispensable in the production process, those in charge 
1274 K. Nowakowski, Niedobory w gospodarce a społeczeństwo i jednostka, Katowice 1993, 
pp. 22–23.
1275 AAN, URM, 32/115, fol. 80–81.
1276 Ibid.
1277 AAN, URM, 32/184, fol. 65.
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often sailed close to the wind of legitimacy. Soviet factories employed buyers 
known as tolkachs, who used all kinds of formal and informal connections to 
provide the necessary means of production. In one of his books, Roger Boyes 
describes a Moscow household appliance factory, where the main skill of three 
such specialists is their know-how in identifying those to bribe, intimidate or get 
drunk to get results. On an occasion, when the timely meeting of production tar-
gets depends on getting a crucial supply of copper wire, a tolkach triumphantly 
pulls off the necessary purchase on the black market, in the full knowledge that 
the wire has been stolen from another factory.1278 It has to be said that the role of 
buyers employed by Polish factories was quite similar. 
On both micro and macro scale, the state adapted itself to strategies evolved 
by society, acquiescing, for instance, in the “dollarization” of the Polish People’s 
Republic in the full knowledge that the dollars and marks spent in the Pewex 
stores – much needed by the country’s economy – came mostly from the black 
market. It is hard to disagree with the observation of the sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman that a “centralized economy cannot survive without its illegal and ugly 
reverse side.”1279 One must then ask: did the black market undermine the socialist 
system or – on the contrary – did it strengthen and stabilize it?1280 Undoubtedly, 
by bringing some flexibility and freedom to the rigid, centrally planned economy, 
the black market helped stabilize the system – but only in the short term. In the 
long run, the anarchic economic activities of citizens that went directly against 
the precepts of the ideology embraced by the state produced increasingly deeper 
cracks in the socialist edifice. 
Real socialism would probably not have survived as long as it did without 
market mechanisms taking their course within the planned socialist economy. 
We should therefore perhaps view the illicit commercial activities as the relics 
of a healthy economy – re-introduced by the back door –that made it possible 
for entrepreneurship to survive. Was the black market the last stronghold of eco-
nomic freedom of the individual, never conquered by the communist state? Jour-
nalists (such as Daniel Passent or Stanisław Podemski) and economists (Marek 
Bednarski and Kazimierz Rogoziński) drew attention to the characteristics of 
1278 R. Boyes, The Hard Road to Market. Gorbachev, the Underworld, and the Rebirth of 
Capitalism, London 1990, p. 11.
1279 As cited in: H.E. Gramatzki, Schattenwirtschaft…, p. 428.
1280 See: C. Petrescu, Entrepreneurial Tourism in Romania: A System-stabilizing Factor?, in: 
Schleich wege. Inoffizielle Begegnungen sozialistischer Staatsbürger zwischen 1956 und 
1989, edited by W. Borodziej, J. Kochanowski, J. von Puttkamer, Köln–Weimar–Wien 
2010, pp. 115–133.
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the individual businessmen who were operating illegally, such as their creativity, 
initiative and a free market mindset. In 1987, Kazimierz Rogoziński wrote: “In 
the most critical phase of the market crisis, between 1981 and 1983, the black 
market proved indispensable for two reasons: it offered goods unavailable in 
retail trade and created opportunities to barter rationed goods for others, not 
necessarily rationed. […] The presence and the mechanisms of the black market,” 
concluded the author, “perceived in the context of market ethics, give us reasons 
to be optimistic. Despite the lessened impact of material incentives, entrepre-
neurship among Poles is alive and well, it just needs to be put to good use.”1281
Certainly, a significant number of Poles exhibited spontaneous, grass-roots 
inventiveness and mobility: working out business plans, estimating profit and 
loss, finding investment capital, and carrying out transactions across a variety of 
geographical locations. Whether consciously nor not, they built an “intermediate 
space” suspended between the two worlds, a space that broke free from the rigid, 
ideological framework. This was, however, only one side of the coin. Despite its 
insights into the specific contexts and determinants of the prevailing system, the 
black market nevertheless criminalized everyday life and encouraged breaking 
of the law. In 1964, “Trybuna Ludu” published a story about a teacher who was 
having a family house built and was determined to accomplish the project legally 
but who “had been unable to buy a gas central heating boiler from any legiti-
mate source. At the time, this was a product that was easily available on the black 
market, and that was where all his neighbors had bought theirs. To keep his con-
science clear, the teacher settled for a legally available coke boiler, even though 
his neighbors thought him peculiar.”1282 Regardless of whether this particular 
story was apocryphal, undoubtedly – besides those who relied on and took the 
black market for granted – there were others who, for a variety of reasons, did 
not take advantage of illicit sources, whether because they could not afford it, did 
not how to go about it, had too little money or simply did not want to take part 
in an illegal activity. 
The black market was a drain on state supplies and resources, further exacer-
bating shortages; this led to more chaos in the less-than-perfect state distribution 
system and impeded it catering for the needs of the economically and socially 
underprivileged. The black market had never been a charity; its active players took 
1281 K. Rogoziński, Kryzys jako weryfikator w sferze rynku i konsumpcji, in: Narzędzia 
polityki gospodarczej i społecznej w procesie kształtowania konsumpcji. Ogólnopolska 
konferencja naukowo-dydaktyczna Katedr i Instytutów Obrotu Towarowego i Usług 
Uczelni Ekonomicznych, Ustroń, wrzesień 1987 r., vol. 1, Katowice 1987, pp. 159–161.
1282 B. Lewicki, Przestępcy mimo woli, TL, October 20, 1964.
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full advantage of their privileged position by imposing monopoly prices, which 
only the richest could afford. There is no doubt the black market supported the 
wealthy and the risk takers, and excluded the majority of the poor and the less 
tough. What determined whether the unofficial price was acceptable was the 
household budget. Some items could be bought more expensively on the black 
market; others could be siphoned off from official distribution channels, using the 
tried-and-tested ruses. The latter option was of course preferable since it usually 
involved a complex system of “scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours” rather than 
parting with excessive amounts of cash, and the voices demanding the equality 
of rationing were directed not only against the shortages but also against various 
black market activities that were beyond the financial reach of the masses. The re-
sponse of the authorities was to introduce anti-market solutions such as rationing 
coupons – which, after a fashion, stabilized the system since both the coupons and 
cheap products in the stores were provided by the central government.
While the average consumers had very little leverage against the state distrib-
utor, on the black market they were totally disenfranchised, their only option 
was to vote with their feet and stay away. Dissatisfied clients of state stores or 
coops could at least resort to the provisions of consumer protection, and start 
by making a complaint in the ubiquitous “Customer Complaints and Feed-back 
Book”, which every retail outlet was obliged to display; in practical terms, this 
usually meant that lip service had been paid to the letter of the law, but hardly 
ever led to any tangible outcome. The black market transactions did not offer 
even such, largely illusionary, guarantees. One could only blame oneself for hav-
ing been duped into buying counterfeit dollars, rotten meat or lethal alcohol. The 
free market subjected the entire society in Poland and in other socialist countries 
to compulsory attendance at the “school of hard knocks”, more akin to a “prison 
academy” where new inmates learn improved criminal techniques from old lags 
than to a business school. Nevertheless, the question remains what impact the 
demoralizing force of the socialist second economy had on social and economic 
behavior after 1989, when Poles took to capitalism with gusto.1283
One would not wish to go as far as condone the popular opinion, albeit un-
supported by academic research, that the illicit, grass-roots economic activity 
helped to bring about a more rational distribution of resources and products 
within the inefficient, centrally-planned socialist economy. This perception led 
1283 M. Tymiński, Malwersacje w przedsiębiorstwach socjalistycznych (1950–1970), “Dzieje 
Najnowsze” 34, 2002, no. 4, pp. 97–98; see: L. Holmes, The End of Communist Power 
Anti-corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, Cambridge 1993.
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directly to glorifying the black market as a form of social resistance, as indeed the 
black market during the German occupation had been perceived in the People’s 
Republic of Poland. What is certain is that, prevalent and spontaneous as the 
illicit economic activities were, they demoralized citizens as well as undermin-
ing and ridiculing the structure of the state. Naturally, the primary goal of the 
black marketeers was profit and other side effects such as these were incidental. 
And the black market itself would not have arisen in the first place, had it not 
been for the shortage economy of the socialist system, from which it benefited 
and with which it co-existed in a symbiotic relationship. Shortly before 1989, 
when the writing was on the wall for the socialist economy, many Poles who 
under socialism had evolved a cosy modus operandi, based on dependable social 
connections, watched the developments of a new and unpredictable system with 
trepidation, unsure of how they would function in the new reality. 
Although Edmund Mokrzycki’s comments below apply to private enterprise 
in general, they also apply to the black market per se, as both sectors often inter-
sected: “Contrary to popular opinion that saw private enterprise as a capitalist 
Trojan horse in a socialist stronghold, the sector was as integral a part of the so-
cialist economy as the Vladimir Lenin Steelworks or the State Agriculture Farms 
(PGRs). The very first weeks of the transformation revealed the total dependency 
of the sector on the central distribution of goods and above all its symbiotic 
relationship with state industry and trade. For the sector, market mechanisms – 
to the extent that they had been indeed effectively implemented by the reforms 
– turned out to be lethal rather than beneficial.”1284 Roger Boyes poignantly ob-
served that the year 1989 represented a revolution of consumers who wanted to 
join the “economic republic” that had previously been the preserve of the author-
ities and the hard currency elite.1285 Without a doubt, the half-century long black 
market experience of socialist society helped raise economic awareness and as a 
result brought victory over the status quo. If one were to wonder by what route 
the black market Trojan horse had been led in, it was through neither the front 
nor the back door, but rather through a side gate. There is no need to erect mon-
uments to the currency dealers and the ‘veal women’; let us, all the same, preserve 
them as a fond memory. 
1284 E. Mokrzycki, Nowa klasa średnia, “Studia Socjologiczne” 1994, no. 1, p. 46.
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